SIDI BOU ZID

Following the American Torch landings in November, 1942,and a failed drive toward Tunis, the Allied forces and German Afrika Korps engaged in a rugged campaign in mountainous central Tunisia. For the American forces it was a fierce, and often unsuccessful, baptism into armored warfare. The Americans earned critical experience the hard way, much like the British did a year before. They learned the trade quickly and seldom made a mistake more than once. But it seemed they had to make them all at least that one time. The Germans under Rommel fought well, as always, but by this time their circumstances simply would not allow anything other than very temporary victories. Their opponents would always get stronger and more numerous, even after a defeat, and the Panzerarmee could no longer replace its losses. While Russia drained the Germans of enormous quantities of men and materiel, the great and unprecedented Allied arsenal was just beginning to hit it's stride. The battles in central Tunisia in January and February, 1943 were Afrika Korps' swan-song. This one last great offensive would result in tactical victories, at times even on a large scale. But strategically, even the victories simply hastened the end. The last series of German offensives in Africa began at the end of January, 1943 with Operation Eilbote which divested the Allied forces, mostly Free French, of advanced positions at Karachoum Gap and Kairouan Pass, some 40 miles from Tunis. Further south, at the end of January the Germans pushed the Allies into the Sidi Bou Zid area behind Fa'id Pass.
After abortive attempts to retake the strategic pass in early February, the Allies settled into defensive positions to build toward an all-out offensive planned for early spring. As expected, the Germans would not give them a long rest. Taking the initiative, German forces concentrated at Fa'id Pass and just to the south at Maizila Pass with the intent of trapping and destroying the Allied positions around Sidi Bou Zid. On the morning of February 14, 1943 two full Panzer divisions, the 10th and 21st, with artillery and infantry, under General Heinz Ziegler, were to launch a two-pronged blitzkrieg against the American Combat Command (CCA) which was sitting behind Fa'id Pass and around Sidi Bou Zid.
While the Germans telegraphed their punch enough to let the Allies know something was afoot in this area, the Allied dispositions to receive it were quite inadequate. Only two battalions of infantry were allotted to the major hill features covering the area around the pass, Djebels Lassouda and Ksaira. Most of the armor of CCA was held back, around the Sidi Bou Zid area. The infantry on the Djebels were provided with small detachments of armor and tank destroyers. These dispositions were entirely out-of-scale with the size of the physical features. The Djebels were too large to be covered by one battalion. The bulk of CCA was scattered north and south of Sidi Bou Zid, making timely and concentrated intervention against a strong enemy difficult.The result was that the forces covering the Pass and Sidi Bou Zid were hopelessly dispersed.
Although the overall commander, General Fredendall, who was hunkered down in his large underground HQ some distance from Sidi Bou Zid, had not personally viewed the situation at the front, the inadequate U.S. dispositions did become known to another important person. Strangely enough, none other than Dwight D. Eisenhower visited CCA at Sidi Bou Zid on the night of February 13. Ike didn't like what he saw. The unsoundness of the dispositions, the precarious isolation, were immediately apparent to him. So was the need for more armor and infantry -specifically the rest of the U.S. 1st Armored Division (the parent of CCA). When Ike left Sidi Bou Zid, 2:00 AM on the 14th, a very strong wind was covering the sound of German movements around the Pass. Headquarters did issue an alert to the troops, though, to prepare to meet an offensive in the morning. Patrolling tanks from Lassouda Force were the first to meet the 10th Panzer. One of the first tanks knocked out belonged to Lassouda's commanding officer, Colonel Waters. Thus, there were no orders to begin the prepared artillery barrage on the pass. The tanks and tank destroyers of CCA, around Sidi Bou Zid, went forward to meet the enemy and ran headlong into newly arrived Tigers. The Panzers moved past Lassouda from north and south. CCA's tanks attempted to check this movement but were forced to retire with heavy losses.
At the same time 21st Panzer moved from Maizila Pass in the south, splitting into two spearheads, one in a flanking movement toward Bir El Hafey and the other due north to Djebel Ksaira. The unopposed left-hook to Bir El Hafey then turned northeast toward Sidi Bou Zid. The north spearhead cut off the forces on Djebel Ksaira and turned west to Sidi Bou Zid. It quickly became apparent that the troops at Sidi Bou Zid would have to be pulled back. The remnants of the CCA armor fought a fine rear-guard action to cover the withdrawal. But the American cavalry was coming. A force of light tanks and infantry under Colonel Kern was coming fast from Sbeitla to the northwest. This force set up a protective line at a crossroads northwest of Sidi Bou Zid, which henceforth would bear the moniker "Kern's Crossroads." At this point CCA rallied and held the crossroads. The few remaining tanks foiled the German attempts to disrupt the retreat, and the Germans settled for Sidi Bou Zid while turning to reduce the remaining garrisons of the two Djebels, which were now entirely surrounded. The remnants of the two battalions held out a couple more days. Five days later, Rommel's big offensive at Kasserine Pass was launched. This attack resulted in one of his most famous desert victories. But it was a pyrrhic one. The attack failed to yield any fruits, and it was the last major offensive. Rommel had shot his bolt. An unending string of Allied victories began in early March at Medinine. The Germans were pressed into an ever shrinking African bridgehead in Tunisia. On the evening of May 12, 1943 it was all over, in the words of the final message from German HQ:
"In accordance with orders received Afrika Korps has fought itself to the condition where it can fight no more."