Introduction

Reports of a dramatic increase in West European anti­Americanism have filled the American media in the past few years, giving casual readers the Impression that the alternative and peace movements in these countries are motivated by an almost pathological hatred of the United States. Demonstrations which condemn, for example, NATO missile deployments are taken to be thinly­veiled attacks on the American way of life and are reported as such, to the exclusion of coverage of the protesters' reasons for demonstrating. Nowhere is this phenomenon more prevalent than in press coverage of oppositional movements in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Some observers on the Left have suggested that the emphasis placed by the media on the "anti­American" component of alternative movements in West Germany is a deliberate effort to divert attention from the "real" issues at hand.2 While I do not necessarily concur, I would contend that the definition of anti­Americanism, as it is popularly used, mistakes reasoned protest for irrational prejudice, and thereby deprives the term of its usefulness in identifying this phenomenon where it really exists.

The perception of West German anti­Americanism on the part of journalists and politicians in the United States is largely the result of structural factors inherent in the nature of the alliance between the two countries. Considering the overall structure of West German­American relations, American concern over the FRG is understandable. The Federal Republic, perhaps more than any other country in Western Europe (including the United Kingdom), has assumed paramount importance for American politics in recent years. American policymakers have consistently seen West Germany, situated as it is in the middle of a divided European continent, as the most important bulwark against Soviet ambitions and the expansion of communism on the continent. Recent West German economic problems have not altered this fact. The FRG still boasts by far the most powerful European economy, and comprises with the United States and Japan one of the "big three" of the capitalist world. Therefore, the U.S. views a "loss" of West Germany as tantamount to a loss of the European continent to Soviet hegemony and world communism. Such a European domino theory has permeated much of American political thinking over the last three decades. Moreover, the prior closeness of the relationship between the two nations has inflated American expectations, increasing the likelihood of tension as West Germany "grows up" politically. According to one writer, the present American concern "reflects the disappointment with an ally that, more faithful than the rest, embodied America's fondest myths about itself."3 The focus of American attention on the FRG is thus to be expected; however, it is worth investigating why this anxiety over West German anti-Americanism peaked in the early 1980s.

Anti­Americanism became such a potent issue in the 1 980s because it was at this point that general perceptions and expectations on both sides clashed most dramatically with actual responses to international developments. On the American side, much of the disparity lay between American political expectations of the Federal Republic and the unanticipated West German desire for autonomy of action. On the West German side, the most visible manifestations of the conflict arose among younger Germans, whose perceptions of their own country differed dramatically from the American view. The underlying structural process emanated largely from the natural maturation of the Federal Republic and the corresponding growth of its political and economic assertiveness in the global arena.

In addition to the structural origins of the American perception, this paper will give a brief historical overview of a sub­group-Intellectuals -within German society whose very real anti­Americanism has flourished for centuries. Such an overview will provide an insight into the character of contemporary anti­Americanism. Much of the antipathy borne by German intellectuals towards the United States has been cultural, as opposed to political, and this distinction will prove crucial in the discussion of the West German Left today.

Lastly, in order to refine the standard definition of anti­Americanism this paper will draw on the case of the intellectuals, update the term to render it applicable to the contemporary context, and then examine the West German new social movements in light of this understanding. Once demystified, the term "anti­Americanism" will be useful in identifying a heretofore unrecognized-and potentially dangerous- trend among alternative movements in the Federal Republic during the 1980s.

I. American Perceptions: The Structural Dimensions of the Problem

The assumption on the part of many Americans that a dangerous new anti­Americanism is on the rise in West Germany has as much to do with policy and opinion­makers in the United States as with any objective changes in West German attitudes. The American perception is a direct result of the loss of this country's decisive prominence in the West German­American alliance, or, to use Czempiel's terminology, of a shift in the nature of the relationship from "hegemonic­hierarchical" to "egalitarian­cooperative."4 The tension that has resulted from this shift is intensified by the uniquely "special" relationship the two countries shared prior to the Federal Republic's emergence as a major political force in Western Europe.5 Americans have been inclined to interpret the consequences of West Germany's rise to political and economic "adulthood" as evidence of anti­Americanism, and not as a natural outgrowth of increased power and prestige. Many American opinion­makers still see the Federal Republic as the Teilstaat (partial state), somehow lacking the full legitimacy of its neighbors. (It is interesting to note in this context that other European nations- France in particular-have rarely been accused of anti­Americanism, despite indications that such sentiments have been stronger there than in the Federal Republic. This is precisely due to France's relative autonomy-and West Germany's dependency-vis­a­vis the United States since 1945.)

The structural reasons for America's preoccupation with the phenomenon of anti­Americanism in the Federal Republic have both an economic and geopolitical component. The complementary nature of politics and economics in this case has intensified the malaise on this side of the Atlantic, because the FRG, still arguably the United States' most reliable ally, has developed into one of its most formidable economic competitors.

Exports have consistently represented the most important dynamo in the West German economy for general societal well­being since the reconstruction period after World War II. As long as this export strategy did not challenge American economic hegemony, the United States did not mind West Germany's prowess in this domain. However, faced with severe trade difficulties, especially in the areas of declining productivity and international competitiveness, the United States has come to view the Federal Republic as its most important economic rival (along with Japan). West Germany successfully challenged American industry all over the world, including here in the United States. While consumer products became the domain of the Japanese, the West Germans scored impressive successes throughout the world in industrial goods such as machine tools, chemicals and precision instruments. They proved successful in their biggest market, Western Europe, as well as in the OPEC countries, the Americas, the NICs, and perhaps most important for the present argument, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Osthandel (trade with the East) has played a significant role in West Germany's export strategy, despite its relatively small size when compared to Germany's economic exchange with Western Europe. However, while Osthandel may represent a fraction of Westhandel, West Germany has become the leading Western trading partner for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Osthandel's importance grew even more with the persistence of the economic crisis plaguing the Federal Republic's Western trading partners and the Federal Republic itself. As unemployment became the most serious problem confronting West German policy­makers during the late 1970s, any trade that promised to create or keep jobs assumed paramount importance for all concerned (i.e., political parties, the state bureaucracy, employers and organized labor). Lastly, the significance of Osthandel should not be measured only in quantitative terms. It lent additional support to another dimension of West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, namely Ostpolitik.

Just as Osthandel was originally welcomed and encouraged by the United States, so too was Ostpolitik, since it promised to provide essential European support for America's global strategy of detente. By the late 1970s, however, a series of events soured Americas relationship with the Soviet Union and led to a full­scale repudiation of detente, begun by the Carter administration and then fully implemented under the aegis of the Reagan presidency in the early 1 980s.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979 testified to the dangers of the post­detente era as well as to the complexities of coordinating an allied response to Soviet actions. The American reaction to the situation in Afghanistan was swift and strong: sharp curtailments of grain sales to the USSR, further limitations on exports of high technology goods and the U.S.­led boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, which the Federal Republic joined as the only major American ally in Western Europe in notable contrast to the British, French and Italians. President Carter vowed that a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf would be seen by the United States as a threat to its own security and that the U.S. would protect its interests by military means if necessary. Carter moved to increase U.S. military presence in the area and asked Congress to resume draft registration.6.

