CHONGCHON
25th November - 1st December, 1950
A new UN offensive began on November 24th as the 8th Army once
again pushed toward the Yalu. On the west flank, I Corps was deployed.
The ROK II Corps stood to the east while IX Corps advanced in
the centre.
Initially, the advance was steady along the entire front. Little
did the UN troops know that the PRoC 38th Army had crossed the
Yalu on November 10th. Moving only at night, they had eluded UN
air reconnaissance and deployed along the Chongchon river by the
22nd. With time to rest and draw battle plans, an ambush of giant
proportions was set. Always thinking on a large scale, General
Lin Piao plotted the envelopment of the entire IX Corps.
Heavy blows fell first upon the ROK 8th Division on the night
of November 25th. As ROK units melted away, the entire right flank
of IX Corps was suddenly exposed. Standard PRoC tactics of infiltration,
road-blocks and envelopment destroyed ROK resistance.
The US 2nd and 25th Divisions were assailed on and across the
Chongchon, forcing the 25th Division to withdraw with heavy losses.
The 2nd Division found extraction more difficult and was soon
in an untenable salient. Its artillery positions, supposedly a
safe distance behind the "front", were directly attacked
by infantry from the PRoC 113th Division.
As the 2nd Division had been centred on Kujang-dong, this became
a crucial point of defence for the UN troops. With the fall of
Tokchon, a southerly escape route had to be held open. Kujang-dong
was one of two routes upon which the PRoC advance could be blocked.
By November 27th, 2nd Division's right flank was in danger of
collapse and withdrawal to Kunuri was necessary. To bolster the
left flank and block the advance of the PRoC 114th Division, the
newly arrived crack Turkish Army Command Force (TACF) was sent
towards Wawon. Just east of there PRoC road-blocks stopped the
Turks. Heavy fighting induced fearsome losses on both sides as
the Chinese finally met an opponent who would not yield.
In time, even the Turks had to withdraw, having held off the PRoC
advance long enough for the 2nd Division remnants to filter south.
Within the closing trap only two routes of escape remained open.
To the south-west, through a long road adjacent to the Chongchon,
the cities of Anju and Sinanju remained in UN hands. The 1st Cavalry
Division had been called from reserve and its 5th RCT held open
the gate at Anju.
A more direct route to the south passed
through steep hills, towards Sunchon, where the remainder of the
1st Cavalry Division waited. Though a seemingly quicker route,
PRoC troops had conducted yet another envelopment and had infested
the pass. Thus, exhausted and beaten, UN troops had to run a veritable
gauntlet of fire.
By December 1st, the survivors of 2nd Division had reached Sunchon
and another UN offensive had been smashed by a heretofore unseen
enemy. Chinese troops were credited with superhuman abilities
due to their lack of fear in the face of horrendous losses. In
the waning days of December, the 8th army fled more than 120 miles
despite the lack of pursuit. The longest retreat in the history
of the US military had ended and UN morale had been utterly shattered
in the woeful trek up the Chongchon, and down the "Gauntlet".