Sample Thesis Statements
1. Compare and contrast the historical context of 18th century British and colonial America.
Thesis Statement: Although the American colonies emulated Great Britain's culture and political structure throughout most of the 18th century, anglicization eventually gave way to contrasting religious ideas and political and economic discontent.
2. Discuss the causes and effects of the Civil War.
Thesis Statement: The causes and effects of the Civil War can be attributed to the contrasting political, cultural, and socio-economic conditions in the North and South
3. Analyze the differences between the Spanish settlements in the southwest and the English colonies in New England in the 17th Century in each of the following:
Politics
Religion
Economic Development
Thesis Statement: Catholic Spaniards ran to the New World in search of gold and glory for the crown while Protestant English were running away from control by the crown.
4. Critique the history of expressive and material culture as well as the expressions of social difference and deviance in the United States.
Thesis Statement: Americans created distinct forms of popular literature, art, sports, and entertainment; however, urban violence and discontent, poverty, and alcoholism threatened the American cultural identity as well as the American dream itself.
5. Discern the origins, content, and judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court.
Thesis Statement:Throughout U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court has evolved to promote and protect the rights of American citizens, regulate interstate commerce, and maintain a delicate balance between the state and federal government.
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Book Review
America�s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton, 2nd Edition, By William C. Berman.
(Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998)
By Dan Champagne
From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, historical forces were at work transforming the political landscape. Frustrated with the New Deal coalition and the liberal welfare state, American�s began to embrace a traditional conservative ideology. In his book, America�s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton, William C. Berman offers an insightful analysis regarding this �rightward shift.� According to the author, �Liberalism had become a pejorative word for millions of voters because it was a vehicle for big governmental spending programs for blacks.� This disillusionment with the New Deal order gave rise to a powerful �new conservative establishment� that supported low taxes, less government, patriotism, family values and individual responsibility. (Berman 1-3)
Drawing from an array of extensive primary and secondary sources, Berman deftly examines the �political, cultural and economic� milieu in which conservatives and liberals functioned over the course of four decades. In order to explain conservatism�s political triumph, Berman explores the gradual erosion of the New Deal coalition against the backdrop of �presidential politics� from Nixon to Clinton. The result is a fair and balanced account that clearly explains America�s political realignment from a liberal welfare state to powerful new conservative movement. (Berman xi, 224)
In the first chapter, Berman maintains that throughout Lyndon Johnson�s second term, the body politic was changing inside America. Although the Great Society achieved some success, many white middle class Americans were fearful of urban crime, and resented militant blacks, student radicals and the liberal civil rights agenda. In the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon shrewdly played to the sentiments of this white backlash by calling for tougher law enforcement. While in office, Nixon worked hard to fashion a conservative alliance among Northern Catholics and southern white Protestants, arguing that �the Great Society had wasted the public�s money.� (Berman 9-18)
The conservative trend was briefly derailed - due primarily to the Watergate - when Jimmy Carter won the 1976 presidential election. Unfortunately, Carter and the Democratic Party lacked an ideology and sense of direction with which the American people could identify. Carter�s attempt to bring a sluggish economy under control resulted in high taxes, mounting deficits, unemployment, and rising inflation. Moreover, problems in Afghanistan and Iran highlighted the nation�s frustrations. (Berman 51-56)
In the preceding chapters, Berman argues that the American public�s disillusionment with Jimmy Carter helped pave the way for Ronald Reagan and the reemergence of conservatism. The author goes on to point out that growing forces in the Republican Party - allied with a New Religious Right and conservative Democrats in the South - forged a New Right that was instrumental in electing Reagan. With an overwhelming mandate, the new President boldly called on Congress to cut spending (excluding the military) and lower taxes. At first, the economy spiraled into a deep recession; but, by 1983-84, Reaganomics had produced a �major upturn in jobs and profits.� In addition, Reagan�s foreign policy was instrumental in the collapse of the Soviet empire, and bringing an end to the Cold War. (Berman 100-106)
