Japanese CultureCHAPTER 2: CULTURE AND ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS
contents:
Confucianism and other Religions
APPENDIX A: MALAY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SINGAPORE
APPENDIX B: CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC COUNTRIES
Management
Implications of Cultural Differences
The Asia-Pacific is home to some of the world’s most ancient societies. Globalization and progress in the region might be expected to encounter resistance in the inertia of cultural tradition. These societies, including very modern countries such as Japan and Singapore, are rapidly taking on many trappings of encroaching westernization yet they still embrace their cultural heritage. Singapore conforms more than most Asian countries to Western patterns of education, work, and civil society, but few would claim that Singapore really resembles a Western polity. In the view of Samuel Huntington: “Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, Iran have become modern societies without becoming Western societies. China is clearly modernizing, but certainly not westernizing.” (1996:36)
China was indeed once the cultural paragon of the entire East Asian region, and it still retains considerable cultural hegemony. The Chinese culture can be characterized as affective, or emotion-based rather than rational –relatively more oriented on humanity rather than economic rationality (Trompenaars 1998). This chapter describes Asian cultural legacies, particularly Chinese culture. As the argument evolves in this and subsequent chapters, however, it will be clear that even such ancient traditions do not hamper globalization, modernization, and progress in the Asia-Pacific.
ASIAN CULTURES: AN OVERVIEW1
A 19th century anthropologist defined culture as: "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society." (Hill 2004:98) Culture, more simply put, is the system of values and norms of a society. These values and norms are in constant interaction with a person's environment, as shown in Exhibit 1 (Hill 2004, Figure 3.1). Thus, environmental influences such as music, literature, science, technology, religion, and politics in a country form a person's culture, and at the same time culture is transforming the political philosophy, educational system, and other elements of a person's social environment.
A quote from a preeminent scholar of culture serves to illustrate this interaction between culture and environment. Concerning political economy, Geert Hofstede observed: "Culture...affects the attractiveness of economic systems: free-market capitalism in culturally collectivist countries often appeals less than systems of state capitalism and state socialism. These are political choices but underneath are cultural choices." (1984a:86) Concerning economic and business systems, it is generally agreed that the larger environment and enterprise interpenetrate each other in shaping the culture that is prevalent in an organization.
It is also commonly understood that culture shapes individual human behavior. This takes the concept of culture one step further, saying it is not only norms and values but the characteristic behavior that results. Frequently, the definition of culture deliberately includes behavior: e.g., Hodder (1991:34) defines culture as "the binding element that ties individuals together through their integrated patterns of behavior, thought and communication..." Trompenaars' model of culture adds an "outer layer [of] artefacts and products" (1998:23), which is a behavioral outcome from cultural norms and values. The implication of the connection between culture and human behavior is that if culture can thus be said to determine business and economic behavior, that is tantamount to saying that culture exerts at least some influence on differences in the nature and speed of economic development, hence explains East Asian economic success.
However, many scholars reject the notion that culture provides a valid explanation for different levels of economic success, for three identifiable reasons:
1. Culture cannot by itself explain behavior or why people think as they do, much less determine behavior. By extension, cultural factors cannot determine economic performance.
Such an explanation of economic performance reduces people, nations, and history to mere caricatures of cultural stereotypes. It would seem to imply that culture is monolithic, dominating behavior of each individual. Especially in modern cosmopolitan economies, people are less bound by traditional cultural values. It may be more reasonable, therefore, to view human nature more generally as a source of economic dynamism or failure.
2. There are inconsistencies in the modern tendency to explain East Asian success, juxtaposed with earlier tendencies to use culture as a basis to explain East Asian economic failure. Max Weber and others argued that Confucianism retarded development. And many countries have achieved economic success without Confucian or other Asian cultural traits.
3. Growth promoting facets are structural, not cultural. This is the argument of the World Bank and mainstream liberal economists, who look to a nation's institutions, incentives, and policies to explain economic performance. These 'fundamentals' determine which cultural strands are allowed to come into play. Culture therefore plays an indirect role. In other words, culture may help or hinder development, but it cannot explain development.
The following is a brief introduction to major Asian cultures. Only the Chinese culture will be analyzed in detail --because such an analysis is an essential foundation for understanding the Overseas Chinese family business later. Other East Asian cultures are anyway closely related to the Chinese (Sinitic), so a detailed coverage of for example Japanese and Korean cultures would be somewhat redundant.
The Japanese share Confucian traditions with the Chinese, though Japanese identify Shinto as their indigenous religion (see endnote 3). They possess a similar work ethic as the Chinese, and rely on family loyalty and support. But the Japanese differ from the Chinese in that they possess a stronger sense of a tangible society and of nationalism.
This stronger sense of society is a subtle contrast to the Chinese emphasis on person-to-person relationships (discussed later). While the Japanese, like Chinese, feel loyalty to family, they manifest loyalty to larger groups, including the business organization and (famously) the striving towards a greater nation. Ethnic nationalism might be enhanced by the influence of Shinto, which attributed to the Japanese race a divine quality. Nationalism might also be an inheritance of an island mentality and the isolation of Japan.
Due to their isolation as an island people, and their ethnic homogeneity, Japanese sense of cohesion is strong. Apart from a small Ainu minority, Japanese are predominantly the same race and share the same language. Also, Japan had developed a 'siege mentality' from being under threat from outside powers --yet never being conquered. However, national cohesion was preceded by centuries of social fragmentation in a feudal system run by mini-kingdoms, each with their own supporting samurai class of warriors. They did have some experience with centralized administration in the 7th century and again from the end of the 16th century. The government of the Meiji Restoration from 1868 effectively transferred feudal loyalties to the nation for purposes of modern industrialization --to avoid the subjugation by the West that Japan could observe in China. Collectivism and nationalism, plus adaptiveness, contributed to the success of the Meiji Restoration and probably to Japan's economic success.
The fact that the Japanese borrowed from the Chinese culture illustrates another cultural attribute of the Japanese, that they are quick to learn foreign ideas and adapt them to their own purposes. A modern manifestation of this tendency is their quickness to absorb new technology and improve on it --in many cases achieving competitive advantage in global production involving this borrowed technology.
The present-day Malay race populates Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, (and Polynesian islands, Cambodia, and other countries not covered in this analysis). There are even strains as far north as Taiwan and Japan. The race has much cultural diversity, with prehistoric racial and cultural influences from China and India at least. By the 15th century Islam (and Roman Catholicism coming later to the Philippines) had a dominant impact. A relatively tolerant brand of Islam emerged, infused with traditional beliefs and customs. Islam today is the main religion in Indonesia, Malaysia, and parts of the southern Philippines.
