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For Allah's Sake continued: |
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Not surprisingly, Palazzi has been criticized by some of his co-religionists for his messianic interpretation of such passages. One liberal Moslem academic living in Jerusalem who prefers not to be identified objects to Palazzi's stepping so far out of line with the current Moslem consensus. But Palazzi says in response that his view more closely reflects traditional Islam, as opposed to today's politicized Islamism. While he agrees that consensus is an important concept in Islam, he explains that "consensus" means that "major Islamic scholars around the world have no objection to a specific stance - it [consensus] is not a referendum of popular thinking." This, he says, is why he has not been the target of death threats. Nothing he says is heretical, and none can take issue - whether theologically or traditionally - with his views. Although he is, as he says, out of the current consensus, he is not totally out of the religious loop. In fact, Palazzi's is not the only Islamic voice speaking out for Israel. He is joined by many Sufi masters, both here and abroad. Sufi Sheikh Mehmet Selim of Turkey has even said that Israel should be admired for its staunch defense of human rights. But while Sufism may be considered marginal, the non-Arab Moslem world - including such as Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as Turkey itself - is not. And Palazzi reports that there, his views are not considered entirely outre. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, also a leading Moslem scholar, has come out in favor of improving his country's ties with Israel. Palazzi also acknowledges the observation that governments like those of Egypt and Turkey promote the Sufi tradition of non-political spirituality and mysticism in order to deter Islamism. The reverse is also true, he says; those countries with a strong Sufi tradition, such as Turkey, have been least receptive to what is known as "fundamentalist Islam" or "Islamism." |
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Palazzi is encouraged, he says, by traditional Islamic (as opposed to what is today called "fundamentalist Islam" or "Islamist") views coming out of the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. In fact, the credo of the new Islamic University of Tashkent, as outlined by Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, sounds anything but Islamist: "[The university's aim is] to cultivate the study of our religion from a broad and humane perspective, taking into account developments in the natural sciences and world civilization. We intend to make a noble contribution to the development of morality and ethics, and to strengthen peace and stability in our land, and the whole world, by inspiring feelings of mutual love and respect between peoples."
A GENERATION ago, even some sectors of the Arab Moslem world were more willing than they are today to show flexibility in their dealings with Israel. When the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat came on his peace trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, he was accompanied by Sheikh Sha'rawi, the revered former mufti of Egypt who had resigned from public office to devote himself to the study of Sufism. |
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By this act, Sha'rawi, a universally-recognized Islamic authority, refuted the claim that peace with Israel was impossible from the Islamic perspective. Praying together with Sadat at al-Aksa Mosque, he flew in the face of calls for Moslem leaders to refrain from going there as long as it remained under Jewish rule. Sha'rawi's influence was so strong that it even compelled the mufti of Saudi Arabia to declare that a peace treaty with Israel was permissible as long as it served Moslem interests.
But all that changed with Sha'rawi's death, and the assassination of Sadat. The Hamas terror organization, which recognizes the Saudi Arabian mufti as its religious authority, has taken advantage of the loophole in his ruling, and now proclaims that it no longer serves Moslem interests to develop peaceful relations with Israel. Today's politicized religious leaders, says Palazzi, especially the popular charismatic preachers, are usually far from being scholars. Often they are unordained, either in the traditional teacher-to-disciple sense, or in the sense that they had never attended institutions of Islamic studies. Palazzi recalls an al-Quds interview with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in which the charismatic Hamas leader revealed that he had never studied beyond elementary school, and that his "Sheikh" title was merely honorary, because of his age and status.
Palazzi also points to the denial by the Palestinian Authority-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem Ikramah Sabri that a Jewish Temple had ever existed on the Temple Mount. This, he says, is a flagrant slap at Islamic tradition. Imam Qurtubi, the Islamic counterpart of the Jewish commentator Rashi, quotes the earlier commentator Imam Tabari who related the Prophet Mohammed's response to a follower's query about the ruins of the fabled Jewish Temple. Qurtubi sets out in writing Tabari's words about the destruction of the Temple, which tally in every detail with biblical accounts of the Temple's destruction by the Babylonians, reconstruction, and final destruction by the Romans.
Palazzi speculates that Sabri had been a PLO flunky before his appointment to his current position. Sabri had in fact complained to the director of the Mosque of Rome about Palazzi and the unusual views he had voiced as the Moslem representative a 1996 conference on Jerusalem held here. Palazzi asked the mosque's director to give Sabri his address and fax number, so that Sabri could address him directly - but Palazzi is still waiting to hear from him. PALAZZI says it is the Wahabi sect, that rules Saudi Arabia, that is responsible for the politicized Islam so dominant in the Middle East and throughout much of the Islamic world. |
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He calls the Wahabis, once a tribe of Beduin nomads, "primitive literists"- a case in point is the two Saudi princes who accompanied astronauts on a NASA mission ten years ago, in order to give official witness before a religious court that the earth was, in truth, not flat - and asserts that the Wahabis have made tremendous efforts to transform Islam from a religion into a totalitarian political ideology. The Wahabis had themselves been branded heretics by hundreds of fatwas before the British brought them to prominence to help them take control of Mecca and Medina. Girded with physical power through their oil wealth, and spiritual power through their control of Islam's holiest sites, Saudia Arabia and the Moslem Brotherhood that it supports wield tremendous influence over the Moslem world.
In Europe, Palazzi charges, local Moslems are confronted by "religious colonialism." While he estimates that only about 200 out of the half-a-million strong Moslem community identifies with the Moslem Brotherhood, the Brotherhood controls more than 90 percent of Italian mosques. He also says that Saudi ambassadors pressure local European governments to look upon Moslem Brotherhood clerics as the official representatives of local Moslems. However, they have a counterbalance in the ambassadors from countries like Morocco and Egypt, who point out that the extremist Moslem Brotherhood is banned in their own country.
Palazzi also notes that in the US, Islamist influence is even stronger, thanks to the Saudis' strong government and business (i.e. oil) links. It is ironic, he notes, that the only organization authorized to train military chaplains in the US is one religiously tied to the Hamas - although the US has outlawed Hamas, declaring it a terrorist organization. |
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