The success of the Reagan Revolution notwithstanding, Berman concludes with a discussion on the decline of conservatism and the �Clinton center.� Frustrated with President George H.W. Bush�s broken tax promises and a sputtering economy, the American voters sent conservatives reeling in the 1992 presidential election. Democratic President Bill Clinton emerged with a plan to create new jobs, increase taxes, and reform health and welfare. However, his budget barely passed Congress and did little to spark the economy, marking the President as a �tax and spend liberal.� Consequently, the Democrats lost both houses of Congress in the midterm elections. Always the astute politician, Clinton won reelection by moving to the center and reaching out to Republicans, while defending key elements of the Democratic agenda. (Berman 166-175)
America�s Right Turn is an elegantly written book that is both lively and informative. Berman truly captures the rise and triumph of the conservative movement by examining the erosion of the liberal welfare state through the lens of presidential politics. In addition, the author effectively demonstrates that the rightward shift was a direct result of the liberal democratic agenda, the decline of organized labor, and a growing conservative coalition in the United States. The author�s greatest fault, however, is that he assumes the New Deal order remained intact until the election of 1968. On the contrary, there�s ample evidence to suggest that the rejection of the liberal ideology began much earlier. For example, during the prosperity of the post war years, Americans turned against federal regulations and welfare programs. Moreover, Congress was controlled by a conservative majority made up of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats - the same alliance that blocked Roosevelt�s reforms after 1938. (Breen, Divine 840)
Overall, Berman has done an outstanding job. Except for a few minor oversights, this is a solid book. Although some of the ground has been covered before, this is a useful narrative that will continue to stimulate debate regarding the cause and effect of the conservative realignment. Readers interested in a coherent anatomy on political ideologies in contemporary twentieth-century American history will find a complete and objective treatment in America�s Right Turn.
Sources:
Berman, William. America�s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton. Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Breen, T.H. and Robert Divine. America: Past and Present. Glenview, Ill: Scott,
Foresman and Co., 1984.
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Oral History - Hill 351
Recollections of the battle for Hill 351 during the Colmar Campaign, by B Company CO
Lt. G. William Mohr, US Army, 3rd Infantry Division
Dan Champagne
The story begins on December 17, 1944. I was the commanding officer of B Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Regiment (part of the 3rd Infantry Division) as we started our advance south from Strasbourg, France to relieve the 36th Infantry Division in the Colmar Region. The 3rd Division�s first objective was to secure the towns of Bennwihr and Sigolsheim. These were the last two important towns between an element of the American line and the key city of Colmar. Both towns were located at the extreme western edge of the Alsace Plain, and just east of the last high slopes of the Vosges. We were facing a difficult challenge because the enemy had fortified all of these areas, including the high ground. One of the obstacles to our advance was a German stronghold called Hill 351.
The 1st Battalion, 15th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Keith L. Ware, was ordered to capture the town of Sigolsheim, which was an anchor of the enemy line located on the northern perimeter of the Colmar Bridgehead. Even though the town had been battered by artillery fire, the German force had dug into the rubble and was primed and ready to resist our attack.
At H-hour 0730 on December 23, the 1st Battalion attacked Sigolsheim. We immediately encountered machine gun and small arms fire before entering the town. The entrance of Company A into the town of Sigolsheim was just the beginning of a terrific fight that was about to take place. The 1st Battalion was repulsed from Sigolsheim several times. We quickly learned that the enemy defenses were not only in the towns but also on the northern and eastern slopes of Hill 351. In addition, the ground was muddy and our tanks got bogged down. It was just a mess. We suffered terrible losses that day and had to eventually pull back to Riquewihr, where we dug in for the night.
It was now apparent that before we could take Sigolsheim, the enemy must be cleared from Hill 351 or the same thing would happen again. The hill was perfectly positioned between the towns of Bennwihr and Sigolsheim. It was a steep, bare, irregular mass of rock which sloped gradually to the northwest toward Riquewihr and provided the Germans with excellent observation. This miniature Cassino was defended by 200 crack SS troops under orders to hold their positions to the last. To make matters worst, they used the hill to direct artillery and mortar fire on our troops as we moved into Sigolsheim. If we would have taken Sigolsheim without first taking Hill 351 it would have been suicidal.
On the morning of December 24, Companies A and C attacked up the northwestern slope of the hill. Company A, commanded by Capt. Elmo F. Tefanelli, reached the top twice but was badly disorganized by heavy mortar and artillery fire. The Germans pushed them back and they were forced to withdraw to the base of the hill. Company C, under the command of Capt. Samuel H. Roberts, took up the fight and succeeded in reaching the northeast slope of the hill by noon. Both companies were forced to dig in.