Both Islam and Catholicism emphasize an individual's moral behavior in life, and place in death (rather than the hierarchical relationships of Confucianism) which many scholars have extended to support the notion that Malay cultures manifest a weaker work ethic and less concern for material success. Malays are also family-centered and cohesive at the local level.
The colonial era created a dual society, where the colonial masters and gradually the Chinese participated industriously in economic development while much of the indigenous population remained in traditional, commodity-based trades. In Malaysia and Java the indigenous trading class had been marginalized by both the Portuguese and the Dutch, who made treaties with local rulers to limit trade with Europeans to those appointed by the ruler. The Dutch monopoly over international trade in Indonesia lasted until the Second World War. The British inherited that circumstance in Malaya when they arrived in the late 18th century, where they found no indigenous trading class. They judged the Malays to be indolent --which also justified continuing colonial rule. (It should be noted that foreign multinational corporations are active investors in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and profess considerable satisfaction with the labor force in those countries.)
An early study on Malay entrepreneurship in Singapore is instructive on the Malay dilemma. (See Appendix A.)
The way in which society organizes, or structures itself is most typically seen in terms of orientation on individuals, or alternatively the group; or in terms of its stratification into various levels, i.e., social classes. Appendix B reports on the famous Hofstede study on social structure in terms of "individualism versus collectivism", "power distance", and other cultural values. While many Asian societies are characterized as having a low degree of social stratification (e.g., Japan), India’s traditional "caste system" is an instance of stratification which has in the past seriously limited social mobility, hence perhaps held back economic development. (See Hinduism below.)
Social structure and religion are perhaps the two most important variables influencing Asian cultures. Hofstede's study clearly distinguished East Asians from Western cultures in terms of two specific dimensions of social structure: Without exception, Asian societies were classified both as collectivist and high power distance societies, whereas Western societies were classified as individualist and low power distance.
Religion has perhaps the most profound, yet subtle influence on Asian cultures. There are thousands of religions in world society today, but five can be singled out as dominant. Christianity is the world's most widely practiced religion, with about two billion adherents mostly in Europe and the Americas, and growing rapidly in Africa and Asia. Although many Asians are Christian, another four main religions of the world have a much more noticeable cultural effect in Asia and therefore will be the focus of discussion in this chapter. These religions are: Islam (1.3 billion adherents), Hinduism (900 million adherents), Buddhism (360 million adherents), and Confucianism (225 million adherents). (See Exhibit 2.) "Chinese traditional religion" in the Exhibit is meant to categorize the common religious influence of the majority Chinese culture: a combination of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, as well as traditional non-scriptural/local practices and beliefs. It may be called Neo-Confucianism, or simply Confucianism. The number of adherents to Confucianism would be considerably understated since it reflects only those who profess that religion, whereas the cultures of China, Korea, and many other Asia-Pacific countries are much more influenced by Confucianism than the religions (such as Christianity) they might profess.
Buddhism and Confucianism are discussed in the section on CHINESE CULTURE. Below is a brief introduction to Islam and Hinduism and their impact on business.
Islam is perhaps the most important influence on culture of the Malay peoples, and also is an important factor in many South Asian cultures. Islam began around 610 A.D. in Mecca, Saudi Arabia where the Prophet Muhammad preached. Adherents to Islam are called Muslims. Muslims share many central principles with Christians and Jews --e.g., viewing the Christian savior Jesus Christ as one of God's prophets. However, more than Christians, Muslims are bound to their religion as a way of life prescribed in their holy book, the Koran.
Muslims forbid drinking alcohol, eating pork, and they hold women to conservative codes of behavior and dress, all of which sets them apart from modern liberal society --in the West at least. In recent decades, what outsiders call "Islamic fundamentalism" (Muslims dislike the phrase) has been in the ascendancy in some Islamic countries, sometimes demanding strict adherence to traditional beliefs and rituals. Their conflict with liberal Western values has led to violence and hostility. (See endnote 4).
Because Islam is a way of life, Islamic economies must be set within a moral framework prescribed by the Koran. Some codes condemn monopolies and concentration of wealth, and promote the protection of laboring classes. Other codes require standard business and economic practice to be modified to adhere to particular laws in the Koran.
Interest, or riba, if forbidden. The Koran states: "Trade is like usury, but God hath permitted trade and forbidden usury." Rather than paying or charging interest, lenders take a share of the profit from borrowers. An Islamic bank, instead of lending money at interest to a business, in effect buys shares in the enterprise in the hope of receiving dividends. Similarly, a bank deposit by a customer is treated like an equity investment in whatever activity the bank uses the capital. The advantage of this idea is that it encourages lenders to act like investors, i.e., monitor the use to which the money is put. It also emphasizes sharing responsibility, as both borrower and lender share in the profits or losses.
However, this can be clumsy. Banks may know little about the business their money is being put into, just as depositors may simply be people looking for a steady return. If banks and depositors have to share risks with borrowers, they may be deterred from lending or depositing their cash in the first place. Thus, there will be less money in the system.
Finally, in practice Islamic banking appears to some to be simply a charade, which may result in complicating credit transactions by pretending actual interest is something else.
Provision for the poor is made through alms-giving, called zakat. "Observe prayer and pay alms-tax", instructs the Koran. Zakat may simply be a tax --the real benefit to the poor may be administered no more equitably and efficiently than in non-Muslim countries. However, it can be a means for religious oversight in wealth distribution programs. In Malaysia, some zakat donations are invested in MARA (Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat or Council of the Peoples' Trust) for specified programs in training, promoting business, and the like.
Muslims have five traditional duties --the five Pillars of Islam: honoring no God but the one true God (Allah) and recognizing Mohamed as his prophet, praying five times a day, giving alms or zakat, fasting during the lunar month of Ramadan, and making a hadj or pilgrimage to Mecca at least once a lifetime.
It can be argued that fasting during Ramadan weakens the physical and mental capacity for work, but others argue that the sacrifice strengthens self-discipline. Besides, possible loss of working time is not unique to Muslims --Buddhists have numerous religious holidays, and Chinese close down completely for the Lunar New Year.
The hadj has been criticized for the 'opportunity cost' of a long journey to Mecca, and because it increases the power of conservative religious forces and also subsidizes a religious elite that coordinates the annual pilgrimages --much of the money flowing out of the country. "In Indonesia, where the pilgrimage became a government monopoly in 1970, the cost that year was estimated at ... $2400 per person. At 70,000 pilgrims and even maintaining the 1970 cost, that would be almost $17 million annually." (Von Der Mehden 62) The counterargument is that it may strengthen the drive to accumulate wealth to be able to make the trip, and broadens intellectual horizons.
