ORIGINS OF THE PACIFIC WAR .

A complete analysis of the origins of the Pacific War would take far more space than is available to us at the present, however we may briefly outline the long-term and immediate issues. Among the long- standing issues underlying the immediate causes of the Pacific War, we may enumerate (but not discuss) Japan's relative poverty in raw materials, a poverty illustrated by her pattern of importation in 1940; then too, we may note the long- standing traditions of military service and imperial grandeur which drove Japan's militarists to opt for greater and greater visions of empire; the inability of Japan to establish a functioning democratic system was also a part, for politicians hostile to expansionist schemes tended to be assassinated with sickening frequency. We might also mention Japan's rightful resentment over the essentially racist attitude of the U. S. towards Japan and the Japanese, a racist attitude which almost caused a war between the two nations in 1907.

Probably the three most important immediate causes of the war, however, were the conflict in China, the American preoccupation with European affairs, and a certain basic misunderstanding. The "China Incident" involved Japan in a long and apparently insoluble involvement in the affairs of that unfortunate nation. At the same time, the U. S. was suffering from a kind of moral hangover as a result of the actually worthless "Open Door Policy", which made many Americans, and some Japanese, believe this country had a vested interest in the defense of China. Further increasing American involvement in the Far East was the annexation of the Philippines in 1898, which involved the U. S. in the intimate details of imperial rivalry in that sector, and which also stood in the way of any potential Japanese expansion in the East Indies. With American attention focused on the European conflict, time and temper devoted to the Chinese and Pacific crises grew short. American embargoes on munitions and aircraft in July 1940; scrap iron and steel, September 1940; and finally on oil and oil products in July 1941 certainly did nothing either to make Japan better disposed towards the U. S. or to materially aid China. American Lend- Lease aid to China also did little to improve the American image in Japan, where the political leadership and the generals were beginning to think that the U. S. was just biding its time until it was ready to go to war. In a sense, of course they were correct, but they had the intended victim all wrong: It was Germany, not Japan with which the U. S. was actively seeking a quarrel. The final straw came from a source which might otherwise have smoothed things over: the peace negotiations. Being essentially ill- disposed towards each other, neither side was quite honest in these negotiations and neither laid its cards on the table. Thus, when the U. S. insisted that Japan get out of "China" it meant China proper; Japan could keep Manchuria. Unfortunately, the Japanese assumed the U. S. intended for them to get out of Manchuria also, an intolerable situation in the view of the Army. Then too, messages between the two parties were often garbled or mistranslated, with the tendency being to select the less compromising and more belligerent connotations. This sort of thing did nothing to cool tempers and so it went. In the end both sides found themselves at war without really understanding why.

ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS .
More than any other war in history, the Second World War was a war of material
attrition. Ultimately the outcome of the war was decided as much, if not more, by the economic might of the United Nations as by any fighting skill they might have possessed. This situation was particularly evident in the Pacific War where a secondary industrial power challenged the mightiest industrial base in the world. Japan, generally considered one of the industrialized nations of the world before 1941, was actually possessed of a rather feeble industrial base. Indeed, in terms of both per capita and total production, she exceeded only Italy among the "great" powers in ingot steel production, the basic measure of industrial viability. When compared with the other major powers the picture was even drearier.

During the 1930's, by a prodigious but ill- planned and poorly organized effort, certain industries vital to war purposes had been built up, though at a cost in efficiency which would not emerge until the pressures of war production proved too much for the thin reed which Japan's industrial base actually was. Thus, while actual steel output increased some 14% between 1941 and 1943 (Japan's peak steel production year) worker efficiency declined to but 59% of the prewar levels. The problem was, simply put, that the entire industrial base had not been broadened. Thus, while total aircraft production was force- fed into a 1300% increase between 1931 and 1941 (from 368 airplanes to 5,088), between 1941 and 1944 with the immediate pressures of war upon them, the Japanese were only able to increase aircraft production by 443%, to 28,180 airplanes, for their peak production year. During the same period the U. S. increased production of military aircraft by something like 3,238%, from about 600 to 19,432 (and from 1941 to 1944 by about 500%, to some 96,318). Of course in 1931 military production was rather a small part of total aircraft production but by 1944 it had become virtually all of total production. Meanwhile, in the U. S., aircraft industry worker efficiency was actually increasing as advanced assembly line methods - adopted from automobile manufacturing - were introduced and utilized. Japan'ss basic problem, then, was that the pressure was not spread around, but merely applied to certain obviously necessary industries, such as electrical equipment, in which production scarcely increased by 30% between 1941 and the peak war year of 1944. Lack of this sort of equipment would hinder any increases in production of other types of vital materials. By contrast the United States, which had more or less embarked on a consumer economy in the 1920's, only to be interrupted by the Great Depression, found itself actually possessed of reserve production capacity resulting from the 1929 crash, and also from the experience of World War I, in which an enormous amount of waste had gone into our industrial expansion. In point of fact, the American standard of living continuously increased during World War II - an occurrence without precedent in history. It would be this reserve capacity, coupled with an enormous wealth of experience, which would permit the United States to out produce Japan by enormous amounts in virtually every category of military equipment once it got its industrial capacity into full swing. This, of course, was the key. As an examination of the accompanying warship production chart will demonstrate, it took the U. S. a little time to get fully into production, particularly in as much as it started its preparations for war rather later than any of the other powers. Thus, during all of 1942, the U. S. would add but one first line carrier (100A/ C) to its fleet, while Japan would add four (184 A/ C). Of course, during the Second World War, the U. S. Produced 108 aircraft carriers of all types, carrying spaces for 5,500 aircraft, as against Japanese production of 17, with spaces for 740 aircraft. Indeed, Japan's total production of warships of all types barely approached 200, a figure exceeded by U. S. submarine production alone. What it all boils down to is that economically Japan was a minor- league team, able to upset the pros occasionally, but in trouble over the long haul.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND P LANS .

