Leadership and Democracy in a Postmarket Society

 

Anthony Mansueto

 

 

0.0           Introduction

 

One of the most difficult problems involved in building a nonmarket social order is the question of authority. Nonmarket resource allocation involves making public judgments regarding substantive questions of value --deciding, for example, that inner city education or scientific research or arts funding is more important than designer jeans or BMWs. This in turn means establishing objective criteria in terms of which such decisions are to be made and establishing structures which will allow an entirely different sort of deliberation than we are accustomed to seeing in the legislative bodies of bourgeois democracies.

 

This seems to many people to threaten the pluralism and secularity which characterizes most "advanced” market societies. The marketplace is agnostic regarding questions of value and thus, at least in principle, allows a diversity of value systems to coexist peacefully, each informing decisions regarding resource allocation in proportion to the effective demand exercised by its adherents. Political deliberations increasingly become attempts to compromise differences between competing interest groups and public judgments regarding fundamental questions of meaning and value are scrupulously avoided, and in some cases explicitly excluded by constitutional and other provisions guaranteeing separation of Church and State. Is it possible to save an authentic ideological and religious pluralism while making public judgments which have hitherto been regarded as part of a protected private sphere? And how does one construct a public arena in which meaningful and respectful debate regarding fundamental questions is possible?

 

These questions are both fundamental to the task of envisioning what a nonmarket social order might look like, and thus of pivotal strategic importance. Without some way to make substantive judgments of value any possible "economic democracy" would simply transfer the war of all against all from the marketplace to the legislature and give the lobbyist an edge over the his former employer, without any guarantee that resources will actually be allocated in a way which promotes human development. At the same time, achieving a perfect consensus regarding fundamental questions of meaning and value seems undesirable.  Human development is enriched by the presence of a variety of ideological and religious tendencies in the public arena.  And while a consensus regarding values might well be possible in an ethnically and religiously homogenous peasant society, or one undergoing the early stages of industrialization (like many of the socialist countries of the twentieth century), it hardly seems possible in the multicultural metropoles created by globalization or in societies characterized by a large petty bourgeoisie which stands to benefit from (and thus support) the restriction of market mechanisms but which also values (and in fact depends for its productivity on) its intellectual independence and ideological nonconformism.

 

This essay will propose a solution to this problem. We will begin by looking again at the ways in which the whole problem of authority has historically been theorized, focusing in particular on the question of public judgments regarding substantive questions of value. I will suggest that socialists generally have given far too little thought to this question, instinctively adopting a sort of Rousseauian social contract theory when (a radically historicized) natural law reasoning is actually more consistent with the socialist project. The inadequacy of normative socialist political theory has allowed a variety of authoritarian models to creep in, including what amounts to rule by right of conquest accompanied by an incipient tendency towards sacral monarchy –what is usually referred to as a "cult of personality." We will then look at some of the concrete structural implications of an historicized natural law approach for the various spheres of human society: economic, political, and ideological. Finally, we will assess the strategic and tactical implications of our analysis and suggest ways to move forward.

 

 

1.0 Authority in Communitarian, Archaic, and Tributary Societies[1]

 

The earliest human societies vested authority in individuals or groups of individuals who, because of their pre-eminent capacities, seemed especially close to the divine. There are a number of different degrees of this sort of sacralization.

 

1)       The leader is an intellectually, morally, or spiritually advanced individual who rules in virtue of his/her ability to help the community and its members survive and develop.

2)       The leader exercises priestly functions and thus makes the divine present to the people.

3)       The leader is a spiritually perfected individual who has returned to earth to help the people grow and develop.

4)       The leader or ruler is an actual or adopted descendent of the gods.

5)       The leader or ruler is a divine person.

 

Generally speaking the less extreme forms of sacral authority are typical of communitarian and archaic societies, the more extreme of fully developed tributary social formations. Examples of the first degree of sacralization include village elders and specialists in healing, herb lore and star lore in communitarian societies. Examples of the second degree of sacralization include priests and other ritual specialists in communitarian, archaic, and tributary societies, and their descendents in the present period –e.g. the priestly (and more especially episcopal and papal) authority within the Catholic Church and other religious traditions with a strong ministerial priesthood.  Examples of the third degree of sacralization include many Buddhist monarchies such as that of Thailand in which the king is considered to be a Bodhisattva, i.e. a being who has attained enlightenment but who has decided to postpone entrance into Nirvana and to return to earth to help his people in their own quest for enlightenment. The fourth and fifth degrees of sacralization are typical of sacral monarchies in tributary societies which the ruler is regarded as the adopted son of God (as in much of Mesopotamia), as a descendent of the gods (Mycenae?) or as himself divine (as in Egypt).

