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In the following pages
the evidence pertaining to the causes, nature and events of the Moroccan
invasion of the Sudan are analyzed from a historical and international
perspective. Under consideration will be the role of Europe in the rise
to power of the Saadian Dynasty and the role of Islam as the root of
Al-Mansur desire to establish himself as the Caliph of the Sudan. The
paper will examine the people and events, bo th inside and outside of
Morocco, which effected the invasion of the Empire of Songhai in 1591.
The procession
of the paper will proceed as follows: The structure of the invading army
will be exmained first. The composition of the army will be scrutinized
as to it peculiar dispostion and equipment. Then the events of the long
travel across the S ahara will be outlined and the battles of the
invasion detailed. These facts are required to show how massive the
military undertaking was. After the actual e vents of the invasion have
been studied the work will chronicle the rise to power of the Saadian
dynasty. The events of their advancement will be examined with in the
framework of world events to demonstate how greatly the events in Europe
influenced pol itics of Morocco. The trends of the dynasty are
highlighted as further evidence the changes caused by the European
presence in Morocco. Finally, the paper will conclude with the aftermath
of the invasion and the final power struggle of the Saadian dynas ty. In
presenting these events I will attempt to demonstrate how the influence
of Europe unknowingly contributed to the conflict between Morocco and
Songhai by changing the balance of power in Africa.
The invasion
of Sudan began from Marrakech on October 16, 1590. Al-Mansur, the
Shariff of Morocco, ordered his best warriors to invade the Songhai
Empire and capture the source of gold. Mulai Ahmad al-Mansur (the
victorious) also known as al-Dhahabi (the golden one) was the ruler of
Morocco from 1578 -1603. Under the command of Pasha Judar the troops
marched south toward the desert. After a long and dangerous journey
across th e Sahara they arrived in the Empire of Songhai. There the
soldiers would enter in a series of battles adventures and emerge
victorious. The well equipped Moroccan army captured many of the
Empire's principal cities and forced the the Songhai leader to sur
render. The source of gold remained outside their reach. The location of
the mines were a secret known only to one tribe which lived along the
southern Niger River and guarded by the silent trade.
The number of
troops which made up the massive invasionf orce is a matter of minor
controversy. According to Bovill the invasion force consisted of four
thousand soldiers and an additional two thousand non-combat troops.
Julien's account disagrees, in History of North Africa , he
asserts that the army contained three thousand fighting troops.
Regardless of the actual number of troop which left Marakesh, the force
knew that it would be dramatically outnumbered when it finished crossing
the Sahara. The troops relied on the ben ifits of European military
technology and Turkish military tactics for victory.
According to Bovill the troops sent were specially trained elite, hand
picked from the ranks. The soldiers, he writes, were men "chosen
for their discipline, hardiness and courage." Bovill E.W. The
Golden Trade of the Moors . Oxford. The Oxford University Press,
1968. p.167 Most of those chosen by al-Mansur to take part in the
invasion were not of Moroccan origin. The force was so overwhelmingly
extranational in origin that the official language of the expedition was
Spanish. Op
Cit Bovill p.168. In
The Golden Trade of the Moors Bovill breaks down the force by
both profe ssion and nationality. He concluded that the constitution of
the force demonstrates that Al-Mansur lacked faith in his countrymen as
soldiers. Of the four thousand who left Morocco only fifteen hundred
light cavalry men were Moroccan. The remainder of the force included two
thousand footmen, half of which were armed with the arquebus and an
additional five hundred mounted arquebusers. The strength of the force
came from later twenty-five hundred troops which was composed of
Aldalsians and renegades. Spanish Moors who had migrated to Morocco T
his group provided the stability, power and structure for the army. The
large numbers of troops present required the immense numbers of camels
brought to transport the munitions, food, water, and other supplies for
the long march and the following battl e. A number of historians wrote
that an earlier invasion attempt may have taken place in which al-Mansur
sent more troops and less supplies. If the rumors of an earlier invasion
are accurate, the men send died in the desert except for a single
survivor. Some records indicate that al-Mansur se nt a large number of
soldiers in to the desert as a punishment for transgressions and
historians believe that these records are the cover up of the earlier
failed invasion attempt. The invasion force also brought with it six
cannons and a team of Spanish gunners to fire them. In Mali; A
Search For Direction , by Pascal James Imperato the author asserts
that the invasion force brought with it ten mortars which fired stone
balls. Otherwise Imperato's version of the mission agrees with Bovill's.
These were weapons of great destructive power for their time.