When the United States sought alliance support in responding to the Soviet invasion, the FRG affirmed its solidarity and its willingness to share in the "division of labor." Since the West Germans could not match U.S. military deployment to the Persian Gulf, they agreed to increase aid substantially to Turkey, Greece and Pakistan, as well as expand the West German defense budget. The implication was that they would be ready to take on a larger European defense burden if American forces in Europe had to be sent to the Persian Gulf. The West German government stressed that the Soviet invasion presented, first and foremost, a challenge to the nations of the Third World (the U.S. with its global perspective interpreted it as a threat to the Free World). It would not, however, agree to restrict trade with the USSR, perhaps because Soviet trade comprised a significantly greater share of West Germany's GNP than that of the United States.7

The FRG saw the Afghanistan crisis as a regional problem to be corrected as unobtrusively as possible, whereas the United States viewed the invasion as a challenge to American control and prestige. While European foreign ministers were working to come up with conditions to ease the Soviet withdrawal from Kabul, Washington was imposing an economic boycott on the Russians. As the Europeans were asking and encouraging Moscow to withdraw, the Americans were punishing the Kremlin in an attempt to force a Soviet withdrawal. In terms of strategy and geopolitical reality, it was easier for the United States to curtail relations with the Soviets than for the FRG to do sod The physical proximity of the USSR and the importance of continued relations with the Eastern bloc countries, particularly the GDR, forced the Federal Republic to seek a more conciliatory and diplomatic solution in any East­West confrontation. This reality has thus far met with little sympathy on the part of the United States due to the latter's substantially different geopolitical position.

The Afghanistan crisis highlighted broader American­German issues. How could the FRG and the U.S. forge a mutually acceptable Soviet policy when the goals of both nations differed so vastly? Still primes inter pares within the North Atlantic alliance, the United States had hoped, indeed expected, that its allies would follow its wishes concerning a political and economic repudiation of the Soviet Union. The Americans were, of course, disappointed.

The crisis in Poland also exemplified the differing German and American perspectives. Americans were distressed at the lack of a suitable German response to the coup d'etat, the ensuing mass arrests and the outlawing of Solidarity. U.S. policy­makers compared unfavorably the 300,000 West Germans who in October 1981 had protested NATO's plan to install American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe with the meager demonstrations against martial law in Poland, which occurred in a few German cities during December of that year. Chancellor Schmidt, who had been visiting East German Party Chief Erich Honecker when the Polish armed forces staged their coup, denied for weeks that the Soviets were in any way responsible for this action. Whereas the coup convinced the United States that a tougher stance should be taken, the West Germans were spurred into intensifying their detente efforts in order to protect their relationship with the GDR and Eastern Europe.9 (Yet, one must not forget that the Bundestag was the first Western parliament to condemn the Jaruzelski coup.)

The imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 brought another issue to a head-the quarrel over the Euro­Siberian gas pipeline. Though the West Germans denounced the Polish putsch, they continued to extend major credits to the Soviet Union for the construction of the gas duct. In contrast, the United States felt that military intervention called for economic sanctions against the USSR. These trans­Atlantic disagreements brought Euro­American relations to a low point, characterized by resentment, recrimination and retaliation

immediately after the Versailles Summit in June 1982. It took the

remainder of the year and the appointment of a new U.S. Secretary of State to restore calm.10

The American defense of U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union was seen as particularly hypocritical in this light. " Bonn resented Washington's pressure to act against West German economic interests (during a period of high unemployment) when the United States itself took no action which would negatively affect its own economic interests.

The issue of interest rates and the strength of the American dollar holds much greater significance for the future of the FRG than the political squabbles mentioned above. When the dollar was weak and Inflation high in the U.S., the West Germans (led by Schmidt) claimed that the United States was "exporting" its inflation to the rest of the world and thus destabilizing the global economy. Now that inflation has been stopped by soaring U.S. interest rates, the Federal Republic fears that those high rates, in combination with a strong dollar, are preventing economic recovery in Europe. Both worries on the part of the Germans seem reasonable. In an open world economy with flexible exchange rates, the West Germans must keep their own interest rates high to attract capital if American rates remain high. Unfortunately, the West German economy has so far not been able to cope as well with these high rates as its American counterpart. No solution to this problem Is m sight.

The apparent groundswell of support for German strategic neutrality -allegedly with the ultimate goal of reunification with the East-as evidenced in part by the popularity of the Greens, provides another source of alarm for Americans. A recent poll shows that 82% of the Greens-contrasted with 37% of the Social Democrats and 30% of the Christian Democrats-favor German political and military neutrality. The flamboyance and high visibility of the Greens has brought once again to public attention a yearning that has been shared by many Germans for decades.

Interest in neutralism and reunification is nothing new. During the 1 950s, the SPD under Kurt Schumacher advocated socialist renovation through speedy reunification, even if it meant losing the military protection accorded by the alliance.3 Social Democratic "shadow" foreign policy during that period mandated that West Germany not enter into treaties or take defense measures that would make reunification more difficult. '4 Together with certain leftist (or "activist") unions such as IG Metall and IG Druck und Papier, the SPD also opposed, for the same reason, West German rearmament within the Western alliance. 5

After the SPD abandoned its commitment to reunification in the early 1 960s, the extreme Right remained as the only sector of West German society calling for reunification on a regular and programmatic basis. The emergence of the Greens signals the first time in two decades that the call has been issued from the Left. It would be a mistake, however, to identify this as an indication of a latent nationalistic tendency within the Greens, which is precisely what the American- and in many cases, German-press has done.

II. Right­ vs. Lefit­wing Anti­Americanism:

The Case of the Intellectuals

Research shows that America and Americans have always been more popular with the mass public of Germany than with the country's intellectuals.' However, German intellectuals are significant for this study as they do represent a long and quite genuine "anti­American" tradition. Moreover, it is mainly this group that left tangible records in the form of written documents, causing anti­Americanism's pervasiveness and qualitative importance to be grossly exaggerated.

It will become evident in this brief overview that there are two types of anti­Americanism: cultural and political, which, in a somewhat generalized way, one could identify with the Right and the Left respectively. This dichotomy will prove to be particularly relevant to our consideration of the present nature of West German anti­Americanism.

