[pf] US Election Wrap Up, from Michael Albert of ZNet

· I don't have a URL for this, but since I'm not a subscriber to ZNet, I
probably wouldn't have access anyway.  David Mac.

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Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2000 08:03:29 +1300
From: Carol Ann Bradford <.-.-.@ak.planet.gen.nz>
To: GreenViews<GV@greenLists.org.nz>
Subject: [GV]US Election Wrap Up

Long, but interesting for those who care...  CA


 Election Wrap Up -- Or...
Money Doesn't Talk, It Swears
 By Michael Albert
 
 Did Nader hurt Gore? Did Gore hurt Nader? What does the
 tally say about U.S. political views, electoral activism,
 election reforms, and a Green agenda? Here are some
 preliminary reactions.
 
 Did Nader Cost Gore?
 
 Oddly, this is getting harder rather than easier to know
 with each passing hour. Gore failed to match Clinton's
 success despite running as an incumbent in "peacetime" with
 "a booming economy" -- and against a moron. Gore reportedly
 lost among the elderly in Florida, not due to Nader, for
 sure -- but not all by himself, either. Rather, it seems to
 have been with considerable help from a manipulative ballot
 layout that had elderly Jewish citizens voting
 disproportionately for Buchanon instead of for Gore, or
 double-marking their ballots and having them thrown out
 entirely, in what may turn out to be the biggest story of
 the election, unless of course, missing ballots and false
 poll-place instructions and phone harassment in other States
 catch the spotlight. Gore lost Tennessee, Arkansas, and West
 Virginia also himself and not due to Nader, unless, of
 course, these states had tampering too. But still, taking
 Gore's performance and all the shenanigans as a given,
 whatever its many causes may have been, what was Nader's
 impact on him?
 
 In Wisconsin the Nader vote was crucial to the late count,
 but since Gore eked out a win it didn't affect his result.
 In New Hampshire and Oregon if we ignore any contrary exit
 polling that may exist and assume that if Nader hadn't run
 Gore's tally would have risen significantly, then yes,
 without Nader Gore would have won those states. And had
 Nader not run in Florida, given how close that vote there
 is, and assuming it isn't turned around, certainly Gore
 would have won and thus also won the electoral college. So
 yes, Nader's involvement reduced Gore's tally, and arguably,
 if we take everything else as given and if things don't turn
 around due to challenges or recounts, it may have cost him
 the electoral college tally. Nonetheless, it would be
 ridiculous to blame Gore's poor showing solely or even
 primarily on Nader. There were too many other more powerful
 factors contributing to it, including Gore's own lacklustre
 campaign, voting error, voter intimidation, and what seems
 to be outright voter manipulation and fraud.
   
 Did Gore Cost Nader?
 
 Backing up, if the Gore-Bush race had not been so close
 nationally -- in other words if Gore had done his job well -
 or even if his campaign had been more forthright about its
 victory margins in the major Democratic states rather than
 scaring folks silly in all states -- I think Nader would
 have gotten 5%. Gore's weakness caused large numbers of
 potential Naderites to vote against Nader even where doing
 so wasn't needed to beat Bush.
 
 Nader got only 4% in New York and California, big states
 where Nader's constituency is strongest. That's1% worse than
 mixed-bag Colorado and 2% worse than right-wing Montana. In
 Massachusetts Nader did a little better, at 6%, but in
 Connecticut he again got only 4%, and most relevantly in
 both states he scored well below what he polled. And
 likewise for Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, among
 others. In some states Nader may not even have outscored his
 1996 results when he barely ran a campaign at all. In other
 words, not only did many people who liked Nader better vote
 for Gore in swing states, but this also occurred in
 Democratic stronghold states. Can anyone doubt that many
 people voted Gore at the last minute sensing a close
 election and not wanting to tip it to Bush? Clearly Nader's
 percentage would have been higher in MA, NY, CA, CN, OR, WA,
 ME, VT, MI, WI, and NM, just to name some of the obvious
 places, were it not for last minute switching to Gore.
 Otherwise, why would his percentage in those states be no
 higher than in Utah and Nebraska? Would anyone have
 predicted before the tally that Nader's support would
 include Alaska at 10%, Montana at 6%, Utah at 5%, Colorado
 at 5%, Vermont at 7%, and Maine at 6%, and yet attain only
 3% nationally? By the way, anyone else notice that the
 obvious exit poll question seems never to have been asked --
 did you vote for your first choice, or did you prefer some
 other candidate. Exit-pollers and statisticians and analysts
 would prefer know one hears the answer to that question.
 