 

In tributary societies this sort of sacral authority is overlaid with a second type of legitimation: rule by right of conquest. Here human society, and indeed the universe generally, are considered to be founded on violence and a will to power.  The ruler rules simply because he has manifested the greatest power by vanquishing his rivals. This sort of legitimation is characteristic of many military monarchies. When combined with claims on behalf of the sacral character of the ruler warfare itself seen as contributing in some way to the divine economy. Thus the Aztec Honorable Chief Speaker was at once military commander and chief priest, providing through wars of conquest the sacrificial victims which the gods required in order to keep the universe alive. It was the French traditionalists de Bonald and de Maistre who theorized most fully this sort of monarchy, arguing that human society is based on sacrificial violence.  Jesus as the perfect sacrifice was the final world monarch and the pope his vicar. But other monarchs participated almost sacramentally in this saving act of cosmic violence, both through their submission to and anointing by the Pope and by their own wars of conquest and by the acts of judicial violence by means of which they preserved the social order (de Maistre 1814/1965).

 

Clearly neither of these approaches to authority is really compatible with the construction of a nonmarket social order which promotes the full development of human capacities. The first presupposes not only a consensus on values but assent to the (very difficult to sustain) claim that some one individual or group of individuals uniquely mediates the divine to humanity; the second effectively equates might with right. At the same time, we should note the tendency for elements of both sorts of legitimation to reassert themselves in socialist societies. Parties which come to power as the result of a successful armed struggle, especially where this took the form of a protracted struggle on the part of a more or less organized revolutionary army rather than an insurrection rule, in effect, by right of conquest. It is the military commanders who become the new government and the political-military organization which serves as effective guarantor of the revolution. Similarly, where the revolution has been effected under the guidance of a profound revolutionary thinker such as a Lenin or a Mao sacralization, especially in a society where sacral monarchic structures were already present, is nearly inevitable. Anyone who doubts this need only listen carefully to a hymn such as "The East is Red."  We will discuss later in this paper how to handle this problem.

 

 

2.0 Authority in Bourgeois Society

 

Liberal Democratic theories, however, are no more compatible with the task of creating a nonmarket social order than are theories which vest authority in a single ruler or group of rulers on the basis of their sacral character or military prowess. This is because all liberal democratic theory is based on a radical agnosticism regarding questions of meaning and value. Let us look briefly at each of the various liberal democratic theories.

 

Natural rights theory (Locke 1690/1967) is based on the notion that because we are all created by God, and thus in a certain sense God's property, none of us can infringe on the life and liberty of another nor can we take the property of others, something to which they are entitled because they have mixed their life with the land by labor. This excludes reallocation of resources in order to better promote human development and is thus incompatible with the project of a nonmarket society --though it is not at all clear that it is any more compatible with generalized commodity production, which certainly affects reallocations of its own.

 

Formalist theories (Kant 1797)  regard ethics as a matter of logical consistency. One may not require of, or do to, others what one does not require, or permit to be done, to oneself. Since motivations are not really subject to public scrutiny, this tends to lead to a very limited role for the public authorities, which simply enforce a doctrine of equal rights under the law. Once again, reallocation of resources in order to promote human development is excluded, in this case as instrumentalizing some (those who would otherwise be richer) for the development of the others (those who, were it not for reallocation, would be poorer).

 

Utilitarian theory (Mill 1848/1965) is based on the view that ethical judgments are simply a matter of personal preference. The good is simply what most people prefer.  While this may be determined either through market mechanisms or through democratic deliberation, substantive judgments of value are excluded. Socialists who adopt a utilitarian perspective soon find themselves trying to placate mass demand for consumer goods, a terrain on which they cannot hope to compete with capitalism.

 

Social contract theories regard political authority as wholly and completely the product of an agreement among the people to restrict their individual freedom in the interests of some higher good. In the more minimal Hobbesian variant of contract theory this higher good is simply security of person and property. Reallocation of resources is once again excluded. The more maximalist sort of contract theory, associated with Rousseau (Rousseau 1762/1962) envisions a social compact which brings into being a rich and morally elevated social life --something which socialists have naturallly found attractive. This sort of contract theory finds a powerful social basis in societies which have undergone an insurrectional experience which draws the whole population into the public arena, creating for a time a heightened awareness of social realities. The result is a sort of democratized version of sacral kingship in which the people as a whole take on a sacred and morally elevated character. The difficulty is that when things settle down, and difficult decisions must be made, the sacral aura of the new social order tends to dissipate quickly and "democracy" becomes simply a way of bargaining over competing interests, without reference to any higher standard in terms of which resource allocation decisions might be made.