From the late 1 8th century (i.e., the founding of the United States), throughout the 1 9th and well into the 20th century, a strongly negative assessment of things American outdistanced any positive views of the United States and its inhabitants on the part of German intellectual elites. Both conservative and radical thinkers placed German (the radicals would stress European) "Kultur" above American "civilization." That new civilization was constantly decried as overly material

is, vulgar, uncouth, instrumental and mass­oriented.

Beginning with Hegel, virtually all pre­20th­century German observers condemned the political immaturity of this new country, as manifested by its lack of a European­style state. As long as it failed to establish such a state-and the prognosis looked bad given the size of the country as well as its civil turbulence (which was an outgrowth of its multi­ethnic and immigrant population)-the United States, Hegel concluded, would remain forever peripheral to world history.' 7 Accordingly, Heine wrote of America: it was a "colossal jail of freedom', where "the mob, the most disgusting tyrant of all" carries out "its crude authority." He continued: "You dear German farmers! Go to America! There, neither princes nor nobles exist; there, all people are equal; there, all are the same boors!"'8 Jacob Burckhardt equated the a­ and anti­historical nature of American society with barbarism. He discussed the "ahistorical Bildungsmensch" who exists in the New World's materialist blandness, monotony, mediocrity and uniformity, and thus whose only escape lay in an inevitable-and pathetic- imitation of the Old World's mores and values.'9 Nikolaus Lenau, a major America enthusiast before his trip to the United States, was so disappointed in all things American after his arrival that he returned to Germany in a completely dejected state, informing his countrymen that there were "serious and deep reasons that there were no nightingales and no singing birds at all" in this awful country of "worn out people" and "scorched forests."20 Whether these intellectuals had actually visited the United States, as had Lenau, or whether they made their judgements from afar (as did Heine, Burckhardt and Nietzsche), mattered little in terms of their dissemination of anti­Americanism among Germany's intellectuals and its growing Bildungsburgertum.

For these intellectuals, America was the soulless juggernaut, threatening "Kultur" and true nobleness (Edelheit) which only a long history could create. The very essence of this upstart country was the destruction of its own "Kultur" and nobleness as evidenced by the gradual genocide of the Indians.21

It should be noted that both Marx and Engels spent considerable time analyzing and interpreting events in the New World for Europe's bourgeois readership, most often in a favorable light.22 Indeed, it can be argued that these two, in notable contrast to their followers who later constituted the multifaceted construct known as Marxism, were among a small handful of German intellectuals who were favorably disposed toward the United States and "Americanism."23 They rejoiced in the bourgeois republicanism and material populism of this new political entity and in the fact that Europe's working classes would be encouraged in their political struggles by the liberating experiences which Marx and Engels detected in American social developments. The victory of the Union over the Confederacy represented, for these two great political thinkers, a major world historical event in which progress clearly prevailed over reaction, which was hardly the case on an autocratic European continent dominated by the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Romanovs. Although Marx and Engels were exceptions in their own era, a certain fascination with the American way of life carried over to, and was adopted by, West German protesters of the 1 960s and early 1970s. (This phenomenon will take on great significance below in our comparison of the protest movements of the 1960s and 1980s.)

In addition to Marx and Engels, it was mainly a small group of liberal republicans who extolled the virtues of the New World.24 Fascinated by the new nation's federalism, some of these individuals voiced their pro­Americanism in 1848 during the national assembly in Frankfurt. To German liberals, the constitutional arrangement of the United States remained a model well into the 20th century. With the complete victory of the reactionary/conservative political and cultural order following the ill­fated Paulskirche movement, these liberals- and a few non­Marxist radical democrats-faded into Germany's political and cultural background. Indeed, some of them took their admiration of the United States sufficiently seriously to emigrate to the New World.

In the Weimar Republic, many on the Left and the Right disdained America, though for almost perfectly opposite reasons. (There also was a cult of Americanism among such left intellectuals as Brecht, Kracauer, etc.) To the former, it represented the bastion of capitalism and the source of misery for working people throughout the world. To the latter, it embodied the worst manifestations of a liberal and multiethnic society and lacked the necessary culture and history to provide the backbone of a Volksgemeinschaff. Anti­Americanism, of course, reached new heights under the twelve years of Nazi rule.

It was not until the immediate post­World War II period, and especially during the first decade of the Federal Republic's existence, that pro­Americanism became somewhat more common among West German intellectuals. This intellectual pro­Americanism, however, can not be separated from a concomitant growth in anti­Soviet and anti­communist feelings which prevailed among German intellectual elites and the general public alike.

This was the era of the Americanization of West Germany. Hardly any aspect of West German civil society remained untouched by this process, which entailed the complete bourgeoisification of West Germany under a liberal capitalist aegis. Since the Federal Republic proved to be the only successful liberal democracy ever established on German soil, and since Americanization was an integral part of this building process, the very construct "Federal Republic of Germany" and its collective identity have remained inextricably tied to the United States.

With the far Right culturally discredited and officially banned, one of the most vocal and prolific sources of anti­American sentiments was silenced in the intellectual discourse of the Federal Republic. Interestingly, but perhaps tellingly, rightist intellectuals, with the notable exception of a still existent neo­Nazi fringe, developed a pro-Americanism over the years which often bordered on mindless imitation and uncritical apologetics. However, this is not to say that the Right never attacked Americanism for its materialist, vulgar, mass-consumption­oriented Coca­Cola culture. Especially during the height of the Adenauer years, it was not uncommon to read columns by conservative intellectuals accusing the United States and Americanism of an excessive concern with permissiveness and democracy, which by definition undermined elites and thus weakened the West in its deadly struggle with the less democratic East. Time and again, rightist anti-Americanism reared its head by accusing the United States of being too "soft" on its adversaries because of the American preoccupation with democracy and due process. Basically, anti­Americanism of the Right in the Bonn Republic, in notable contrast to Weimar, was confined to a culture! criticism of things American ("they have such bad taste," "they have no class"; etc.), whereas its pre­Bonn political component changed to an explicitly pro­American position. The acceptance of the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions brought an end to the political anti­Americanism of the Right, which has since developed into a major supporter of the United States.

The only sustained political criticism to which America has been subjected in the Federal Republic has emanated from leftist intellectual circles. From the very beginning (i.e., late 1940s, early 1950s), intellectuals in or close to social democracy, the SPD and the unions assailed American policies as inimical to the interests of the German working class, the working classes of Europe and thus global peace.

In notable contrast to rightist intellectual anti­Americanism, its leftist counterpart-until the present period-concentrated almost exclusively on the concrete political activities of the United States in Europe and the rest of the world. The main thrust of the criticism was focused on the United States' role as the West's leading imperial power. American intervention in Vietnam, Chile, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere provoked sharp criticism from the Left during the 1 960s and early 1 970s, but this criticism did not, for the most part, extend to a cultural condemnation of the American "way of life." Nor did it spare West Germany from accusation of complicity in the capitalist­imperialist world order."

