WILDERNESS
May 5 - 6, 1864

Fought in the tangle of undergrowth that had overset Joe Hooker, the battle of Wilderness was a total and bloody confusion. Normally steady troops often broke and ran when unexpected attacks broke out of tangled vegetation a bare 20 yards away and on both sides units tended to become mixed, making the transmission of orders difficult. Three main roads led into the Wilderness from the west and south-west: the Turnpike and Plank Roads from Orange, and the Catharpin Road from Gordonsville. Ewell was ordered to take his corps along the plank road and form a defensive position and wait for Hill, on the Plank Road and Longstreet on the Catharpin to arrive. Longstreet had much farther to travel than the other two.
Ewell deployed successfully and ran into Warren's corps. Initially, Ewell's forward brigade was routed but the attackers were soon outflanked and routed in their turn. Two more blue divisions were surprised and driven off, some fleeing into Confederate lines so completely had they lost their sense of direction. Ewell did not advance beyond his original position and spent the afternoon digging in. Hill, coming slightly later up the plank road, made heavy contact with Hancock who had been given orders to backtrack from the Catharpin Road to deal with him. The terrain decisively favoured the Confederate defenders but it was still 25,000 versus 7,500 and Hancock would probably have broken through were it not for the fall of darkness. Both commanders were planning attacks for the following day. Grant sent Burnside to fill the gap between Warren and Hancock and Warren was to keep Ewell occupied while the main attack went in on Hill. Lee planned to shift Longstreet from the Catharpin Road to the Plank Road and have Hill sidle north to fill the gap.
Longstreet's corps was delayed until well after sunrise. Hill's troops, who had neglected to entrench overnight, were pushed back, although in good order, and matters were getting critical when Longstreet's lead brigade finally arrived. By about 10.00 o'clock, the line had been restored.
There was then something of a lull. Grant, at this point, had both flanks exposed and no centre, for Burnside had got himself lost in the tangle and was wandering around in circles with two divisions. Ironically, by having
disappeared, Burnside put in an effective defence on the right flank. Gordon, commanding the Confederate far left brigade repeatedly asked permission to attack the open flank but was refused because Burnside was unaccounted for. On the Union left, not only was Hancock's flank open, but an unfinished railroad cutting led right up to it. Longstreet was not the man to miss such an opportunity and he sent Sorrel with three brigades into the attack. At 11.00 am he exploded into the Union flank with dynamic results. As Hancock said to Longstreet years later "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."
The Confederate units had become terribly mixed-up, however, and two actually started firing on each other. Longstreet went forward to stop it and was badly wounded and had to be carried from the field. Command went to General Field who spent the next four hours sorting the units back into some sort of order.
At 6.00 pm Gordon finally got permission to attack the Union right when Lee himself came up to investigate. Burnside had by this time found the centre opposite Hill and his phantom flank protection worked no longer. Gordon charged in and started to roll up the flank, but darkness fell before Grant suffered any major disaster.
The following day saw both sides entrenched and very little fighting. Grant had been decisively beaten, losing 17,666 casualties to his opponent's 7,800 and being turned on both flanks. It was a far worse disaster than Hooker had suffered on the same ground. Unlike Hooker, however, Grant managed to avoid defeat by the simple expedient of refusing to acknowledge it. He marched for Spotsylvania and Lee would have to do his work all over again.