ACROSS THE 38TH
25th - 29th June, 1950

Before withdrawing from Korea, Russia and the U.S. each prepared native military forces in their respective halves of the country. Each had a specific intent, as evidenced by their equipment. The very nature of the opposing forces would quickly determine the outcome of any confrontation, as was demonstrated in the short summer of 1950. The Russians had made the North Korean Peoples Army into an exact replica of their own armed forces. Included were T-34 tanks with 85mm guns, self propelled 76mm assault guns and a variety of heavy artillery and mortars, with a small air force of Yak fighters and Il-10 ground attack bombers. Many NKPA troops were veterans of WWII and the Chinese Civil War, fully trained in the doctrine of Russian envelopment. A complete spy network detailed the precise locations of ROK defences. By 1950, the NKPA was second only to the Russian Army, in Asia. It was a finely tuned offensive arm, capable of the invasion for which it had been created.
The ROK, on the other hand, had been blessed with antiquated WWII equipment such as ineffective 2.35" rocket launchers (bazookas) and 37mm anti-tank guns, neither of which could stop modern armour. They had a large number of old, short range, 105mm Howitzers, with little ammunition. There were no tanks, anti-tank mines or combat aircraft. Training was minimal and divisions were under-strength, with no intelligence network to assist them. By June 1950 there was only a stockpile of six days supply, 15% of all weapons and 33% of all vehicles were under repair, and all major commands had recently been shifted. Many men were on leave and most units were poorly disposed and not on likely invasion routes. The US had feared a confrontation with Russia and purposely hamstrung the ROK, to prevent their initiation of aggression. Rather than making an effective defensive army, they had produced a mere national police force. Reflecting American over-confidence of the period, TIME magazine called the ROK Army the ". . . best damn army outside the United States".
On the morning of June 25th, several NKPA divisions crossed the 38th parallel at key points. The 1st, 3rd and 4th Divisions deployed down the Pyongyang-Seoul, Pochon-Kumwha and Yonchon-Tongduchon roads respectively. Elements of the 105th Armoured Brigade led the way.
Defending, the ROK 1st Division was badly deployed, spread from Yonan to Korangpo. The 7th Division was better positioned at points along the parallel, Tongduchon and Pochon. Only the lead elements of the 2nd Division were available near Seoul, with the remainder in reserve at Taejon.
Artillery blasted the ROK positions as armour rolled over defenders, punching holes which truckloads of infantry soon filled. One Regiment actually rode a train to Kaesong, totally surprising the defenders. The ROK soldiers were unable to stop the armour and fell into panic. The inept General Chae ordered a counter-attack at Ui Jongbu, thus depleting his manpower further. Withdrawal became a rout, and ROK units fled to the capital city, Seoul. Even as the NKPA reached the outskirts of Seoul, the main bridge south across the Han river was prematurely blown, while crammed with hundreds of civilians. Cut off from retreat, the remnants of the ROK forces were lost, with all their equipment. Soldiers were seen disrobing peasants at gunpoint, in an attempt to disguise themselves as civilians. By noon of the 28th, Seoul had fallen. Those ROK forces which had survived the onslaught were reduced by half, all across Korea. Kim Il Sung's plan was working masterfully. It was expected that ten days would be required to conquer the rest of Korea; two months would be allowed if the U.S. intervened!