Al-Mansur
aquired the canon through his trade relationship with England. Many of
the facto rs which led to the Morcoaan victory were extra-national in
origin. The knowledge of advanced military tactics, training, and
coordination came from the European members of the force. Knowledge of
those modern skills by the small invasion force were ess ential for
traveling across the Sahara in force. The possession of the European
designed hand weapons was vital to the three year occupation of
Timbuktoo. During the occupation the weapons helped the small force hold
the populous through fear. The arti llery pieces gained from England
were essential to the Moroccan's initial defeat of the Songhai imperial
army. Even the arquebus would not have been sufficient alone to rout the
overwhelmingly larger force. The arquebus is an early form of the musket
and was nearly as dangerous to its users as to their opponents because
it had a defect of blowing up when fired. When it did work, the weapon
was slow to fire and difficult to reload. Reloading required the gu n
power, shot and a slow burning cord to be manipulated before the soldier
can aim at a target. The reloading procedure is so long that only
experts can use the weapons effectively during battle. During battle of
Alcazar the Portuguese force armed with arquebuses were out flanked and
annihilated by the Moroccans, in spite of their technological advantage,
because the gunners were out flanked and unable to reload in time to
stand a second charge . Bovill, E.W. The Battle of Alcazar.
London. The Batchworth Press, 1952.
The cannons fired against the Songhai forces never had to be reloaded.
The initial volley made so much noise and did so much damage that the
Songhia force fled back to the water without attempting to charge. Only
zealot bowmen who fought with one leg tied to their thigh withstood the
initial char ge and explosions.
The initial invasion force was commanded by Pasha Judar of Granada.
Judar, like many of Al-Mansurs officers, was an enuch. He was appointed
to the rank of Pasha in order to lead the battle. Under him were ten
Kaids, or Lieutenants, four of whom were renegades. Captured Europeans
who had converted to Islam. Additionally, Judar brought a special force
of eighty Christian body guards. He felt that these would give him a
great deal of additional safety and requested specifically them from
Al-Mansur. Bovill. The Golden Trade of the Moors. p.168 It is
unknown why Al-Mansur chose Judar to lead the force, no records have
revealed any that Judar had the proper training or suggest that he was
unusually skilled. Perhaps Al-Mansur trusted Judar, who had been
captured while still a baby, and was rais ed in the royal palace. Bovill
c ontends that the surprising choice was made because of Judar's
organizing ability and integrity. Judar's organizing ability equipped
him to lead a force so far from home.Judar's integrity was such that
Al-Mansur trusted him to properly lead an army so fa r from Al-Mansur's
control. According to Bovill, more contemporary accounts of the invasion
cite the youth of Judar as a primary reason for his selection as the
leader of the invasion force. Whatever the reasons were for his
selection it is worthy of re peating that Judar was not of Moroccan
origin.
The actual
events of the march toward Songhai are not known in detail. The army
train included over eight thousand camels and their drivers, one
thousand high bred horses and force of six hundred sappers. This
multitude required an immense quantity of food, water, dried dates,
tents, military provisions, shelter, and innumerable other necessities.
Ibid p.169 The fifteen thousand mile route they followed across the
Sahara to the Niger River was ordained by limited num ber of places that
they could replenish their water supply. They traveled a path which was
the same or very similar to that which was used by the merchant
caravans. An accounting of this route and some of the difficulties and
dangers of travel along it can be found in the well known works by Ibn
Battuta and Leo Africanus. The invasion force was acompanied by an
anonymous Spaniard, his accounting of the actual journey can be found
according to Bovill, in 'La ConquÍte du Soudan par El- Mansour (1591).
Op Cit. Bovill p.263 It is possible that the account came from Juan de
Medina or one of the other emissaries of King Phillip II who are known
to have been at the palace of Al-Mansur a round that time. The
casualties lost during the 135 day march are known to be quite heavy.
Julian, in his History of North Africa and J.O. Hunwick in Ahmad
Baba and the Moroccan Invasion fo the Sudan (1591) agree that Judar
lost at least one half of his force along the journey. Julien,
Charles-Andre. History
of North Africa .
Trans. John Petrie. Ed. C.C. Stewart. New York: Praeger
Publishers,
1970. p.223 Bovill's account of the journey, in the Golden Trade of
the Moors , is more specific but less definitive. He cites the
evidence showing the size of the initial force which met with the troops
of Songhai and the lack of any eviden ce that any other portion was held
in reserves. Regardless of the actual number who survived the long
journey; the army of Al-Mansur arrived greatly outnumbered.
