

Policy Memo:
North Korea Nuclear Crisis

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POLICY MEMORANDUM

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TO: The National Security Council, United States of America
FROM: Dave H. Kim, Advisor to the National Security Council
RE: North Korea Nuclear Crisis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threatens the United States (U.S.) and the global community by: 1) developing nuclear weapons; 2) proliferating materials and technologies associated with nuclear weapons; and 3) undermining the international nonproliferation regime. Specifically, the DPRK has:

1. Admitted to a uranium enrichment program;
2. Abandoned the Agreed Framework of 1994;
3. Withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT);
4. Expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors;
5. Reopened nuclear facilities and resumed the reprocessing of fissile materials for the sole purpose of building nuclear weapons;
6. Attempted to transfer weapons technologies to other nations.

The nuclear crisis on the Korea Peninsula is a problem for many countries, and many countries should partake in resolving the crisis. The best policy option for the U.S. is to pursue a multilateral agreement – a peaceful and diplomatic solution – that allows for the sharing of costs, accountability, and responsibilities. It will be exceedingly difficult for North Korea to disavow or violate an agreement where its neighboring states are also signatories. The cooperation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) – the DPRK's closest ally – will be particularly important to the success of such an agreement. A main goal of the U.S., therefore, should be winning over Beijing to collaborate on the resolution. While this may pose great challenges, the *raison d'être* for China and the U.S. to work together are many.

INTRODUCTION

Key Questions

Some key questions to consider are: 1) why is a multilateral agreement the best policy option; 2) why is China's collaboration so critical its success; and 3) why would China want to cooperate with the U.S. on the North Korea nuclear crisis? If these questions – which are interrelated – can provide the answer to the policy problem, then they are key questions that

require further study. This examination will begin by providing historical context for analysis, such as past relations and current political relations and economic state of affairs. The second portion of the essay will discuss the possible policy options and their strengths and weaknesses. Analyses of the possible policy options will study the advantages and disadvantages of each policy option and incorporate the factors of the past and current strategic, political, and economic relations from the background portion of the essay. Lastly, this paper will recommend a policy option and what this course of action, if adopted, may mean for the U.S. government.

Criteria for Analysis

The key factors that can influence potential policy options are effectiveness, durability, costs, and public opinions and perceptions. Effectiveness will measure to what degree North Korea will be free of and unable to produce nuclear weapons, and, therefore, the concept of complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) will be the standard of measure.¹ Durability must be a key factor of consideration due to the recent collapse of the Agreed Framework of the 1990s. Policymakers of the world, and in particular the U.S., are not likely to be content with another short-lived success that will demand their attention and resources again in the near future. Costs of a possible policy option will consider both human and financial resources – the costs in “blood and treasure.” If the costs are too high in either aspect, the challenges of carrying out such a policy option may hinder or render useless the resolution. Finally, public opinions will consider those of the U.S. public, the neighboring states (the Republic of Korea [ROK], Japan, China, and Russia), and, to a lesser extent, the overall global community and international governmental organizations (IGO).

¹ The CVID idea, favored by the current Bush administration, is much more likely to satisfy both “hawks” and “doves.”

The Historical Context

The interchanges between China and Korea that has lasted for millennia permeated nearly every aspect of the two civilizations. While the relationship did have its strains and disappointments, the millennia of favorable relations and familiarity cannot be pushed aside or ignored. In fact, it can be argued that it was not until the imperialist movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century that China, itself being in no condition to protect or assist the traditional vassal state, truly disenchanted Korea by allowing Japan to have free reign and eventually annex and colonize Korea for almost four decades. Korean hostilities have always been aimed more at Japan, not China, for the countless invasions on the peninsula and the most recent colonial rule that formally began in 1910.² And while South Korea detached itself politically and strategically from China at the end of World War II, North Koreans have grown only closer to their Chinese comrades in the last sixty years, albeit while still maintaining a uniquely strong sense of self and independence. China has traditionally been an ally and protector of Korea until the Chinese Civil War, and, even after the Civil War, China has maintained its status as a key ally to the DPRK regime in North Korea.

The Economic Milieu

China's economy now has the second largest purchasing power parity (gross domestic product [GDP]) in the world at \$6.5 trillion with an annual real growth rate of 9.1 percent.³ Compared to the U.S.' \$10.9 trillion GDP and growth rate of 3.1 percent and North Korea's \$29.5 billion GDP and growth rate of 1 percent, it is clear that Beijing and Washington are in

² Victor Cha, "What's Behind the Smile?" *Comparative Connections*, Pacific Forum CSIS, Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 2000, available at: http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/003Qjapan_skorea.html.

