OMAHA BEACH

East of Utah Beach was the second American landing site designated Omaha. Omaha Beach stretched 7000 yards east to west in a crescent shape with cliffs, bluffs and draws (steep gullies) being its chief geographical attributes. This was a contrast to Utah Beach's flat and marshy terrain. Extending out from the beach into the tidal flats for 250 yards were placed complex obstacles and mines that the Germans had been constructing for over two years and that Rommel did not yet consider sufficient. The high bluffs and cliffs commanded all approaches to the beach from the sea and tidal flats. Any advance made from the beach would be held to narrow passages (draws) between the bluffs made by streams long since dried up. The Germans had arranged their pillboxes as strongpoints to control these passages. They were arranged to fire east and west enfilading any troops in the draws. The pillboxes were further protected so they could not be knocked out except by direct infantry fire and assault.
Adding to this defensive position was an unaccounted for German Infantry Division - the 352nd. This was an experienced group with service on the Russian front. This unit was thought to be around the St. Lo area and allied intelligence had missed it.
A half hour before H-Hour (0630), Omaha Beach was subject to one of the most intensive bombardments from naval and air. After this softening up process had taken place, nine LCT® rocket launching ships were to fire 9000 rockets on to the beach in a saturation bombardment as the first wave of assault forces were on their way to shore.
General Gerow commanded V Corps and the lead assault force were regiments of the 1st Division under General Huebner. The 116th Infantry Regiment (attached from the 29th Division) was on the right abreast to the 16th Infantry on the left. Their initial objective was to clear beach defenses and the ridge of high ground parallel to the main coastal road which was 2-3 miles inland from the beach. From this line the assaulting force would fan out and extend the perimeter to between five and six miles deep astride the Bayeux highway.
Another force was landed between Omaha and Utah Beaches at Pointe du Hoc with the purpose of silencing 155 mm gun emplacements. This task was assigned the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion. Reaching the heights where the guns were located, it was found to be deserted. But the Rangers were behind schedule and this changed the landing site of another wave of Rangers. However, this Ranger Battalion later found the guns and destroyed them at an inland location. It was soon discovered by the first wave that the bombardment achieved minimal results. German resistance was stiff and energetic. High seas, underwater obstacles, and intense enemy fire destroyed many landing craft and caused high casualties before the assault companies reached the shore. After hitting the beach, which varied from only a few yards to 200 yards in the center, the U.S. forces came under withering enemy fire from concrete fortifications, machine-gun emplacements, and sniper nests. Heavy casualties and disorganization resulted. High cliffs were at both ends of the beach and bluffs in the center which contained the heavy gun emplacemnts which could sweep the beaches with murderous fire. At Omaha the Germans came very close to 'throwing the Allies into the sea' as Rommel had promised Hitler. The one mile beach offered only patches of tall marsh as cover for individuals. The plan to exit the beach called for clearing five exit points and advance inland. The first assault waves took heavy casualties in some companies and others became confused and disorganized. Naval gunfire had managed to silence some of the enemy batteries and fortifications but most were still in operation. The first wave should have landed nine companies evenly spaced across the beach but because of mis-landings and heavy enemy fire they had bunched together. The second assault wave consisting of five separately timed landings was to complete the build-up of the two assault regiments. Additionally two combat engineer battalions were to land and begin clearing the beaches. The right flank was decimated by heavy fire and the heavy weapons company in the center took hours to assemble survivors.
Fifty minutes after H-Hour 32 DD (Duplex Drive) tanks were launched into the high seas and only 5 made it to shore. All but one of the 105-mm howitzers of the 111th Field Artillery Battalion were lost in the seas. Ten ferries used to shuttle men and equipment were swamped and sunk adding to the confusion.
Waiting to land in the 116th zone was the 5th Ranger Battalion together with two companies of the 2nd Rangers. They were waiting for news on Pointe du Hoe which would determine whether they landed in the 116th Infantry zone. The attack on Pointe du Hoe was delayed forty minutes because of current drift. The Ranger reinforcements concluded that the attack had failed and proceeded with an alternative plan. Again two companies came under heavy fire and were badly mauled.
In the 2nd Battalion zone the second wave in the heavy weapons company took severe losses and became badly disorganized. It took an hour before an organized American attack could be put together.
The 16th Infantry experienced similar losses and disorganization as did the 116th. The 3rd Battalion successfully completed the landing to the 16th Infantry's left but the headquarters landed at another location and it was hours before they rejoined their outfit. Command was one of the gravest problems faced by the assault units, not only because of casualties but also of extreme difficulties of communication. Also there was confusion of mixed units and the narrow sector of the front. So the first few hours were critical to Omaha's success. The air support was absent because of the weather making the assault units nearly dependent upon themselves to accomplish anything. Naval bombardment was beginning to take a toll on the Germans who were not being reinforced, especially the 916th Regiment of the 352nd Division.
The first three hours were grim and whether a beachhead could be established was in doubt. Only by direct assault and fire from LCT's were strongpoints overcome and the commanding heights reached.
Movement off the beach began before 0800, taking place initially between the exits. It began in a number of individual actions by groups of men never more than company size and often much smaller. Some actions had tank supportm and others had destroyer naval gunfire support, the ships ventured close to shore and delivered direct fire. Although it was in doubt for the first three hours, the exit from the beach finally began to happen. Order was gradually developed throughout the morning hours, allowing wave after wave of assault troops to come ashore along with their equipment. And as numbers swelled, the exodus from the beach increased and units of V Corps advanced slowly towards Vierville, St. Laurent and Colleville toward first day objectives. This increasing number of American troops began overwhelming depleted German forces that were running out of ammunition and had not the replacements to take the place of the casualties that had been taken. By nightfall, nearly 34,000 troops had landed along with 3300 vehicles on Omaha and began their trek inland. The beachhead D-DAY + 1, was two miles deep in the center and five miles wide along the coast and as Utah, Omaha did not obtain their first day objectives. In fact, Omaha and Utah had not linked up and it would take another week before all five beachheads would be connected.