 

There is, finally, a sort of postmodernist democratic theory associated with thinkers like Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1958), which regards the public arena as a place where an essentially Nietzschean contest of wills takes place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and recognition.  The aim here is not any extra-political goal but rather the esteem of one's peers.  This theory is explicitly antisocialist and rejects the whole notion of politics as a means of promoting human development or human civilization. 

 

 

3.0 Natural law Approaches

 

The third and final group of approaches to the problem of legitimate authority is that associated with the natural law tradition.  Here authority is not vested in any one person or group of persons, no matter how large, but rather in a principle, accessible to human reason, which orders all things. This principle is achieved by means of a rational ascent, using the method of the dialectic.  Attempting to explain why the universe is organized as it is, and indeed why it exists at all, we eventually conclude to an Unmoved Mover which draws all things into Being by means of teleological attraction.  This Unmoved Mover is at once the Beautiful, the True, the Good, and the One, and when we have glimpsed it we have not only a principle in terms of which we can explain the universe, but also a principle in terms of which we can order human action (Plato. Republic, Aristotle. Metaphysics, Ethics).  Traditional natural law theories were based on a more or less static cosmology so that while individuals and organisms were understood to grow and develop, the system as a whole was not.  The result was a focus on each individual fulfilling its purpose in the context of a the larger systems of which it was a part, rather than on dynamic growth and development. The retheorization of natural law theories in the context of an evolutionary cosmology and a dynamic theory of human history and civilization which we have carried out elsewhere (Mansueto 1997) suggests, however, that the moral imperative ought more properly to be understood to require us to promote the development of complex organization in the universe or more concretely, to conserve the integrity of the ecosystem and the social fabric and to promote the development of human capacities.

 

Within the context of natural law theory, authority derives from the ability to correctly understand and apply natural law. While earlier theory emphasized the relative differences among people in their capacity to do this (Plato. Republic, Aristotle. Politics) and thus tended to favor a monarchic or aristocratic regime, there was a growing tendency from the middle ages on (Aquinas. Summa Theologiae) to recognize that the ability to understand and apply natural law is in fact shared by every human being in virtue of their underlying rational capacity, something which has resulted in an increasing tendency to incorporate democratic elements into political theory in the natural law tradition.  It should be noted here, however, that in natural law theory democracy does not mean popular sovereignty.  It is not the will of the people which rules, but rather the natural law itself. It is just that there is a recognition of the capacity of everyone within the society to participate in interpreting and applying natural law to the concrete conditions of social life.

 

Jacques Maritain (Maritain 1951), the most important natural law theorist of the twentieth century, emphasized this democratic element and developed a radical critique of the whole concept of sovereignty. He points out, quite correctly, that it is in fact quite impossible for any finite system to exercise sovereign rule which is unaccountable to any higher power. If nothing else individual rulers and political parties are ultimately accountable to the people, and the people to history.

 

It remains true, of course, that there are some people who are more developed intellectually than others, and who thus understand the requirements of natural law more profoundly than others. How does one tap into their insights without compromising the right of everyone, in virtue of their underlying rational capacities, to participate fully in the democratic arena? Maritian’s solution, and one which has become increasingly popular in recent years, is to organize prophetic interventions into the public arena through the institutions of civil society: trade unions, community organizations, churches, public interest groups, etc., which seek to inform public discourse without seeking political power, something which distinguishes them from political parties.

 

 

 

 

 

4.0 Towards a Solution

 

What is the usefulness of this perspective for theorizing the problem of politics in a nonmarket social order?  First, it must be said that as we have pointed out elsewhere (Mansueto 1998, 1999), it is only natural law theory which really allows us to make the kind of substantive moral judgments which a nonmarket allocation of resources allows.  Second, we should point out that socialist political theory has, when at its most profound, tended towards a natural law approach to the problem of political authority.  This is true of both of the most controversial doctrines of socialist political theory: the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the vanguard party.  Marx’s claim that the proletariat is the leading revolutionary class is, at least in substantial measure, a claim for the epistemic superiority of that class --i.e. that it is situated socially and historically in such a way as to endow it with a privileged perspective. To put the matter more rigorously, something which becomes possible if we are willing to put aside Marx’s own atheistic commitments (Mansueto 1988, 1998, 1999a), the working class, precisely in virtue of its work, participates in a unique way in the creative activity of God, with whom it then becomes connatural, endowing it with a preconceptual, connatural knowledge of the divine nature and thus of natural law (Mansueto 1999b).  Similarly, Marx’s theory of the vanguard party (as distinct from Lenin’s) is based on the claim that this party represents simply the most advanced section of the working class, that which understands most fully the “line of march, conditions, and ultimate general result” of the historical process (Marx 1848/1978).

