Sun Tzu's The Art of War

1.  War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the
province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.  It is
mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

2.  Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental
factors and make comparisons of the seven elements later named. 
So you may assess its essentials.

3.  The first of these factors is moral influence; the second,
weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, command; and the fifth,
doctrine.

4.  By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be
in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them
in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.

5.  By weather I mean the interaction of natural forces; the
effects of winter's cold and summer's heat and the conduct of
military operations in accordance with the seasons.

6.  By terrain I mean distances, whether the ground is traversed
with ease or difficulty, whether it is open or constricted, and
the chances of life or death.

7.  By command I mean the general's qualities of wisdom,
sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness.

8.  By doctrine I mean organization, control, assignment of
appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and
the provision of principal items used by the army.

9.  There is no general who has not heard of these five matters. 
Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated.

10.  Therefore in laying plans compare the following elements,
appraising them with the utmost care.

11.  If you say which ruler possesses moral influence, which
commander is the more able, which army obtains the advantages of
nature and the terrain, in which regulations and instructions are
better carried out, which troops are the stronger;

12.  Which has the better trained officers and men;

13.  And which administers rewards and punishments in a more
enlightened manner;

14.  I will be able to forecast which side will be victorious and
which defeated.

15.  If a general who heeds my strategy is employed he is certain
to win.  Retain him!  When one refuses to listen to my strategy
is employed, he is certain to be defeated.  Dismiss him!

16.  Having paid heed to the advantages of my plans, the general
must create situations which will contribute to their
accomplishment.  By "situations" I mean that he should act
expediently in accordance with what is advantageous and so
control the balance.

17.  All warfare is based on deception.

18.  Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity.

19.  When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far
away, that you are near.

20.  Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and
strike him.

21.  When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is
strong, avoid him.

22.  Anger his general and confuse him.

23.  Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.

24.  Keep him under a strain and wear him down.

25.  When he is united, divide him.

26.  Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not
expect you.

27.  These are the strategist's keys to victory.  It is not
possible to discuss them beforehand.


Section II

1.  Generally operations of war require one thousand fast four-
horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in
leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops.

2.  When provisions are transported for a thousand li
expenditures at home and in the field, stipends for the
entertainment of advisers and visitors, the cost of materials
such as glue and laquer, and chariots and armour, will amount to
one thousand gold pieces a day.  After this money is in hand, one
hundred thousand troops must be raised.

3.  Victory is the main object in war.  If this is long delayed,
weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack
cities, their strength will be exhausted.

4.  When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources
of the state will not suffice.

5.  When your weapons are dulled and ardour damped, your strength
exhausted and treasure spent, neighbouring rulers will take
advantage of your distress to act.  And even though you have wise
counsellors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future.

6.  Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we
have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.

7.  For there has never been a protracted war from which a
country has benefited.

8.  Thus those unable to understand the dangers inherent in
employing troops are equally unable to understand the
advantageous ways of doing so.

9.  Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of
conscripts nor more than one provisioning.

10.  They carry equipment from the homeland; they rely for
provisions on the enemy.  Thus the army is plentifully provided
with food.

11.  When a country is impoverished by military operations it is
due to distant transportation; carriage of supplies for great
distances renders the people destitute.

12.  Where the army is, prices are high; when prices rise the
wealth of the people is exhausted.  When wealth is exhausted the
peasantry will be afflicted with urgent exactions.

13.  With strength thus depleted and wealth consumed the
households in the central plains will be uttterly impoverished
and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated.

14.  As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down
chariots, worn-out horses, armour and helmets, arrows and
crossbows, lances, hand and body shields, draft animals and
supply wagons will amount to sixty percent of the total.

15.  Hence the wise general sees to it that his troops feed on
the enemy, for one bushel of the enemy's provisions is equivalent
to twenty of his; one hundredweight of enemy fodder to twenty
hundredweight of his.

16.  The reason troops slay the enemy is because they are
enraged.

17.  They take booty from the enemy because they desire wealth.

18.  therefore, when in chariot fighting more than ten chariots
are captured, reward those who take the first.  Replace the
enemy's flags and banners with your own, mix the captured
chariots with yours, and mount them.

19.  Treat the captives well, and care for them.

20.  This is called "winning a battle and becoming stronger."

21.  Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged
operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the
Minister of the people's fate and arbiter of the nation's
destiny.

Section III

 1.  Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact;
to ruin it is inferior to this.

 2.  To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to
take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better
than to destroy them.

 3.  For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is
not the scme of skill.  To subdue the enemy without fighting is
the acme of skill.

 4.  Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the
enemy's strategy.

 5.  Next best is to disrupt his alliances.

 6.  The next best is to attack his army.

 7.  The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only
when there is no alternative.

 8.  To prepare the shielded wagons and make ready the necessary
arms and equipment requires at least three months; to pile up
earthen ramps against the walls an additional three months will
be needed.

 9.  If the general is unable to control his impatience and
orders his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, one-third of
them will be killed without taking the city.  Such is the
calamity of these attacks.