Among German intellectuals, who comprise only a small part of the overall population, there has been a long tradition of anti­Americanism. In contemporary West Germany, however, this tradition has reached its lowest point due to the quiesence of Right intellectuals. Though still culturally anti­American, these intellectuals have not been particularly vocal because their anti­Americanism has by and large refrained from criticizing America's political role in the contemporary global order. However, the traditional political "anti­Americanism" of the Left, which always dominated over its cultural criticism, has remained. Even though the Left is currently more outspoken about its disenchantment with American policy, by our definition, it is the Right which has heretofore maintained a more intrinsic anti­Americanism, a fact largely ignored by the media in both countries. It has been rightist views of American society which have harbored a basic prejudice, whereas the leftist arguments, until recently, have been directed at concrete events and policies. This is not to imply that the latter is immune from reductionism equally as simplistic as that which characterizes the former. It is merely to underline an inherent qualitative difference between the two. This difference, as we shall see, is fading

III. Anti­Americanism in the Contemporary Context

We have already established that the definition of anti­Americanism used by the mainstream American press-which equates criticism of American policies with an irrational "anti­American" prejudice-is both deceptive and dangerous. This label has become, in both the FRG and the United States, an accepted means by witch to delegitimate the Left, the peace movement or indeed any group which challenges U.S. domination of foreign policy. The question remains, however: If the contemporary West German Left is anti­American, what is the nature of this anti­Americanism and how does it differ from the popular understanding of the term?

In order for "anti­Americanism" to be meaningful in the context of the West German Left, one must ask: Does it (the Left) embody an antipathy towards things American beyond issues of American politics (interpreted in a broad sense)? Or alternatively: Is there something unique to American culture and values; which the Left disdains? Anti-Americanism which is "contingent" or politically motivated is excluded from this definition, while cultural or "structural" anti-Americanism will be the focus of discussion. According to this understanding of the term, a contempt for America's role as an imperial power or for Ronald Reagan and cruise missiles does not in itself constitute an anti­American disposition.

I shall argue in the remainder of this paper that prominent sectors of the Left (including the Greens) do represent a resurgent antiAmericanism. This phenomenon is worrisome to the extent that it is based on ignorance and on a misunderstanding of American society and culture. Furthermore, it has the effect of blurring West Germany's complicity and responsibility as a capitalist power, and recasts the script deceptively with the Federal Republic in the role of victim." I do not, however, intend to imply that a consensus exists on the Left- or among the Greens-on this issue, or that the Left is concealing a latent nationalism-evoking National Socialism-in its criticism of the United States. (I have previously argued in these pages in fact that the internationalist philosophy of the Greens and much of the Left as a whole, combined with their adherence to nonviolence, exempts them from this criticism.)25

Deutschland: Komplize oder Opfer? (Accomplice or Victims)

The notion that the new social movements of the 1 980s trace their roots to the protest movements of the 1 960s can now claim widespread -almost universal-acceptance among observers of the West German Left. This consensus has prompted most writers to highlight the similarities and commonalities of the two "generations"-to the exclusion oftheir differences-producingan inaccurate and misleading picture of today's alternative scene. In the remainder of this essay, I will identify the areas where the two movements diverge, offer some explanations for this divergence and address the dangers for the Left posed by their new outlook. In addition, I will examine how this intergenerational conflict is being played out within the ranks of the newest -and most exciting-fixture on the West German political scene: the Green Party.26

The critique of the United States embodied in the anti­Vietnam War movement of the late 1 960s and early 1 970s essentially saw the United States as the world's leading imperialist power with the Federal Republic as `'accomplice" in a global division of labor.2' The popularity of books by authors such as Bernt Engelmann, which detailed West German complicity in American imperialism, and which appeared in profusion during the early 1 970s, attests to predominance of this belief.28 The crimes of the Third Reich remained prominent in the minds of young radicals of this generation and their political ideologies were informed as much by an intense-even ruthless-anti­nationalism as by a critique of multi­national capitalism and imperialism.

Concomitant with this broad political condemnation of the Western Alliance, the "generation of '68" often held positive feelings for the United States, both its culture and its people. Many of the students and intellectuals who stood at the barricades during this period had visited the United States and maintained strong ties there.29 Many spoke English well. As will be discussed below, most recalled American generosity immediately following the Second World War. In short, although their political criticism of the United States was bitter and farreaching, members of this first postwar generation were by and large not anti­American, under our definition. As Gunter Grass, a symbol of this generation who has remained politically active into the present period said: ". . . as amazing as it sounds, I who am often in America and love America, and see that they are our ally . . . think that in this situation, criticism is the best sign of loyalty."

This is not the case with supporters of the new social movements today who belong to the second postwar generation. The careful observer of the West German alternative scene will detect a marked change in both the style and content of the protest movements, away from cultural acceptance of the United States and the American people. In today's generation, the political condemnation of the United States inherited from the '68 generation is joined by a cultural antipathy a kneejerk tendency to equate all things American with the MacDonalds'invasion and thus to pronounce them evil.3'

"Die BRD ist El Salvador. ,'32 As this graffito on a Frankfurt wall demonstrates, this new orientation is inextricably linked to the perception of the Federal Republic as a "victim" of U.S. foreign and economic policy. Publications of the Left refer to West Germany as "occupied territory" and decry the FRO's subordinate position politically, economically and culturally vis­a­vis the United States. The West German government has ceased to be an "accomplice" to the crimes of the United States and has become a "puppet," uncritically accepting the edicts of the Reagan (or Carter) administration. The NATO doubletrack decision, which was in fact approved-one could argue initiated -by the SPD­led government of Helmut Schmidt, is often cited as evidence of this "quasi­colonial" relationship. Even acts of terrorism, which during the 1 970s were likely to be directed at pillars of West German capitalism (such as Jurgen Ponto or Hanns­Martin Schleyer, chairman of the Dresdner Bank and head of the FRO's two most important employers' associations respectively) are today most often directed against U.S. military installations.

In contrast to their forebearers of the 1960s, members of todays generation are less likely to speak English well, less likely to have visited the United States, and more prone to think of the United States as a "decadent culture" and of Americans as "obsessed with consumption." Coupled with this, the program of the contemporary Left, concerned as it is with issues of ecological destruction and nuclear war, contains a critique of modernism and industrialism of which the United States is the leading embodiment. (The opposition of much of today's Left to industrialization itself, and not just to capitalist industrialization, stands in marked contrast to the favorable disposition toward industrialization along socialist lines held by many leftists during the 1960s.) Moreover, in its simplistic anti­modernism, the West German Left has embraced some aspects of right­wing anti­Americanism. This is not to say that the peace and ecology movements, or the Left in general, are rightist or backward­looking, but rather that the Left opens itself up to the danger of co-optation from the Right by not explicitly distancing itself from the cultural anti­Americanism of the latter, with which the Left has frequently-and somewhat erroneously -been identified.