The most important strategic consider- ation of the Pacific War was that the conflict was determined by naval/ air operations. The accompanying Situation Map will give a good idea of the general strategic dispositions on the outbreak of the Pacific War. In effect, this was the general situation throughout the entire period of tension as well, roughly 1937 - 1941, and, in geographical terms, reppresents the situation as early as the beginning of World War I, when the United States and Japan both began to plan for an eventual Pacific War. American planning initially tended to be rather general - something on the order of a staff study on the possibility of war with Japan known as Orange. Eventually, however, these plans became rather detailed and were continued year after year, with suitable adjustments as the balance of strengty changed. Among the changes not really taken into consideration, however, was the increasing power and flexibility of aircraft and of the aircraft carrier. In effect, the plan was principally (perhaps purely) battleship oriented. The outlines of the Orange Plan remainedthe same for decades so it is relatively easy to consider it. On the outbreak of a war with Japan the fleet - initially based at San Diego but moved to Pearl Harbor in the late 1930's - would immediately begin to seek a surface action with the Imperial Navy. Meanwhile, the forces in the Philippines would retreat into the Manila Bay area, where it was expected that they could hold out for three or four months until the fleet had fought its way back across the Pacific. In the process, small contingents of marines would seizeoccasional bases from the Japanese, but the main fleet base would become Manila Bay. Using the Philippines as a spring-board the fleet would then advance to threaten Japan herself in the hopes of provoking a general fleet engagement with whatever was left of the Japanese Navy. On paper the Orange Plan was a rather good one, fully within the capabilities of the U. S. Navy during the period up to the mid- 1930's, however, the increasing strength of air power should have been taken into consideration but was not. To be sure, thought the planners, aircraft carriers would now accompany the fleet on its drive across the Pacific, but primarily for reconnaissance and skirmishing purposes. Pearl Harbor effectively killed the Orange Plan. From the Japanese viewpoint a series of study plans had also been formulated, but only the most fanatical officers could ignore the very great numerical disparity between Japan and the United States. In the period during the final drift into war, the strategic problem of how Japan could successfully take on the United States was studied by her most brilliant naval strategist, Admiral Yamamoto. Perhaps more fully than any other Japanese officer, Yamamoto was aware of the great strength and potential of the United States, having served as naval attaché in Washington for several years. A member of what might be termed the "peace party" in the debate over the decision to go to war, once the decision was made, Yamamoto began studying the
options open to Japan. He concluded that a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, having primarily a defensive purpose, would have to supplement a general offensive against the rich lands of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. This limited offensive was the Pearl Harbor Operation. Yamamoto believed that by striking at and crippling the main U. S. battlefleet, while overrunning huge areas in the South and Southwest Pacific it might just be possible not to defeat the United States - an accomplishment which he felt was beyond Japan's capabilities - but to make it willing to settle for a negotiated peace, a peace from which Japan could legitimately be expected to come away with some gain. Thus, the entire purpose of the Pearl Harbor and Central Pacific operations was the damaging of America's capability to immediately strike back at Japan and the extension of Japan's defensive frontiers hundreds of miles further east through the seizure of certain British and American territories in the Central Pacific. As things turned out the Pearl Harbor Operation, while a far greater success than anticipated, was something of a psychological failure for it united the American people such as they had never been united before in wartime. Indeed, World War I was probably the most generally popular war in American history, including the Revolutionary War. It was the only American war initiated by a direct enemy attack. A second benefit arising from the Pearl Harbor disaster, was that the United States was forced to fall back upon its handful of carriers as its first line of defense in the Pacific while Japan was still relying primarily on the battleship. This would have serious consequences as the war dragged on. The first error was that Yamamoto miscalculated America's recuperative powers. As early as February 1942, American air reinforcements were reaching the Netherlands Indies via Australia and a build- up of air and ground forces was begun in that country. Meanwhile raids, were made against the Mandates and Tokyo itself. Obviously something would have to be done to slow down American preparations further, but the conquest of the Philippines - which dragged on until May - and of Indonesia and Malaya tied up Japan's slender resources. Still, small forces occupied portions of New Guinea and the Solomons including the excellent harbor of Rabaul, as anticipated in Yamamoto's plans. With the release of forces from the conquest of other areas, the decision was made to step beyond the originally planned defensive line in an effort to seize all of the Solomons and New Guinea. At this point things began to go awry.American strategist, notably Admirals King and Nimitz, had been avoiding a general action where their few aircraft carriers would be risked until something really important turned up. The Japanese threat to the air and sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand was important and the carriers were committed successfully at Coral Sea and, a month later, when Japan again stepped beyond the boundaries of her planned defensive line to try to seize Midway, another success was obtained. The carrier battle effectively determined
he course of future American strategy in the Pacific. It would be to use fast carrier task forces to project American air power into Japanese controlled areas so that the Marines and Army could seize and hold needed air and naval bases. Guadalcanal was the first such operation (and a close one at that). It proved successful, however, and coupled with the fact that Japan failed to commit her fleet after the numerous air and surface actions in the area, marked the beginning of the long push back as American industrial might outstripped Japan's rather feeble ability to replace lost ships and planes. After Guadalcanal the United States adopted a cautious offensive policy, while Japan decided to stand on the defensive, and avoid general engagements if at all possible. (This was probably an error, however, for by husbanding their resources the Japanese would accomplish very little, while trying for some sort of general action during 1943 might well have gained them a bit more time than they actually had. During early 1943 the relative strengths of the two powers were rather close, particularly in aircraft carriers, where Japan had something of an edge. So much so that the U. S. borrowed a Royal Navy carrier to help out for a time.)

THE FLEETS .

A trans- oceanic war is fought primarily with naval forces and the Pacific War was even more water- oriented than hitherto had been the case in the history of warfare. The naval forces ranged against each other in the Pacific War amounted to the two greatest navies in the world, each a well- trained, aggressive force willing to fight as hard as would be necessary for the ultimate victory each hoped for. At the same time, each had certain advantages and disadvantages. The Japanese Navy's greatest asset was that it possessed the largest carrier air fleet in the world in 1941, manned by well trained, well equipped pilots who knew their business and who were led by air- oriented officers - though the traditions of the battleshhip fleet died hard. A fuller discussion of naval air power will be found below, but suffice it to say for the present that it was through an aggressive and judicious use of this large aircraft carrier fleet that the bulk of Japan's early victories were achieved, and through the constant dragging effect of the battleship tactics (which still dominated Japanese naval thought) that Japan was not able to successfully prolong the war even more than was the case. One of Japan's greatest advantages, in addition to the high state of her carrier forces, was the tremendous efficiency of her surface combat forces. Training in all aspects of surface combat was highly realistic and extremely arduous. It would not be far off the mark to say that, ship for ship, the Imperial Navy was more than a match for the U. S. Navy in surface action during the period under discussion. Certainly the numerous surface actions in the Solomons, during this time, prove this without question. There are a number of reasons for this Japanese superiority in surface action, and particularly in night action where they proved virtually invincible for a time. Fundamentally the reason is simply that the Japanese considered training serious business while the U. S. Navy consider it a form of competition. Thus, while the Imperial Navy gunnery training went on regardless of weather, in the U. S. Navy, since it was competitive and prizes were awarded for high scores, gunnery training was held only under ideal conditions of sea and wind, and almost never at night, when the fall of shell could not be properly observed or scored. There was at least one, and probably no more than this one, material advantage which the Japanese held and which tended to help them a great deal in surface actions: torpedoes. Japanese cruisers and destroyers carried large batteries of torpedoes, often with one or two sets of reloads, while American cruisers tended to lack these altogether, and even some classes of destroyer were built to carry but a handful. Then too, there was the Japanese 24" "Long Lance" torpedo itself, which was materially superior to American
torpedoes in virtually very category. In fact, the "Long Lance" was the finesttorpedo in the world at the time. While the average torpedo of the period might possibly be coaxed to 7,000 yards, the "Long Lance" was capable of several times that and, with its greater size packed a bigger punch. It also had a considerably more efficient firing
mechanism than the American torpedoes, as well as a better depth control. All in all a powerful asset to any surface force in heavy action and, as it turned out, the main killer of American ships during the surface battles for control of the Solomons. Any discussion of torpedoes quite naturally leads to a discussion of submarines and in this particular arm the U. S. Navy had a distinct advantage. Training and numbers were certainly more or less on a par at the beginning of the war, and the Japanese may even have had slightly better submarines, and certainly better torpedoes - although the "Long Lance" was not carried in submarines at this time. The difference was not material, but doctrinal and the doctrine favored the U. S. Navy in the end. At the beginning of the war Japanese submarine doctrine stressed the use of the submarine as a weapon designed to snipe at and pick off enemy warships. American doctrine at this time envisioned the submarine as a weapon to snipe at and pick off enemy warships too, but shortly after Pearl Harbor the submarines were unleashed against the Japanese merchant marine. Ultimately, if anything could be said to have won the war single- handedly it would be these submarines, which usually reduced the size of Japan's merchant marine to the point where imports came to a virtual standstill. Probably no other strategic error made by the Japanese during the war was as far reaching as their refusal to let their submarines go after American merchant shipping. Japan's available submarine strength in 1941 was more than three times greater than Germany's in 1939 and the damage it could have inflicted would have been enormous, particularly in view of the tremendous shipping needs of the global conflict. As it was, as a result of this unrealistic policy, the U. S. Navy did not have to
provide escorts for convoys outside of the immediate battle areas, thus permitting it to muster every destroyer to combat duty. A little ambitious Japanese whittling away of American shipping might have prolonged the war by a year or more, though the outcome, made inevitable by America's might and moral indignation, would not have changed greatly. Similar to Japan's refusal to employ her submarines against merchant shipping, was the Imperial Navy's refusal to do anything about its own shipping. Thus a convoy system was not instituted until very late and actually after the U. S. Had adopted a "wolf pack" system (learned and taken over from the U- boat experts, the Germans). To briefly recapitulate then, Japan's chief errors in naval strategy were two- fold. First, she failed to press her advantage after Pearl Harbor, when her naval aircraft strength was 672 planes to the U. S. Navy's 280 in the Pacific, and, second, she failed to properly employ her large and efficient submarine fleet. The
U. S. Navy's chief error was in attempting to operate its few carriers in too widely dispersed operations, though this sort of thing gradually cleared itself up as additional carriers arrived. In addition, it is probably unfortunate that surface-oriented admirals continued to dominate much of American naval operations in the Pacific far too long after Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, of course, doctrine, tactics,and strategy were not nearly so important as strength. At the beginning of the Pacific War Japan was considerably
stronger than the United States in the Pacific, but as American combat skill improved the tide would begin to turn. And as American economic might began to get into stride the change would become swifter and swifter.