³ *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2003, available at: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>. Unless stated otherwise, all figures are estimates for fiscal year 2004.

perfect positions to apply some sort of economic pressure on Pyongyang. For instance, China is North Korea's single greatest imports partner, making up roughly 40 percent of all imports into North Korea, and second largest exports partner, consuming 28.4 percent of North Korean exports.⁴ Additionally, North Korea's economy, perhaps the most centrally planned and isolated economies of the world, is still in grave dire straits. Despite a good harvest in 2001, North Korea has faced ten consecutive years of food shortages, barely escaping mass starvation, thanks to \$300 million in food aid from the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and others in 2002.⁵ What these figures do not reflect, however, is the fact that North Korea's GDP still ranks ninetieth out of the list of 231 countries. The greatest problems associated with North Korea's dismal economic conditions may have to do with the regime's poor management. For example, the DPRK's military expenditures ranked the highest in the world at 33.9 percent of GDP in 2001. When compared to those of its immediate neighbors – the PRC's 4.3 percent, South Korea's 2.8 percent, and Japan's 1 percent – one cannot help but question the DPRK regime's management of its economic resources, as well as its priorities and intentions.

POLICY OPTIONS

Agreed Framework II

Akin to the original 1994 agreement, the U.S. can negotiate an Agreed Framework II with the DPRK regime. While the Framework was regrettably short-lived and ultimately left many in doubt, it was successful in halting the development of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula for nearly eight years. Work at nuclear facilities covered by the Agreed Framework had ceased; this freeze was monitored by IAEA inspectors; and the DPRK had agreed to a moratorium on

⁴ It should be of significant notice that South Korea and Japan, both immediate neighbors and members of the Six-Party Talks, round out the top three importers of North Korean goods, at 28.5 percent and 24.7 percent respectively.

⁵ *The World Factbook*, available at: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

ballistic missiles tests.⁶ However, to avoid a repeat of the first failure of the Agreed Framework, certain lessons learned can be applied in the second Framework. For instance, those who have studied and are familiar with the DPRK regime should not have been surprised at learning that the DPRK had taken advantage of the loopholes. The negotiators of Agreed Framework II, then, should take such facets into consideration to close these gaps and leaks in the next round. Additionally, although the duration of the Agreed Framework's success may be unsatisfactory to most policymakers, many repeated short solutions can theoretically add up to a long-lasting solution in the end. A sequence of solutions that effectively dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program, with short periods of renewed negotiations between such solutions, may be in practice very effective in preventing the DPRK from commanding a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons. A short-lived solution is better than not having one at all. Moreover, this would be essentially a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK, and this equates to tremendous autonomy and range for Washington in negotiations with the Pyongyang, and it is ultimately the U.S. and the DPRK that will determine the terms and applications of the agreement. The costs for this policy option will be relatively low again and there is also unlikely that there will not be any surprises for the U.S. and its allies this time around.

Perhaps the greatest disadvantage with this policy option is, again, that the original agreement of 1994 collapsed in 2002 after only eight years. Beginning in October 2002, the DPRK: lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled the United Nations (UN) IAEA inspectors; confirmed intelligence reports of a clandestine uranium enrichment program; announced the withdrawal from the NPT, to be effective immediately;⁷ and declared that the bilateral Joint Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula agreement with Seoul

⁶ *North Korea Special Collection*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) webpage, available at: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/index.htm>.

⁷ The DPRK claimed 89 of the 90-day withdrawal notification period had been consumed in 1993.

was no longer valid.⁸ And currently, North Korea is actively developing nuclear weapons, and the U.S. intelligence community estimates that the DPRK may possess two to six nuclear warheads.⁹ The mere existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula is intolerable. Thus if a possible solution is unlikely to last a satisfactory duration of time, then the same solution also loses all effectiveness once the agreement is terminated. Today's U.S. policymakers, particularly those who demand a surefire policy, are likely to oppose such a policy option.

The Multilateral Agreement

A multilateral agreement provides an alternative that is still peaceful and diplomatic. This policy option allows for the sharing of costs and responsibilities, thus keeping the same low costs and burdens. However, a multilateral agreement, in which several governments are signatories and bound to an agreement, also means the sharing of accountability and applied pressures on the DPRK regime that a bilateral agreement cannot offer. A part of this is an inherent feature of a multilateral agreement where the DPRK will be forced to consider long and hard about the consequences before breaking an agreement with – in addition to the U.S. – the ROK, Japan, the PRC, and Russia, the members of the ongoing Six-Party Talks.