The 1st Battalion fought in the snow for possession of the hill through Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, suffering heavy casualties. Hill 351 still remained in German hands as Christmas night came to an end. However, we were not about to concede the hill to the enemy so easily. Early that Christmas morning, Lt. Col. Ware had ordered my company (B Company) out of Sigolsheim to attack Hill 351. He wanted us to attack the hill from the direction of Riquewihr so we could join up with Company C on the northeast slope. I told him that it was too dangerous to withdraw from Sigolsheim during daylight hour so we moved into position near Riquewihr after dark.
On December 26 at 0500, we encountered a heavy firefight en route, coming under heavy machine gun and small arms fire from a well-entrenched enemy. Throughout the morning my men inched slowly up the hill. Shortly before noon, B Company approached the slope of the hill but immediately encountered fierce and accurate artillery and mortar fire. We had already made several unsuccessful attempts to advance up Hill 351. We were going one foot at a time. Each time we moved, a rain of accurately directed artillery and mortar fire fell on the men. As we pressed forward, we encountered fire from half a dozen machine guns which had excellent field of fire; they dominated our approach to the crest. All of a sudden, one of my officers got a wound in the chest. I knew then that we were in for one hell of a battle. The fighting was so bad that we were eventually forced to dig in.
I immediately sent Pfc. Dominick Trepasso and Sgt. William Weinberg back to Battalion Headquarters to get help. When they both got there, they showed Lt. Col. Ware our position on the map. They told him that there were not many survivors left, and the ones who were alive were centered around Company B on the northeast slope. Ware immediately put together a Task Force of about twenty-five men. Weinberg and Trepasso led them up a road and through a vineyard back to Company B.
For the better part of two hours Lt. Col. Ware reconnoitered the enemy positions. He deliberately drew fire on himself in order to locate enemy automatic weapons. Ware then moved up the hill to feel out possible approaches to the heart of the German stronghold. At approximately 1400 hours, Ware decided that a display of leadership was required. So, he went from foxhole to foxhole trying to inspire us to attack. He then armed himself with an automatic rifle and led a handful of men and a tank in a daring assault on six enemy machine gun positions at the top of the hill. It was the bravest thing I ever saw.
As soon as Ware and his men proceeded up the hill, enemy machine gun fire converged on them from hidden positions. Ware moved forward ahead of his men as bullets ricocheted off the rocks beside him. He approached to within twenty yards of the first enemy machine gun and shot two German riflemen. He then indicated its position to his tank by firing tracer rounds into the emplacement. The tank promptly knocked the gun out of action. Ware then turned his attention to a second machine gun and advanced fifty yards through furious fire, killing two of its supporting riflemen. Again, his tank silenced the gun. After he expended the rounds for the automatic rifle, Lt. Col. Ware took up an M1 rifle, killed another German rifleman, and fired upon a third machine gun nearly fifty yards away. Once his tank destroyed the position, he charged toward a fourth machine gun and fearlessly engaged it, forcing the support riflemen to surrender.
During this action, Ware�s small assault group was fully engaged in attacking enemy positions. Five out of eleven men were casualties. Lt. Col. Ware was wounded in the hand but refused medical attention. For his actions, he received the Congressional Medal of Honor. I am proud to say that I was one of the key witnesses who wrote up a complete description of this incredible feat of heroism.
In my opinion, Ware�s courage was an act, not only of heroism, but of necessity. It was essential that the deadlock in the Sigolsheim sector be broken and that the discouraged troops be motivated. Col. Ware personally killed five Germans and captured about twenty others. Tank fire, which the Col. directed, accounted for four of the six machine guns that comprised the hard core of the German position.