THE AIR FORCES .

Though the more glamorous warshipand the more heroic amphibious operations have tended to take the lion's share of most accounts of the Pacific War, the fact remains that the decisive combat arm was air power, in both land and carrier based forms. From beginning to end, the Pacific War was dominated by aerial conflict and the importance of the control of the skies was recognized very early by both sides. The U. S. however, was better able to handle this problem than were the Japanese. Both the U. S. and Japan had not one, but two Air Forces: one Army controlled and one Navy controlled. In both nations each service had been allowed to develop its air arm with little or no coordination with the other. However, in the U. S. there was some tradition of inter- service cooperation to overcome the strong rivalry existing between the Army (particularly the Army Air Force) and the Navy. In Japan, inter- service cooperation was considerably less. Both nations had serious drains on their air power. For the U. S. Air Force, and to a lesser extent the Navy, the demands of the European War had to be met, but the issue here was primarily a strategic one and Europe was considered the primary combat theatre. An effort was made to carefully evaluate the needs of both theatres before any decision was made on shipping men and aircraft off to the one or the other. While theatre commanders would opt for an increased importance for their theatre, using all sorts of rather unethical techniques to do so, ultimately the matter was decided dispassionately and after a careful evaluation of the
needs and intentions in each theatre. Not so for the Japanese. Of roughly 2,700 Army and Navy first line combat aircraft, on hand in December of 1941, a quarter were assigned to the job of keeping an eye on the Russians in Manchuria and China. For the entire war, this task would tie up enormous numbers of aircraft and ground support elements with no increase in the war effort. A significant and ultimately disastrous course of action. In terms of aircraft and airmen Japan was probably second to none in 1941. Her pilots were probably the finest in the world. Pre- war pilot training was a rigorous, lengthy process taking years and washing out far more men than it passed through. For high school graduates, roughly 26 months were consumed in ground and flight training, plus another year of operational training from land bases, for an average of 3 1/ 4 years before a man could qualify as a first line pilot, assuming he was lucky and everything went well and he did not try for carrier training, which would add another year. Needless to say this gave Japan an extremely well- trained, aggressive, professional bunch of combat pilots, those few that it produced. The rigorous training program was, in fact, far too rigorous for operational needs. While the pilots were good, there just were not enough of them. In December of 1941, there actually were not enough pilots to fully man all available aircraft, provide replacements, man training centers and maintain a comfortable reserve. Men washed out of the pilot training program before the war were often far better material than would be acceptable later, when men would be sent into combat with barely a year or less of preparation by 1943. A significant error in pilot training was the fact that men were kept with operational squadrons far too long, indeed generally until they were killed or wounded. This had two negative influences. First, it tended to impair the efficiency of units whose men had been on the line for too long and, second, it deprived training centers of the wealth of experience these seasoned men could have provided. By contrast, American pilot training was rather sloppy, and American pilots, both Army and Navy, received far less flight training than did their Japanese,counterparts at the beginning of the war (though the flight time needed to qualify would roughly reverse by the end of the war). While this did not produce pilots trained to the same fever pitch of efficiency as Japanese training techniques did, it did produce large numbers of good pilots quickly. Of course Japan's troubles in the air did not begin and end with pilot training. The aircraft produced for Japan (and let us not forget that they were produced by an overstrained industrial system) were exceptionally maneuverable, fast planes but terrible in anything but attack. Japanese air combat doctrine was all- out attack oriented and aircraft were built to reflect this doctrine. Thus, their first line fighter for much of the war, the "Zero" had a very feeble construction and would literally fall apart under any sort of pounding, though in the attack is was invincible. Even the long obsolete P- 26 could on occasion bring down a Zero, provided it got in the first shot. By contrast, the most obsolete operational first line American fighter, the Brewster "Buffalo" was able to take a great deal more punishment, and, as time went on, American planes, designed on the principle that defense and attack capabilities were equally important, would sport armor plated cockpits, self- sealing fuel tanks, and other plane and pilot saving mechanisms. In short, Japanese aircraft could "dish it out" but not "take it". American aircraft could do both well. A final error made by the Japanese was their critical misuse of carrier pilots during the Solomons Campaign of 1942-1943. In effect, the Imperial Navy took these highly trained specialists and, because the Army could not provide enough land- based air power (due, undoubtedly, to the huge air forces sitting out the war in Manchuria and China) grounded them to provide land-based air power for the support of ground operations in the Solomons. This left Japan's aircraft carriers with no air groups and they effectively retired from the war for over a year, when, re-equipped with green air groups, they emerged for the slaughter of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944. American carrier tactics, partially copied from the initial Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor would never have permitted this sort of thing to happen. The theory was to use the high- speed carrier to take aircraft where they could operate against the enemy's bases, execute the air strikes, and then get out as quickly as possible, particularly if numerous enemy land- based aircraft were in the area. In conclusion we must attribute the ultimate American victory in the air to the more effective aircraft produced by the United States and particularly to the great numbers of both planes and pilotsturned out by the U. S.

THE GROUND FORCES .

Ground combat in the Pacific War was conducted primarily as an adjunct to the naval/ air conflict going on around it. Virtually all ground operations were launched principally to gain forward air and naval bases from which to project American power further along on the road to the ultimate goal: Japan. Though limited in this sense, ground combat in the Pacific War was as intense as ground combat in the Hitlerian War, though, of course, the numbers involved were smaller. But certainly the 75% casualties suffered by some units in Iwo Jima were not insignificant when compared with fighting in Europe at the time. When the war began, the Japanese Army had several distinct advantages. For one thing, it had the benefits of combat experience in China and it was generally better equipped than the forces opposing it. In some cases the Chinese armies may even have proven better equipped than some of the Allied units the Japanese encountered on their march of conquest in early 1942. However, as time went on, the experience gained in the "China Incident" would betray the Japanese Army. One of the key reasons for Japanese success in China, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia was the near-total unpreparedness for war among the defending forces. Training and equipment were both at a premium and the Japanese, who had more of each, were clearly the superior forces. In the Philippines, where a partially trained native army was on hand, the Japanese were, in fact, given a bit of difficulty. A more effectively trained and better equipped Philippine Army might well have held them up far longer than was the case. China adversely influenced Japanese doctrine in several ways, but most notably in tactics and equipment. Thus, tactically, the "banzai" charge seemed an efficient solution to the problem of attacking defensive positions. In China, it invariably tended to work more often than not. Of course, the Chinese troops who broke under such an attack were usually untrained, ill- equipped conscripts who would have preferred to have been elsewhere. Indeed, several well trained Chinese units were fully the equal of the Japanese counterparts as early as 1938, and a fully equipped and trained U. S. Infantry or Marine Division had a great deal more going for it than mere training, though the archaic Japanese tactical doctrine certainly gave U. S. forces an advantage from the start. The second inheritance from the Chinese Campaign, and one compounded by Japan's inefficient industrial base, was the fact that heavy firepower was not really needed in China. Not seeing a need for heavy artillery, the Japanese Army never developed it. This decision was undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that Japanese industry would have been hard pressed to manufacture such equipment. The end result, then, was that a division of 20,000 Japanese troops would be supported by some 36 pieces of 75mm howitzer, while an American division of some 15,000 men would have almost twice as much artillery firepower! Of course, Japan, though it had a population roughly 50% the size of the United States, managed to get far more of its men into combat units. Throughout the war Japan raised over 100 divisions, to the U. S. 's 95. Why, then were the Japanese not able to overwhelm American formations in combat? There are two reasons for this, the first being that American domination of the seas and skies made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to move their troops around as the war progressed. The second is more basic: the troops were just not available. Throughout he course of the war, roughly half of the Japanese Army was busy holding down the Chinese or keeping an eye on the Russians. Though these garrisons were drawn upon for replacements and occasional reinforcements, they effectively failed to pull their weight in the war effort. In a sense, China was not only the cause of the Pacific War, but also a key factor in the Japanese defeat.