10.  Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without
battle.  They capture his cities without assaulting them and
overthrow his state without protracted operations

11.  Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact.  Thus,
your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete. 
This is the art of offensive strategy.

12.  Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to
the enemy's one, surround him;

13.  When five times his strength, attack him;

14.  If double his strength, divide him.

15.  If equally matched, you may engage him.

16.  If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing;

17.  And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him,
for a small force is but booty for one more powerful.

18.  Now the general is the protector of the state.  If this
protection is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if
defective, the state will certainly be weak.

19.  Now there are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:

20.  When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order an
advance or ignorant that it should not retire, to order a
retirement.  This is described as 'hobbling the army'.

21.  When ignorant of military affairs, to participate in their
administration.  This causes the officers to be perplexed.

22.  When ignorant of command problems to share in the exercise
of responsibilities.  This engenders doubts in the minds of the
officers.

23.  If the army is confused and suspicious, neighbouring rulers
will cause trouble.  This is what is meant by the saying: 'A
confused army leads to another's victory.'

24.  Now there are five circumstances in which victory may be
predicted:

25.  He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be
victorious.

26.  He who understands how to use both large and small forces
will be victorious.

27.  He who ranks united in purpose will be victorious.

28.  He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not,
will be victorious.

29.  He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the
sovereign will be victorious.

30.  It is in these five matters that the way to victory is
known.

31. Therefore I say: 'Know the enemy and know yourself; in a
hundred batttles you will never be in peril.'

32.  When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are equal.

33.  If ignorant of both your enemy and of youself, you are
certain in every battle to be in peril.


Section IV

 1.  Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves
invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability.

 2.  Invincibility depends on one's self; the enemy's
vulnerability on him.

 3.  It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves
invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable.

 4.  Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but
cannot necessarily do so.

 5.  Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of
victory in the attack.

 6.  One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when
it is abundant.

 7.  The experts in defence conceal themselves as under the
ninefold earth; those skilled in attack move as from above the
ninefold heavens.  Thus they are capable both of protecting
themselves and of gaining a complete victory.

 8.  To forsee a victory which the ordinary man can forsee is not
the acme of skill.

 9.  To triumph in battle and be universally acclaimed 'Expert'
is not the acme of skill, for to lift an autumn down requires no
great strength; to distinghuish between the sun and moon is no
test of vision; to hear the thunderclap is no indication of acute
hearing.

10.  Anciently those called skilled in war conquered an enemy
easily conquered.

11.  And therefore the victories won by a master of war gain him
neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for valour.

12.  For he wins his victories without erring. 'Without erring'
means that whatever he does insures his victory; he conquers an
enemy already defeated.

13.  Therefore the skilful commander takes up a position in which
he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his
enemy.

14.  Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking
battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning.

15.  Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and preserve the laws
and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

16.  Now the elements of the art of war are first, measurement of
space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations;
fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory.

17.  Measurements of space are derived from the ground.

18.  Quantities derive from measurement, figures from quantities,
comparisons from figures, and victory from comparisons.

19.  Thus a victorious army is as a hundredweight balanced
against a grain; a defeated army as a grain balanced against a
hundredweight.

20.  It is because of disposition that a victorious general is
able to make his people fight with the effect of pent-up waters
which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss.


Section V


 1.  Generally, management of many is the same as management of
few.  It is a matter of organization.

 2.  And to control many is the same as to control few.  This is
a matter of formations and signals.

 3.  That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack
without suffering defeat is due to operations of the
extraordinary and the normal forces.

 4.  Troops thrown against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs
is an example of a solid acting upon a void.

 5.  Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage; use
the extraordinary to win.

 6.  Now the resources of those skilled in the use of
extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; as
inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers.

 7.  For they end and recommence; cyclical, as are the movements
of the sun and moon.  They die away and are reborn; recurrent, as
are the passing seasons.

 8.  The musical notes are only five in number but their melodies
are so numerous that one cannot hear them all.

 9.  The primary colours are only five in number but their
combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all.

10.  The flavours are only five in number but their blends are so
various that one cannot taste them all.

11.  In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary
forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend
them all.

12.  For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their
interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings.  Who can
determine where one ends and the other begins?

13.  When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its
momentum;

14.  When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is
becasue of timing.

15.  Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and
his attack precisely regulated.

16.  His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing,
the release of the trigger.

17.  In the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there
is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles
but cannot be defeated.

18.  Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent
cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength.

19.  Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or
cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions.

20.  Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by
creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him
with something he is certain to take, and with lures of
ostensible profit they await him in strength.

21.  Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the
situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.

22.  He selects his men and they exploit the situation.

23.  He who relies on the situation uses his men in fighting as
one rolls logs or stones.  Now the nature of logs and stones is
that on stable ground they are static; on unstable ground, they
move.  If square, they  stop; If round, they roll.

25.  Thus, the potential of troops skilfully commanded in battle
may be compared to that of round boulders which roll down from
mountain heights