As a regional hegemon militarily, politically, and economically, China's influence in the region and on North Korea is unquestionable. As mentioned earlier, China and Korea have shared good relations, history, and familiarity, centering on the exchange of goods, ideologies, arts, peoples, and languages. Chinese and Koreans even share similar experiences of humiliation

⁸ *North Korea Special Collection*, available at: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/index.htm>.

⁹ *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July-December 2003*, NIC Reports, Director of Central Intelligence, available at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm.

and suffering under the common foe of imperialist Japan.¹⁰ These common grounds between China and North Korea indicate that, where the DPRK will naturally be somewhat suspicious – if not outright distrustful – of all initiatives of the U.S., the DPRK will be more open-minded when in discussions with the PRC. Furthermore, China – with an economy that is approximately 220 times that of North Korea – is the single greatest importer of North Korean goods *and* the single greatest benefactor of foreign economic assistance in the form of food grains, fuel oil, and long-term loans.¹¹ In March 2003, China flexed its muscle and cut off oil supplies to North Korea for three days, presumably for the purpose of drawing the DPRK regime to the negotiations table in the nuclear standoff.¹² China, Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, has touted its relations with North Korea for decades as being “as close as lips and teeth.”¹³ Beijing—Pyongyang relations can be likened to the relationship between the U.S. and Israel.

Why would China want to cooperate with the U.S. in resolving the nuclear crisis? There are four incentives for the PRC to work together with Washington. First, China is fundamentally against North Korea developing and possessing nuclear weapons. Not only is this idea threatening in itself, but what is more important to China is that a nuclear-armed North Korea will drastically destabilize the region and likely lead to an arms race. North Korea is perceived to be the greatest security threat to both South Korea and Japan, and it would not be unrealistic for both governments to also seek to develop nuclear weapons. The current strategic alliance

¹⁰ To my knowledge and in my opinion, this aspect is not discussed very frequently. For one such discussion, see: “Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: regional implications of North Korea’s nuclear program,” *Federal News Service*, March 12, 2003, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

¹¹ *The World Factbook*, available at: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>; *Background Note: North Korea*, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State webpage, updated August 2004, available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm>.

¹² Jonathan Watts, “China Cuts Oil Supply to North Korea,” *The Guardian* (London), April 1, 2003, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,926833,00.html>; “North Korea Hit by a Brief Halt in China’s Oil Supplies,” *Agence France Presse*, March 12, 2003, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

¹³ “Pursed Lips, Gnashing Teeth,” *The Economist*, September 4, 2001, available at: http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=768263.

that provides the “nuclear umbrella” may easily be deemed to be inadequate to significant portions of policymakers in both South Korea and Japan. A nuclear-armed South Korea and, in particular, Japan would be the absolute last thing the PRC would tolerate. Moreover, voices for a nuclear weapons program in Taiwan are almost sure to grow boisterous as well.

China will want to collaborate with the U.S. because this presents incredible opportunities for give-and-take with the American government. One such opportunity is perhaps what is China’s most important current issue: the future of Taiwan and its push for independence. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 commits the U.S. to provide various defensive and security measures to Taiwan, and this issue, more than ever since President Carter’s decision to shift official U.S. recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC, is one of the primary points of conflict between the U.S. and China.¹⁴ Considering the magnitude of the Taiwan issue for the PRC, the U.S. has a range of realistic incentives to offer China in exchange for working together with the North Korea nuclear issue. An example of such an incentive may involve the reduction of arms sales, which has repeatedly been a hotpoint in U.S.—PRC relations.¹⁵ Another opportunity for give-and-take lies in the War on Terror as China tries to stamp out Muslim separatists in the Xinjiang Uyghur region and as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attempts to post FBI personnel and agents in Beijing for closer collaborative efforts.¹⁶

The PRC has taken great strides in reviving and reforming China’s sluggish and centrally planned economy, and herein lies the third reason for China to collaborate with the U.S. in

¹⁴ Monte R. Bullard, “Strait Talk: avoiding nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan,” an e-book, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), 2003, available at: <http://faculty.miis.edu/~mbullard>.

¹⁵ John King, “U.S. Official: Taiwan Arms Sale Will Address Imbalance,” *CNN.com*, April 23, 2001, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/23/bush.taiwan.04/?s=1>; “Chinese Fury Over U.S. Arms Sale,” *BBC*, April 25, 2001, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1296425.stm>.