THE COURSE OF THE PACIFIC WAR .

A rough outline of the course of the operations in the Pacific is of value here. Briefly, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor gave the initiative to Japan and for roughly six months she expanded to her planned defensive line. It was hoped that the U. S. would decide the Orient was not worth the effort, but Pearl Harbor mobilized American opinion and the U. S. determined to carry the war through at any cost. As a result of minor pinprick operations like the carrier raids on the Mandates and the Doolittle Tokyo Raid in the Spring of 1942, the Japanese decided to extend their defensive perimeter in two directions, towards Australia, in an effort to cut the tenuous supply lines to that country, and towards Midway, in an effort to force the U. S. Navy to abandon Hawaii as its main Pacific base and to fall back on California. Both these efforts were frustrated by the carrier battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and
June, partially due to a Japanese inclination to devise overly ingenious plans which had the net effect of dividing their available forces. Despite the loss of her main carrier strength in Midway, Japan still attempted to cut the Australian life line by operations in the Solomons and it was in this area that the first determined counter offensive began (at Guadalcanal in August 1942). In this bloody operation, the land battle actually was of relatively little importance compared with the numerous naval air and surface actions tought over control of the waters around the island. In effect, between the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (May- October 1942) Japan lost her edge in naval air power, and between the Battle of Savo Island and the Battle of Vella Lavella (August 1942 - October 1943) she lost her edge in surface combat as well. After this, the Japanese carrier fleet effectively retired from the war for over a year, partly because their air groups were heavily engaged in land- based combat in the Solomons. After the Battle of the SantaCruz Islands, Japan would hoard her carriers and other heavy ships until mid- 1944, by which time it would be too late and they would be so greatly outnumbered in both planes and ships as to make the outcome obvious to anyone. Meanwhile, in the Solomons, the basic pattern by which the U. S. would achieve final victory was emerging, as, one after another, key islands were seized, while others, less important or too tough to crack, were "neutralized" by a combination of air power and naval blockade. In late 1943 the Navy and Marines launched a drive across the Central Pacific to supplement the drive in the South Pacific and both would meet in 1944 in the Philippines. Japan, having entered the war in hopes of a swift victory, could but try to hold the line and try to find a way out.

CONCLUSIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS

Of several general conclusions whichmay be drawn from a study of the Pacific War, two stand out above all: the vital role played by the American submarine offensive against Japan and the overwhelming efficiency of the American industrial establishment, which provided the means once the decision to carry the war through had been taken. To be sure, the airplane, and the aircraft carrier, proved potent and ultimately decisive weapons but the root cause of the American victory was the enormously successful submarine operations linked with the cornucopia of American
productivity. In other areas, several important developments occurred, the most important probably being the reinforcement of amphibious techniques into a precise military art, an art still almost totally dominated by the United States. The Pacific War also has the distinction of being the first extensive and lengthy naval campaign in history and, at the same time, totally altering the pattern of naval warfare which had existed since the emergence of the ship of the line, in the Seventeenth Century. There are several interesting speculations, or "What ifs..." in the Pacific War. Obviously the most interesting is the possibility that, with just a bit more good will and under- standing on both sides, the entire thing might have been avoided. The net result of this might well have meant the defeat of Germany at an earlier time and a totally altered world situation. Or it may not have. Certainly, if Japan had managed to keep her Pearl Harbor Striking Force in operation a bit longer, things may well have gone smoother during her conquest of the Pacific and if the troops and aircraft idling away in China and Manchuria had been committed to the main theatre, things would almost certainly have moved along faster. At the least, a bit more time may have been gained. From the American standpoint we may consider the possibilities of a "Japan First" strategy- one in which all of America's budding military might was hurled into defeating Japan- which probably would have been an error, since Germany was the more dangerous enemy (although ultimately, in the face of Allied economic and manpower resources it would have mattered little). On the other hand, the U. S. Certainly could have made a substantially greater effort in the Pacific without seriously impairing the war against Germany. For example, the Navy actively considered converting several very large liners into aircraft carriers in late 1941, which would have increased the numbers of this critical class available in the Pacific in 1942- 1943, when at one point there were but two U. S. carriers operational. Of course, as the Army pointed out, such a conversion might have impaired troop shipment overseas but, as things turned out, American mobilization and staging overseas actually took place at least a year too early for the European Theatre. One interesting speculation is to consider the situation which might have obtained if the Philippine Army and American formations in the Philippines had been up to full strength, a condition which was planned for October 1942, but which could have occurred earlier if pre- war planning had been different. This possibility, however, would seem to be something of a two- edged sword, for MacArthur, an aggressive general if ever there was one, may well have tried to fight it out with the Japanese in the open. An American- Filipino Victory would have resulted in a delayed Japanese occupation of the islands but, isolated as they were, they would have fallen eventually anyway. A Japanese victory would have speeded up Japanese occupation and possibly
extended the war. Ultimately, the occurrence of any of the foregoing possibilities would not have altered the fundamental outcome. Once the U. S. decided to fight on to final victory (thus not doing what Japan anticipated i. e., deciding that the cost was too much for the gain) American economic might took over. In the face of that the Japanese never had a chance.

GENERAL SITUATION AND
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
DECEMBER 1941