Indonesia's Muslim population, at 180 million, is the largest in the world and contains almost 90% of South-East Asia's Muslims. Islam is believed to have arrived in Indonesia four centuries ago, but local people seem to have converted gradually, while preserving many of their pre-Islamic beliefs. Islam was diluted by diverse island cultures and religions already there --Hinduism, Buddhism, and folkways such as animism. Many rituals performed today by otherwise devout Muslims honor pagan spirits, e.g., in the annual labuhan ceremony, gifts are carried in procession to the sea and thrown in as offerings to Loro Kidul, the goddess of the surrounding seas.
Modern Indonesian-style Islam indeed seems tolerant compared to the more pure strains of the Middle East --women drive cars and many of them dress freely, and liquor is easily available even during Ramadan. Indonesians profess sincere devotion to their Islamic faith while at the same time they take pride in the preservation of local rituals (which also attract tourists). Indonesian Islam, and South-East Asian Islam in general, has been more lax about doctrine and more temperate, thus less prone to extremism. However, the emergence of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia in the wake of US President George Bush’s “war on terrorism” attests to the powerful emotional hold of religious and cultural solidarity. The October 2002 bombing in Bali signaled the presence of radical Islamists in Southeast Asia, and since then there have been other attacks in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.
In recent decades, oil-rich Gulf Arabs have sponsored South-East Asian students to study Islam in their countries. They have also funded Islamic schools and charities in Southeast Asia. Abu Bakar Basyir, the alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiah, runs a religious school near Yogyakarta in Java, where he is just one of many clerics who are striving today to purify (and apparently also radicalize) South-East Asian Islam.
Efforts to bring South-East Asian Islam into line with orthodox practice actually began as early as 1912, with the foundation in Yogyakarta of the Muhammadiyah organization. In 2003 Muhammadiyah boasted an estimated 28 million members, consisting mostly of city dwellers and intellectuals. The divide between santri, or orthodox Muslims, and abangan, the followers of folk religion, has dominated Muslim politics in Indonesia. The Nahdlatul Ulama organization is sympathetic to the abangan and claims more members than Muhammadiyah (40 million), but the numbers of the santri have swelled as Indonesians move to the cities and lose contact with their rural traditions.
In 1945, Indonesia's new nationalist leader, Sukarno, circumvented demands for an Islamic state by endorsing a state creed called Pancasila, with five pillars: belief in one god (no mention of Islam), humanitarianism, national unity, democracy arising out of deliberation, and social justice. Both Sukarno and his successor in 1966, Suharto, suppressed Islamic fundamentalists with their political and military power.
Effectively excluded from politics, religious leaders focused on social and economic development. The pesantren (rural complexes of mosques and schools) emphasized religious study, but they also added classes in practical subjects and helped villagers in health care, crop diversification, and organizing cooperative shops. The role of traditional village religious leaders (ulama) has been supplanted by modern, more intellectual Muslim teachers.
The Iranian revolution in 1979 inspired a worldwide Muslim revival. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, several thousand South-East Asian Muslims went to join the mujahideen fighters. The resurgence of Islam in the post-Suharto era was evidently as an alternative to western values and other alienating aspects of capitalist development, especially spurred by the economic difficulties since the crisis. Today Islamic fundamentalism has become a powerful sociopolitical force not easily contained by the democratic government.
In modern Muslim societies, public displays of piety seem to have become something of a fad with the urban elite. Schools and university campuses are at the centre of the revival. Students raised as abangan by their parents adopt the more intellectual (and stringent) version of Islam under the influence of their classmates.
Concerning Islamic economic practices, Indonesia has not applied the rule of the Koran to their economy so strictly. For example, banks charge and receive interest, and there is a concentration of wealth among elites in the business sector as well as in politics. However, in 1992 the country's first Islamic bank was created, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI). BMI lent money in exchange for a share in the profits earned.
Hinduism is the world's oldest major religion, originating in India over 4000 years ago. Most Hindus today live in the Indian subcontinent.
There is no founding prophet nor an original sacred book. Hinduism is based on a dual concept, that to fulfill human destiny one must satisfy certain responsibilities to society (dharma), and achieve ultimate release from the world. Thus, human existence is both worldly and spiritual. Another concept is karma, that one reaps what one sows, a concept that is played out through reincarnation (rebirth into a different body). A person's karma is affected by the present life and determines future life. By perfecting the soul in each new life, an individual reaches nirvana, or spiritual perfection that allows release from the cycles of reincarnation.
Devout Hindus tend to lead an ascetic life, focusing on spiritual rather than material quests. This is often seen as contrary to pursuit of wealth and worldly achievement.
Hinduism also supports India's "caste system", where society is ranked hierarchically into social groups. Although in modern India discrimination based on caste is illegal, the customs are still adhered to in some parts of the country, especially in backward areas. Castes may be confined to certain occupations, and the caste is hereditary. Social mobility between castes was not to be accepted within one lifetime. This severely limits social and professional opportunities. Marriage is largely related to caste, especially in the more traditional rural areas. In business organizations, management cannot easily promote able individuals of a low caste.
The purpose here is to present an introductory survey of major values and norms that constitute traditional Chinese culture, relying primarily on a landmark treatise by Gordon Redding6. Redding immediately concedes that Chinese behavior is amazingly enigmatic in the view of outside observers. Westerners generally fail to comprehend the influence of Chinese traditional culture in everyday life, including the conduct of business, and why Chinese remain such an "old fashioned" people. Chinese are less transparent than many other cultures. They appear to be quite secretive --"inscrutable" is a personalitty characteristic often attributed to Chinese. This may be explained partly because their language is seldom spoken by non-Chinese, and their culture encourages a certain reticence.
"The tradition is thus conveyed in attitudes more often than in declarations, in nuances of behavior and in eventual courses of action rather than in open discussions of the rights or wrongs of an issue. It is only when one observes a present-day high-tech office full of well-qualified and highly efficient operatives of modern office equipment going through a feng-shui ritual to appease the spirits which control the fortune of the location, that one is suddenly jerked back to a pre-scientific but still highly relevant mental world." (p41)
Confucianism and Other Religions
The prevailing ideology for most of China's recorded history is attributed to the teachings of Kong Fuzi (551-479 BC), otherwise known as Confucius. Confucianism is based on an elaborate set of ethical codes that guide human relationships.
