The Hog That Saves the Grunts

May 27, 2003
By ROBERT CORAM




 

ATLANTA
The Air Force is planning to give the A-10 Warthog an
ignominious homecoming from the Persian Gulf.

In early April, Maj. Gen. David Deptula of the Air Combat
Command ordered a subordinate to draft a memo justifying
the decommissioning of the A-10 fleet. The remaining eight
active duty A-10 squadrons (in 1991, the number was 18)
could be mothballed as early as 2004.

This is a serious mistake. The A-10 was one of the most
effective, lethal and feared weapons of the Iraqi war. Its
absence will put troops on the battlefield in grave danger.
The decision to take this aircraft out of service is the
result of entrenched political and cultural
shortsightedness.

About the same time that the general's order was issued, a
crucial battle of the Iraqi war was unfolding. The United
States Army had arrived at a Tigris River bridge on the
edge of Baghdad to find Iraqi tanks and armored personnel
carriers positioned at the other end. A deadly crossfire
ensued. A call for help went out, and despite heavy clouds
and fog, down the river came two A-10's at an altitude of
less than 1,000 feet, spitting out a mix of armor-piercing
and explosive bullets at the rate of 3,900 rounds per
minute. The Iraqi resistance was obliterated. This was a
classic case of "close air support."

The A-10 was also the most storied aircraft of the first
gulf war. It flew so many sorties the Air Force lost count.
The glamorous F-117 Stealth fighter got the headlines, but
Iraqi prisoners interrogated after the war said the
aircraft they feared most were the A-10 and the ancient
B-52 bomber.

To understand why the corporate Air Force so deeply loathes
the A-10, one must go back to 1947, when the Air Force
broke away from the Army and became an independent branch.
"Strategic bombing," which calls for deep bombing raids
against enemy factories and transportation systems, was the
foundation of the new service branch. But that concept is
fundamentally flawed for the simple reason that air power
alone has never won a war.

Nevertheless, strategic bombing, now known as "interdiction
bombing," remains the philosophical backbone of the Air
Force. Anything involving air support of ground troops is a
bitter reminder that the Air Force used to be part of the
Army and subordinate to Army commanders. For the
white-scarf crowd, nothing is more humiliating than being
told that what it does best is support ground troops.

Until the A-10 was built in the 1970's, the Air Force used
old, underpowered aircraft to provide close air support. It
never had a plane specifically designed to fly low to the
ground to support field troops. In fact, the A-10 never
would have been built had not the Air Force believed the
Army was trying to steal its close air support role - and
thus millions of dollars from its budget - by building the
Cheyenne helicopter. The Air Force had to build something
cheaper than the Cheyenne. And because the Air Force
detested the idea of a designated close air support
aircraft, generals steered clear of the project, and
designers, free from meddling senior officers, created the
ultimate ground-support airplane.

It is cheap, slow, low-tech, does not have an afterburner,
and is so ugly that the grandiose name <object.title
class="Movie" idsrc="nyt_ttl"
value="244754;113731;113727;113728;49864;136362">"Thunderbolt"</object.title> was forgotten in favor of "Warthog" or,
simply, "the Hog." What the airplane does have is a deadly
30-millimeter cannon, two engines mounted high and widely
separated to offer greater protection, a titanium "bathtub"
to protect the pilot, a bullet- and fragmentation-resistant
canopy, three back-up flight controls, a heavy duty frame
and foam-filled fuel tanks - a set of features that makes
it one of the safest yet most dangerous weapons on the
battlefield.

However, these attributes have long been ignored, even
denied, because of the philosophical aversion to the close
air support mission. Couple that with the Air Force's love
affair with the high technology F/A-22 ($252 million per
plane) and the F-35 fighter jets (early cost estimates are
around $40 million each), and something's got to give.


Despite budget problems, the Air Force has decided to save
money by getting rid of the cheap plane and keeping the
expensive ones. Sacrifices must be made, and what a gleeful
one this will be for the Air Force.

The Air Force is promoting the F-35 on the idea that it can
provide close air support, a statement that most pilots
find hilarious. But the F-35's price tag means the Air
Force will not jeopardize the aircraft by sending it low
where an enemy with an AK-47 can bring it down. (Yes, the
aircraft will be that vulnerable.)

In the meantime, the Air Force is doing its utmost to get
the public to think of the sleek F-16 fighter jet as
today's close support aircraft. But in the 1991 gulf war
and in Kosovo, the Air Force wouldn't allow the F-16 to fly
below 10,000 feet because of its vulnerability to attack
from anti-aircraft guns and missiles.

Grunts are comforted by the presence of a Hog, because when
they need close air support, they need it quickly. And the
A-10 can loiter over a battlefield and pounce at a moment's
notice. It is the only aircraft with pilots trained to use
their eyes to separate bad guys from good guys, and it can
use its guns as close in as 110 yards. It is the only
aircraft that can take serious hits from ground fire, and
still take its pilot home.

But the main difference between those who fly pointy-nose
aircraft and Hog drivers is the pilot's state of mind. The
blue suits in the Air Force are high-altitude advocates of
air power, and they aren't thinking about muddy boots. A-10
drivers train with the Army. They know how the Army works
and what it needs. (In combat, an A-10 pilot is assigned to
Army units.)

If the Air Force succeeds in killing the A-10, it will
leave a serious gap in America's war-fighting abilities. By
itself, air power can't bring about victory. The fate of
nations and the course of history is decided by ground
troops. The A-10 is the single Air Force aircraft designed
to support those troops. For that reason alone, the Air
Force should keep the A-10 and build new close support
aircraft similar to the Hog, demonstrating its long-term
commitment to supporting our men and women in the mud.


Robert Coram is author of "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who
Changed the Art of War."