A. There were some 42,000 ground troops in Hawaii, organized into two weak infantry divisions with supporting artillery, anti- aircraft and tank units. Of about 400 Army and Navy aircraft in the islands only some 140 fighters, 6 bombers, and a number of PBYs were of first line quality, the remainder being either obsolete or obsolescent.
B. By late 1941 the U. S. had some 1,800,000 men under arms, including overseas garrisons, but the bulk of these were only partially trained and poorly equipped by the outbreak of the war. In the entire Army there existed not one combat ready division. The Army Air Forces were in similar condition, though a trickle of first line equipment was coming into service, much of it earmarked for overseas garrisons.
C. The Panama Canal Zone was defended by some 21,000 Army and 11,000 Army Air Force personnel. Equipment was meagre and training was not particularly good. The coast defense system, however, was one of the finest in the world.
D. Including the recently mobilized Philippine Army, there were some 120,000 ground combat troops in the Philippines, of whom only 32,000 could be considered well trained, first line troops, being Regular Army, Marines, Regular Philippine Army, and Philippine Constabulary. The balance of the ground forces were hastily organized, badly trained, and poorly equipped Philippine Army Reservists. These troops comprised roughly a dozen divisions plus some supporting independent artillery, cavalry, tank, and engineer formations. Including Army Air Force, Philippine Army Air Force, and Naval aircraft, there were over 250 aircraft in the islands, but only 30 B-17's, 72 P- 40s, and 32 PBY's could be considered operational first line aircraft. E. The Anzacs suffered under the considerable handicap that the best parts of their land and air forces were off fighting in the Mediterranean Theater when the Pacific War began. There was one first line regular brigade in Australia with a tankless regular armored division
and the equivalent of nine militia divisions, plus a regular brigade in Fiji and one militia brigade in New Zealand. Finally, the Australians could fall back upon 32,000 World War I Veterans who constituted a sort of Home Guard reserve. The lack of first line aircraft was keenly felt, but about 100 useful aircraft were on hand, largely divided between Australia and Papua.
F. In the Netherlands Indies there were some 124,000 troops and militarized police divided into two divisions and some 15 independent battalions, plus an odd lot of supporting units. Roughly a fifth of these troops were Dutch. Equipment, training, and particularly morale were very poor - Holland had been in Nazi hands 18 months by late 1941 and the Indonesians were restless, and growing more so. Of 312 aircraft on hand the most modern were the Brewster Buffalo and B- 10's.
G. In addition to the Singapore Fortress there were four divisions and four independent brigades of British, Indian, Australian, and Malayan regular troops, all badly equipped and not well trained - one division had been fully equipped and trained for the Western Desert. In addition there were a few nearly useless local formations maintained by the princely states. A few relatively modern aircraft were among the 100 at hand, but none could match the Japanese.
H. Approximately two British- Indian- Burmese regular divisions were available in Burma, with little to recommend them and virtually no air support. More or less available in India were another division and a poorly equipped armored brigade. A number of Chinese divisions, varying from good to worthless, were also available, just over the border.
I.. The Siamese Army was the best Asian army excepting only the Japanese. There were four fairly well equipped and well trained regular divisions available for foreign service and a small not overly useful air force and navy. In the event, the Siamese would first resist, then join the Japanese.
J. On paper the Chinese armies totaled some 300 divisions, but none were up to strength and perhaps not more than 100 T/ O& E divisions could have been formed from them. Badly equipped, poorly led, shabbily clothed, and generally ill- treated, the Chinese would resist feebly
and would have potential but would be hindered by domestic political entanglements from capitalizing on this. Some Chinese formations, however, would prove very valuable and equal to anything the Japanese could throw at them, particularly the Communists and certain German- trained Nationalist units. In the air, the "Flying Tigers" an American volunteer Group managed to keep a small number of P- 40's and older aircraft in action against the Japanese, but rarely more than 100.
K. Though of indeterminate strength, the Soviet Far Eastern Army was the finest portion of the Red Army, and highly respected by the Japanese, who had been bested by it in two bloody
battles in the late 1930's. This respect would work in the Soviet's favor when, in the desperation of the struggle for Moscow, many first class combat units would be sent to the West. Constantly keeping an eye on the Japanese in Manchuria, this force would significantly influence the course of the war long before it ever fired a shot.
L. The French had approximately two divisions in Indo- China, plus support elements and a small, but relatively modern air force. There was a small naval squadron as well. These forces acquitted themselves well in a brief war with Siam in 1941, but, under the advice of President Roosevelt that resistance was rather useless; had acquiesced in a peaceful Japanese occupation of portions of the country during 1940. The French Indo- Chinese forces would have no influence on the coming conflict.
M. The Japanese Army of occupation in Manchuria comprised 13 divisions, 24 independent brigades, and some 560 aircraft, supported by a small and inefficient Manchukuoan puppet statearmy. The primary mission of these forces would be to keep an eye on the Russians. Most of them would still be there in 1945, though this army was often used for drafts of experienced men into depleted combat units elsewhere.
N. Twenty- two divisions, 21 brigades, and about 120 aircraft held Japanese occupied China and prepared for additional gains when the Pacific War began, supported by a large, ineffective Chinese puppet army.
O. In the home territories Japan maintained six divisions, 11 brigades, 10 depot divisions and some 90 Army aircraft. The Navy maintained a number of aircraft and several Special Naval Landing Force units.
P. Japan had available for immediate occupation in the "Southern Army" sector - which extended from Burma to the Solomon's - 10 divisions, 4 brigades, 5 Special NNaval Landing Forces, and some 700 Army, and large numbers of navy aircraft. These units were actually located in such diverse places as Indo- China, Hainan, Formosa, Truk, and Japan itself.

N AVAL /A IRCRAFT S TRENGTH A VAILABLE Outbreak of the Pacific War - December 1941

TYPE JAPAN UNITED STATES ALLIES Pacific Total
CV 12 3 8 -
A/ C 672 280 671 -
BB 11 9 17 2
CA 18 13 18 1
CL 17 11 19 10
DD 104 80 183 20
SS 67 73 112 11

These forces were available to the belligerent powers when the war began. The Allied Powers, chiefly the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands, had additional forces available outside the Pacific Area but the pressure of other commitments would preclude their strengthening their forces in the Pacific, unlike the United States which would draw upon the Atlantic Fleet in early 1942 for both carriers and battleships. Not included in the table are one French light cruiser and several destroyers in Indo- China, which took no part in the campaign.

Divisions Available
December 1941 To June 1943
MONTH JAPAN UNITED STATES Total Pacific
Dec 1941 51 30 4
Jun 1942 56 49 9
Dec 1942 56 76 12
Jun 1943 67 87 14
This table illustrates the increasing tempo of American mobilization in terms of Army and Marine combat divisions as compared with Japanese efforts. Not included in American totals are the divisions of the Philippine Army, Australia and New Zealand. Losses are not included, nor is any attempt made to equate non- divisional combat elements into divisional equivalents, though large numbers of these were available. "Pacific" is here used to mean areas bordering on the Pacific Ocean and includes the American West Coast.

AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE DECEMBER 1941 TO JUNE 1943
MONTH JAPAN UNITED STATES U. S./ JAPAN
Dec 1941 2,685 1,459 54%
Jun 1942 2,661 9,185 290%
Dec 1942 3,674 12,039 304%
Jun 1943 5,431 17,738 307%

Just in terms of aircraft available in the Pacific it can be seen that the U. S. had an enormous superiority over Japan relatively early in the war. As time went on this superiority would become greater and greater, even excluding aircraft assigned to the European Theater or retained for training purposes in the U. S. Also not included, though not of enormous numbers during this period, are the Australian and other Commonwealth air forces which also fought in the theatre. Roughly speaking, somewhat more than 19% of American aircraft in December 1941 were carrier- borne. After the war began, the figure tended to fluctuate greatly but ran about 10- 15%.