Although Confucianism is regarded by many of its adherents as a religion, it does not share all the attributes of what constitutes religion in the commonly held view. It has no supernatural deity and afterlife, rather it is based on rules of conduct (adherence to which does not bring heavenly salvation). There is no 'church', nor a priesthood. Also, it is not exclusive or dogmatic, i.e., it exists in the minds of adherents who might simultaneously profess a belief in other religions (commonly Christianity among Overseas Chinese). However, to accommodate the needs of the average peasant for temples to pray, magic, guarding spirits, and the like, Confucianism was ritualized to some extent, mostly combined with traditional practices of ancestral worship.
It might also be noted that the Confucian heritage impacts the entire Chinese culture, whether or not particular individuals consider themselves to be believers in Confucianism.
Confucian teachings emerged from the realities of the times. Because he lived during a period of dynastic decline and disorder, Confucius and other scholars of his day were concerned with the means by which social stability could be restored. Confucius promulgated a philosophy that after his death was compiled by disciples into a single compendium, the Analects, which became a widespread influence in subsequent centuries. Confucius idealized the China of an earlier era, when rulers presided over peaceful domains where each individual was sensitive to his proper station in life.
China has always been an agrarian state concerned with social order for the central purpose of subsistence farming. The basic, self-sufficient unit of collectivity in ancient Chinese society was the family (chia), with the Chinese state an extension of the family unit. Relationships amongst individuals were bound by moral precept and acted out through prescribed role behaviors. Harmony is diffused up to the level of state government, where officials also are charged with exemplifying the same virtues.
Thus, the way to assert proper order in government and community affairs is founded on sincere, ethical behavior and strict observance of traditional rules and rituals. Harmony is achieved through an elegant balance of motives and manners. These qualities may seem idealistic and abstract, but each was carefully observed and defined in Confucianism. Social order and a person's place in the social structure are epitomized by a Confucian quote: "Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. Hence the basis of a happy and harmonious family, nation and world is the cultivation of the self."
Behaving according to Chinese rules for civilized conduct becomes the focus for societal development. This system can thus keep order in the entire society. Social decorum is achieved by interior goodness and exterior grace. The Confucian gentleman develops knowledge of correct protocols and the discipline to carry them out. Individuals cultivate two crucial virtues: ren (human-heartedness), and li (gentlemanly conduct). A person's humaneness depends on benevolence towards others, which is against individualism. Li is less a sense of ritual behaviors than a sensitivity to what is appropriate. A Western equivalent at the simplest level is the gentleman's consideration for the feelings of others. The difference between the Chinese and Western systems is not in terms of principles, as both cultures value genteel conduct. But conformance to appropriate behavior is a central priority for the cultured Chinese.
For social order to work on this basis necessitates both a proper understanding of prescribed roles in society and compelling conformance to required behaviors. In ancient times it was the basis for a gentleman's education --and the basis for control by the state. (See endnote 7.) A person becomes Confucian today through the school system and family socialization. Parents still pass on their own inherited notions of discipline and respect for the family integrity. Familial indulgence serves to create the kind of dependence that can be used to ensure compliance. Westerners are often struck by the strict control exercised in traditional Chinese families, especially evident in emphasis on study and education. Confucianism also tends to be reinforced in the Overseas Chinese community, which perpetuates Chinese ethnic solidarity.
Although Confucianism is not always a discernible element of the curriculum in school (especially compared to the powerful role of Christian education), it is taught to some extent by study of the main writings of Confucianism and discussion of their implications. Confucian education is important in Hong Kong and Taiwan, officially sponsored in Singapore (in the guise of "moral values" instruction), and commonly reinforced in other Overseas Chinese schools in Asia (though less so in Thailand where it has given way to the pervasive Buddhism). More importantly perhaps, the kind of social finesse that so clearly differentiates the Chinese is inculcated in the upbringing of children. The principal sanction is the loss of face. This also amplifies the individual Chinese character's responsiveness to shame.
Of course, the noble aspirations for the role of morality have not always been really inculcated --especially not in government; China's internal politics have a long history of exploitation of the authority granted in such hierarchical society. Nevertheless, the abuse of power may be constrained by the morality of Confucian values, which places a kind of paternal responsibility on leaders and becomes a source of legitimacy for effective government. Government in the Confucian tradition was established on trust and obligation, on ethical foundations rather than "checks and balances" and institutionalized power as in the West.
Because Confucian order was always more fundamentally moral than it was rational, and because the realities of abuse of power and exploitation can never be fully overcome, Confucianism has historically undergone many rounds of re-interpretation --"until it finally exhausted itself in the upheavals of nineteenth-century Chinese history and retreated below the surface of society or went abroad." (Redding 1990:46) Paradoxes have never been resolved, and Redding describes "three polarities in thinking": first, the tension between self-cultivation versus the ordering and harmonizing of the world; second, concentrating on the inner realm or the outer realm of social order; third, choice between knowledge and action. (pp46-7)
Neo-Confucianism comprises elements of Taoism and Buddhism, as well as traditional folkways. Taoism, ascribed to Lao Tzu who was an older contemporary of Confucius, added a link with nature, and also incorporated the idea of dualities. The major tenet of Taoism is respect for natural order (see endnote 8). The dualist principle of wu-wei (active not-doing) is a central notion of Taoism. The Hong Kong colonial government's official policy of "positive nonintervention" seems to symbolize this idea. Taoism is said to have fostered artistic depth, obscurantism, and other esoteric elements of Chinese cultural heritage.
Confucianism and Taoism were the original Chinese philosophies that survived all other traditions. Each underwent transformations over the centuries and influenced each other, but the fundamental contrast between them remains. Taoism held that the key to all meaning was to be found in the workings of the natural world; Confucianism found such meaning in human relationships. The Tao (the Way --a mysterious, ever-present force which defies any simple definition, but essentially represents all active power in the universe) should be allowed to follow its natural course. Confucianism insisted on proper behavior and a nurturing role by leaders to govern society.
The Buddha, born in 560 BC to an Indian ruling family, was an ascetic said to have attained "enlightenment". The framework of Buddhism centers around the Four Noble Truths: that this life is suffering; that its source is craving; that suffering can cease; and that the practice of the Eightfold Path --of right views, right intentions, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right meaningfulness can bring about its cessation. Buddhism spread to China around the second century AD. Today Buddhism is a major religion in many Asian countries including Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tibet, Vietnam, and also has some influence in Korea, Japan and elsewhere in Asia. With its emphasis on mindfulness and meditation, Buddhism has provided a refuge for people who reject the more hedonistic aspects of Asian consumer societies. In China, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism have intermingled; Buddhism and Taoism have been partially absorbed into neo-Confucianism.