At first glance, this transformation of West German attitudes toward the United States, during a period which also witnessed the Federal Republic's rise to political adulthood, seems paradoxical. Given the increased strength and autonomy of the Federal Republic within the Western Alliance, why do protesters of the 1980s see West Germany as existing in a quasi­colonial relationship with the United States? Furthermore, why did radicals of the 1960s, when the United States unquestionably enjoyed a position of political hegemony over the Federal Republic, perceive a more equal, or complicit, relationship between the two countries?

The answer is a complex one and has to do with the different forces and experiences which shaped each generation's Weltanschanung. As discussed above, the generation which came to political maturity during the turbulent decade of the 1960s viewed the United States in an ambivalent light. To be sure, the United States was seen as the aggressor in an imperialist adventure in Vietnam, and in other cases where American weapons-and in some instances, troops-had been used to unseat democratic governments, as in Guatemala, the Congo, Iran, the Dominican Republic and later, Chile. At the same time, students of this generation recalled the generosity and goodwill of the American government and people in the form of CARE packages and airlifts. Moreover, many young West Germans of the 1960s credited the Marshall Plan for their own relative well­being and the stability and strength of their country's economy.

Of equal importance in shaping West German attitudes toward the United States was the towering figure of President John F. Kennedy. As imperialist as virtually any other American president, Kennedy held a particular fascination for West Germans-leftists included-largely through a combination of his youth, personal charisma and the impact of his June, 1963 "ich bin ein Berliner" speech on the German psyche.

The Left was also attracted to the idealism and quasi­socialist rhetoric of his New Frontier and to his apparent commitment to civil rights for America's black minority. This awe of Kennedy was of course heightened by his assassination and martyrdom on November 22, 1963.34

The memory of the Holocaust and the shame which the first postwar generation inherited from its parents contributed to the feeling that West Germany's political weakness was deserved. It also intensified the impression that the Federal Republic's very existence was to a large extent the result of American largess. The impact of the Holocaust Effect in sustaining a self­critical attitude on the part of the Left and in crushing any nationalistic impulses cannot be emphasized too strongly.

The second postwar generation came of age in a vastly different political climate, which was characterized by the fading of the Holocaust Effect, a decline in the legitimacy of the American presidency (a by­product of Watergate) and, more recently, by the administration of Ronald Reagan and the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in the Federal Republic. Moreover, although both generations of activists were profoundly influenced by "post­materialist" values- that is, values critical of the material and monetary aspirations of prewar generations, in favor of a greater concern for "quality of life"-the second postwar generation has internalized these attitudes to a far greater extent.35 Briefly stated, the generational dichotomy consists of two components: "those aged 25­34 who have 'made it,' are now established in careers and can devote their energies to political causes; and those under 25 who are resigned to not attaining satisfying professions and expensive possessions, who have opted for a more extreme set of anti­materialistic values."36 What is so fascinating in the West German case is that the post-materialist trend has thus not only continued, but become stronger over the years.

The growing importance of postmaterialist values and the expans~on of higher education have increased the number ofpeople who not only show a greater disdain for all traditional forms of authority, but, as part of that intellectual package, also oppose the overall hegemony of things American in West German life. On this level, one can detect the development of a crypto­nationalist consciousness that is almost exclusively cultural. In addition, the emphasis placed by the younger generation on self­actualization and individual autonomy provides the source of a growing source of frustration, both with the dominant role played by the state in the lives of individuals, and by the United States in the geopolitical "life" of the Federal Republic. Of all the factors involved in heightening the sense of "Germany as victim" among the young radicals of today, none is as crucial as the NATO double track decision and the rise of Ronald Reagan. Together, these two have made the "Deutschland als Opfer" syndrome virtually a national affliction.

In the early 1970s, SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt's initial successes with detente and Ostpolitik reduced cold war fears that Europe was "sitting on a nuclear powder keg." The increase in East­West tensions during the 1970s, culminating in the double­track decision in 1979 and Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, shattered this complacency. These two events catalyzed both the peace movement and the Left in general to an extent unknown since the late 1960s. With the deployment, Western missiles would directly threaten Soviet cities with a first strike from Europe and this, combined with Reagan's alarming rhetoric about the ""inability" of a nuclear war in Western Europe, brought to life fears that the FRG was being used as the dupe in a deadly game of nuclear "chicken." These developments, it should be noted, have been subject to varying interpretations by different sectors of the West German alternative scene. For example, to the peace movement, the arrival of American missiles in Mutlangen, Neu­Ulm and Heilbronn represented a huge qualitative increase in the likelihood of a nuclear war on German soil; for the Left as a whole it meant that West Germany's territorial sovereignty-and with it its independence in foreign policy-had been forfeited once and for all to the United States.

As former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explained, geopolitical concerns are very real to West Germans. "Living that close to the Soviet Union, we are careful in not provoking anybody. We don't like provocative behavior on the Western side either."37 To a certain degree, Reagan seems to be achieving the opposite of his intended effects. His avowed policies corroborate the peace movement's views that the USSR is basically on the defensive because, they argue, the United States appears to be striving towards superiority and world domination.

Another way to understand the gerreracional divergence discussed above is to examine the Angst (fear) of the German people in this context. Germany's geopolitical position has implicated it in devastating wars throughout history and this has produced a general fear of war in German society, most recently resulting from the experience of the Second World War. This fear is shared by those who actively participated in the war, by those who remember the devastation of their homes and cities, and by youth who have heard vivid accounts of the misery from their parents. As one observer reported: "Their country was once devastated by Allied and Soviet bombardments and they fear it could happen again."38

Wolf Biermann, a popular political composer and singer from East Germany currently residing in the Federal Republic, feels that Angst is critical to understanding the shift in West German opinion from initial support to rejection of the NATO double­track decision. After World War II, there was a diffuse fear (Furcht) of war which, for instance, fueled the Fight Against Atomic Death movement of the 1950s. The combination of the specific factors of the 1980s just noted catalyzed a transformation of that diffuse Furcht into a much more directed, intensified Angst. Furcht expresses the idea of a general anxiety, whereas Angst denotes a specific fear, in this case caused by the imminent missile deployments and bellicose rhetoric of the Reagan administration. In other words, there were very specific events which provoked this Angst.

