Terrorism and sociology
Science policy analyst Daniel S. terrorism and sociology International-convention-against-terrorism. Greenberg, writing in the Washington Post, criticized what he called "a whiff of hysteria-fanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors who have stepped forward against the menace of bioterrorism. . . terrorism and sociology Immigration and terrorism. . While a gullible press echoes [their] frightening warnings, there are no independent assessments of the potential for terrorist attacks or the practicality of the proposed responses. "2Using more polite language, the General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, made a similar point in a preliminary report published in March. terrorism and sociology Terrorism in australia. The report said that plans developed by the Department of Health and Human Services for "medical consequence management" after a chemical or biological terrorist attack appear to be "geared toward the worst-possible consequences from a public health perspective and do not match intelligence agencies' judgments on the more likely biological and chemical agents a terrorist group or individual might use. "The GAO report concluded: "A sound threat and risk assessment could provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target spending for medical and other countermeasures to deal with a biological and/or chemical terrorist threat. "3Examining the dataIt is paradoxical that chemical and biological terrorism has come to occupy such a high position on the worry list of top U. S. government officials when so little is known about the actual threat. At the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, the authors have sought to bridge the gap between anecdote and empirical knowledge. With research assistance from Jason Pate and Diana McCauley, we have compiled a database of 520 global CBW incidents that occurred between 1900 and May 1999. Our goal in building the database was to help identify which types of terrorist groups were most likely to acquire and use chemical and biological agents, the motives underlying attacks, the choice of agent and target, and other aspects of terrorist behavior. Although caution is in order when extrapolating from the past to the future, much can be learned from examining actual cases. The Monterey database also permits statistical analysis of the historical record, making it possible to discern patterns over time in the incidence of chemical and biological terrorism. This information should assist policy-makers in developing prudent, cost-effective programs for prevention and response. The incidents involving chemical or biological agents in the Monterey database include hoaxes, plots, efforts to acquire toxic materials, proven possession of materials, and actual attacks. The incidents have been grouped in two basic categories, terrorist or criminal. There were 282 terrorist cases (54 percent) and 238 criminal cases (46 percent). We define terrorism as "the instrumental use or threatened use of violence by an organization or individual against innocent civilian targets in furtherance of a political, religious, or ideological objective. " Criminal incidents, in contrast, involve extortion, murder, or some other non-political objective. They are not addressed in this article. Of the 282 incidents grouped in the terrorist category, 263 were selected for analysis because they contained sufficient information to permit cross-case comparison. While most of these incidents took place overseas, 40 percent occurred in the United States. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about the catastrophic nature of chemical and biological terrorism, actual attacks were few in number, small in scale, and generally produced fewer casualties than conventional bombs. A breakdown of the 263 cases between 1900 and last May is eye-opening: 26 percent were hoaxes or pranks, eight percent involved an apparent conspiracy that did not proceed far, four percent involved the attempted acquisition of dangerous materials, 10 percent involved the actual possession of dangerous materials, 21 percent concerned a threatened attack that did not materialize, and only 27 percent (71 incidents) included the actual use of a chemical or biological agent. Of the actual attacks, 83 percent (59) occurred outside the United States. The largest number of incidents took place in 1995 (16, all non-U. S. ) and in 1998 (15, one-third in the United States). In very few cases did the perpetrators seek to inflict mass casualties-defined as 1,000 or more deaths-and in none did they occur. Among the 71 actual attacks-and again, the coverage is global and the timeframe is 1900 to May of this year-the choice of agent and method of delivery varied considerably. Chemical agents employed included cyanide (by far the most popular), rat poison, VX nerve agent, sarin nerve agent, butyric acid, mercury, and insecticide.
Terrorism and sociology
Studies || Counter terrorism unit || Counter terrorism unit || Biological and chemical terrorism