CHIPYONG
13th - 16th February, 1951


The winter of 1950-51 was a traumatic period for UN commanders who saw the defeat of their entire force and the entry of a frightening juggernaut into the war. A demigod to many, even the irrepressible General MacArthur had become a doom sayer. Ordering the 8th Army to retreat to the original beachhead "bastions" if necessary, he gravely predicted the total destruction of his command unless the PRoC mainland was invaded at once. To that end, he urged the immediate release of Nationalist Chinese troops and the use of nuclear weapons, even at the risk of escalation to WWIII! President Truman found himself in a political tug-of-war with his military commander, further upsetting the UN effort. Reluctantly, the goal of reunification of the peninsula was abandoned. In a final tragic note, perhaps symbolic of the sorry turn of events, General Walker died in a traffic accident on December 23rd, leaving the 8th Army without a leader.
General Ridgway found himself cast into the fray as commander of a defeated army, often retreating when there was no pressure from the enemy. Except for the Marines, the morale of UN troops was at an all time low. A student of the bold General Patton, Ridgway took immediate steps to regain the initiative. Commanders were ordered to lead their troops from the field, as opposed to their former practice of taking residence in rear area headquarters. Front line troops engaged in aggressive patrols, increasing both their intelligence of enemy actions and their confidence in combat. Units were kept in interlocking formations, preserving front lines and preventing envelopment. Every form of supporting fire was utilised to cauterise objectives so that ground troops could secure their goals in relative safety. Artillery ammunition was expended with such volume that US Congressmen even complained of the cost!
As a net result, the 8th army was soon ready for a measured advance north. General Ridgway intended to squeeze terrain from the enemy, exacting the heaviest toll possible and forcing resolution of the war on the negotiating table. Gone were the days of reckless advance and crusty old notions of total victory. Marking a crucial turning point in thehistory of warfare, Gen. Ridgway turned the battlefields of Korea into giant "meat-grinders", capable of stopping the great red dragon of China. The era of limited war had begun. General Ridgway's offensive began on February 5th, 1951 as X Corps and the I and II Corps from the ROK began a large scale envelopment to destroy huge portions of the PRoC army. The ROK 5th Division attacked on the right flank, north-east of Hoengsong to the Hongchon-Pugnam line. On the left, the ROK 8th Division attacked to the Yongduchon-Hongchon line. The US 7th Division drove up the Pyongchang-Hoengsong road while the US 2nd Division was held in reserve along the Chipyong-Wonju axis.
The PRoC 40th and 60th Armies, with NKPA II and V Corps counterattacked. As always, a weak point was found in the ROK lines, and by February 11th, the ROK 8th Division was routed. UN Forces fell back some 5-20 miles along the whole front, leaving the US 2nd Division in an exposed salient. General Moore was ordered to hold firm, for if Chipyong fell, the corridor to Yoju would be left unguarded. That in turn would allow PRoC forces to sweep behind X Corps, south-east along the Han River.
The 23rd Regiment (US 2nd Div) deployed among the hills at Chipyong, with time enough to fortify and lay mines. Supporting units were deployed to take advantage of natural terrain, which served to funnel the enemy into a meat-grinder. Firmly at the core of the defence was a crack French battalion.
General Peng was an able commander but cursed with a stubborn nature. With recent PRoC victories along the Chongchon and Chosin he had no reason to think his veteran Corps could not push aside a mere regiment. Probing attacks began the night of February 13th, only to leave hundreds of Chinese dead at the base of the hills by morning light. Inflexible and incensed, he continued to push his troops south in the days to come.
Despite the success of their tactics, the Chipyong defenders could not hold out forever. Relief was dispatched on February 14th from Yoju in the form of a regiment from the 1st Cavalry Division. In keeping with their finest traditions, the cavalry arrived just in the nick of time and prevented a PRoC breakthrough. By February 16th, the three PRoC divisions fell back, leaving 5,000 dead behind. General Ridgway was so impressed with the victory he personally viewed the battlefield even while it was being secured. Likea phoenix, 8th Army had risen from the ashes of Chosin and avenged itself at the crossroads of Chipyong.



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