ON THE NAVAL AIR POWERREVOLUTION

The aircraft carrier was originally conceived as a means of providing a conventional battleship fleet with the advantages of aerial reconnaissance. Thus it was that in World War I the British Grand Fleet came to possess a number of aircraft tenders, and, later, actual carriers. In time the advantages of using these carriers in combat roles were also realized and limited combat missions were assigned, more or less commensurate with the limitations of the aircraft involved. In the period between world wars the nations owning aircraft carriers, Japan, the U. S., Britain, and France held a generally similar view on the uses of naval air power. To wit, that the aircraft carrier was to act as the "cavalry of the sea," scouting far ahead of the battle fleet, annoying and sniping at the enemy before the main engagement, falling back far behind the Battle Line during the heavy gunnery exchange, and then, when it was all over, either following up the victory with a hard pursuit or, in a reverse, covering the retreat of friendly forces. This was, in essence, the doctrine of both the Japanese and American navies at the outbreak of World War II, though a few voices were heard in both nations proposing that the naval air arm assume a strike role totally independent of the battle fleets. Indeed, on maneuvers in the early 1930's, an American carrier force proved highly successful in a surprise, independent raid on the Panama Canal. And another did very well against Pearl Harbor on a Sunday morning. However, like prophetic voices everywhere, these individuals went unheard, except when they made such wild claims that any hearing they received was more in the form of ridicule. Yamamoto, who planned the Pearl Harbor operation and the sweep of Japanese victories which followed after it, had some insight into the potential of independently operating naval air forces based on carriers, but had doubts as to their effectiveness even after the overwhelming success at Pearl Harbor (where, it must be remembered, it was the battleships which were the prime target, not the carriers assumed to be there). Thus, except for the Pearl Harbor operation, the Japanese Navy generally operated on the theory that the carrier forces were ancillary to the battle fleet throughout the war, even though accepting the carrier as supreme in theory. The Americans were on no higher level of thinking when the war began, but the elimination of the battle fleet- then the mainstay of sea power- suddenly made the handful of carriers in the Pacific the first, and only, line of defense. Until newer battleships came along, the carriers would have to maintain the fight alone. Through the first six months of the war, up to Midway, the U. S. Navy clung ever more feebly to the theory that using carriers in the first line was a temporary expedient and that it was surface action which was still the thing to do. Meanwhile, led increasingly by enthusiastic younger, air- minded officers, the carrier forces became more skillful and more accustomed to operating independently. The overwhelming victory at Midway- where relative air parity existed but where the Japanese could have wiped the Americans out in a surface battle, more or less sealed the fate of the battle fleet as the backbone of the sea power. After Midway, the aircraft carrier became the main arm of the fleet, a situation confirmed in the great carrier battles of the Guadalcanal campaign. Though, of course, battleship admirals and doctrine did operate as a drag on the carriers throughout the war. It would be useful examine the elements which made the carrier/ carrier' plane combination supreme. To begin with, of course, carriers could conduct reconnaissance better than any other vessels, even when the others were equipped with float planes. A carrier's reconnaissance elements were able to conduct an aggressive, far reaching search, whereas float planes were virtualsitting ducks. Then too, the carrier could stand far off of its target and conduct operations out of range of most conventional defensive forces. To be sure, operating carriers in the presence of strong land based air power was somewhat suicidal, but by late 1944 the
U. S. Navy was able to send literally thousands of aircraft into action on carriers, more or less overwhelming land- based air power. Then too, if action got too hot, carriers were better able to run due to their very high speed. And the endless seas gave, them plenty of room to hide in, as well as the ability to strike anywhere. Trying to get to an opposing carrier with a battle force was virtually impossible, unless the carriers were employed in a clumsy and careless manner, as did happen on a couple of occasions in World War II, none of consequence. In effect, to kill a carrier you needed another carrier. The aircraft, operating as "expendable" weapons- planes being easily replaceable as were, to a somewhat lesser extent, pilots- had the reach and agility to make deep strikes and get home again without imperiling their base( another advantage). Indeed, you could think of a carrier as a battleship which fires piloted shells, with the advantage of being able to recover the unexpected ones. Finally, two very important elements, time and cost. An aircraft carrier was considerably cheaper to build than a battleship and took a lot less time to put together. During the war the American record for battleships was something like 36 months whereas, on the average, two carriers could have been built in the same time. With all of these advantages, the supremacy of the carrier became more and more evident as the war progressed. In point of fact, of course, the battleship had had its day before the first shot had been fired. It just took a little time to realize that and to find the right formula
for employing the replacement: the fast carrier task force.

OTHER WARSHIPS

Both sides were just about evenly matched, on paper, in the other categories of warships. The Japanese had an advantage early in the war because of superior crew training, tactics and, in some cases (as with torpedoes), weapons. Battleships were never really decisive during the Pacific War. They were the slowest (outside of the "combat" transports which carried ground troops) warships in use. Their size made them good targets. Most of the decisive surface actions were fought at night in restricted waters. Not good conditions for using 30,000 ton battleships. More easily used in this role were cruisers, which were faster than the battleships and averaged about 10,000 tons. Even more actively used were the destroyers. These ships were the "infantry" of the Pacific Naval War, andsuffered accordingly. Japanese battleships were somewhat heavier than US vessels, although American ships were, on the average, more heavily armed. In addition, the Japanese had four "fast" battleships which could keep up with carriers and cruisers. Japanese battleships were from 31,000 to 64,000 tons in weight and armed with eight to twelve large caliber guns (14 inches in most cases, 18 inches in the largest ships). Their secondary armament consisted of twelve to eighteen 5.5" to 6" guns plus twenty or so 25mm anti- aircraft guns. Speed varied from 25 to 30 knots. American battleships fell naturally into two groups. First was a collection of World War I vintage vessels armed primarily with 14" guns, though one had 12" pieces. These tended to be very slow, more heavily protected, and
equipped with huge amounts of anti- aircraft guns (as compared with the older Japanese ships). Most carried from eight to sixteen 5", something around forty 40mm and upwards of fifty 20mm guns. some of the very oldest vessels also carried from six to ten 5" single- purpose guns as well. They displaced from 26,000 to 36,000 tons and generally served as gunfire support ships in as much as none of them could keep up with the aircraft carrier task forces, since their speed was only some 20- 21 knots under the best of conditions. The second group of American battleships comprised vessels completed from 1941 on. These were uniformly fast vessels, of about 28- 30 knots and were armed with nine 16" guns apiece. Displacement was 35,000 tons. These vessels provided excellent anti- aircraft coverage for the carrier forces, mounting sixteen to twenty 5" guns, from fifty to a hundred 40mm, and some forty to seventy 20mm pieces. In addition to providing anti- aircraft coverage for the fleet, these vessels were designed to meet and fight the Japanese battle fleet should the opportunity arise. The next most important class of surface combat vessels was the cruiser. The cruiser was initially conceived to fill two separate, but occasionally complementary functions. The first was to act as a reconnaissance and scout vessel for the main fleet (a function which, by the outbreak of the war, had been taken over by carrier- borne aircraft) and the second was to provide protection to the more important
warships during close combat. In this second role the cruiser proved particularly useful, adding its anti- aircraft fire into the defensive screens thrown up around carriers. A totally new role also evolved during the war: that of substituting for battleships when the latter were needed but not around. Japan, like the US, favored the 8" gunned, or "heavy" cruiser and most of her pre- war light cruiser construction was converted to carry 8" guns as soon as it was convenient for the Japanese Navy's shipments to do so. This meant, in effect, that the available Japanese light cruisers were very small vessels indeed, displacing between 2,800 and 5,800 tons and armed with from four to seven 5.5" guns, some anti- aircraft and, a feature missing and to be missed in the US cruisers, from four to eight torpedo tubes of from 21" to 24" caliber. On the other hand, in compensation for their small size and hitting power these vessels had a relatively high speed of from 31 to 36 knots. The Japanese employed them primarily as flotilla leaders for their destroyers and in this role they served rather well. Japanese heavy cruisers were formidable, sturdy machines displacing from 9,300 to 13,300 tons and carrying from six to ten 8" guns, generally in double turrets, though occasionally in single ones. Anti- aircraft armament ranged from four to eight 4.7" or 5" guns, between eight and twelve 25mm, and a number of smaller pieces. All were equipped with from eight to sixteen 24" torpedo tubes. Training in the use of these weapons, particularly at night, was extremely fine. Speed hovered between 33 to 35 knots. By contrast, the American cruisers, whether heavy or light, were very similar to each other except for minor differences in age and design. The oldest class displaced some 7,050 tons and could make 34 knots carrying ten 6" guns and eight 3" anti-aircraft. Unique among American cruisers, they carried six 21" torpedo tubes. All other classes of consequences during the critical period displaced 9,100 to approximately 10,000 tons and were armed with either nine or ten 8" or fifteen 6" guns, eight 5" anti- aircraft, plus some smaller pieces and could make 32 to 34 knots. Fundamentally the designs for all of these vessels, as well as the superior classes which followed towards the end of the war, were identical. In terms of destroyers, vital for escort of the larger combat elements in battle and of the non- combat supply elements behind the battle lines, the significant differences were in training, where the
Japanese tended to have the edge, particularly at night and in torpedo actions. Excepting coastal vessels, of which Japan had a number, destroyerstended to displace between 1,190 and 2,090 tons with the edge to the Japanese. On the other hand, in terms of armament the Americans tended to have the edge, particularly as the war went on. Most destroyers carried from four to eight 4" to 5" guns, frequently dual-
purpose types, with a number of anti- aircraft machine guns thrown in. The anti- aircraft armament increased considerably during the war as the destroyers also took a hand in covering carrier operations. Most destroyers carried from six to sixteen torpedo tubes, with some of the Japanese torpedoes being 24". Here, of course, lay a major advantage of the Japanese, for their 24" torpedo was a particularly potent and accurate weapons system. In speed there was also little difference, both sides having vessels capable of making from 34 to 38 knots with ease. Thus, in this vital category of warship- perhaps the most vital category after the carrier- there was little to choose
from the one side or the other. Both sides had a considerable number of submarines on hand at the beginning of the war and these proved a mixed bag. The Japanese badly mishandled theirs, attempting to use them against "military" targets exclusively, rather than against shipping. The US, of course, loosed its submarines against Japan's
merchant marine. In effect, the submarines won the war. Japanese submarines were not materially inferior to American ones and were, in some respects, superior. Most displaced from 1,140 to 2,900 tons, with occasional units above and below these figures. Deck armament was usually one or two guns of from 3" to 5.5" caliber, supported by up to as many as four 25mm anti- aircraft guns, though occasionally these were missing. From four to eight 21" torpedo tubes were carried, generally with from two to three torpedoes per tube available. Speed was from 14 to 23 knots on the surface and from 7 to 10 knots submerged, which was rather typical for the period. Endurance tended to be good and many Japanese submarines carried mines, which were rare among American submarines. American submarines did not differ greatly from Japanese ones, though there probably were more older ones on hand. They displaced from 500- for the very oldest- to 2,730 tons, with a deck armament usually comprising a gun of 3" to 5" caliber, though three vessels carriedm two 6" pieces. From four to ten 21" torpedo tubes were carried, with one or more sets of reloads. Unfortunately, them American submarine torpedo was rather poor at the beginning of the war and time was required to remedy the faults in the system. Speed was from 14 to 21 knots on the surface and from 8 to 11 submerged, fairly typical of the period. The average endurance of the US submarines at the start of the war was less than that of their Japanese counterparts. Fundamentally, there were few marked differences between Japanese and American warships. What made the difference was the degree of training,tactical skill, and the material advantages gained from superior torpedoes and such. This helped the Japanese keep ahead for the early part of the war. But as the US Navy became more proficient, more sophisticated, and more technically skillful, these advantages melted away.