According
to Bovill's account the invasion force arrived at Lekatwa (now Dra'a)
and Hunwick places the arrival site at Karabara (now Bamba). Hunwick, J.O.. "Ahmad B'b' and the Moroccan Invasion of
the Sudan (1591)." Journal of the Historica l
Society of Nigeria II. Ibadan, (1962) : 311-328.. op cit p.318
Which ever source is correct, the arrival of the invaders so close to
Gao came as a surprise to the Songhai army who expected them to turn
westward after leaving the desert and head toward Timbuktu. As a r esult
Askia Ishak, the King of Songhai, send a message to the clans and tribes
to inform them of the nearness of the invading army. According to
Bovill's account a group a Tuareg tribesman, enemies of Songhai, killed
the messengers before they arrived at the destination. It has also been
suggested that the leaders were unable to conceive of an serious attack
coming from across the desert and that this lack of faith led to their
unpreparedness. In any case the confusion and disbelief on the part of
the Songhai leaders translated into fear and a hasty retreat when the
Moroccan army came into sight.
The forces of
Songhai were no stranger to battle, and the Niger River itself acted to
defend them as they withdrew to their small island retreats. The
Moroccan army had no boats and couldn't follow them. The invaders, now
low on food and water, went to Tondibi where the Songhai army was
waiting. Tondibi was a cattle pasture outside of the city of Gao. Hidden
hehind a wall of cattle for protection and armed with sabre, spear, and
bow the defending forces were a m atch for any of the desert tribesman.
Unfortunately, the tactics of the Songhai forces were not made to
withstand gun fire, nor were there walls a match for cannon balls. The
noise of the gun fire caused a stampede of cattle and the defending
forces ran away in fear. The poor people of Gao were helpless to slow
the onslaught and surrendered to the invaders. In spite of their easy
victory, Judar and his forces were greatly disappointed by Gao which did
not possess the wealth of gold they expected to fin d. The continuous
debilitating effects of desert life, the toll of disease, malnutrition
and heat exhaustion only magnified their disappointment. The army, which
had lost three quarters of its strength in travel would have been
whittled down by the effec ts of occupation had they not moved (on April
25, 1591) to Timbuktoo where the conditions were better. When they moved
Judar did not leave behind a garrison to hold Gao; an oversight that
Al-Mansur did not enjoy.
The terms of
the surrender of Gao were quite lucrative in view of the invaders
situation. Askia Ishak offered Judar 100,000 pieces of gold and 1000
slaves if the army would leave. Ibid p.319 The invasion force was
already weakened by lack of food and supplies and in no position to
search for any hidden gold supply. Judar send a request to accept the
surrender back to Al-Mansur and was angrily refused. Al-Mansur had more
on his agenda then wealth, he wanted the power and prestige to command
the title of Caliph of the Sudan. As a result of Al-Mansur sent second
invasion force across the Sahara to take control of the expedition and
complete the conquest.
The actions of Al-Mansur in Morocco after the launching of the second
mission might lead one to believe that the notion of power had driven
him insane. He kept secret the reports of despair sent from Judar. He
also proclaimed to the people of Morocco t hat complete victory was
already at hand and that the source of gold had been found. To complete
the illusion of victory Al-Mansur paraded around a sku ll that he
falsely claimed was taken from the head of Askia Ishak, the King of
Songhai. These perditious actions were motivated by the instabilities in
Morocco and the need of Al-Mansur to maintain his grip on the throne.
Admitting a set back would have left him more vulnerable to a revolt by
his son, an uprising by the merchants or to an insurrection by the
outlanders. Al-Mansur was forced to anticipate many possible causes of
unrest. The people were taxed heavily to support the expensive war
effort. Op Cit Bovill p.178 The taxes were collected by military force
because no civil government could control the outlying areas. Dissidence
among the people was increased by the growing influence of the English
trade company. The English were still seen as the infidel by many
Maraboutic and traditionalist Islamic leaders in the countryside. The
state of affairs in the low lands of Morocco during the invasion is well
known. The beginning of the Maraboutic crisis were beginning to show.
Additionally, there were elements in Mor oc co that were troubled by the
possible effects of the war on the Trans-Sahaaran trade. These men,
mostly merchants, new more about the nature of the gold supply then
Al-Mansur. Acquainted with the hidden nature of the gold source and
aware of the difficu lties of Saharan travel they had never supported
the war. They were fearful that failure would interrupt the gold trade
which was the source of their livelihoods. As a result the pretence of
victory may have been required to maintain order with so much o f Al-
Mansur's military strength of his army in the field and so much dissent
in his kingdom.