 So of course Gore's poor showing, whatever its many causes,
 reduced Nader's overall tally, arguably costing him his 5%
 goal. But there is no point belaboring this, because there
 is the more correctable and ultimately more important matter
 of Nader not positively attracting more votes from the
 non-voting majority in the first place (more below).
     
 What does the outcome say about U.S. political views?
 
 Actually, it says little that's new (ignoring, for the
 moment, the possible crises we may encounter if the Florida
 vote situation explodes). We knew that Gore and Bush would
 be close. We knew that roughly twice as many folks would not
 vote as would support either candidate, easily enough to
 overwhelmingly win any three-way election among all
 registered voters. And we also knew that Greens would wind
 up the third largest party in the U.S. In short, give or
 take a few points we knew that relative to the total
 eligible public it would turn out roughly: Those Not Voting
 50%, For Gore 24%, For Bush 24%, For Nader 2%. We even knew
 that there would be shenanigans -- there always are -- but
 not quite this incompetent. Of all people to screw
 with...causing elderly Jews to have voted for their
 arch-enemy Buchanon and against a Jewish candidate, to boot.
 How many laws suits is that going to inspire? Where are the
 vote regulators when you need them? Where is Jimmy Carter,
 for heavens sake? Is Bush going to mimic Milosevic and step
 down -- and will he do it before or after Congress burns?
 
 Clearly the dominant message of the turnout and balloting is
 that most folks still feel that the U.S. presidential
 election marginally impacts their lives. Non-voters see
 their choice as to be screwed by Al or to be screwed by
 George. Not being masochistic, the non-voters stay home.
 Among those who do vote, those who own capital or who occupy
 highly paid and empowered positions aggressively
 differentiate the candidates regarding positions that impact
 them. They prefer Bush, but they vote significantly for Gore
 as well. In contrast, those with lower incomes and occupying
 disempowered positions in society who vote at all, are often
 moved by media-distorted perceptions of welfare costs,
 defense issues, the the relative power of government as
 compared to business, misperceptions about job
 possibilities, etc., and probably nearly as often, wind up
 voting for (spin-doctored) personality since nothing else
 seems compelling. At any rate, at best voters' choices
 reflect constrained preferences. Big changes are not on the
 ballot. People take for granted that society's defining
 features will go unaltered, even if they would prefer
 systemic changes were that option freely available. So other
 than its drama and the possible crises that accumulating
 scandals could soon unleash.which may well prove to be quite
 memorable...in truth this has been the same old electoral
 show. Reigning hierarchies go untouched and largely
 unaddressed. Limited policy differences motivate some
 voters, but most of those eligible to vote either stay home
 or vote for the prettier personality.
   
 What does election 2000 say about elections and left
 activism?
 
 For getting votes, money matters. Money determines how many
 people even know that you exist, much less how many people
 know what you favor. It determines whether you are
 sufficiently visible to inspire not only respect, but also
 belief that you can win, which is crucial for holding votes.
 And even if you garner tentative voter support, money
 determines whether you can get those voters to the voting
 booths. Nader got 2.6 million votes. To run in 2004, the
 Greens or any other progressive parties need to get $10 or
 more from each of those voters for the next election. That's
 the grass roots alternative to government funding.
 
 For communicating content, media matters. Shutting Nader out
 of the debates was anti-democratic and locked the door on
 the visibility needed to win 5%. Pathetic media coverage
 guaranteed low support, low hope, and thus low votes. Any
 future campaign must more effectively galvanize alternative
 media and internet options, and must also mount a far more
 powerful campaign of visible pressure on mainstream media
 and on the debate authorities. Why not have rallies of
 10,000 and 15,000 people outside NBC, or inside NBC, for
 that matter?
 
