CHOSIN RESERVOIR
27th November - 4th December, 1950

In November 1950, X Corps was assigned to assist the 8th Army in its northern advance by seizing the village of Yudam-ni on the western shore of the frozen Chosin Reservoir. The Marines were to advance west to cut the NKPA/PRoC supply lines at Mupyongni, then turn north to the Yalu. Upon reaching the Manchurian frontier, the "Home By Christmas" campaign would be declared a success and the Korean War would have been "won" by the UN.
On paper the plan appeared simple enough but there was some dissent. USMC Commandant General Gate warned that X Corps was "going out on a limb" and that a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea was "too much to ask" of army or marine troops. In particular, he cited difficulty in maintaining supply and evacuation of personnel. Unfortunately for the men required to fight the battles, General Gate's prophetic warning was ignored. Once again "total victory" fever prohibited UN generals from realising they had crossed an historic threshold into an era of limited war.
Meanwhile General Peng had drawn up a plan of his own, sending the formidable 9th Army Group to Chosin. The sole task of the eight divisions involved was to destroy the 1st Marine Division as they would kill a "snake" in their homes. Deployment was swift enough to place the 124th Division ahead of the marines at Funchilin Pass on November 2nd.. By November 7th, PRoC troops had withdrawn and the Marine advance continued.
By November 26th, the Marine vanguard arrived at Yudam and within a day the 5th and 7th Regiments were both deployed.1st Regiment was spread about Haguru and Koto to keep thesupply lines open. The Marines at Yudam could expect norelief if they required it. Soon enough they realised they had run into a Chinese dragon of Corps dimensions.
The PRoC 78th and 89th Divisions took strong positions on the prominent ridges, virtually surrounding the valley in which Yudam was located. As they tried to pin the Marines in place, the 59th Division swept along the west, cutting the supply lines between Yudam and Toktong Pass. General Peng had set a clever trap but he too came to realise he had taken hold of the Tiger's tail!
Had any other troops of the UN conglomeration been thus entrapped their fate would have been as Custer at the Little Big Horn. The Marines, however, were trained as assault troops. Even their service personnel could fight beside the shock troops with no lack of skill or discipline. In addition, the Marines enjoyed the best close air support of the war with most of their 11th Battalion artillery in place as well.
Though considered the best troops of China, the divisions at Chosin suffered the same basic faults which crippled every PRoC campaign. Supply was never adequate beyond the first few days of an attack so that penetration of enemy positions could rarely be exploited. Effective communication existed only to the regiment level, meaning that HQ orders often took up to two days to filter down to engaged battalions. This delay seriously offset the superior mobility of PRoC troops, leading to uncoordinated attacks and heavy losses. Inadequate administration allowed thousands to die from normally non-fatal wounds, simply due to lack of proper care.
In effect, the Chinese traded off every advantage but manpower. That alone would be cast against the firepower of a small force of men with a common will of steel. It is no accident that General Peng chose as his first priority the destruction of the "soldiers with the yellow leggings". A characteristic pattern of the Korean War repeated itself along the shores of the Chosin as both sides fought for control of the high ground. PRoC troops probed and attacked by night, trying to overrun Marine positions at any cost. If the defenders survived until dawn, Corsairs pursued and eliminated the massed attackers. Often, hundreds of bodies were seen piled about the defensive perimeters of Marine positions.
Finally, the Marines knew they had taken the "best punch" of their enemy. While news reports back home predicted the imminent defeat of both the 8th Army and Marines, the leathernecks themselves knew they could not be beaten.
Nevertheless, they were ordered south to Haguru as part of a general UN retreat. When asked about the retreat General
Smith stated simply "We are not retreating ... we are just attacking in another direction". With precisely that determination, the 1st Marine Division cut a path through enemy lines, arriving at Haguru by December 4th. With that act of defiance the Marines had been as a candle in a whirlwind, casting the only light of hope in the disastrous defeat of the Chosin Reservoir.