TOBRUK

At the end of the Gazala, Bir Hacheim battles (June 15, 1942) the British Eighth Army was in full retreat toward the border of Egypt. At this time a great debate began over the future defense of the legendary fortress of Tobruk. As in the previous year, Tobruk was in the process of being isolated by the Afrika Korps. In 1942, the name Tobruk held even greater prestige with the sorely tried British nation than Dunkirk. Tobruk was the only place, anywhere on the face of the map, where British soldiers had stood toe-to-toe with the German Army and were not beaten. At Tobruk they had stopped the Germans cold. For British morale the name Tobruk was like that of Verdun to the French. Unfortunately, other similarities between those names were beginning to appear.
General Auchinleck was opposed to a second seige of Tobruk. His superior, Churchill, ever-aware of the importance of morale and symbolism to a nation fighting for it's existence, believed that Tobruk could be held in a rematch. The confusion in policy which resulted from these differing opinions within the high command caused severe problems for the British units trying to respond to the rapid advances of the Panzerarmee. Auchinleck was prevented, by signals from Churchill, from ordering a break-out of the Tobruk garrison while there was still time. At the same time he did not reinforce the garrison with available forces, retreating from Gazala, because he believed that another seige was hopeless. The British got the worst of both options.
German commanders concurred with Auchinleck's assessment of the situation. The Tobruk defenses had deteriorated significantly from the previous year and the Panzerarmee had much greater striking power, an entire Panzer Division (21st Panzer) which wasn't on the scene the previous year, was available this time around. To make matters worse, the British Navy weighed-in with the opinion that they were not prepared supply Tobruk through another seige. Rommel, in hot pursuit of the fleeing British, saw immediately that he must knock out the fortress of El Adem (10 miles due south of Tobruk) before turning again on Tobruk. Auchinleck was concentrating his forces around this point, hoping to stop the Germans here and save Tobruk in this way. On June 15 Rommel brought the entire striking force of the Panzerarmee to bear against the British forces hastily attempting to concentrate in the area. On the night of June 16, the 29th Indian Brigade, holding El Adem, made the fateful decision to break-out into the open desert. Had they withdrawn into the Tobruk perimeter, just to the north, they could have contributed to the defense of the fortress. As it was they disappeared into the desert, and out of any further contact with the rest of the 8th Army for the remainder of the battle.
Afrika Korps steadily drove east in a running fight to El Duda, Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed, pushing the British armor in front of them. Turning northeast on June 17, toward Gambut, they cut the coast road (Via Balbia) east of Tobruk, completely investing the fortress. Trapped inside the Tobruk perimeter were the 2nd South African Division, the 11th Indian Brigade, the 201st Guards Brigade and the 32nd Army Tank Brigade (4th and 7th Royal Tanks). It was with this complement that the British attempted to guard the 35 mile perimeter ring of the fortress against the entire Afrika Korps.
Rommel concentrated his striking forces, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions plus a group of infantry and engineer units under Colonel Menny, along the southeast portion of the perimeter across from the 11th Indian Brigade. Rommel's ability to rapidly position his assault forces for the attack on Tobruk took the British by surprise. They never
imagined he could formulate a plan and assemble his forces in such a short time. But the plan was already in place, prepared a year earlier when Rommel threatened and Tobruk held. And Afrika Korps had demonstrated, over and over, that it could move with unmatched speed and agility. The British, as usual, were deliberate in their preparations and they were hampered even more by the confusion of intentions in the upper command. They didn't have time to form a committee and argue it out.
Early in the morning of June 20, against rather feeble resistance, Group Menny moved through gaps in the perimeter minefield to make a breach in the line of bunkers behind an Anti-tank ditch. The engineers bridged the AT ditch, and in poured the panzers. The weak resistance of the 11th Indian Brigade was due to an extensive Stuka and artillery bombardment, and ineffective artillery fire from British guns. The 11th Brigade was driven below ground by the German barrage, into some very effective concrete shelters built by the Italians prior to the war. Once they came out Group Menny was already there, ready to take prisoners. The poor British artillery response was due in part to the lack of AT guns in the fortress. The guns of the 25th Field Regiment, which was to cover this sector, were sighted in an antitank role, and were not available to bombard the German troops in the gap. Nothing else picked up the slack. The inner minefields had fallen into disrepair and were not an obstacle to the German panzers pouring into the fortress. As it turned out, British tanks proved to be of little use either. Unlike the previous year, when a firm British armored counterattack stopped the German advance into Tobruk, there was no coordinated plan for armored counterattack. The British tank strength was limited: only 52 tanks in total, all Mathildas and Valentines. These tanks, without a unified command, were thrown into the battle piecemeal, and only about half ever did engage the enemy. The armor that was on the scene put up a gallant, determined fight around the King's Cross area but were overwhelmed by the concentrated power of the two Panzer Divisions. By early afternoon Rommel was sitting atop the Pilastrino Ridge overlooking the ravaged city of Tobruk. During the afternoon panzers advanced to Tobruk harbor and, although stung by a persistent antiaircraft battery turned against the tanks, by evening they had fought their way into town. There they proceeded to fire on British ships from the shorefront, sinking a number vessels attempting to break into the open sea. 15th Panzer advanced west across Pilastrino Ridge, overwhelming infantry units in defensive positions. By nightfall the Germans had taken the entire eastern half of the Tobruk fortress, including the town. The remaining garrison, squeezed into the western half of the fortress had little choice but to try to break out of the death trap that night. Unfortunately for the British, indecision afflicted the command structure. General Klopper, in command of the garrison, wanted to break out but could get no direction from 8th Army headquarters. Many of his officers wanted to fight to the end, in true Tobruk fashion. Nothing happened that night. By morning the western half of Tobruk was in complete chaos, with much of the remaining garrison in a disorganized state. Shortly after dawn, General Klopper raised a white flag over his headquarters. 33,000 British prisoners fell into Rommel's hands in one stroke. The Germans also captured large stocks of gasoline, ammunition, guns, and even tanks. On that evening of his greatest achievement, June 21, Rommel received the news by radio that he had been promoted to Field Marshal.