The society which developed from these religious influences was strongly hierarchical, bound by ritual. Rulers had a "mandate of heaven" (see endnote 9), and by the same token the people tended to be amenable.
The "foundation stone" of Chinese society is hsiao, or filial piety. (58) This is the fundamental value that leads to the central role of family in Chinese life, with all its implications. This certainly does not mean families are any closer emotionally than for example the average Western family. In fact, relations with spouses, parents, etc may be distant or strained, but the family unit is fundamentally self-sufficient and competitive, serving as a mutual support system. The stability of the family derives from the authority granted the head of the household, and strict compliance by all family members in giving their obedience, respect, and support. Any failure to observe the spirit and conventions of filial piety is deplorable --"the only 'sin' in a society otherwise devoid of such a transcendental concept." (Redding 1990:59)
"When a Chinese son dies before his father and is thus unable to take care of him in his old age, the father is expected to ritually beat the coffin at the funeral, 'to punish the child for being so unfilial as to leave his father alone in his old age'." (Wolf 1968, in Redding 1990:59)
The notion of a family extends not only through the network of family relations, but also to encompass its property, its reputation, its ancestors' spirits, and even its posterity. Family cohesiveness and paternal authority are enhanced by common ownership of family possessions, with individuals sometimes expected upon demand to return property under their care to the common pool. Individual family members are thus to an extent without independent resources and bound to the collective effort.
Regulation of family relations is based on a set of rules about deference. A rank order exists for the main relationships (wulun): father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and ruler-subject (or boss-subordinate). In addition, there are rules regulating trust and reciprocity among friends. All this contributes to a distinctively Chinese character of dignified restraint and human sympathy in dealing with the inevitable conflicts in human relationships. Thus, the role of morality is implicit, and extends beyond family to larger units of Chinese society, ultimately encompassing the idea of polity and nationhood.
Larger units of society include the lineage, the village or neighborhood, and associations based on common interest. Lineage includes the clan, or collection of lineages sharing a surname. Such is the attention to relationships that a lineage group of 500 people made up of 15 families would not be unusual. A subdivision of a lineage group small enough for individuals to be known to all is a fang, usually a five-generation family. Loyalty to the lineage group is constantly reinforced by rituals of birth, marriages, and funerals.
The village is less cohesive a unit, with less effort for recreation, socializing, cleaning, or community welfare. Associations and families had to unite across the village for this purpose, which was problematic. There is less of a sense of community, rather a village or neighborhood is a location where rival families and other more cohesive associations accommodate each other. In other cultures, villages provide a viable alternative for social cooperation, but Chinese avoid close interaction at that level. The social contexts for Chinese can be seen as concentric circles of obligation --family, lineage group, no-man's land.
No-man's land is traversed by means of guanxi (connections), which we discuss in a later chapter. Redding introduces the concept of "limited and bounded trust" (66-68) to describe the rules of obligation binding an individual to society, and ultimately to the nation. While trust within the family is obligatory, higher levels in the "concentric circles" of a Chinese social network are treated with less commitment. In order to interact, individuals establish guanxi networks, which are likened to "treaties" involving mutual exchange of favors. Trustworthiness is the binding 'glue' of networks.
It is necessary at this point to reconcile the weak sense of community with what Hofstede's research found to be a strong collectivist tendency in Chinese society. The strong hierarchical (vertical) bonds cause a special perspective on horizontal bonds. Horizontal relationships will be secondary to vertical family allegiances. But also, such high levels of conformance and subservience necessitated by strong families do not promote strong individualism --i.e., the individual gravitates towards social support networks rather than strikes out on his own. This is a collectivist tendency, which goes hand-in-hand with the strong sense of hierarchy --what Hofstede calls "power distance". (See Appendix B.)
However, rather than groups, the social support is found in relationships. (This profound contrast is explained again in a later chapter.) Social approval, rather than abstract principles of right and wrong as in the West, guides Chinese behavior. "Sensitized to the feelings of others, the person guides him or herself through life as if in a web, the vibrations from which act to assist in navigating the essentially social world." (p62) The individual thus cannot be independent of his or her relationships, and they partly define who the person is in the eyes of others. The family, clan, and head of state arbitrate over tendencies toward individualism. Most Chinese traditions act to obviate egotistical individualism, and self-absorption in one's own sentimentality, emotions or ambitions. "In Taoism, your body is lent to you by the universe in which you should lose yourself 'as fish lose themselves in water.' In Buddhism, the ego is seen as an illusion, and the aim is to transcend it to the unborn pure being. The dignity of the person as an end in itself is not part of the most fundamental Chinese ideals." (p63)
In the Chinese socialization process, for example the raising of children, any individual aggressiveness receives negative reinforcement. School and homelife places high value on sensitivity to others, and conformity to family and group behavior norms. For this to work, Chinese cultivate a strong sense of belonging to social groups outside the family.
A person's "face" represents his or her prestige within the various relationships that a person establishes. The individual person 'invests' in various relationships and groups, and protecting this investment becomes an exercise in not losing face. Face plays a greater role within more valued relationships, and may not influence behavior in all instances --some investments can be abandoned. Nevertheless, because of the face-consciousness of traditional Chinese, "sensitivity to displays of respect and deference become the coinage of social interaction." (p66) Although obviously all humans are sensitive to the views others hold of them, loss of face generally becomes much more important to a Chinese individual than a non-Chinese.
So far we have examined some of the key sources of the Chinese culture, and the social structure that reflects these cultural roots. It remains to identify nuances of behavior that result, particularly behavior at work.
The work ethic of Chinese has long been supposed to be superior. In colonial days Chinese laborers produced more and took on more arduous tasks --they also tended to drive a hard bargain, like insisting on piecework. They functioned effectively as intermediaries to get native workers to accomplish tasks desired by the colonial masters. This has been explained in terms of a seriousness of purpose and sense of responsibility, attributed to an extent as a matter of face, to do one's duty to one's family and to develop one's reputation. The only "salvation" was when prosperity was achieved.
It seems that such perseverance is not unusual among Chinese. A Chinese person's typically disciplined and restrained upbringing, and even learning the Chinese language (involving memorization of thousands of characters), seems to prepare the Chinese for hard work and rather tedious tasks later in life.