The reinforcements that Al-Mansur sent to actualize his claimed victory
were as well trained and equipped as their predecessors and possessed
more initiative and creativity. Their leader, Mohammed, was formerly the
leader of all the renegades in Morocco. Mohammed, like Judar, was an
enuch. The supporting forces are said to have crossed the Sahara in
seven weeks. Ibid p.180. Once they arrived in Timbuktoo, on August 17,
1591, Op Cit Hunwick p.319 the new leader learned much of his foe from
the experiences of Judar who Mohammed appointed to be his second in
command. Realizing that the unconquered Songhai forces would again
retreat to their water enshrouded refuge he ordered the boats be built
fro m the few available trees and the doors and door frames so that his
forces would be able to pursue their opposition along the water.
Three weeks after his arrival Mohammed had constructed three barges from
the conscripted supplies and, leaving a force behind to maintain the
fortress Judar had built in Timbuktoo, went south to re-attack Askia
Ishak. Ibid p.319 The battle of Gurma was a complete victory of the
invaders. The Songhai forces fled the field and the disorderly retreat
led to the death of Iskia Ishak who was cut of from his troops and then
murdered by Taureg tribesmen. Following the victory, large n umbers of
Songhai deserted the kingdom. Victory for Mohammed was still out of
reach. Op Cit Bovill p.183
The military successes were valuable but the lack of food, troops and
resources prevented the army from directly controlling such a large
area. While the majority of his troops were chasing the Songhai army
across the Dendi Forest a revolt occurred in Timbuktoo. The rebelling
people of Songhai successfully restricted the Moroccan's to their
fortress where the supply of food and water was sharply limited. Word of
the siege reached Mohammed and he sent a relief force to assist his
troops in breaking free. The leader of the rescue mission was Kaid M'mi.
The Kaid is described as "a farsighted man" and is credited
with making peace with the people of Timbuktoo. Op Cit Hunwick p.320
After the siege was broken M' mi convinced the people of the city to
swear allegiance to Al-Mansur and requested that Askia Ishak's
successor, Askia Mohammed Gao, provide food for them as a gesture of
good faith. The temporary peace he established coul d not solve the
essential problems of the invaders; they were too small a force, far
from home, trying to subdue a much larger area of land then they had
anticipated, and running fearfully short on supplies. As the problem of
food became more immediate Bovill notes that there was a famine that
year and that food was unusually scarce. Kaid M'mi convinced Mohammed
that the breadth of the desert prevented Moroccan rule over the Songhai
people by force alone. Op Cit p.320
The Askia agreed to provide food and when he arrived Mohammed ordered
the massacre of his men as a reprisal for the deaths incurred during the
march across the desert. Op Cit Bovill p.181 Mohammed next attempted to
create a puppet ruler to establish a hold over the country. His efforts
were frustrated by rebellio n in the south, which was still beyond his
reach and Mohammed led his army back out into the field.
In the southern rain-forests of Songhai, Askia Nuh, became the new
leader of the defense forces. Using a combination of guerrilla tactics
and an alliance with one of the war tribes he was able to mount a few
small victories against the invaders. Aft er two years of chase Mohammed
gave up attacking the guerilla forces and returned to Timbuktoo in 1594
with a new plan. After his arrival he successfully plotted to gather the
wealth of the city and managed to send 100,000 mithqual A mithqual is
equal to 1/8 of an ounce of gold. of gold back to Al-Mansur. Op Cit
Hunwick p.322
Al-Mansur was at last convinced that the chance for control over the
gold supply was impossible. The gold supply which was never discovered
during the invasion was nearly depleted in any case. Al-Mansur accepted
the profits of victory and received a hu ge tribute of gold. For further
details on the following seventy years of the partial Moroccan
occupation of Songhai see Mali; A Search For Direction by James
Pascal Imperato p. 27-28.
Op Cit Bovill p.190
Op Cit Hunwick p.317
Op Cit Bovill p.160-162
Op Cit Hunwick p.318
Op Cit Bovill p.160-162
Op Cit Hunwick p.317
In 1583 Askia Daoud died an d a power struggle ensued among his sons
which weakened the military power of Songhai. Additionally, the western
coast of Africa was suffering from the attrition of the Spanish and
British slave trade and the combination of internal and external
ailments left Songhai ripe for invasion.
Op Cit Hunwick p.320
The Almoravids did attack across the Sahara, in 1052 a Jihad attacked
the Empire of Mali in hope of making religious conquests in the name of
Islam. There action was not an invasion by a governmen t supplied
military however so Al-Mansur is technically correct.
Op Cit Bovill's account of the invasion records witnesses to caravans of
tribute arriving in Morocco heavily laden with gold. vill p.165-166
Tim He used the wealth for non military ventures such as the building of
an opulent palace and an elaborate mosque.
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