 Blame is easiest to do something about when placed on
 oneself. When Nader voters bemoan that it is Gore's fault
 that Nader fell short, they need to also ask, for example,
 why Nader's tally was so low in Black communities and among
 working people. In California, the exit polls I saw indicate
 that Nader did half as well among Blacks as he did among
 whites, which is simply horrible. I suspect similarly bad
 results for Nader's tally among union members (and it is
 worth noting in passing that Gore got 69% of union voters,
 and while the AFL-CIO thinks this was a massive achievement,
 when you think of 30% of union members voting for Bush the
 image of union ballot boxes quickly transforms from
 impressively two-thirds full to pathetically way too empty).
 In any event, Nader doing better with blacks and organized
 workers could have easily catapulted him well over 5% -- and
 blaming this deficit on Gore makes no more sense than
 Democrats blaming Nader for Gore losing among the elderly in
 Florida, or losing Tennessee, or West Virginia. Nader, or
 any other left candidate, needs to spend more time
 explicitly talking to working people, to Blacks, to Latinos,
 and to women about the issues these constituencies
 prioritize. The Greens have got to either greatly diversify
 or they must join cause with Black and Latino-headed
 organizations in new formations, making strong alliances
 with labor groups as well. Approximately half of all
 eligible voters didn't vote. If Nader had attracted just a
 hair over 4 out of every 100 of the non voters, he would
 have made 5% nationally. If the Nader campaign was in the
 trenches, I can't help but feel it should have been quite
 attainable. The idea that left candidates can do well with
 campaigns that aren't explicit and aggressive about gender
 and race as well as about class, and particularly that don't
 reach out as aggressively as possible to those who are
 disaffected from politics as compared to those who are
 already leaning their way, is horribly wrong-headed. To his
 great credit, Nader himself seemed to learn that lesson with
 steadily more force as the campaign unfolded. Next time
 around, the insight should inform strategy from the outset.
 
 Elections do not by definition reveal true preferences. In
 fact, winner-take-all elections obviously generate huge
 anti-democratic pressures that prevent an election from even
 revealing what people most want. Instead of each person
 indicating who they like most, that is, we get a mass
 outpouring of lesser evil voting, with priority desires
 often never even expressed. More on this, below.
 
 The big issue, as always, is the future. How do we translate
 campaign activity into lasting movement strength? This is
 the true test for the efficacy of our recent third party
 electoral work in coming weeks and months.
 
 This election campaign was an ideal intervention point for a
 large-scale and ambitious third-party project. The main
 parties were as little different as in decades. There was
 reason to think Democrats could win in a walk. A reputable,
 energetic, and very capable third party ticket was
 available. There was the possibility of debacle, sure. But
 there was also the possibility of fantastic achievement.
 High stakes makes for hard choices. But once the race was
 afoot, by choice of the Greens themselves, it was obviously
 wise to seek the best possible outcomes. Were they attained?
 Regarding the vote -- no, they weren't. There is no point in
 denying it. But that isn't necessarily the end of the story.
 The real question is will the consciousness-raising,
 organization-building, fund-raising, and linkage-creating of
 the campaign translate into local and national progressive
 momentum? If the answers come out yes, then the campaign
 will have been worth the time, effort, and expense that
 progressives and leftists put into it. If the answer comes
 out no, then in hindsight it will have been a well-meaning
 mistake (and if so, there is no shame in that).
 
 So the bottom line is that what happens next is the real
 referendum for electorally-centered political organizing.
 Can we go forward building new movement infrastructure and
 enlarging our base on the basis of the campaign, or will the
 work that was put into the campaign yield few lasting gains?
 Now is the time to solidify and enlarge our efforts, thereby
 demonstrating the efficacy of our election work in
 developing lasting political movement and structures, or, if
 we fail to achieve that, demonstrating the failure of our
 election work on those grounds.
 