THE AIRPOWER/INFANTRY/
ENGINEERS COMBINATION

In a very real sense the key to the American advances in the Pacific was extremely elementary. In essence, it consisted of never advancing beyond the reach of friendly land- based air power, particularly of fighters. Doing this required considerable advanced planning but was not overly difficult and became easier as the war went on. Tactically and logistically, of course, this sort of thing proved to be something of a "monster" at times. What it all came down to was what may be termed the airpower/ infantry/ engineers combination.

AIRPOWER. To be reasonable, fighter- range during most of the war was about 400 miles. This worked out to something like 400 miles out, 200 miles in reserve for combat and whatnot, and 400 miles back, with a little left over, just in case. Significantly, not until 1944, when the U. S. had the capability of lifting something over 2,500 aircraft in carriers, were any advances made beyond this 400 mile limit. The fighters gave you security from enemy airpower. Under their cover you prepared to leap forward- but not over 400 miles- to establish a forward base. Consider: From Guadalcanal (taken before a full understanding of the combination tactics was held) to the Russells is only some 75 miles; the Russells to Rendova, 120 miles; Rendova to New Georgia, 25 miles; New Georgia to Vella Lavella, 60 miles. And so it went, not merely in the South Pacific, but also in the Central Pacific (where no landings were undertaken before late 1943, when over 1,400 aircraft were available on carriers) and in the South West Pacific, where somewhat larger leaps were undertaken. Having attained air superiority over an area the next thing to do was to send in the infantry.

INFANTRY. These could be either Army or Marines and would be supported by appropriate amphibious elements to help them get ashore in the fastest time with the fewest casualties. Usually a combat loaded division meant for amphibious assault could consume up to 100,000 tons of shipping, or about eight or ten Liberty ships. Then we have non-divisional combat elements, add in transport for the amphibious elements supporting them, the construction engineers along for the ride, and the mountains of ammunition and supplies needed, and we have a considerable armada. But it didn't stop there. Destroyers would have to accompany the transports as escort; command ships to provide direction; and cruisers and battleships to pound the beaches and provide air defense. Obsolete battleships proved highly useful in the role of beach
softening up. They were much better at it than the more modern ones, which were meant to fight other battleships. Curiously the biggest battleship fight of the Pacific war was a case of obsolete vessels fighting on both sides: Surigao Strait. For good measure, as they became available, escort aircraft carriers would also be provided to give really close- to-hand air support. These additional vessels would require more destroyers and escorts and so it would go. Even a relatively small, one- division assault could run to well over 100 ships of all types by the time all calculations were finished. Then, of course, the Japanese occupying the target had to be dealt with, which tended to be a bloodier business than conventional fighting anywhere else. Roughly speaking casualties were high and generally equal in amphibious operations, except that most Japanese casualties were killed in action (Iwo Jima: Japanese had. 21,000 KIA; U. S. had 6,800 KIA, 18,000 WIA). Once the infantry had taken the place (indeed often while they were still in the process of taking it ), the engineers would move in.

ENGINEERS. Often neglected is the vital role of the engineers in Pacific operations. Landing with the invasion troops, to whom some engineers provided amphibious assault assistance, construction engineer elements would immediately begin airfield construction. Sometimes this was not difficult and where an already existing strip could be found it was possible to refurbish it and get it back into use within 24 hours or so (48 hrs. if heavy fighting had taken place over it ). Where no airfield existed things began to get tough. A light, airborne- type construction battalion, functioning in heavy kunai grass such as was often found in New Guinea during MacArthur's advances, could get a 4,500 feet fighter strip into action in about 20 days given good drainage and fair soil bearing qualities. These would be fairly ideal conditions however, and in most cases things were considerably less than ideal. Thus, on some islets, dredging operations had to be undertaken to get coral from lagoons to provide a good base on which to lay the steel matting found so valuable in airfield construction. Once the engineers finished their job, and often while they were still doing it, fighter aircraft could begin to operate out of the new airfield, which in the Pacific often meant the heavy, long range P- 38. This, of course, would start the whole cycle over again. Even late in the war the importance of using land- based air to cover advances was conceded. Thus Leyte was invaded before Luzon and Luzon before Okinawa, as the Amukusa Islands were to be occupied before Kyushu, and as Kyushu was to be taken before Honshu. It was a good formula, and it worked, which was the basic proof of its value.

