Unions have had a history of colliding head-on with both government and business associations in North America. For most of the twentieth century, unionism and socialist aspects have been considered closer to Communism than to the capitalist structure in which it is normally found. “Workers of the world unite” was the rally cry that lay at the underpinnings of Marxism and rightfully scared many business associations into creating “With us or against us” mentalities. However, modern unions are just as hierarchal and organized as any business structure. This paper will look at the institutionalization of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) and its predecessors, as well as the use of different methods of negotiations used over different time periods by this interest group. 

	Unions are one of the best examples of the success of a group institutionalizing for the betterment of its members. Strikes are only effective with the use of a large number of the workers and the ability to negotiate on behalf of the group as a whole. David Truman’s The Governmental Process, (1951) makes the claim that groups cannot exist without individuals, and individuals cannot exist without groups.  For any pluralistic government, this paves the way for unionist structures to appear and attempt to maximize the benefits for their members.  Union memberships in North America have been categorized into two categories, craft and industrial. The nature of the industrial is more of a mass party – the autoworkers union consists of workers with varying levels of skill, making some much more valuable than others. Laxer defines the strengths of the two styles well, “Craft unions relied on the restriction of entry to the trade to minimize competition for jobs. The industrial unions relied on the mass power of their memberships and their potential to halt production.”

The need to appease these parties within the greater umbrella group leads to some internal rifts and divisions. It is in these divisions and push for member’s benefits that lead to the CAWs’ growth, division from American unions and democratic structure.  

	In Canada, early auto production mirrored that of the United States. Work was relatively slow, but the US corporations could ship cars though Canada, and receive commonwealth deals that otherwise would have been missed.  By 1922 Canada’s auto production was number two in the world.  This was not to last though, and while production increased, so did foreign completion and technological production. By 1925, tariffs of up to 35% were put in place to protect Canadian jobs from cheaper foreign (American) imports. This forced many of the smaller companies out, and Canada would never regain anything more than a bit part in global auto production. The production, unionization, and most of the communication and legitimization would come from the south for the next sixty years.

	The United Auto Workers (UAW) was formed in South Bend, Indiana in 1936, but gained legitimacy when GM officially recognized the Union and their demands to end the sit-down strike in Flint, Michigan the following year. Canada’s UAW started in Kelsey Wheel, Windsor, and GM’s subsidy plant, McKinnon, in St.Catherines. Like the Americans, the worker’s unions could do little until they were recognized by the larger business community. 	This recognition was vastly important to the unions, because in order to have legitimacy through any governmental process, the interest group must be able to appeal from a bottom-up (sub-government) branch or the top down, (sending public issues to the executive). In American, where the real war for legitimation was being fought, the UAW had an ace up its sleeve.

	President Roosevelt was on the way out, and his pro-labour “New Deal” platform was moving with him. His 1935 Social Security program had won over the labour vote but by the end of the decade, conservative thought was pushing back. The Depression was entering its tenth year, and a second great approaching in Europe, Roosevelt was more pressed than ever to get America working again. He pressed large business to come to terms with the labour unions as quickly as possible. With the governmental pressure from above, and workers striking below, GM became the first of the big three to recognize the UAW. A few months later, GM president William S. Knudsen was chosen to be chairman of the US Office of Production, which then chose GM to be the main contractor for the US Army in WWII, a twelve billion dollar contract. 

	Meanwhile, in Canada, the Union had elected Treasurer George Burt as the new president of the Canadian UAW. Burt set up the general infrastructure to reflect the democratic electoral process the Union believed in. A loose collation of Nationalist and CCF supporters had put Burt into office, (defeating right-wing American-sponsored Charlie Millard) and Burt’s actions reflected this, setting up a strong central agency to oversee the Union’s actions, the Canadian Council as well as stepping out against American influence by refusing to support the no-strike bills. 

	The Canadian Council is an example of alienation and institutionalization within a corporate structure. The Canadian Council is an elected body that was created in the idea of a social democratic structure. The central body oversaw all the operations regarding labour issues within their jurisdiction (and consulted outside of it) to make sure they were able to maintain influence over left-wing politics in Canada. With the idea of the equal vote, from executive to floor workers, the people supporting the Union believed that the workers themselves had influence over the decision making process within the institution. There was also the idea that the executive would come from and be replaced by the workers ranks, and would therefore be more closely associated with the view of the workers, although in the Canadian UAWs’ 65-year history, George Burt and Buzz Hargrove represent 40 years of leadership. Still, the Canadian Council quickly became the mouth piece (internal and external) for the Union so that they could more efficiently communicate with industry. 

	The Canadian UAWs’ rejection of American CIO-endorsed labour policies would prove to set precedence and become the main factor in the establishment of CAW. Burt outright rejected the policy of banning work strikes during times of war, something the US UAW agreed to, and Burt also attempted to distance the Canadian Union by waiting five years before adopting policies such as the successful collective agreement and “pattern bargaining” models and were more moderate . Burt’s independent polices and nationalistic views were found again in the eighties under Bob White.