Even though the German defensive positions were significantly compromised, they still controlled the hill. When Ware got back to Battalion Headquarters, he ordered me to organize my company in preparation for the final assault. It was just about that time that I got hit in the hip. I immediately asked a private to come up and cut open my canteen so I could put ice on the wound. It was so cold that day that my drinking water was frozen. Then the scariest thing happened. Suddenly, a shell came into our foxhole and hit the private in the chest. I looked down on my leg and there were parts of his brains sitting there. We lost a lot of good men that day; it was one hell of a fight.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion coordinated its fires with the attack of the 1st Battalion in the final clearing of Hill 351. Once the German positions were shattered, they frantically ran toward the hillcrest. Mortar fire from Company D spread over the forward slope of the hill and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
Hill 351, the towns of Bennwihr and Sigolsheim and a large number of prisoners were the spoils of war that day. However, the price of victory was high. We called Hill 351 Christmas Hill, and the Germans called it Bloody Hill. Both names were fitting. B Company had the largest casualties that day. We lost all our officers and over forty percent of the Company. In the end, we seized the hill that the enemy had been ordered to hold to the death and eliminated part of the Colmar Bridgehead, putting us one step closer to the German border.
After we cleared the hill, I was taken back to a tool shed (makeshift aid station) near the base. On the way down, my stretcher bearers dropped me twice. You know, they tell you when you get a bad wound it doesn�t really hurt; well, don�t believe them. When I got back down the hill, they cut off all my clothes and started giving me plasma. Then they put me on a jeep, covered me with a blanket, and drove me to battalion headquarters. I remember being naked as a jaybird and cold as hell.
When I got to Battalion HQ, the surgeon gave me a shot of whiskey and said: �The war is over for you Mohr.� They finally put me on the operating table after I had lost an enormous amount of blood. Throughout the night, the doctors gave me penicillin and blood every three hours. When I woke up at 0500 the next morning, I asked the doctor how long is this going to continue. He said, �When your fingernails get a little pink, you�re out of trouble.� I remember praying to the lord that morning and telling him that if he got me home alive I would try to do everything I could for my fellow man.
I was eventually flown to Paris in a cargo plane. And from France, I was shipped to Nashville. I remained there for about three months or so to recuperate. I wanted to stay in the army but they told me my leg was an inch too short. According to Army regulations, if my leg was at least 1� inches too short I would be eligible for full disability. It was � inch too long to qualify. After about eight months, I started losing all the feeling in my leg. As it turned out, my leg was indeed 1� inches shorter than normal. So, in the end, I did qualify for full disability. In 1946, I was honorably discharged with the rank of captain.
The battle for Hill 351 not only influenced the outcome of the Colmar Campaign but it also had a big impact on my own life. During the battle, I wasn�t so much afraid of getting killed - although it did enter my mind - as I was of not doing the right thing. The last thing I wanted to do was to be a failure in the eyes of my men. As an officer, I was confronted by this phenomenon throughout the war. Even today it weighs heavily on me in regards to my wife, children and grandchildren. The war definitely matured me; I was forced to grow up fast and accept responsibilities whether I liked it or not.
Many years after the war, I was treated for post-traumatic stress disorder. No, I don�t think about the war every night but I think about it often. It�s just something that never goes away. I give a lot of talks on Memorial and Veterans Day which is therapeutic. The message I tell young people is to try and settle your differences peacefully. War should always be a last resort. In recent years, my health has been failing. My leg wound gives me a lot of pain these days and makes it difficult to walk without a cane. But, looking back, I�m not bitter and I don�t have any regrets. I�m glad I served; I would do it again in a minute. I especially admire the young people serving in the armed services today, and often think back to the time I was called to duty. It makes me proud to be an American.
After the war, G. William Mohr was an Associate Professor at Indiana University - his alma mater. In 1954, he went to work for his father at the Mohr Construction Company, where he remained until his retirement in 1983. The following year, Mohr published a pictorial account on the Third Infantry Division�s march through France and Germany. Sadly, Bill Mohr died of a heart attack in Naples, Florida shortly after our interview. He is survived by his loving wife Joan, three sons: James, William and Douglas and six grandchildren.
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Annotated Bibliography
Ambrose, Stephen. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the
Bulge to the Surrender of Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
In this definitive World War Two account about the U.S. Army in Europe, Stephen Ambrose draws from countless interviews with American and German veterans. This riveting narrative is the sequel to Ambrose�s best selling book, D-Day, and chronicles the events from the hedgerows of Normandy to the eventual surrender of the Third Reich. Ambrose portrays the �faces of courage, heroism, fear and determination� that shaped the victory of the citizen soldiers in the Second World War. Ambrose truly captures the realities of war by placing the reader on the field of battle. This is an elegantly written, must read book that is both lively and informative. The author�s greatest weakness, however, is that the work lacks analysis. Throughout the book, Ambrose lionizes Eisenhower to a fault, rarely scrutinizing the Allied commander�s broad front strategy. Moreover, due to the considerable attention given to the GI�s, the reader is left with many unanswered questions regarding some of the other major players in the European theater of Operations.
