In the first decade following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini’s charismatic leadership overshadowed all officials.

After the Imam’s demise and the subsequent power vacuum in Iran’s political scene, two prominent personalities came to the fore: Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and Hojjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. As members of the Revolution Council, they established a balance of power by respectively assuming the posts of the leadership and presidency.

In the upcoming presidential elections, from which Rafsanjani is effectively eliminated by the Constitution, candidates who are politically almost equal are running for the post.

In the wake of the definite withdrawal of Mir Hussein Musavi as a candidate, the technocratic G-6 (Executives of Construction Party) and the left wing Majma-e Rouhaniyoon-e Mobarez (MRM) have decided to jointly support Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami in his independent bid for presidency.

When Rafsanjani became president eight years ago and the radical MRM was marginalized, Mir Hussein Musavi, Iran’s premier during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, initiated a period of political silence. During the past eight years, Musavi has deliberately abstained from expressing any views or participating in political affairs.

The idea of nominating Musavi created a special fervor in the society and was a power maneuver by the MRM to cast its popular support and legitimacy in the teeth of its rival. Given the extensive popularity Musavi enjoys in Iran, the rival Jame’ah Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez (JRM) was alarmed at his candidacy for president.

According to a member of the Association of Qom Seminary Teachers (AQST), the JRM accentuated the danger posed by Musavi and prompted the AQST to unanimously and hastily declare the competence of Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri for president.

Musavi’s definite withdrawal following this decision reflected his dissatisfaction with the move and his decision to continue a political life in the shadows.

Currently, the serious competition is between two prominent and major personalities, Khatami and Nateq Nouri, marginalizing all other candidates.

Khatami agreed to run for presidency after political groups held a series of intensive consultations with him. He entered the race as an independent candidate and won the joint support of the MRM, the G-6, and other affiliated groups.

As a "seyyed" (offspring of the Holy Prophet (S)) and given the Iranian community’s religious faith in, and love for, the children of Fatima (SA) (the Prophet’s daughter), Khatami is sure to win many votes.

In Iran, a "seyyed" has a highly dignified status. Based on the "shariah" (religious law), Shiites must pay a one-fifth levy from their income to needy "sadats" or "seyyeds".

Khatami’s education at both the theological seminary and the university is a great combination. His record is brilliant in pre and post-Revolution struggles in Iran and Europe.

With his far-sightedness, his principles, his self-restraint, and his personality, Khatami has found strong support among university lecturers and students, educated people, and the middle-class urban community.

Regarded as a decent man, Khatami is among few Iranian officials who has succeeded in keeping his political status immune from the mud-slinging of political groups. In fact, most political groups respect and revere him.

On the other hand, his rival Nateq Nouri entered the electoral scene with greater readiness. A year ago he declared his willingness to run for presidency and based his standing in the elections on the backing of the JRM and the AQST.

Nateq Nouri also has the trust and confidence of Tehran’s conservative Bazaar, an influential and powerful arm in the country. And concurrent groups which wield extensive influence among the traditional, layman classes have declared support for Nateq Nouri.

At the beginning of the presidential race, Nateq Nouri’s supporters were highly confident that they would emerge victorious at the polls. But as time goes on, Khatami is bridging the gap.

In the meantime, any candidate who can win the support of the majority of silent voters will have a better chance of success.

Women constitute one of the strongest national power groups whose support Khatami has won. In the years since the Revolution, this group, notwithstanding its competence, has not had a fair chance to reflect its influence and capability through involvement in political affairs. Khatami has, however, succeeded in winning their support by addressing them and their problems.

Iran’s Women’s Association, headed by Imam Khomeini’s eldest daughter, Ms. Zahra Mustafavi, has come out in support of Khatami, increasing his popularity among Iranian women.

If Khatami succeeds in formally winning the support of the President’s eldest daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, who won a Majlis seat with an overwhelming majority last year, he will tremendously increase his chances.

Although Hashemi is a staunch advocate of the G-6 which supports Khatami, her personal stamp of approval as the head of the Islamic Countries’ Women Sports Solidarity Council would boost Khatami’s popularity even more.

Meanwhile Nateq Nouri’s supporters have relied on the AQST’s access to the mosques as a means to win the votes of the traditional classes, looking at the concurrence of the elections with the religious mourning month of Muharram, during which people go to mosques more than any other time.

At the same time, the conservative stance of Iran’s Labor House (a nationwide and influential political group) toward presidential elections has created doubt and ambiguities.

Labor House, headed by Ali Reza Mahjoob, has traditionally had an open alliance with the MRM and the pro-Imam Line groups. But it has not so far shown any open inclination to follow the MRM and appears to be buying time to avoid supporting its candidate.

As a very powerful worker’s group, the Labor House has a large number of people under its umbrella and can play a determining role in the elections. Obviously, any candidate that can obtain Labor House votes would have a greater chance of success.

If Khatami fails to win the Labor House’s support, it will be a heavy blow for his camp, and his rival will use the situation for political purposes.

Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri is the third prominent candidate who does not, of course, have the same chance of victory as the other two. But his withdrawal or his support for any other candidate would be of paramount importance.

Reyshahri, who heads the Society for Defense of the Values of the Islamic Revolution (SDVIR), was a minister alongside Khatami and Nateq Nouri in Mir Hussein Musavi’s Cabinet.

In view of the intense competition between the two major candidates and the possibility of a second round of elections, Reyshahri’s withdrawal and support for one of the other two could be the last ace to play. Still for political considerations Reyshahri might be expected to remain silent.