Financial prowess is also commonly attributed to Chinese: "The delight taken in eating is spoken of perhaps only less often than the desirability of making money." (Osgood 1975:1108, in Redding 1990:70) Money-mindedness is explained in terms of three characteristics of traditional Chinese society: the respectability of the pursuit of riches, the ability to make money often free and clear of tax or other confiscation by authorities, and the legitimacy of financial arrangements only on the basis of relationships and trust.
Money-mindedness goes hand-in-hand with frugality, an inclination to sacrifice personal (and family) consumption to save money for investment. Their past poverty may have steeled them to this tendency. The importance of family self-sufficiency would make money-mindedness and frugality simply pragmatic behavior.
One of the effects of an individual being so constrained by a carefully maintained family and social order may be passiveness. Implacability and conservatism are often seen as characteristic Chinese behaviors. Where outward demonstrations of deference or obligation are so important, society becomes bogged down to an extent by ritual and tradition, and by putting a proper 'face' on things.
A further significant feature of the Chinese society was veneration of the past (and by extension veneration of the old). Confucian culture is retrospective, drawing wisdom from former times. Confucius himself harkened to the days of stability and order of the Western Zhou dynasty (1027-771 BC). Family order, state order, and natural cosmic order (Taoism) were to be maintained, and the individual was compelled to maintain the status quo and respect tradition. This may induce an impressive stability but also perhaps an incapacity to adapt, innovate, and change. Early expectations of Confucian society, in fact, were that it was not fertile ground for the development of capitalism. Taoism and Buddhism added to the drag on progress by focusing on spiritual concerns rather than worldly endeavor.
The Confucian Mindset (see endnote 10 )
APPENDIX A: MALAY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SINGAPORE11
Malays constitute 14% of the population in Singapore (2003 figures). Their minority status, coupled with certain cultural attributes, has resulted in an apparent disadvantage in business, which to some extent causes a 'vicious circle'. There is legacy of a less prominent role in business activity by Malays, which leads to a supposition that Malays have a weak motivation to work and tend to lack entrepreneurship. If Malays are then assumed to be indolent, they will be discriminated against in employment. Non-involvement in business reconfirms the stereotype. Restricted economic opportunities confines Malays to low income communities and prevents Malays from accumulating capital. Without capital there can be no business activity. Hence, it is not easy to escape the 'vicious circle'.
The British colonialists had equated industriousness with the kind of capitalist spirit displayed by the Chinese who labored in colonial mines and engaged in petty commerce. Though the Malays contributed to the colonial economy as producers of food and other commodities, they developed an early reputation for being uninterested in economic gain. The assumption that Singapore Malays tend to be rural, poor, and indolent is generally mistaken, but there is a legacy of weak entrepreneurialism, as we explain here.
Pre-war commerce in Singapore was highly segmented by ethnic group, the Malay sector focusing on crafts, trades, pilgrim brokerage, publication of Malay and Muslim texts, and food production for the Malay market. Many crafts were displaced by mass-produced imports, and the older generation did not diversify into new lines of business. Malays had a position in the electrical trades, but they were excluded from many trades dominated by small Chinese firms that did not often accept Malay apprentices in the early days. Also, Malays entered businesses not requiring premises or overheads such as personalized direct selling and subcontracting. However, potential Chinese customers reputedly favored other Chinese suppliers and contractors or paid the Malays lower rates (though foreign multinationals were less prone to discriminate). Because of a seemingly phlegmatic attitude, there was a tendency of Chinese to believe that Malays are satisfied to make just a little money.
In Singapore's mature market there are fewer opportunities for entrepreneurs to work up from below, as capital requirements are high. Urban renewal and government regulations prevent the old backyard and street businesses, and retail space is now expensive. Since the 1980s successful new businesses are more often highly capitalized, or skill-based concerns in technical and professional lines.
Malay enterprise in Singapore still appears mostly in niches, including the cooked food business. Moving up from small hawker stalls to more expensive restaurants is problematic, especially if they are selling to Malays. Since Muslim food must be specially prepared, Malays tend to be their own customers. Few Malays can afford to eat in the more expensive restaurants, and anyway they tend to entertain and hold ceremonial dinners at home (unlike the Chinese who enjoy elaborate restaurant meals). Lack of familiarity between Malays and Chinese, rather than actual racial discrimination, limits the numbers of Chinese customers.
Tania Li argued that Malay's have the additional disadvantage of a negative climate for business from within their own communities. Their fellow Malays often resent business success, and competition among entrepreneurs tends to be regarded as motivated by spite. They might even engage in self-destructive behaviors. One Malay entrepreneur stated, "if you have two Malay shops side by side, selling the same product, but one has more customers because he is more friendly, the other will be envious and upset; so he will lower his prices to sell at a loss, until both shops are bankrupt, but he will feel satisfied." (Li 1989:141) Competition also makes Malays feel vulnerable to gossip and even witchcraft.
Malays have a self-image of themselves as more caring and less profit-seeking as a race, especially compared to the Chinese. "In the Malay view, precise and explicit calculation, or the blatant pursuit of maximum profit with no consideration for the other party, negates social relationships which are developed between individuals on the basis of a mutual willingness to 'give'." (p145) This shapes their expectations of each other and affects business decisions. Therefore, they cannot do 'pure' business, rather they must stress interpersonal relations in the transaction.
Ill-feeling within the Malay community shuts them out of some businesses best supported by family, friends, and neighbors. Communal relationships impose constraints on buyers, sellers, partners, or any business associate to have sympathy for each other. For example, a Malay woman stated: "I pay $100 to the Malay lady who looks after my child while I'm at work. She would charge $200-300 for a Chinese child, but Malays are considerate, and she knows I don't earn much. If I earned more, I could give her more." (143)
Elaborate strategies are adopted by Malay entrepreneurs to minimize conflicts. Tactics are adopted to downplay the aspect of self interest, the extent of business activity, or the profit --thus, the presence of natural capitalist values is concealed. In negotiating a price for a service, the onus is passed to the customer by asking them to name the price; but satisfying both buyer and seller makes this tactic a "tense game" (p143). Keeping one's distance is also a tactic, but keeping social and physical distance is difficult as much Malay business must be in their own community.
