Posted On Columbia University’s GULF2000 Website (October 23, 2001)

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Terrorism!

A Survey of Where Iran Now Stands in US Diplomacy

By Dariush Sajjadi ([email protected], http://www.geocities.com/dariushsajjadi)

When Washington pointed her finger at Bin Laden and at the unconventional Taliban brand of Islam as the prime suspects behind the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US and launched a military strike against Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, she somehow defeated her own purpose.

Rather than turning the Muslims against Bin Laden and Taliban, the US-led strikes boosted Bin Laden’s image before the Muslims around the world and turned his brand of Islam into a widely recognized religion. Fed up with US policies toward the Middle East, Muslims avidly welcomed the Bin Laden-style Islam which is fighting Washington tooth and nail. This is while prior to September 11, Iran’s revolutionary Islam which burgeoned after the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the only vocal voice blasting US policies toward the Middle East.

Meanwhile Washington’s declaration that in the war against terrorism the countries are either with the US or against her caused huge concern among countries whose names appeared on the US-issued "list of states sponsoring terrorism".

This statement particularly alarmed the Islamic Republic of Iran whose relations with the US were severed two decades ago following the 1980 US Embassy takeover in Tehran.

While Washington was hunting down the suspects, the Iranian statesmen issued condolence messages as a pragmatic way to show their sympathy and to simultaneously stave off any possible US retaliatory measures against Iran. Tehran thus seemed to follow the advice of ancient Iranian luminary Avicena who said one should fear the angry cow, for it has horns and no brain.

Thinking that her military strikes would instill fear in Iran, Washington decided to settle scores with Islamic radicalism but failed to differentiate between the Islam fostered by Iran and the one promoted by the Taliban.

Once the US anger subsided and once Iran realized that the US would not grant any concessions to have Tehran on her side, Iran adopted an independent and logical stance: It negated both terrorism and the US. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei announced that Iran would side with neither the terrorists nor the United States.

This stance faced Washington with a dilemma: Either to simultaneously combat both the Iranian and the Taliban radical brands of Islam or to officially recognize Iran’s moralistic, more tolerable, and less harmful Islam vis-à-vis the adventurist and unconventional Bin Laden version of Islam

These two choices have, however, elicited opposing views among US statesmen. A group of US statesmen who are highly influenced by the Israeli lobby urge the US to attack Iran. They contend that such an attack would be very beneficial, as it would destabilize Iran’s fledgling democracy while concurrently helping the anti-reform wing restore its totalitarian and monopolistic policies and enforce restrictive measures. The ultimate goal would be to present Iran as a violent country, an image that would overshadow Israel’s radical policies in the region.

Another group believe that after two decades of hostility with the US, Iran has come to its senses with the election of moderate Mohammad Khatami as president and understood that it should comply with international laws. They argue that any violent US reaction toward Iran would bring back the unconventional behavior that Tehran has displayed over the last two decades.

This group hold that Iran’s radical and anti-US Islam whose ultimate mischief was taking American diplomats hostage for 444 days is preferable to the Bin Laden brand of Islam whose smallest mischief is lauding the murder of 6,000 Americans in terrorist attacks in one day on US soil.

This group, therefore, seek to prevent the spread of the Bin Laden brand of Islam by recognizing Iran’s principle-laden combat with the US, provided, of course, that Iran could lead all Islamic radical movements in the Middle East.

Fed up with Israel’s political actions, this group argue that increased anti-US sentiments in the Middle East are flared by the Muslims’ belief that the US is behind Israel’s unconventional behavior in the region.

As such, this group want to bridge the US-Iran gap to strike a balance between Israel’s good terrorism! and Iran’s ugly terrorism! and to use closeness with Tehran as a lever to exert pressure on Tel Aviv to bring the Middle East peace talks to fruition. And simultaneously to denounce the bad Bin Laden terrorism by recourse to military muscle.

Since Iranian revolutionary Islam’s military and economic power does not match that of the US, Tehran will have to rely solely on its principle-laden and defensible stances toward US policies and actions in the Middle East.

Iranian statesmen can now use this comparative advantage to prompt the US to accept and recognize the Iranian brand of Islam which Washington finds to be the most healthy and economical model of campaign with the US. This will enable Iran to take the first step toward negotiations with the US.

Once formal ties with the US are established, Iran can strive to settle its fundamental differences with the US within official political corridors. No longer would the two sides have to resort to illegal means that gave them the freedom to counter each other in any way they wished, as Tehran and Washington will be accountable toward one another for their acts and deeds.

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