The mass base ofthe 1980s movement-as opposed to the student/ intellectual "generation of '68"-and its relative disdain of ideology in favor of immediate "concrete" issues (see "Angst" discussion above), also distinguish it from its ancestor. During the 1960s, protesters shared a highly ideological orientation, as witnessed by the extraordinary popularity of the writings of authors belonging to the Frankfurt School (Herbert Marcuse in particular), as well as those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, among activists at the barricades. Political meetings of this period frequently degenerated into sectarian squabbles revolving around conflicting interpretations of, for example, a paragraph from Volume 3 of Capital or a passage from the Grundrisse, and ownership of the "40 grosser Blauen," as the collected works of Marx and Engels were called, was de rigoeur.40 The relative prosperity of the period also lessened the prominence of "bread­and­butter" issues such as unemployment, and tended to exclude people without a university education.

In contrast, the 1970s saw the end of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) and an attendant rise in unemployment, increased awareness of the dangers of nuclear power and Waldsterben (forest destruction), and a growing alarm at the frenzied pace of nuclear armament by both superpowers. These were issues "accessible" to amass constituency, as evidenced by the type of books which have come to be movement "classics," such as Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, or Herbert Gruhl's Ein Planet wird geplundert (A Planet is being Plundered), in contrast to Marcuse's more arcane One Dimensional Man of the 1 960s. The very real presence of 6,000­7,000 nuclear warheads on West German soil, in addition to Sovietmissiles aimed et the FRG, underscored for many the need for mass collective action independent of ideology.41

The unifying factor for the peace movement-and indeed for the Left as a whole-is not an over arching ideology as in the 1 960s, but the common perception of Angst, which the missiles symbolize. It is only on this macro­level that unity can be maintained. As soon as questions of how one maintains peace or to what extent one can disarm arise, a myriad of opinions are voiced.42 Heretofore, however, this fear has proved mobilizing and not paralyzing.

The Green Party

Perhaps no political movement of the contemporary period has been at once so scrupulously analyzed and so misunderstood as the West German Green Party. Its members and followers have, predictably, been portrayed as nationalists whose concern for ecology is merely an updated version of the "Blood and Soil" invocations of the Nazi period.43 In addition, the multi­ideological makeup ofthe party has been simultaneously exaggerated by the mainstream media In the United States (and cited as evidence of their incapacity to govern), and more interestingly, downplayed by many of the Greens' Left supporters -including some in the United States-who see intraparty tensions as a passing phase.44 Neither reflects an accurate picture.45

The Greens are relevant to this paper primarily as a trans­generational party, and as such they embody characteristics of the protest movements of both the 1 960s and the 1 980s. Generational tension is evident in the conflicts which currently threaten to divide the party. To contend, however, as many do, that the Greens simply grew from the remnants of the peace and anti­Vietnam War movements of the 1 960s is to ignore a very crucial process of decentralization and grassroots democratization which the alternative scene underwent during the 1970s. The character of the party(and the Green movement es a whole) is largely shaped by its roots in the citizens' initiatives (Burgerinitiativen) which proliferated during the last decade. These initiatives centered around issues such as nuclear power, pollution and hazardous waste dumping which affected people in their own communities. Consequently, the citizens' movement had to broaden its appeal to those potential participants who would not otherwise involve themselves in political concerns, accounting in part for the relatively low importance of ideology in the movement and party, in favor of an emphasis on concrete issues.46 (This de­emphasis of ideology enabled Greens to form otherwise unlikely alliances among themselves, uniting people with such disparate world views as Rudi Dutschke and former CDU representative Herbert Grahl in the same party.) Another by­product of the decentralization and local control of the citizens' movement organizations was the exposure of a large sector of the West German population to democratic decision­making.47 This held great appeal in particular for the younger, second­generation post­materialists, many of whom felt alienated from the top­down "democratic centralist" power structure of the numerous communist K­parties, and who saw this experiment in grassroots democracy as a key element in building an empowering political movement of the 1980s. In large part, it is members of the second postwar generation (comprising a large section of the Green party rank and file) who embody a cultural criticism of the United States which under our definition qualifies as anti­American.

Essential to our understanding of this phenomenon is the ongoing search among young people of the second postwar generation for national identity. The particular issues which spawned the "Green revolution" have contributed to the formation of a new Heimatgefahl (notion of "home") among many West Germans, precisely because the impact of the problems addressed is localized.48 This increasing concern with the ecological well­being of "home"-not necessarily the nation as awhole, but often individual regions49-accounts in part for the anti­American character of this group. For many eco­Greens, Heimalgefahl provides the link which is necessary to reincarnate a positive identification with Germany and to establish it as a victim of external forces striving to destroy it. (When a citizens' movement arose in opposition to a proposed runway addition to Frankfurt's Rhein­Main Airport, activists dubbed it the "Ami­runway" and in so doing implicated an ". . . outside power, the U.S. [which] was blamed for the incomprehensible action of the state government."50 The Green Party leadership, consisting of older, more seasoned activists, many of whom-like Petra Kelly-have had extensive contact with America and Americans, is as a whole far more likely to limit its "antiAmericanism" to the contingent political realm, usually in the form of "anti­Reaganism," as discussed above.

A similar dichotomy exists in the conflict between Marxist "Reds" and the ecological and counter­cultural wing of the party's "Green" faction. The "Red" Greens, best exemplified by the Hamburg­based Group Z faction and by individuals such as Thomas Ebermann and Rainer Trampert, consists of people who are likely to have been activists during the 1 960s, have at least ideological ties to the labor movement and tend on the whole to have joined the Greens after leaving either one of the K­parties or the "non­dogmatic" Left. Their critique differs from that of many ecologists in that they do not a priori reject industrialization as bad or accept what they call a "no­growth" economy as good.51 They see the participation of labor unions as key to building a mass following in West Germany and are likely to be wary of many of the counter­cultural trappings of the eco­Greens. In addition, while they are highly critical of NATO's and the United States' role as imperialist and capitalist behemoths, they do not on the whole sharply condemn American culture or the American people. Their "anti-Americanism" is limited for the most part to a political criticism, although this often has very visible-and occasionally violent- overtones.

Many of the eco­Greens, in contrast, see the United States as a symbol and major embodiment of alienating, fremdbestimmt technology and culture. If forced to identify a metaphor for the victimization of the Federal Republic, many Greens and members of the counter­culture at large cite MacDonalds, which has in fact been the target of many anti­American demonstrations. (For the record, the Left rejects the notion that anti­MacDonalds protests are anti­American. Rather, they insist that such actions are directed against agribusiness, of which MacDonalds is merely a visible representatively To this, I would ask why similar protests have not been staged at British­owned fast­food chains such as Wimpy's or German­owned restaurants such as Wienerwald, which are equally dependent upon agribusiness and multi­national capital.)