Bradley, Omar. A Soldier�s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc, 1951.
In this definitive, and highly recommended, World War Two memoir about the U.S. Army in Europe, General Omar Bradley takes the reader on a behind the scenes eyewitness account of the men involved in marshalling and directing the war. It is not so much a soldier's story as a commander's story. This book is not just an autobiography. On the contrary, it also describes the strategies of the various campaigns in the European Theater. In his treatment of Eisenhower, Patton, and Montgomery, Bradley offers an interesting look at the men behind the legends and their failures and shortcomings. The book is lively, informative and extremely personal, revealing a different side of Omar Bradley. Bradley�s greatest fault, however, is his undying support of Eisenhower. Consequently, he inadvertently places the Supreme Commander on a pedestal where he�s virtually untouchable. This privileged position leaves the reader feeling a bit skeptical. Moreover, Bradley is highly critical of Monty and never truly gives Patton his due.
Breuer, William. Death of a Nazi Army: The Falaise Pocket. Scarborough House
Publishing,1985.
In this book, William Breuer does a nice job depicting the monumental defeat of the German Army in France. This riveting narrative captures the plodding struggle through the hedgerows, the rapid breakout at St. Lo, and the devastating Allied pincer movement that surrounded 100,000 die-hard Germans at Falaise. Overall, this is a good look at a relatively unknown battle of WW II. The author�s research is original, but it is supported by an array of secondary sources from some of the top historians in the field. In his treatment of the commanders, Breuer points the finger of blame at Eisenhower for not allowing Patton to close the Falaise-Argentan Gap sooner; but, not surprisingly, he maintains that Bradley�s caution and coolness toward Montgomery also contributed to the tactical blunder. Although this is a solid treatment of the Falaise-Argentan Campaign, Breuer�s greatest weakness is that the story is clearly written from the American point of view. Moreover, the author spends an inordinate amount of time on the events leading up to the Falaise Pocket, which leaves the reader pondering the book�s title.
Brooks, Victor. The Normandy Campaign: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris.
Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002.
In this brief yet satisfying book, Victor Brooks takes us on a momentous journey, beginning with the Allied landings at Utah and Omaha Beaches and ending with the liberation of Paris. Brooks presents a complete picture of the Normandy Campaign, with full coverage of all the nations taking part and a candid look at the rivalry between the different Allied nations and the different German branches of service. This book is well written and complimented with interesting sidebars and an annotated bibliography. In addition, the author uses his unique grading system to evaluate the relative performance of the major military and civilian leaders during the course of the campaign. He is especially critical of Bradley�s overly cautious approach, yet praiseworthy of Patton�s audacity, maintaining that �the Third Army commander was the American general with the clearest vision of the main military objective during the Normandy Campaign.�
Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War 1943-1945. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
This in depth book is written by the Allied Supreme Commander�s grandson David Eisenhower, and focuses on the preparation and execution of WW II in the European Theater of Operations. This is a political rather than a military view of the war in Europe. As a result, military matters are the backdrop to the political intrigues Ike is subjected to. Because most other books on WW II ignore the political aspects, this work offers the reader a refreshing perspective. David Eisenhower does an excellent job presenting the rivalries between the allied generals, the political maneuverings of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Patton, Bradley, and Montgomery receive appropriate attention as does Normandy and the Ardennes offensive. The Eisenhower-Montgomery feud is covered extensively. Surprisingly, the author is more impartial & perhaps more understanding of Monty's motives than other American historians have been. Overall, the book is clearly written, thoroughly researched, and paints a fair and balanced portrait of the Supreme Commander. Somewhat disappointing, however, is the laissez faire approach the author takes when confronted with Eisenhower�s broad front strategy. Although David Eisenhower doesn�t come across as overly supportive of his grandfather�s plan, he isn�t willing to scrutinize it either.