The following story illustrates some of the above points:
"In the sale of goods to the consumer, the nature of the personal relationship between the buyer and seller is often crucial. A few small traders do sell 'cold' from house to house, office to office, or in factory canteens, but a greater part of the trade is done by women on a personal basis. They visit friends, relatives, and neighbors, and go through the rituals of a social visit. They are offered a drink and they make enquiries about the family. They then produce their selection of goods in kind or from catalogues and samples, and on each of the numerous home-sale visits observed, a purchase was made. The hostess feels obliged to buy, out of courtesy to the seller who has taken the trouble to come to the house. The seller, on her part, underplays the business aspect of her visit by claiming to have brought the goods along casually or incidentally, or at the request of the hostess who has expressed an interest, or in order to help a needy friend who is trying to make a living by selling these goods. The seller emphasizes that she intends to go straight home after the visit to care for her family, that is, she is not making a round of sales calls. In private, the purchaser will state that the seller is doing business and trying to make money, and claims that she only bought the goods out of sympathy and generosity though she may also give a hint of resentment. The seller plays a precarious game; the social relationship will ensure a sale, but if taken too far, too often, or incorrectly played, the social relationship itself could be at risk." (pp144-5)
APPENDIX B: CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC COUNTRIES12
Perhaps the most famous research on national culture differences (work-related) was undertaken by Geert Hofstede.13 Hofstede collected data over the 1967-73 period from 116,000 employees of IBM subsidiaries in 72 countries. He analyzed 53 countries or regions and developed four "value dimensions" to rank national cultures according to relative affinities to particular cultural values.
A follow-up study by Michael Bond was published in 198714, which provided a fifth dimension from a Chinese Value Survey (translated into English), this time administered to 1000 students in 22 countries. This later research was in response to criticism that the original survey did not accommodate Asian cultural values. Hofstede's four dimensions and Bond's fifth are described below:
Individualism versus collectivism --People in societies with high individualism are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate family only. A collectivist society preferred tightly knit social organization.
Power distance --Large power distance indicated societies in which members accept that power in institutions and organizations is unequal, i.e., they accept hierarchical order. Small power distance societies are egalitarian and more readily question authority.
Uncertainty avoidance --Strong uncertainty avoidance societies feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. They are happier with rigid codes of belief and behavior to maintain conformity; and they try to control events. Weak uncertainty avoidance indicates a more relaxed social atmosphere where deviance is tolerated; these societies allow the future to take its course.
Masculinity versus femininity --Masculine societies prefer achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success. Femininity stands for a preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the quality of life. A cultural orientation toward masculinity indicates that a society prefers maximum social differentiation between the sexes, where men assume the more 'masculine' work roles.
Confucian dynamism (Bond's dimension) --Cultures indicating positive dynamism are more oriented toward the future, especially valuing perseverance and thrift. Low-ranking countries are more focused on the present and the past.
East Asian countries generally had the highest scores in Confucian dynamism, which was also highly correlated with recent economic growth. Lowest scores were by Pakistan, West Africa and the Philippines, with many Western countries also ranking low including Canada, United States, Britain and West Germany.
Hofstede originally argued that his four value dimensions were universal and account for an important part of the explanation of differences between national cultural systems. Two of the dimensions in particular (Individualism vs Collectivism, and Power Distance) manifested a pattern in the data that was revealing about Asian culture. The data reflected a grouping of Asian (and many Latin American) countries together, all measuring relatively high in power distance and low in individualism --which contrasted with another grouping of advanced Western countries at the other extreme, with low power distance and high individualism.
Although China was not part of the country data, Overseas Chinese societies were well represented. Also, the Confucian societies of Japan and Korea were included; and arguably many other East Asian societies have been strongly influenced by Chinese culture. High power distance is obviously inherent in the hierarchical superior-subordinate relationships that result from the legitimacy of paternalism. In the Western view, a strong vertical order is a cause for resentment; but in the Asian context a paternal role of superiors carries with it obligations, and abuse of these responsibilities can undermine authority and weaken the allegiance of those below. Whereas in the Western case, considerable effort goes into ways of justifying the authority structure, and considerable challenges from below, for the Chinese, hierarchy is the natural order. This does not mean that compliance is mute and unthinking. There are endless possibilities for resistance and nonconformance, but the general acceptance of vertical relationships does not suggest any subtle contest about rights of subordinates and duties of bosses. Leadership is accepted, and loyalty and diligence from below are normally offered in exchange.
Thus according to Hofstede, Asian countries with high power distance also reflected high levels of collectivism, while many advanced Western societies were at the opposite end of the dual scale. Society may balance these cultural tendencies, and arguably society adjusts this balance with social change. For example, as economic wealth increases, individual freedom is enhanced, causing a rise in individualism and a corresponding decline in the power of the hierarchy.
The USA is often said to benefit from its individualist spirit and low power distance by a high level of entrepreneurialism. New products and new ways of doing business seem to repeatedly emerge from American business. On the other hand, collectivist, hierarchical societies benefit from more loyalty and commitment to the group and the boss. Japanese employees, for example, typically have been accustomed to high employment stability. Staying at one firm gives employees superior company-specific experience, knowledge, and personal networks at the workplace. During the heyday of Japanese corporate growth and success until the 1990s, firms were found to have better teamwork, interdepartmental coordination (e.g., between R&D, marketing and manufacturing), and cooperation between a company and its suppliers.
Management Implications of Cultural Differences
Hofstede drew inferences about how the cultural values might effect management, identifying six management differences each for collectivist and high power distance cultures, respectively. First, in collectivist cultures:
1. The assumption that each individual is motivated by economic self-interest may be culturally untenable. Hofstede offers the example that in Buddhist culture, "mortification of material needs is seen as a higher goal than satisfaction of material needs and monks who go around begging for food have high status." (Hofstede 1984a:86)
2. Managerial psychology may have to be revamped. The familiar "Maslow's hierarchy of needs" is based on the idea that humans are motivated to satisfy their needs in order, from lowest to highest --physiological needs at the lowest level, then safety needs, belongingness needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization the highest need. In collectivist cultures, belongingness may be higher level than ego-needs like self-actualization and esteem.
3 Employer-employee relationships have a moral component, with paternalistic obligations. The employer protects and cares for the employee, in exchange for loyalty. (In individualist countries, the relationship is more calculative, based on mutual advantage.)
4. Business behavior is not impersonal and impartial. Friends and family may get preference in business. The sociological term for such behavior is particularist. Personal trust and relationships may take precedence over (universalist) economic rationality. Investing in personal relationships becomes necessary, regarded as a waste of time in individualist cultures. Rendering services, gift-giving or even bribery can represent an essential part of the economic system.
5. Employing friends and relations together can be desirable, contrary to the common Western view. The domain of work and family overlap, to an extent even legitimizing nepotism.
6. Openness and directness in work relations is not always the best policy. Maintaining harmony requires management to learn the art of indirect communication, preserving proper relations and "face".
