TAEJON
5th - 20th July, 1950

In the years after WWII the United States had reduced the size of its navy and army such that only ten divisions were deployed around the world by the outbreak of the Korean War.
The US had come to depend upon a mighty strategic bomber
fleet, and the atom bomb. Strategic planning had placed a
protective umbrella over regions considered vital. Korea andFormosa were not included and no contingency plans were
developed for their defence. Within hours of the NKPR invasion, US policy changed drastically. American political leaders were shocked by the rapid NKPA advance in the south. Having no strategic plan regarding Korea, and festering in the boiling political soup of McCarthyism, a knee jerk reflex occurred. President Truman and his staff perceived the Korean invasion as yet another example of overt communist aggression... the first step towards global domination. From the chill of a Cold War mind set came the abrupt decision to intervene with a "police action" to arrest the communist advance. Having thus decided to intervene militarily, the US sought United Nations sanction to keep the matter politically acceptable. On June 25th, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to blame the NKPR for the "breach of peace", despite Radio Pyongyang claims that the ROK had in fact invaded the north! The Russian UN representative was absent from the vote and Yugoslavia abstained, allowing the UN to call for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of NKPR forces.
As the NKPA rolled towards Seoul, a Security Council resolution called upon member nations to render military aid to the ROK. Of 59 member states, 53 approved the resolution. 40 offered aid, 16 offered military units and 5 sent medical teams. UN support was forming but the initial burden fell upon US forces.
Of those forces, the closest were the under-strength army divisions on soft occupation duty in Japan. Nearly two weeks would be required to transport any sizeable number of troops to the nearest ROK port; Pusan. Unfortunately, the closing NKPA divisions were also about two weeks distance from Pusan. If Pusan fell, the war would be over. General Church's 24th Division was the first to enter the conflict but with limited time and shipping available it was committed piecemeal into battle. Those men honoured with the first taste of fighting were the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, with an artillery detachment formed under Task Force Smith.
Rushed to Pusan by July 1st, many had not even the time to clean their weapons properly. Directed to the farthest point north, TFS rushed to Osan, passing demoralised ROK troops on the road. Green and cocky, the men of TFS epitomised the US attitude and many were sure the NKPR troops would simply turn and run upon seeing that Americans were ready to fight.
Unfortunately the veterans of the NKPA 3rd and 4thDivisions, the conquerors of Seoul, were not informed of
their obligation to flee in terror. Neither were the US troops prepared to fight such a resolute foe, as they would soon find out.
On the morning of July 5th, TFS deployed at Osan, just hours before the arrival of enemy armour, and the hard veterans of the NKPR 4th Division. Unable to stop the armour, TFS was overwhelmed and its remnants fell back to the south. As other 24th Division units filtered to the front, defensive positions were formed and lost, from P'yongtaek to Ch'onan, Chochiwon and finally the Kum River. Delay and withdrawal was the only possible strategy to employ. Even so, General Church was determined to make a stand at Taejon, a hub in the ROK road network. His problem, as would later be experienced by UN forces holding the Pusan Perimeter, was that his troops were too few to cover all bridges and ferry crossings of the river. The NKPR could employ flanking and envelopment manoeuvres, making a defensive position untenable.
A modern day Thermopylae was the dilemma which faced General Church. For to stand would mean the destruction of his Division, but to abandon Taejon too soon would not allow for the defence of Taegu, a road/rail centre of the highest priority. That in turn would lead, most likely, to the fall of Pusan.
Though 24th Division has been roundly criticised for its poor performance, it probably did no worse than any other army division would have done, and yet it did buy just enough time for a general UN retreat to the Naktong river, forming the Pusan Perimeter defensive position.