THE SHIPPING WAR

The War in the Pacific depended, like anyother, on supply. Being an ocean war, the supplies, quite naturally, had to go by ship. At the beginning of the war, the shipping available to both Japan and the United States was, surprisingly enough, quite equal. Japan had some 5.98 million tons of shipping while the USA had some 6.7 million tons. The crunch, however, came when one compared the shipbuilding capabilities of the two nations. Japan, an island nation, had to import to survive. Japan had few natural resources. And Japan could only build some 600,000 tons of new shipping each year. America could build over ten times that amount, and was doing so by 1943. Before the war began, the United States had already started on a shipbuilding campaign which was to produce 10.8 million tons during 1942- 43. This was increased once America entered the war. Of course, the majority of American shipping was to be engaged in getting material to Europe and fighting its way through Nazi U- Boats in the North Atlantic. The Germans lost the Shipping War in the Atlantic, but only after sinking 23.3 million tons of shipping. On the other hand, the Japanese sank or seized only a million tons of shipping during 1942 (and not much after that). Much of this, of course, was not American shipping, but these ships were lost to the Allied cause. The Allies eventually built far more (some 19 million tons more) shipping than was sunk. The Japanese weren't so fortunate. From the very beginning the Japanese realized that they would have to carefully ration their available shipping. They were all too correct in this estimation. In fact, from the very beginning (despite the 400,000 tons of enemy shipping they seized initially) the Japanese merchant marine declined. Slowly at first (a net loss of less than 200,000 tons in 1942), but the effects of the American "U- Boat" campaign soon took hold. By mid- 1943 the net loss (from the 1941 tonnage) was 440,000 tons. After that one crisis
followed another as the Japanese vainly tried to do more with less shipping. What DO you do with shipping ? You carry troops. An American infantry division required from 70,000 to 100,000 tons of shipping. Once carried across the Pacific it required another 15,000 tons a month to maintain it. The "lift" tonnage fell as the war went on due to increased experience and expertise in putting men and equipment aboard ships. Other units required more tonnage to "lift". Overall, the 518,000 men carried to the Pacific in the first eighteen months of the war required some 3.6 million tons of shipping. Once there, they required some 500,000 tons of shipping a month for maintenance. In the first eighteen months of the war, the United States Army moved some 1.6 million men and some 23 million tons of material overseas (only 6 million tons went to the Pacific). The US Navy tied up some 600,000 tons of shipping, mostly for maintaining the fleet. By mid- 1943 some 200,000 naval personnel (including Marines) were in the Pacific. Over half of the US fleet was concentrated in the Pacific. This increased after mid- 1943 with the neutralization of the German U-Boat offensive in the Atlantic. This German defeat was but another nail in Japan's coffin. At the beginning of the war, Japan calculated that 3 million tons would be needed to maintain their economy. This left some 3 million for the military to use in their offensive. But to support an offensive in the Pacific would require some 2.1 million tons for the Army alone, plus 1.8 million tons needed by the Navy. Of course, the shipping allocated for the Army would gradually decrease as the Army completed its troop movements. Initially the Japanese Army had to move some ten divisions (or their equivalent) by sea. This took up some 700,000 tons of shipping. Also to be moved were engineer, aircraft support and base maintenance units. Finally, all of these units had to be supplied. Not as lavishly as American units, but you couldn't grow ammunition and equipment locally. By the Spring of 1942, the Japanese had some 250,000 land- based troops in the central and south Pacific. These required nearly 200,000 tons of shipping a month to supply. In addition, every time a unit was to be moved, more shipping was tied up. The Japanese planned to reduce army shipping to one million tons by August of 1942. Navy shipping was expected to remain constant at 1.8 million tons. This would leave 3.2 million tons for the civilian economy, which produced all that the armed forces needed to wage war. In early August 1942 American forces went over to the offensive, seizing Guadalcanal Island. The Army, in the course of its attempts to retake the island, took away from the homeland shipping fleet some 400,00 tons of shipping. But this was quickly stopped,
for since the war began, Japan had not been able to muster the necessary three million tons of shipping needed for her economy. At the outbreak of the war the Army had 2.15 million tons, the Navy 1.55 million and the economy 1.71 million tons. By August 1942 this had changed to Army, 1.27 million tons; Navy, 1.5 million; and the economy 2.76 million tons. by January 1943, at the peak of the Army's build- up to retake the "Southern Areas" held by the Americans, the Army controlled 1.41 million tons of shipping, the Navy 1.46 million and the economy 2.34 million tons. American
attacks on Japanese shipping increased throughout 1943 (the Japanese refused to adopt a convoy policy until too late, and then American subs had adopted the "wolf pack" technique). The Japanese managed to build 3.2 million tons of shipping during the war, but Allied air and naval units managed to sink some 7.5 million tons, all but a million tons of it after mid- 1943. All things considered, Japan never had enough shipping to meet the demands of a naval war in the Pacific. The United States was not much better off for the first eighteen months of the war. At the beginning of the war the Army had 778,000 tons of shipping available to it. By the end of 1942 this had risen to 3.9 million tons and by mid- 1943 approached 5 million tons. But after the Spring of 1942 the bulk of available shipping went to the Atlantic. Shipping in the Pacific reached a peak in May 1942 with 2 million tons in use. By the end of the year there was but 1.14 million tons available 1.7 million tons and this amount continued to grow until the war's end. Even though the United States committed itself from the beginning to the defeat of Germany first, additional tonnage had to go to the Pacific in order to move ground troops and aircraft units into what, for all practical purposes, was a vacuum. Once this had been accomplished (and particularly after Midway crippled the Japanese carrier force) the Pacific had to get along on what could be spared from the Battle for the Atlantic. This meant that much of the American material superiority could not be brought to bear on Japan immediately. For example, in 1942 Japan produced 12,100 combat aircraft, the USA produced 30.800. But only B- 17 heavy bombers could be flown out to Pacific bases, all others had to come by ship, as well as the base equipment and personnel for all aircraft. What about Japan's submarine Fleet? It was, initially, the equal of America's. It was crippled by a doctrine which prohibited the wasting of torpedoes on merchant ships. Japanese submarines were expected to go after combat ships, and nothing else. The Japanese held to this doctrine throughout the war. What, if they had adopted the more logical approach, and gone after US merchant ships? This would have probably had a two- fold effect. First, it would have inhibited the US fleet in the Pacific. Destroyers and other light fleet units would be taken away for escort duty to a much greater extent than was actually the case. The second effect would have been felt in the Atlantic. Shipping lost in the Pacific would have to be made up, it was at the bare survival level as it was. This would have probably meant that the American invasion of North Africa in late 1942 would have been put off, or at least seriously curtailed. Much of the same effect would have been evident had the Japanese not been stopped at Midway. But the Japanese could have hurt the Allied cause tremendously simply by changing their submarine doctrine. They didn't, and the Pacific War ended thatmuch sooner. Decided, to a large extent, by hundreds of lightly armed and rathe unmilitary looking merchant ships.

A footnote on Japanese and American Merchant Ships As the war progressed the USA gained not only a quantitative edge over the Japanese in military equipment, but a qualitative one also. This was also evident in the wartime merchant shipping built by both nations. During 1941 America began building a new class of merchant ships, the Type EC2- S- C1 (or "liberty" ship). During the course of the war over 2500 of these vessels were produced. The basic version (there were numerous sub- types for special applications) was 441 feet long and had a lift- capacity of over 14,000 tons. Vessels of this type alone amounted to over 30 million tons of shipping. The EC2- S-
CS1cruised at about 12 knots and had a crew of 45 (plus a gun crew of 36). The Japanese never had anything like it. At the outbreak of the war the Japanee merchant fleet had only 19 ships with a lifting capacity of over 10,000 tons. The ships they built during the war averaged between 2,000 and 3,000 tons each. Their performance was also below the American standard. Their cruising speed, for example, was often 30 to 50% less than that of American merchant ships. This was not particularly crucial during normal operations, but when these ships were used to transport troops in the combat zone their slow speed became decisive. Even during normal shipping operations this slow speed had its effect. For all their shipping tonnage, the average "time" from Pacific areas to the Japanese homeland was greater distances to the US West Coast. The main reason for the slowness of Japanese shipping was the "bottleneck" in their shipbuilding industry caused by an inadequate engine industry. Japan could have produced twice as many merchant ships had they a larger marine engineering capacity. They spread this capacity as thin as possible, thus producing smaller, slower ships. Both Japan and the United States produced special "fast transports." Both nations usually used converted destroyers. In addition the United States was able to produce a special line of "fast transports" built specifically for the task. The United States was also far ahead in its ability to produce amphibious shipping. Even in 1942 the United States was able to unload merchant ships in the combat zone in one third to one half the time ittook the Japanese.

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