Frustration with the workings of centralized government, the military and trans­national organizations such as NATO, and the immobility and "pragmatism" of leftist parties such as the SPD, has brought about a situation in which individuals and movements must act, to borrow E.P. Thompson's words, below the level of the state to take power into their own hands. Consequently, the Greens have directed much of their appeal primarily to the people of Germany and to the peace movements and people of other nations and not directly to governments. They have, for example, recognized and met with "unofficial" peace organizations in Warsaw Pact nations such as Hungary and East Germany, which are frequently the targets of intense state repression. As a result of this people­to­people contact, movements which once operated in isolation, or, as is the case in the West, existed primarily to influence government policy, are making the links, both personal and philosophical, with one another to strengthen and rejuvenate themselves.

A corollary-with potentially negative ramifications-to this new conception is the practice of setting up organizations (or parties) to act as alternatives to established social institutions, allowing activists in fact to "turn their back on the State." (The Oko Fund, ajoint project of the Greens and left­SPD members which functions as an extra­governmental research and environmental protection body, is an example of this effort.) The Greens leave themselves vulnerable to attacks from detractors to the extent that their advocacy-and creation-of alternative state structures has fed the illusion that the repressive apparatuses of society exist without the complicity of the citizenry. They have, in so doing, fostered the belief that people can divorce themselves from their political context by disavowing the actions of their governments. The Greens' insistence that, despite their presence in the Bundestag, they continue to be primarily a movement (Bewegung) and not a party, is a source of great concern within the Federal Republic. To many, this represents an abdication of responsibility, even a contempt for "democracy" as it exists in West Germany, which will render the Greens unable to govern if called upon to do so (most likely in a coalition with the SPD). In addition, by recasting the Federal Republic in the role of victim of American political and cultural imperialism and in not sustaining a critique of West German complicity in the system which they excoriate, the Greens and members of the "second" generation unwittingly lapse into the mythical understanding of a "blameless" Federal Republic. The myth is then fed by the intense Heimalgefahl which informs their world viewer The '68 generation, to its credit, did not allow itself the luxury of divorcing its existence from that of the state. Both state and citizenry had been responsible for the nightmare of the Holocaust, and both would have to be vigilant to keep history from repeating itself. There was no "enemy from without" as is increasingly the case with the younger generation, which sees the United States as the very embodiment of evil. To protect the gains they have made, the Greens should repudiate this anti­American tendency within their ranks, and accept the responsibility that comes with leadership.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of anti­Americanism exists in the eyes of the beholder and cannot be analyzed without a proper appreciation of the overall situation influencing the beholder's perceptions. Thus, as stated in the introduction to this paper, the present concern with antiAmericanism in Europe in general and the Federal Republic in particular has as much to do with the United States as with the actual situation in Europe and West Germany.

One could see how it would be helpful for the American side to enhance the legitimacy of its own position by delegitimating that of its opponents by labelling them "anti­American." With the help of this accusation, the lines become drawn more clearly between "us" and "them,,' "good guys" and "bad guys." While I would not argue in a crudely instrumentalist fashion that a concerted campaign decrying the existence of anti­Americanism in West Germany was deliberately and maliciously undertaken by the Reagan administration and leading American opinion­makers, it seems that little has thus far been done by the same circles to set the record straight. Certainly the practice by West German conservative parties of labelling both the SPD and the Greens as anti­American, in order to discredit them and decrease their popularirv, served domestic electoral, as well as foreign policy, needs. However, there is culpability on this side of the Atlantic too, if not by design then by default. It would be greatly in the interest of the longterm future of German­American relations if steps were initiated promptly to repair some of the damage which has already occurred.

I have identified what I view as worrisome trends on the part of the Greens and the Left in general, which will expose them to accusations of prejudice and proto­nationalism from their detractors, and may indeed scare off potential supporters. The appearance of a persistent cultural anti­Americanism on the part of West German leftists interferes with the process of forging links between the alternative movements of both nations. In addition-absolution, even if unintentional -of past German crimes via non­identification with the state, or rhetoric concerning the Federal Republic's "victimization," projects the blame for society's ills onto a convenient, external enemy, intensifying suspicion of the party from without.

It is arguable that the ignorance which underlies the perceptions of many Americans that "political protest equals anti­Americanism" is a self­serving Ignorance and indirectly puts pressure on foreign governments to limit political dissent within their borders. The ignorance behind the cultural anti­Americanism of the Left, however, has no such purpose and only endangers the fragile goodwill that leftist movements are trying to create.

*The author would like to express his gratitude to Karen E. Donfried, whose senior honors thesis at Wesleyan University on anti­Americanism in the Federal Republic served as an important initial stimulus for this article. In addition, he would like to thank Stephen Hubbell for his insights, ideas and ardent dissenting opinions which were indispensible in re­drafting this article.

1. See, for example, John Vinocur, "Germany's Season of Discontent,,, New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1982; and "Europe's Intellectuals and America's Power,' New York Times Magazine, April 29, 1984, by the same author.

2. John Ely, "The Greens and the Promise of Radical Democracy," Radical America, Vol. 17, No. I (, .­Feb. 1983), p. 31.

3. Joseph Joffe, "The Greening of Germany," The New Republic, Feb. 14, 1983, p. 18.

4. Ernst­Otto Czempiel, "Deutschland­USA: Kooperation und Irritationen," Aussenpolitik, 33. Jahrgang, Jan. 1982, pp. 14­29.

5. Ibid; Manfred Knapp, "Bonn­Washington: Kooperation und Konkurrenz," Aussenpolitik Jg. 29, 4. Quartal, 1978, pp. 385­98; Marion Doenhoff, "Bonn and Washington: The Strained Relationship," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3­5, Summer 1979, pp. 1052­64; William Griffith, "Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to Crisis," Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1982, pp. 117­33; Fritz Stern, "Deutsche und Amerikaner heute,,' Schweizer Monatshefte, 60 Jahr/Heft 8, Aug. 1980, pp.655­73 Lewis Edinger. "The German­American Connection in the 1980s," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. No. 4, Winter 1980­1, pp. 589­606.

G. W. R. Smyser, German­Americen Relations (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), ppp. 29-30.

7. Ibid.

8. Czempiel, pp. 20­4.

12. See polls and text in Elizabeth Noelle­Neumann and Edgar Piel, eds, AllensbacherJahrbuchderDemoskopie: 1978­1983, BandVIIl (Muncher: K.G. Sauer, 1983), pp.

13 Otto Kirchheimer, "West German Trade Unions: Their Domestic and Foreign Policies Research Memorandum (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, April 1, 1956), p. 99

9. Josef Joffe, "Europe and America: The Politics of Resentment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 577­79.

10. Ibid., p. 570. The appointment of George Schultz as Secretary of State brought almost immediate relief to the tension­filled Atlantic partnership according to Joffe. Unlike Alexander Haig, Schultz was able to negotiate successfully not only with the allies but also worth his partners in Washington (Joffe, p. 576).

14. David Childs, From Schumacher to Brandt: The Story of German Socialism 1945­1965 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 122.

15. Gerard Braunthal, The West German Social Democrats, 1969­1982: Profile of a Party in Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 8.

