STONES RIVER
December 31st, 1862

On the evening of 30th December 1862, Rosecrans, advancing south-east from Nashville, met with Bragg at Stones River, in front of the town of Murfreesboro. Rosecrans had about 44,000 troops under the commands of Crittenden, Thomas and McCook. Bragg was defending with about 34,000 under the commands of Breckenridge, Polk and Hardee. Both commanders planned to attack the following morning and each had the same basic battle-plan - to attack the enemy right - but only Bragg achieved anything like his intent. Rosecrans had ordered a long line of campfires to be kindled beyond his right flank in order to trick Bragg into stripping his own right where the attack would land.
The trick worked in a sense - Bragg certainly moved troops there - but the effect was not what Rosecranss had intended. Ever methodical, he ordered his troops to attack immediately after breakfast. Bragg, however, had ordered his troops to attack before breakfast. Hardee ploughed through McCook's three divisions, caught by surprise while the coffee was still brewing. The divisions of Johnson and Davis immediately routed but Sheridan, commander of the third division, was made of sterner stuff. Polk's Corps was in the fight by now and Withers' division ran into a determined defence in a difficult tangle of rocks, scrub and trees. Three separate charges were repulsed.
Then Polk's second division, under Cheatham, arrived. Cheatham had the reputation of being the most profane man in the army. "Give 'em hell, boys!" he shouted. His corps commander was handicapped in this regard by being the Bishop of Louisiana but he was equal to the occasion. "Give them what General Cheatham says, boys!" he called. "Give 'em what General Cheatham says!" The boys did, and despite the significant amount of hell that came their way also, they forced Sheridan back.
Although the line was now bent at an angle of nearly ninety degrees, Sheridan's stand had given Rosecrans the time he needed to organise a defence. The left flank he anchored at the ford across Stones River. He then rode back and forth, directing the defence in person.
The critical point in the line was at the bend of the right angle - a four acre stand of cedars, known loocally as the Round Forest and soon to be christened "Hell's Half-Acre" by the soldiers. On the high ground behind the trees, Rosecrans concentrated his artillery. Bragg attacked repeatedly but in a piecemeal fashion, first with a Mississippi brigade, then with a Tennessee brigade, then with two brigades sent across by Breckinridge and finally with another two brigades from the source. The cotton field in front of Round Forest became a shambles of dead and dying men but the attacks could not withstand the concentrated firepower and none achieved the objective.
When the sun went down at 4.30 pm, Bragg had lost about 9,000 men but he was aware that his opponent had lost more, including over 3,000 captured in the first rush. He had achieved a decisive victory and he knew it. The only problem was, no-one had told Rosecrans.
Rosecrans certainly thought long and hard about retreat but in the end he decided to hold his position. Throughout New Year's day the two armies stared at each other while their commanders wondered what to do next.
On Jan. 2nd Bragg sent Breckinridge on an ill-advised assault against the Union right but Rosecrans had had a full day to re-organise his defences and the assault was beaten back in just over an hour, with more than 1700 casualties. The next day, Bragg received reports that his opponent was receiving new supplies and re-inforcements and he realised that he must withdraw.
Casualties for the battle had been heavy. The North had lost 13,249 (including 3717 captured) and the South 11,739 (including 2,500 captured). Tactically a bloody draw, the battle was a strategic victory for the Union. Rosecrans had taken Murfreesboro and Northern Tennessee.