IWO JIMA
February 19th - March 6th, 1945

"Uncommon valour was a common virtue" Admiral Chester A.Nimitz
Operation Detachment, the plan to capture the island of Iwo Jima in February 1945, was a vital part of the American strategy of island-hopping their way to Japan. Possession of Iwo Jima and its two airfields (with a third under construction) would cut the Japanese links with the huge expanses of ocean that they still controlled. It would also enable the air force to escort the B29s now bombing Japan from the Marianas Islands. It was thus an obvious target - a fact which was itself obvious to the Japanese. The Japanese armed forces had suffered an almost unbroken string of defeats for over two years. Even their prepared defences of islands had resulted in far more casualties for themselves than for the attackers. They looked to change this with a range of new tactics. Gone would be the reliance on fanatical banzai charges to decide the issue. They had proved wasteful of manpower, and had not succeeded in a single instance, close though they were to the heart of the Japanese warrior.
Iwo Jima was to be fortified to the limit. The island consisted of the relatively small Mount Suribachi in the south, and the larger Motoyama Plateau in the north (supporting the airfields), connected by a plain of volcanic sand. This sand would cause great problems for the Marines, as it was too soft to dig in properly, and virtually prevented running. "Like trying to fight in a bin of loosewheat" was the comment of the 4th Division's official history. Both elevated areas were naturally endowed with

hundreds of caves, which the Japanese augmented and interconnected with kilometres of tunnels. Thousands of concrete emplacements were built, and the Japanese spread their supplies, ammunition, and 21,000 men over many sites so that they would not all be destroyed or captured at once. The American plan for the invasion was simple. They would use two Divisions of Marines for the main invasion, the 4th and 5th, and hold the 3rd in reserve to be committed if necessary. The only possible landing place was the eastern shore of the volcanic plain, where eight Battalions would alight on the first day. This meant that there was inevitably going to be incredible congestion on the first day, no matter how well the landing went, with over 50,000 men packed into 2 square miles of open plain - the Japanese gunners would find it difficult to miss. The Americans had also taken account of their experiences in previous invasions. Each Battalion now had an assault platoon attached, equipped with flamethrowers, bazookas and satchel charges. The tank Battalion increased their numbers of flamethrower tanks. A two day bombardment from hundreds of warships would take care of the surface defences. The landings occurred in the early morning of February 19th, 1945. The Japanese held their fire until the Marines stepped ashore from their am-tracks, then let loose with artillery and mortar fire in an intensity unequalled in the Marines' history. The two Divisions making the initial assault suffered 2,300 casualties in the first day, taking an area only half that of the first day objectives. The Marines scooped shallow foxholes in the volcanic sand and waited for the usual counter-attack _ which never arrived. Few Marines had even seen a live Japanese soldier so far, and no prisoners were taken.
The next few days were spent in cutting across the island, and working through the preliminary defences at the base of the Motoyama Plateau, including the first airfield. At this stage the 4th Division held the left flank and the 5th Division the right. Most of the 3rd Division was soon committed to the fight in the central front, as units ran low on men and officers.
February 23rd (D+4) saw the historic capture of Mt Suribachi by the 28/5th Regiment, with the famous flag-raising under fire. The Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, witnessed this from off-shore, and said to the Marines' commander, Holland Smith,: "The raising of that flag on Suribachi means that there will be a Marine Corps for the next 500 years". Smith turned to an aide and whispered "When the war is over and money is short they will be after the Marines again, and a dozen Iwo Jimas would make no difference". How right he was.

The Japanese defenders fought with their typical dogged skill, not giving ground where unnecessary, not expending themselves uselessly in counter-attacks, using the terrain and their superb spotting positions on the top of the Motoyama Plateau to the best advantage. Often they would let the Marines advance past a hidden position, then open fire from the rear. There seemed to be no front line on the island; areas that were thought to have been 'secured' had to be cleared and cleared again before they were safe. The island campaign would not be over until March 16th, as the exhausted Marine Divisions slowly eliminated the pockets of resistance in the north of the island. The Japanese garrison had, in the main, died in place as ordered. The 21,000 defenders had caused 28,500 casualties to the attackers; the first time in the Pacific campaign that the Japanese had inflicted more casualties than they had taken.