CHIPYONG
13th - 16th February, 1951
The winter of 1950-51 was a traumatic period for UN commanders
who saw the defeat of their entire force and the entry of a frightening
juggernaut into the war. A demigod to many, even the irrepressible
General MacArthur had become a doom sayer. Ordering the 8th Army
to retreat to the original beachhead "bastions" if necessary,
he gravely predicted the total destruction of his command unless
the PRoC mainland was invaded at once. To that end, he urged the
immediate release of Nationalist Chinese troops and the use of
nuclear weapons, even at the risk of escalation to WWIII! President
Truman found himself in a political tug-of-war with his military
commander, further upsetting the UN effort. Reluctantly, the goal
of reunification of the peninsula was abandoned. In a final tragic
note, perhaps symbolic of the sorry turn of events, General Walker
died in a traffic accident on December 23rd, leaving the 8th Army
without a leader.
General Ridgway found himself cast into the fray as commander
of a defeated army, often retreating when there was no pressure
from the enemy. Except for the Marines, the morale of UN troops
was at an all time low. A student of the bold General Patton,
Ridgway took immediate steps to regain the initiative. Commanders
were ordered to lead their troops from the field, as opposed to
their former practice of taking residence in rear area headquarters.
Front line troops engaged in aggressive patrols, increasing both
their intelligence of enemy actions and their confidence in combat.
Units were kept in interlocking formations, preserving front lines
and preventing envelopment. Every form of supporting fire was
utilised to cauterise objectives so that ground troops could secure
their goals in relative safety. Artillery ammunition was expended
with such volume that US Congressmen even complained of the cost!
As a net result, the 8th army was soon ready for a measured advance
north. General Ridgway intended to squeeze terrain from the enemy,
exacting the heaviest toll possible and forcing resolution of
the war on the negotiating table. Gone were the days of reckless
advance and crusty old notions of total victory. Marking a crucial
turning point in thehistory of warfare, Gen. Ridgway turned the
battlefields of Korea into giant "meat-grinders", capable
of stopping the great red dragon of China. The era of limited
war had begun. General Ridgway's offensive began on February 5th,
1951 as X Corps and the I and II Corps from the ROK began a large
scale envelopment to destroy huge portions of the PRoC army. The
ROK 5th Division attacked on the right flank, north-east of Hoengsong
to the Hongchon-Pugnam line. On the left, the ROK 8th Division
attacked to the Yongduchon-Hongchon line. The US 7th Division
drove up the Pyongchang-Hoengsong road while the US 2nd Division
was held in reserve along the Chipyong-Wonju axis.
The PRoC 40th and 60th Armies, with NKPA II and V Corps counterattacked.
As always, a weak point was found in the ROK lines, and by February
11th, the ROK 8th Division was routed. UN Forces fell back some
5-20 miles along the whole front, leaving the US 2nd Division
in an exposed salient. General Moore was ordered to hold firm,
for if Chipyong fell, the corridor to Yoju would be left unguarded.
That in turn would allow PRoC forces to sweep behind X Corps,
south-east along the Han River.
The 23rd Regiment (US 2nd Div) deployed among the hills at Chipyong,
with time enough to fortify and lay mines. Supporting units were
deployed to take advantage of natural terrain, which served to
funnel the enemy into a meat-grinder. Firmly at the core of the
defence was a crack French battalion.
General Peng was an able commander but cursed with a stubborn
nature. With recent PRoC victories along the Chongchon and Chosin
he had no reason to think his veteran Corps could not push aside
a mere regiment. Probing attacks began the night of February 13th,
only to leave hundreds of Chinese dead at the base of the hills
by morning light. Inflexible and incensed, he continued to push
his troops south in the days to come.
Despite the success of their tactics, the Chipyong defenders could
not hold out forever. Relief was dispatched on February 14th from
Yoju in the form of a regiment from the 1st Cavalry Division.
In keeping with their finest traditions, the cavalry arrived just
in the nick of time and prevented a PRoC breakthrough. By February
16th, the three PRoC divisions fell back, leaving 5,000 dead behind.
General Ridgway was so impressed with the victory he personally
viewed the battlefield even while it was being secured. Likea
phoenix, 8th Army had risen from the ashes of Chosin and avenged
itself at the crossroads of Chipyong.