Second, in high power distance societies:
1. Superior-subordinate relationships are modeled in the paternalistic authority structure, generally requiring less consultation in the management process. (Whereas in the West, paternalism has negative connotations, implying undisputed power.) A good superior is expected to behave like a good father, and the employee is respectful and dependent.
2. Superiors and subordinates expect power differences to be translated into visible differences in status, such as ostentatious displays of wealth or rank. Status differences contribute to the superior's authority and to the subordinate's respect for it --they even promote the subordinate's status in the eyes of outsiders.
3. Paternal (or maternal) authority implies respect for age. Older managers are taken more seriously.
4. Systems to control abuse of power are not expected. In high power distance societies the boss' power is not generally questioned. In Western businesses, it is common to establish channels to air grievances.
5. Many leadership packages designed by Western consultants may not be applicable. For example, Peter Drucker's Management by Objectives is based on joint goal setting between superior and subordinate and joint appraisal against these goals. This assumes relative independence of the subordinate from the superior, which is unlikely in large power distance societies. Negotiations does not occur, and superiors do not respect their subordinates' agreed objectives and tend to dictate. If foreign leadership programmes are imported, they might have to be re-cast to accommodate the cultural difference.
6. Appraisal systems should be consistent with the way benevolent parents correct their children. (Western systems typically call for periodic superior-subordinate interviews involving openness and two-way communication.) Especially negative appraisals may cause loss of face, and might better be administered indirectly.
REFERENCES
1. Bond, Michael H (1987) "Chinese Values and the Search for Culture-Free Dimensions of Culture: The Chinese Culture Connection," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
2. Hill, Charles WL (2004) Global Business Today, New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin (3rd edition)
3. Hodder, Rupert (1992) "Culture and Development in the West Pacific Rim" (Chapter 3 pp 34-42), The West Pacific Rim: An Introduction, London: Belhaven Press
4. Hofstede, Geert (1984a) "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning", Asia Pacific Journal of Management, January
5. Hofstede, Geert (1984b) Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications
6. Huntington, Samuel P (1996) The Clash of Civilizations, New York: Simon & Shuster
7. Kalb, Claudia (1991) "Islam and Economic Development in Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian Business, Volume 7 No 4 Fall , 74-88
8. Li, Tania (1989) Malays in Singapore: Culture, Economy and Ideology, Singapore: Oxford University Press
9. Redding, S Gordon (1990) The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
10. Trompenaars, Alfons (1998) Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business, McGraw-Hill (2nd edition)
11. Wu Teh Yao (1976) "The Traditional Chinese Concept, Strategy and Art of Governance", Singapore: Nanyang University Occasional Paper No 29, July
endnotes:
1. Discussion draws on Hill (2004) "Differences in Culture" (Chapter 3).
2 Rupert Hodder 1992.
3. Shinto consists chiefly of devotion to deities of natural forces and veneration of the Emperor as a descendent of the sun-goddess.
4. In a widely read article in Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1993 (and book published in 1996), Harvard professor Samuel Huntington argued that a "clash of civilizations" was replacing the old confrontations of the Cold War. Eight civilizations (cultures) were posed as sources of ideological conflict: Western, Slavic/Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, Japanese (unique), Latin American, and African. Huntington regarded "clash" with Islam as the greatest potential threat to peace and stability.
5. Discussion draws on Claudia Kalb 1991.
6. Discussion draws on Redding (1990) "The Psycho-Social Legacy of China" (Chapter 3 pp 41-78); and Wu (1976).
7. Redding relates an awful story of how compliance was enforced in China by severe and publicized punishment:
"In October 1865, Cheng Han-Cheng's wife had the insolence to beat her mother-in-law. This was regarded as such a heinous crime that the following punishment was meted out. Cheng and his wife were both skinned alive, in front of the mother, their skin was displayed at city gates in various towns and their bones burned to ashes. Cheng's granduncle, the eldest of his close relatives, was beheaded; his uncle and two brothers, and the head of the Cheng clan, were hanged. The wife's mother, her face tatooed with the words 'neglecting the daughter's education,' was paraded through seven provinces. Her father was beaten 80 strokes and banished to a distance of 3000 li. The heads of family in the houses to the right and the left of the Cheng's were beaten 80 strokes and banished to Heilung-kiang. The educational officer in town was beaten 60 strokes and banished to a distance of 1000 li. Cheng's nine-month-old boy was given a new name and put in the country magistrate's care. Cheng's land was to be left in waste 'forever.' All this was recorded on a stone stele and rubbings of the inscriptions were distributed throughout the empire." (pp45-6)
8. Another rival school of thought was Legalism, which was initially embraced by Chinese rulers to the exclusion of Confucianism and Taoism. The Legalists governed by a clear system of rewards and punishments. Strict enforcement of the law, rather than moral example as in Confucianism, was the basis of authority. This justified the totalitarian state.
9. At least a millennium before Confucius, the worship of Heaven had become paramount in Chinese religion. The earliest dynasties established the belief that the ruler was the supreme arbiter between Heaven and Earth; thus rulers had inherent power and virtue. Rulers had a "Mandate of Heaven" to rule (as long as the beneficence of Heaven was evident).
10. Redding concludes with "an exploration into a contentious and largely uncharted area", to attempt some explanation of different "mental dispositions", or "thought processes", or "forms of cognition" of Chinese because of their cultural legacy. We summarize this different way of thinking only to suggest this aspect of Chinese culture, without much hope to fully understand it without considerable more study into Chinese philosophy. The point is to show the complexity of the Chinese cultural difference.
Chinese traditionally understood nature (cosmic order) by fitting everything into a framework or classification system, founded on the idea that everything has its context, and is in flux due to many interconnected forces --"causation as part of the tension between opposites in nature". (p75) Everything has its place, connected with everything else. It led to stylization of concepts rather than understanding them. Categorization is enough, apparently negating need for further explanation. Thus, political and social life reverberates with labels --written in Chinese ideograms, which heightens the power of their message: Four Modernizations, Four Great Freedoms, Capitalist Roader, Revisionist, Bad Element (12 categories), the Four-Pests (rats, flies, mosquitoes, sparrows --later elevated to five by the addition of Rightists), the Four Beauties and the Five stresses (a campaign for hygiene and morality), and the list keeps growing.
Another aspect derives from the written language being graphic rather than phonetic. Chinese is a language of pictures, appealing to a sense of tangibility. The emergence of purely intangible, abstract ideas is arguably hindered.
1. Discussion draws on Li, (1989) "Malay Entrepreneurship" (Chapter 9 pp 57-67). . Discussion draws on Hofstede (1984a), 81-99. .Hofstede (1984b)