16. Manfred Henningsen, "Das Amerika von Hegel, Marx und Engels, "Zeitschrift fur Politik (Munchen),Jahrgang 20, Heft 3, Sept. 1973, p. 235; Hartmut Wasser, "Die Deutschen und America," Politik and Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament), June 26, 1976, pp. 8­9; Gunter Moltmann, "Anti­Americanism in Germany: Historical Perspectives," Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. XXI, No.2, Aug. 1975, pp. 18­21.

17. Henningsen, pp. 229­236.

18. Moltmann, p. 20; Henningsen, p. 227.

19. See Wasser, p. 10.

20. Moltmann, pp. 19­20; Wasser, p. 10.

21. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed discussion of the very interesting bond that the German middle class has developed vis­a­vis the American Indians. The romanticization of the Indians by a large number of Germans goes back to the extremely popular books au shored by Karl May. Hardly any German speaking middle class child, especially boy, has grown up without reading a few of May's "classics" about the Wild West with its Indians, both "good" and "bad." Thus, it is fascinating to see this as one of the most popular "underground,' German­language guidebooks of the United States starts the presentation of each of the fifty states with an account of the destruction of the indigenous population. For more on May's enormous popularity, see Gerhard Armanski, "Yankees, lodsmen, und Sachsen," in Dollars and Traume, No. 10 (Oct. 1984), pp. 83­105.

22. See Marx's superb articles on the American Civil War published in the leading bourgeois newspaper, Wiener Presse.

23. Henningsen, pp. 237­240; Wasser, p. 9.

24. Wasser, pp. 6­7.

25. Andrei S. Markovits, " Reflections and Observations on the West Cerman Elections," New German Critique, No. 28 (Winter, ] 983).

26. It should be made clear from the start that the two movements I will be discussing are indeed two different generations. The first generation, roughly comprising those born between 1940 and 1953, was influenced by events that differed profoundly from those that shaped the experience of West Germans belonging to the second generation, born during the late 1 950s and early 1 960s. The impact of these differences will be discussed in detail below.

27. Ibid., pp. 38­39.

28. Prior to the early 1970s, the leftist readership divided its attention primarily between two types of radical literature. The more doctrinaire Leftists spent much of their time poring over the collected works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, while'`independent''radicals were likely to be found reading translations of American books published by Monthly Review Press, such as Paul Baran's The Political Economy of Growth. (I would like to thank Brigitte Schultz for her help on this section.)

29. Markovits, pp. 38­39.

30. Gunter Grass, Die Zeit, April 15, 1980 quoted in David Kramer and Glenn Yago, "The Policy Implications of Perceptions of the United United by the Successor Generation in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin," Paper presented at the Third Conference of Europeanists, Council for European Studies, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1982, p. 38.

31. One anonymous critic contributed this ironic observation to the wall of a West Berlin apartment building: "Coca­Cola was good, jogging was good . . . why should Pershing be bad?" cited in Matt Lyons, Hermes (Wesleyan University), Feb. 15, 1984,

32. Markovits, p. 38.

33. Revolutionare Zellen, "Beethoven gegen MacDonald: Zum Unrerschied zwischen Anti­Amerikanismus und Anti­lmperialismus" in Radikal, No. 117, June 1983, pp.8­9. See also Peter Tergeist, "Berlin (West): Die USA als Besatzer" in Dollars und Traume, No. 10 (October 1984), pp. 30­40.

34. The idolization of Kennedy by the Left cannot be overemphasized. For example, the day after Kennedy's assassination, the Tubingen chapter of West German SDS held a candlelight vigil honoring the fallen President. Similar memorials took place throughout the country.

35. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

36. Joyce Mushaben, "New Dimensions of Youth Protest in Western Europe,"

Journal of Political and -- Sociology, Vol. 11, No. I, Spring 1983, p. 139.

37. "John Callaway Interviews Helmut Schmidt," PT Publications, 1983, p. 9.

38. Gerry O'Connell, "West Germany's Peace Movement: A Troubled Tradition," America, Vol. 145, No.9, Oct.3,1983, p. 177. Another factor contributing to the political climate of fear has been the deteriorating economic situation which has hurt particularly the Job market for educated youth (Griffith, p. 122).

39. Interview with Wolf Biermann, German political balladeer, conducted by Karen E. Donfried, at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, Dec. 5,1983.

40. The forty volumes of the Marx­Engels Werke (or Forty big blues," so named because of the jacket color) was published by Dietz Verlag in East Berlin.

41. O'Connell, p. 177.

42. Mushaben, p. 138.

43. Some of the most distorted examples of this can be found in the dispatches of New York Times correspondents John Vinocur and James Markham. (See Vinocur's particularly objectionable pieces in the New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1982 and April 29, 1984.)

44. See, for example, Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1984) pp. 21­22. Capra's and Sprernak's gratuitous anti­communism leads them erroneously to view the "Red" faction of the Greens as an aberration and to discount its contribution to the "multi­colored" character of Green politics.

45. Again, as in the case of the peace movement, the Greens make clear the contingencies of their political "anti­Americanism."

Green peace politics is not anti­American in the sense of an attitude against the American people. It is directed exclusively against the war­mongering politics of those who, as politically and militarily responsible, have the say in the U.S. That is not to say though that the Greens close their eyes to the aggressive military policy of the U.S.S.R. The Warsaw Pact is not simply victim, but rather participant in the arms race.

(Die Grunen, p. 18 As this shows, most Greens are careful to include the Soviet Union in their condemnation of nuclear armament. Direct action undertaken by Greens, such as Petra Kelly's brazen 1983 anti­nuclear demonstration in East Berlin (which resulted in the brief detainment of Kelly and the other protectors by the CDR authorities) bears out their claims.

46. Angelo Bolaffi and Otto Kallscheuer, "Die Grunen: Farbenlehre eines politischen Paradoxes. Zwischen neuen Bewegungen und Veranderung der Politik," Prokla, No. 51 (June 1983), pp. 65­66.

47. Horst Mewes, "~he West German Green Party " New Cennan Critique No. 28 (Winter 1983), p. 54.

48. Dan Diner, "The National Question in the Peace Movement" in ibid, pp. 101-2.

49. Bolaffi and Kallscheuer, p. 66; Diner, p. 101.

50. Diner, p. 101 n.

51. Capra and Spretnak, pp. 5, 22­25.

52. See Radical, p. 9. The following phenomenon shows the diversity of German youth culture in which the stratification by education and social origin play a par

ticularly visible role; for the consumerist, rock­music­following and slightly punkish teenagers of West Germany's larger cities, MacDonalds restaurants serve as convenient gathering places on late Saturday afternoons before an evening out on the town.

53. The author is indebted to Paul Kumar for his contributions to this section.