A computer can be the target of crime, for example, when a person intends to steal information from, or causing damage to, a computer or computer network. This can be entirely virtual, i.e. the information only exists in digital form and the damage, while real, has no physical consequence other than the machine ceases to function. In some legal systems, intangible property cannot be stolen and the damage must be visible, e.g. as resulting from a blow from a hammer. Yet denial of service attacks for the purposes of extortion may result in significant damage both to the system and the profitability of the site targeted. A further problem is that many definitions have not kept pace with the technology. For example, where the offence requires proof of a trick or deception as the operative cause of the theft, this may require the mind of a human being to change and so do or refrain from doing something that causes the loss. Increasingly, computer systems control access to goods and services. If a criminal manipulates the system into releasing the goods or authorising the services, has there been a "trick", has there been a "deception", does the machine act because it "believes" payment to have been made, does the machine have "knowledge", does the machine "do" or "refrain from doing"" something it has been programmed to do (or not). Where human-centric terminology is used for crimes relying on natural language skills and innate gullibility, definitions have to be modified to ensure that fraudulent behaviour remains criminal no matter how it is committed (consider the definition of wire fraud).
Issues surrounding hacking, copyright theft through warez, child pornography, and paedophilia (see child grooming), have become high-profile. But this emphasis fails to consider the equally real but less spectacular issues of obscene graffiti appearing on websites and "cyberstalking" or harassment that can affect everyday life. There are also problems of privacy when confidential information is lost, say, when an e-mail is intercepted whether through illegal hacking, legitimate monitoring (increasingly common in the workplace) or when it is simply read by an unauthorised or unintended person. In R v Stanford (2006) EWCA Crim 258 the defendant was charged with the unlawful interception of e-mail communications to a public company under s1(2) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. After his resignation as deputy chairman of the company, he was found to have intercepted e-mail to and from certain persons in that company. His defence under s1(6) was that the interceptions had been made at his request by the company's computer system administrator who was excluded from criminal liability because either he was a person who had a right to control the operation or use of the system (s1 (6) (a)) or because he had the express or implied consent of such a person to make the interception (s1(6)(b)). The Court of Appeal held that to "control" for the purposes of s1(6) meant to "authorise and forbid". An administrator only has the power physically to use and operate the system. There is no control in the management sense. The objective of s1 of the Act was to protect the privacy of e-mails. If anyone with unrestricted ability to operate and use a telecommunications system were exempt from criminal liability for intercepting communications, it would defeat the purpose of the statute.
E-mail and sms messages are seen as casual communication including many things that would never be put in a letter. But, unlike spoken communication, there is no intonation and accenting, so the message can be more easily distorted or interpreted as offensive. In England and Wales, s43 Telecommunications Act 1984 makes it an offence to use a public telecommunications network to send 'grossly offensive, threatening or obscene' material, and a 'public telecommunications network' is widely enough defined to cover Internet traffic which goes through telephone lines or other cables. Secondly, a computer can be the tool used to plan or commit an offence such as larceny or the distribution of child pornography. The growth of international data communications and in particular the Internet has made these crimes both more common and more difficult to police. and encryption techniques, criminals may conspire or exchange data with fewer opportunities for the police to monitor and intercept. This requires modification to the standard warrants for search, telephone tapping, etc.
Thirdly, a computer can be a source of evidence. Even though the computer is not directly used for criminal purposes, it is an excellent device for record keeping, particularly given the power to encrypt the data. If this evidence can obtained and decrypted, it can be of great value to criminal investigators. Thus, specialised government agencies and units have been set up to develop the necessary expertise. See below for a link to the U.S. Department of Justice's website about e-crime and its computer forensics services.
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