 What election reforms make sense?
 
 There is likely to be a massive call for reconsidering the
 role of the Electoral College. That's good-and for that
 matter, some people might reasonably wonder why anyone
 should willingly accept as president someone who got beat in
 the popular election, much less who got beat in a popular
 election and won the electoral college only due to mistakes,
 manipulation, or outright tampering. But even more
 important, once the door is open to election reform, what
 else should we seek? (1) Instant Run-off Voting.
 
 As Ted Glick has compellingly explained, under instant
 runoff voting, voters rank candidates in order of
 preference. You could vote Nader/Gore/Bush, for example, or
 any other pattern that represents your true preferences.
 Ballots are counted in a series of rounds. If a candidate
 wins a majority of first choices right off, then that
 candidate immediately wins. If no candidate receives a
 majority of first choices right off, then the last-place
 candidate is eliminated and the second choice candidates on
 his or her ballots are distributed among the remaining
 candidates. If that fails to produce a winner, eliminating
 last-place candidates and re-counting continues until
 someone goes over 50%. In this way, the lesser evil
 phenomenon is minimized or eliminated. This election, for
 example, under instant run-off voting, though Gore won the
 popular vote, he did not win 50% plus one of the votes. Pat
 Buchanan, who came in last, would have his second place
 votes distributed upwards. Even if all those votes went to
 Bush, this would not put Bush over the top. Next, Nader's
 second place votes, as well as any votes he received from
 Buchanan supporters, would be distributed. This would win
 for Gore. And even if Nader had gotten 20%, supposing those
 voters had virtually all placed Gore second, Gore would
 still be the winner. (Of course, if zealous ballot designers
 insure that the first second and third place vote of elderly
 Jewish folks who hate Buchanon with a passion is Buchanon,
 you may still have some after-vote law suits to deal with.)
 
 (2) Proportional Representation
 
 Nearly all elections in the United States are based on the
 winner-take-all principle. As a result, voters for the
 candidate who receives the most votes win representation,
 but voters for the other candidates win nothing. This system
 is unjust because it leaves minorities unrepresented.
 Proportional representation (PR) is based instead on the
 idea that any group of like-minded voters should win
 legislative seats in proportion to its share of the popular
 vote. With winner-take-all, 100% of the representation goes
 to a 50.1% majority. With proportional representation voters
 in a minority win their fair share of representation. There
 are many possible variants of proportional representation,
 but all variants promote more accurate, balanced
 representation of the spectrum of political opinion in a
 given electorate, the our current winner take all approach.
 (Though it is true the even PR doesn't work optimally if
 bags of ballots are disappeared and eligible voters are
 refused voting access on phoney pretexts.)
 
 (3) Campaign Financing
 
 Everyone knows that having a system in which only the rich
 can win is a disaster for anything but the interests of the
 rich. It isn't just that only folks with means can win. Nor
 that only parties with means can win. It is also that
 incumbents spend all their time raising money, and then,
 having used their offices to pile up cash, win
 handily--beholden to those who gave them their money--at a
 rate of about 95%. An interesting alternative to fight for
 might be Federal funding of all elections, with a special
 tax on corporations to foot the bill. No doubt there are
 other approaches, but  something is needed if electoral
 efforts are to get beyond being peripheral.  
 And what should be next on the agenda for Nader, the Greens,
 and the left?
 
 Even more valuable than winning another 2% would have been,
 we need to have a clear and powerful way forward to enact
 over the next couple of months. We need activity that unites
 diverse constituencies including even single issue
 movements. We need activity that promotes creative and even
 joyous participation while it produces powerful,
 well-developed political priorities. We need a national way
 forward that can link to local grassroots organizing, with
 the national effort helping local efforts and being helped
 by them. One option to help accomplish all this that is
 within our means, I think, is the shadow government idea.
 Perhaps other ideas will surface. At any rate, something
 needs to galvanize the campaign's energies soon.

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sent on to Positive Futures by David.
(David MacClement) davd@ihug.co.nz 
http://www.geocities.com/davdd.geo/index.html#top
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