¹⁶ Ralph Jennings, “FBI Director Seeks China’s Help on Al-Qaida Crimes,” *Kyodo News Service* (Tokyo), April 21, 2004, available at: <http://home.kyodo.co.jp/all/display.jsp?an=20040421098>; “Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s Remarks in Beijing,” *Current Issues*, U.S. Embassy, London, UK, June 12, 2001, available at: <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/china135.html>.

resolving the nuclear crisis. Beijing has claimed 7 to 8 percent annual growth in recent years, and while many observers believe the official figures over the past two decades overstated China's real economic growth by 2 to 3 percentage points, China's official national growth rates of the past few years are close to actual GDP growth.¹⁷ China's bilateral trade with the U.S. is especially critical to sustaining this astonishing economic growth. Currently, the U.S. is the single greatest trading partner to China, buying nearly a quarter of all Chinese exports.¹⁸ The PRC's goals of maintaining peace and stability within China and in the region as a whole are intimately linked to its objectives of economic development and sustenance, and China's economic development and sustenance depends greatly on its bilateral trade with America.

The fourth and last incentive for Beijing to work together with Washington has to do with China's close proximity to the Korean Peninsula. China shares a 1,000 km border with North Korea, and more than 200,000 North Korean refugees have been estimated to have crossed into China.¹⁹ The collapse of the Pyongyang regime and the subsequent chaos that is sure to follow would be a most unfavorable scenario for the Beijing government. Due to a steady increase in North Koreans forcing their way into foreign embassies in Beijing to seek asylum, the PRC has declared that it would clamp down and forcibly repatriate more North Koreans.²⁰ Human rights groups have said that North Korean defectors sent back home face severe prison sentences or execution upon their return, and the whole situation has brought unwanted attention. The U.S.' North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 could significantly raise the awareness of human rights

¹⁷ *The World Factbook*, available at: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Ambassador Chun Yung-woo, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, a private meeting at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California, December 9, 2004; also in attendance: Chung Sang-ki, Consul General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco; Monte Bullard, Acting Director of East Asia Nonproliferation Program of CNS; Bill Potter, Director of CNS; Clay Moltz, Deputy Director of CNS.

²⁰ "China Returns N. Korea Refugees," *BBC News*, November 9, 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3995345.stm>.

abuses in North Korea, which could turn up the pressure on China. Human rights issues continue to be a thorn in other areas of foreign relations of the PRC, who are still often associated with the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. And a collapse of the DPRK regime may also mean civil war or violent coup d'état where, although resources may be scarce, military arms are plentiful enough to arm over 1 million active troops.

Where the Agreed Framework II is a bilateral agreement that gives tremendous autonomy and range for the U.S. in negotiations with the DPRK, seeking a multilateral agreement means the U.S. will be restricted by the concerns and priorities of other states. Disagreements may arise concerning not just the provisions but also the means and process of coming to an agreement with North Korea. Considering the importance of winning over China to participate as an ally, this policy option may present great challenges to the members of the U.S. negotiations team.

Preemptive Strike

The most aggressive policy option is a preemptive military strike against known and suspected nuclear facilities, ballistic missiles depots, nuclear storage facilities, military command centers, and other key sites. The regime in Pyongyang has repeatedly stated that any form of sanctions enforced by a naval blockade would be considered 'an act of war' that would call for a 'formidable retaliatory attack.'²¹ Therefore, to be successful, the strike must be without warning and on a massive scale. There can be no doubt that this policy option will be the most effective option for achieving CVID.

²¹ "North Korea Warns Against 'Act of War,'" *CNN.com*, January 21, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "NK Says U.S. Blockade Will Ignite War," *Yonhap (Seoul)*, July 15, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alessandra Rizzo, "U.S. Will Push for UN Sanction on North Korea; North says Sanctions Would Be 'Act of War,'" *Associated Press*, January 22, 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

But what will be costs to the U.S. and its allies? The U.S. war plan for North Korea – known to Pentagon officials as ‘OP-PLAN-50-27’ – has been war-gamed for years and the conclusion is always the same: the U.S. and its allies prevail, but at a terrifying cost.²² The North’s forces of a million-plus men, 11,000 pieces of artillery along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and within striking distance of Seoul,²³ and 800 *Scuds* and *No-dong* ballistic missiles, not to mention chemical and possibly nuclear weapons, could wreak unspeakable destruction that has not been witnessed for over a half-century. North Korea is very different from Iraq because North Korea essentially holds Seoul as a hostage of a desperate retaliatory strike. The global public opinion is certain to disapprove of such destruction and condemn the military strike. Moreover, current military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming immense resources already, and an effective strike on North Korea would simply be impossible in the near future.