 

This said, we should point out that Marx and especially Lenin and the later Leninist tradition seem to make just precisely the error against which Maritain warns us in his analysis of sovereignty. They assume that understanding the laws which govern human history allows us (i.e. the party) sovereign control over the historical process.  This conclusion is at once unwarranted and extremely dangerous. It is unwarranted because the very idea of natural laws (whether they govern physical, biological, or social systems) is precisely that these systems cannot be controlled, but have their own internal dynamism.  Understanding that dynamism allows us to better promote the natural tendency of these systems and of the universe generally to persist in being, to grow and develop, and to evolve towards ever higher degrees of complexity. But we cannot just do as we please with them. It is a dangerous conclusion because it promotes just the sort of totalitarian attempt to manage every detail of social life which has made historical socialist societies oppressive in a way which undermines the larger aim of the socialist project: to promote the full development of human capacities.

 

The error is not, to be sure, surprising. It is of a piece with the larger industrial mindset which, having understood how nature works, proposes to take it apart and put it back together in some way which better suits our whims. And it is of a piece with the sort of atheism which Marx shared with many other Enlightenment thinkers, which does not so much reject the sovereign God of Augustinian Christianity, but rather seeks to displace him. (The God of natural law theory, while omnipotent, in the sense of being able to do everything which is in accord with Her nature, which is to promote the development of complex organization, is nonetheless very far from being sovereign, in the sense of arbitrarily ordering inert matter, or radically subordinate beings, from outside and on high.  Rather, She orders all things by teleological attraction, her incredible beauty drawing forth their capacity to participate in Being.)

 

There are, furthermore, difficulties with the way in which Marx theorized the leading role of the proletariat and the party, quite apart from the question of sovereignty. It is one thing to say that the proletariat enjoys epistemic superiority; it is quite another thing to claim that its perspective is in fact total and sufficient. Indeed, members of all social classes except idle rentiers work and most work without exploiting --i.e. various sorts of peasantries and petty bourgeoisies. Restriction of social leadership to the proletariat, furthermore, risks effacing identities which overlap with the various social classes: women, ethnic groups, etc.  There is, finally, the problem of how one balances the leadership of those who understand the line of march, conditions, and ultimate general result of the historical process with the full participation of the people as a whole, who must participate in order to grow and who bring to the public arena specific knowledges which are necessary for the development and implementation of effective public policy.

 

Recognition of these difficulties has led to a tendency among progressives in recent years to liquidate entirely such historic socialist doctrines as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the vanguard party, generally in favor of vague proposals for some combination of participatory democracy and governance by the institutions of “civil society.” I would like to suggest that such moves are unwarranted and unwise.   Specifically, they tend to liquidate in principle the role of conscious leadership while (to the extent that they actually succeed in gaining real power for nongovernmental organizations) conserving a very large sphere of unaccountable power. The first move is generally a result, at the ideological level, of a rejection of the dialectical tradition in favor of one or another variety of postmodernist perspectivalism (Derrida 1967/1978, Lyotard 1978/1984). We have already discussed elsewhere (Mansueto 1998, 1999) the problems of this ideology. In practice, however, such ideological and cultural relativism often covers a covert chauvinism which prefers the perspectives of the politically correct or spiritually evolved without offering in support of these any sort of argument whatsoever.  This sort of subjectivism is a mark of rentier influence.  It is, after, all, precisely the rentier class which is in a position to see the world as a projection of its own will. The second move reinforces the first. Nongovernmental organizations are, after all, precisely because of their private character, largely immune from public scrutiny and effectively under the control of their senior staff and funders.  This makes them especially vulnerable to cooptation by the large private foundations which provide most of their funding, and thus to the rentier elements we noted above.  Nongovernmental organizations are not, furthermore, generally organized to provide a complete vision of how society might be organized, or even to put forward a complete political platform, but tend, rather, to fulfill more specialized functions, meaning that they provide an important supplement to, but cannot replace political parties.