	Bob White was elected president of the Canadian UAW in 1978. A stanch socialist, White drove further divisions within the North American auto union policy network. In 1979, the Chrysler Corporation was in severe jeopardy, and sought massive loans from both the US and Canadian governments. The US gave it a 1.5 billion dollar loan guarantee; however, Chrysler would not have a profitable year until 1982 with the “K-Car” series, which were off-set by the record-setting losses in 1980 and 1981. In 1982, the UAW accepted a negotiation with Chrysler passing up wage increases for a profit-sharing bonus. This set precedence in the industry, and GM called for the same technique to be used for their 1984 negotiations. The Washington-based UAW agreed to this policy, Bob White did not. White took the Canadian unions to strike, which “caused the layoff of 51,900 U.S. workers, led to Canadian workers winning more hourly compensation through an increased cost-of-living allowance.” 

	This action had many repercussions. It allowed for the Canadian Autoworker’s Union (CAW) to create its own parliament, regulations and, most importantly, it allowed for separate negotiations to occur on either side of the boarder. CAW also opened up its membership, incorporating an “ongoing campaign to swallow smaller unions, representing everyone from candy - bar makers to distillers.” Now representing only a small, specific part of Canada’s labour force, CAW saw it as a necessity to maintain its’ numbers or lose its’ labour-disrupting tactics, and take a decrease its’ funding via membership dues. The first big acquisition was the 9,000 members of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of Canada that year. While this replaced some of the lost manpower of the UAW, this also brought back the original problem of diverse membership needs. The future of CAW fell into the hands of Basil “Buzz” Hargrove. Hargrove and White used this sudden diversity of CAW to their advantage, in just the right time.  

The early nineties ushered in the beginning of the computer-industry and high tech boom. To deal with this CAW re-focused its priorities to white-collar positions and workplace issues, over the blue-collar wage and strikes they emerged from. In this field, middle management positions weren’t the same industry to industry, and wages were almost inevitably linked to performance instead of hours worked. CAW continued its’ method of raiding memberships from other Unions to increase its size, and by 1994, CAW was the single largest Union in Canada. A transformation of new goals to reflect new needs in the information age worked reasonably well for CAW in dealing with modern environments, however, the polices CAW looks to change are normally of the old blue-collar style. Ann Frost, with Industrial Relations specifically defines CAWs’ success as follows,

“Locke (1995) attributes variation in local union capacities to deal effectively with industrial restructuring to the socio-political context in which the local is embedded. Where institutions (such as employer associations, trade associations, or religious groups) effectively mediate the competing interests of labour and management, restructuring proceeds more smoothly and produces better outcomes for the parties involved.”

	Frost attributes CAW and other local interest groups’ ability to adapt as their key to successes. However, until there is a generational change in the executive of CAW, the policies they pursue will be dated. Recently, CAW has fought and won on such issues as the treatment of workers after the Air Canada, Canadian merger and invested in their own future via a million-dollar grant to Ryerson Polytechnic for “Social Justice and Democracy”. These victories have been based on the historical premise of Union success; Ryerson was chosen because it was seen as a “working-class University”, not for any accomplishments in the field, and the Air-Canada / Canadian wage negotiation simply overlooked the real problems of merging the incompatible booking, checking and baggage computer systems.

	Despite these misguided gestures, CAW has been able to reform to be better able to talk to the wide variety of business leaders they negotiate with. Hargrove has had CAW set up series of modern objectives, including the unionizing of young service businesses, Such as Starbucks, and KFC, and setting up formal meetings with Bay Street Dealers and Bankers, to present their new side. ``We are doing exactly what companies do when they want to sell something to the Street,…We want to sell them on our story,...Perceptions are crucial.'' 

	CAW, and the Canadian UAW before it, has been an effective group in maintaining some degree of bargaining power for their members over the past sixty years. By using both discussion and coercion, the Union has lifted the standard of living of auto workers in North America to one of the best, if not the best, blue-collar industries to work in. The Canadian and US government have helped the Union at various points, such as the “New Deal” and Canada’s tariff rates on imported vehicles, but for the most part, unionism has been seen as a business to business transaction, and treated as such. The CAWs’ ability to meet the demands of many seemly opposing parties views has resulted in its’ continued success. CAW has maintained a democratic structure to appease its worker-members, as well as an administrative body to deal with business, media government and sub-government. The next test for CAW will be the adaptation to the new information age, where the physical presence of labour is questionable, and international boundaries are a side issue. 

Bibliography

Books

Robert Laxer, Canada’s Unions (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1976)

Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada 1827 – 1959 (Montreal:Canadian Social Publications, 1966)

Sam Gindin, The CAW, Birth and Transformation of a Union, (Toronto:  James Lorimer & Co. 
, 1999) 

Articles (Proquest /  Canadian Business and Current Affairs)

Russell Lansbury and Greg J. Bamber: Case Study 1: Automobile assembly (ILO, 1999, unpublished document).

Gary Lamphier “Canadian Auto Workers Will Emphasize Better Pensions in Contract Negotiations,” Wall Street Journal; 14  July 1987.

“Labor pains: adapt or face extinction”, Financial Post Magazine; April 1993

Ann C. Frost, “Creating and sustaining local union capabilities: the role of the national union”, Industrial Relations, v.56(2) Spring 2001, pg 307-335

Peter Fitzpatrick, ”Air Canada reaches deal with CAW: should improve service”, Financial Post (National Post) September 30, 2000 pg D6

CAW Press Release, CAW-Sam Gindin Chair Donation, July 27, 2000

Deirdre McMurdy, “Labour woos the pinstripes”, Maclean's (Toronto Edition) v.112(34) August 23 1999

George Ehring “Labour Driving a Hard Bargain” Multinational Monitor, issue 26, May 1990