The Status Quo

The final policy option is the status quo, and one of the two main advantages of the status quo option is that the U.S. is already carrying it out and finding that it is not terribly costly or difficult. Since January 2001, the U.S. has applied diplomatic pressures through: the UN’s IAEA, three rounds of Six-Party Talks, openly declaring North Korea as being a part of “an axis of evil,” and continually refusing to conduct relations, both politically and economically, with North Korea. Additionally, in May 2003, the Bush administration became the driving force

²² Jamie McIntyre, “U.S. Blueprint for N. Korea War,” *CNN.com*, May 12, 2003, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/05/12/nkorea.us/>.

²³ It’s been calculated that North Korean artilleries and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are capable of raining between 300,000 to 500,000 shells per hour to the 12 million inhabitants of the South Korean capital, only 40 miles south of the DMZ. For an in-depth study, see: Stephen H. Baker and Colin Robinson, “Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences,” Center for Defense Information (CDI), May 2003, available at: www.cdi.org/north-korea/north-korea-crisis.pdf; Willis Stanley, “From Vietnam to the New Triad: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Korean Security,” in *The DPRK Briefing Book*, The Nautilus Institute, available at: <http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/StillValid.html>.

behind the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is designed to respond, “to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”²⁴ This option allows the U.S. to focus its energy and resources on the PSI and the on-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second main advantage of the status quo is that it sends a strong message that the U.S. will not reward “rogue states” for their misconduct. It will be painless to continue the strong posturing and rhetoric since North Korea’s negative results and Libya’s positive results speak for themselves.²⁵ Furthermore, the successful re-election of the Bush administration for a second term is likely to keep in check the expectations of the North Korean leadership, and increase the pressure on the DPRK to seek negotiations with Washington.

While the idea of low costs and waiting may be attractive, in reality, time is not on the side of the U.S. and its allies. During the last few years, the DPRK regime has officially withdrawn from the NPT, expelled the IAEA weapons inspectors, restarted nuclear facilities, resumed reprocessing fissile materials for building nuclear weapons, and attempted to transfer weapons related technologies. It is already estimated that North Korea may indeed have built two or more nuclear warheads, possibly arming the medium range *No-dong* ballistic missiles with these nuclear warheads.²⁶ The mere existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea is not acceptable and goes fundamentally against Washington’s North Korea policy. Such a development is may spark a nuclear arms race with it neighbors – especially South Korea and Japan – and destabilize the whole region. This consequent arms race would further threaten the nonproliferation regime, upsetting the global order and stability in a radical way.

²⁴ “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles,” U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet 4, September 4, 2003, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm>.

²⁵ John R. Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, contrasts the differing current conditions of North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and faults/credits the behaviors of the respective states, in a speech titled, “The Bush Administration’s Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation,” delivered to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, Illinois, on October 19, 2004, full text available at: <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/acda376.html>.

²⁶ Sang-hun Choe, “N. Korea Says its Making Nuclear Weapons,” *The Washington Times*, October 3, 2003.

RECOMMENDATION

The North Korea nuclear crisis is problem for many countries, and many countries should partake in resolving the crisis. The U.S. government should pursue a multilateral agreement that allows for the sharing of costs, accountability, and responsibilities. The DPRK has in the past and may again in the future disavow a bilateral agreement with Washington. A multilateral agreement brings with it an intrinsic quality: it will be exceedingly difficult for Pyongyang to disavow or violate an agreement where many of its neighboring states are also signatories. The cooperation of the PRC will be particularly important to the success of a multilateral agreement due to its extensive past history and current relations with North Korea, its closeness both in terms of geography and familiarity, and its ability to influence via political and economic pressures. A main goal of the U.S., in that case, should be winning over Beijing to collaborate on the resolution. While this may require great efforts and skillful diplomatic maneuvers, the *raison d'être* for China to work with the U.S. are obvious and many. The idea is to make concessions and trade-offs politically, strategically, economically, or a combination of these, for the purpose of obtaining mutual gains. For the U.S., they are a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, preventing the proliferation of materials and technologies of nuclear weapons, and bolstering the NPT and the nonproliferation regime.

OPTIONS \ CRITERIA	Agreed Framework II	Multilateral Agreement	Preemptive Strike	Status Quo
Costs	+++	+++	+	+++
Effectiveness	+++	++++	+++++	++
Durability	++	++++	+++++	++
Public Opinion	+++	++++	+	++

* More pluses indicate a higher score (+ = low; + + + + + = high).