 

What, then, is the way forward?  It is, in fact, quite possible to have a polity which integrates broad popular participation with conscious leadership, and which includes the latter without endowing any particular organization or ideological trend with a political or ideological monopoly.

 

We should note, first of all, that there are two distinct kinds of political participation. There is, first of all, the sort of direct participation which takes place through village communities, community organizations, trade union locals, and other small, local organizations which allow face to face interaction.  This sort of participation is very effective at soliciting diverse views regarding immediate local issues and at tapping into their practical wisdom regarding the most effective way to implement broad policy initiatives. It also provides a context in which formal political education can take place. Small local organizations are not, however, set up to debate and act on global political questions.  (I use the term global here in its Gramscian sense, as pertaining to the overall organization of human society, as opposed to particular policies or interest group politics).  Second, there is the sort of participation which takes place in the broader public arena when political parties put forward competing visions for society, engage each other in authentic debate, and submit to popular scrutiny. This sort of participation seems to be most vibrant in polities which have a party-list proportional representational electoral system and a parliamentary governmental system. This is because such systems require people to vote for ideas (parties) rather than individuals, allow many such parties to compete, and make governments accountable to legislatures which reflect the relative strength of various ideological trends in the society.

 

It should not be too difficult to combine both sorts of political participation within a single political system. There are any of a number of ways to do this. One could have two legislative lower houses: one composed of indirectly elected representatives of mass organizations such as village communities, trade unions, and community organizations and one composed of members elected on party lists by proportional representation. Or, one could require that political parties be controlled, at least in part, by such mass organizations, so that they are both internally accountable to the people, something which would force them to develop policies which are workable on the ground, and externally accountable through electoral mechanisms.  One could, if one wanted to be certain of the popular character of the resulting polity, simply disenfranchise members of the exploiting classes. In practice, however, it may be sufficient simply to have expropriated them, thus eliminating their ability to exercise disproportionate influence over public policy by means of campaign contributions, etc.

 

Providing conscious leadership without monopoly is no more difficult. This was traditionally the function of Senates. The difficulty, of course, is that Senates were also designed to over-represent the propertied classes. It is quite possible, however, to have a Senate organized in such a way as to represent a diversity of different types of leaders from various sectors (village, trade union, community, religious, academic, artistic, scientific, etc.), as is currently the case in Ireland, while excluding or limiting the influence of capital. Such a Senate, supplemented by advisory commissions drawing on more specialized expertise, could play the role historically played by Central Committees, while allowing the possibility that there is more than one reasonable way to understand the "line of march, conditions, and ultimate general result" of the historical process, and that there is more than one way to come to such knowledge. Such a Senate would seat side by side the elders of indigenous and village communities, the most seasoned leaders of trade unions and community organizations, artistic, scientific, and philosophical leaders, and leaders of the various religious and spiritual traditions present within the society. By having at least some members of the Senate elected by and accountable to grassroots mass organizations, one could also use the Senate to provide representation for these organizations, thus leaving the lower house free to be elected by proportional representation.

 

The question remains, of course, just how much authority one would give such a Senate. Some upper houses are purely advisory; others have as much or more authority as their corresponding lower houses. There is good reason, however, to endow the Senate with significant power, so that the political system as a whole is able to make difficult but potentially unpopular decisions necessary to protect the ecosystem or invest in humanity’s long-term intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. Such an ideologically pluralistic Senate could also fulfill the role played by Supreme Courts in many contemporary political systems, but with greater leeway, ascertaining whether or not laws passed by the legislature are in accord with the principles of natural law.

 

There remains, finally, the difficult problem we noted earlier in this paper --namely the tendency of revolutionary societies to spontaneously generate sacral monarchic tendencies. The most straightforward way to deal with this problem is to recognize it and attempt to limit the authority which can be exercised by revolutionary leaders, while at the same time recognizing their contributions and their value as legitimating symbols. A presidency, accountable to the Senate but not to the lower house of the legislature, which combines the ceremonial functions exercised by most constitutional monarchs and elected presidents in the parliamentary regimes of the European continent, with a sanctionless teaching authority, would make good use of the talents of a Lenin or Mao without allowing them to monopolize political leadership.

 

All of this may seem like so much idle speculation. We are clearly very far from being the position to create a nonmarket social order in which the questions addressed in this essay would have to be answered. But it is precisely questions such as these which are raised by those who would show that nonmarket resource allocation, precisely because it requires public judgments regarding substantive questions of value, is incompatible with democracy and pluralism.  By showing how one might solve this problem, we advance significantly the struggle for a postmarket social order.

 

 

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