Sunday December 24, 2000

Iran’s reform movement is by nature dialectic and democratic. The movement relies heavily on democratically rejecting and negating its rivals by recourse to the popular support that it has garnered in elections throughout the past three years. It is, moreover, highly capable of interpreting and evaluating social phenomena, yet it falls short of devising a forceful action plan to materialize its objectives.

Almost a century ago, Reza Khan posed a bold question to then Parliament member Seyyed Hasan Modarres. He asked, "Seyyed, what on earth do you want from me?" To which Modarres boldly replied, "I want you not to be." This answer has ever since served as a crystal clear reflection of the logic dominating Iran’s reformist developments.

In his staunch opposition with Reza Khan’s monopoly and sole-contender attitude, this outspoken MP well knew "what he did not want". Likewise, Iran’s modern-day reform movement, while not knowing "what it wants", is cognizant of "what it does not want". (1)

This quality has led the reform movement to tax its energy by merely battling the conservatives with the aim of eliminating them from the domestic political scene. The reformists have actually taken great pride and joy in this battle, for they know that the conservatives’ defeat is inevitable, as they lack popular support.

Such battle hinges on two pillars: "Political survival" (namely, survival of a political wing depends on its continued battle with the rival) and "survival of the fittest" (the fittest wing – that is, the reformists – will be the ultimate winner of this battle). These two features grant Iran’s reform camp a Darwinist quality.

The reformists have, ever since May 23, 1997, used their awareness of the peoples’ reluctance toward the conservatives as a strong incentive to stage a democratic battle with the latter to eliminate them from power hubs, especially from elected offices.

Confident of winning over their rivals, the reformists have found fighting this non-stop battle very enjoyable. Yet the reformists’ mission practically came to an end after their landslide takeover of Parliament seats in the February 18, 2000 elections enabled them to put an end to the conservatives’ long-time hold over this democratic institution.

The life of Iran’s combative reformist movement has from the start been defined within the backdrop of the existence of a rival and the need to fight it. For this very reason, after winning the majority of Parliament seats, Iran’s fervent reformist movement suddenly faced a damper.

With its parliamentary victory, the reform movement removed all "it did not want" from elected offices and institutions relying on popular vote. From then on, the reformists had to go for "what they actually wanted". But since they lacked a clear-cut notion of "what they wanted" and how to translate their demands into action, they went through a foreseeable inertia.

By reviewing developments of the past three years, reform leaders should at present come up with the realistic view that political reforms in Iran are of secondary importance.

Before any political or economic reform, the Iranian society needs all-out reforms in the theological seminaries which have had a decisive role in shaping Iran’s post-revolution political and economic relations.

Problems and cul de sacs blocking Iran’s political and economic relations over the past years have not sprung from party politics, rivalry, or misunderstanding. They have rather emanated from the tenacity and inflexibility of Iran’s traditional fiqh (jurisprudence) vis-à-vis the "supra-traditional" concerns of the modern Iranian population.

The traditional fiqh governing Iran’s theological seminaries claims self- sufficiency in dealing with all individual and social concerns and takes up the mission of leading human beings toward salvation.

Despite all its lofty claims, this fiqh falls quite short of understanding the most fundamental concerns and needs of Iran’s modern population. As such, it naturally defies any form of reform and uses all means at its disposal to defend itself in the face of reforms.

As the Shiite traditional fiqh has opposed governments for 14 centuries, it cannot adapt itself to the modern government system. This is because ever since the first Shiite Imam Ali (AS) was deprived of the right to govern the people at the Saghifeh Bani Saedeh meeting, Shiism has faced a complex arising out of being denied the right to rule.

Shiism has since then relied on negating and rejecting the governments. And from within the fiqh of Shiite Ulema who, for 14 centuries, called all governments "usurpers" for forcibly taking the reins of power, an inflexible fiqhi foundation emerged that was inherently against government.

Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution afforded the Shiites the first chance to rule in 14 centuries, allowing them to restore their trampled right to govern. Ironically, however, Shiite Ulema standing at the helm in the post-revolution Iran had to rule the country by relying on the same fiqh that had negated government for many centuries. As a consequence, since its inception, the fledgling Shiite Islamic Republic has been gripped with contradictions whose impacts have surfaced in various areas.

This fiqh is currently standing at such a position that it grants permit to loner and rogue elements to indulge in violence, as it cannot by nature differentiate between the demands of the primitive and the civil communities.

The contradictions between traditional fiqh and modern demands of the Iranian population have contributed to the failure of Iran’s reformist movements over the past 200 years.

The "maximalist" Shiite fiqh is so all-encompassing that Mesbah Yazdi (the "apple of the eye" of Qom Theological Seminary’s traditional fiqh) has noted: "In Islam, man has no right to think in any way he wants about anything. Laws govern all human acts and deeds in personal, familial, social, and international realms. Individual and family relations and even subjective views are rule-governed. In Islam, man has no right to think in any way he wants about anything. Rather man’s mind, heart, and imagination should also be controlled."

The surprise which May 23, 1997 brought for Iran’s political and social developments can be analogized to a "premature labor". This "premature birth" made the contradictions between the traditional fiqh and the modern government stand out more prominently and simultaneously channeled the reforms toward politics.

Twelve years earlier, Iranian philosopher Dr. Abdul Karim Soroush presented the idea that religious concepts should change in accordance with the demands of the time and in tune with changes in man’s awareness and knowledge. He adeptly pointed to the main area that had to be revamped to make government-people relations logical in Iran’s religious system.

Soroush and his fellow thinkers had well realized that any form of political, economic, and cultural reform would fall to dust if it was not preceded by attempts to modernize the pillars of traditional fiqh which controlled all aspects of man’s life.

Despite the plea by Soroush and his fellow thinkers, the reformists who came to the helm after May 23, 1997 insisted on the primacy of political reforms, and as such revamping the theological seminaries was put on the backburner.

This escalated the differences between reformists and conservatives over the past three years, as the jurisprudential foundations of the two wings’ differences remained unattended in the theological seminaries. And the differences dragged the two wings toward a futile and costly challenge since 1997.

But on the threshold of Iran’s 8^th presidential elections, the rivalry between the reformists and the conservatives seems to have taken a different turn, something that can face the reformist movement with a new development.

In the upcoming presidential elections, the conservatives – rather than the reformists – will well know "what they do not want". The conservatives will unanimously negate Khatami and his political and cultural policies. And in so doing they can easily count on the 8 million votes that their supporters will cast for them.

If the conservatives shrewdly abstain from nominating a weighty candidate for the upcoming presidential elections, they will deprive the reformists – who have the knack for democratic battles – of the blessing of having an election contender. In this case, the reformists have to work hard to persuade the silent majority of Iranian voters to come to the polls and cast votes in their favor. And this will be an arduous task to accomplish.

But if the reformists suspend their political reform plans and get public approval and support to revamp the theological seminaries, they will enjoy new maneuverability for the coming elections.

In case the public opinion approves and welcomes reforming the theological seminaries, Khatami will not be the sole hero of a victorious battle in this field.

This is because theological seminary Ulema do not regard Khatami as a highly qualified jurisprudent. For this reason, Khatami’s uncalculated foray into this realm can draw him toward an unpredictable fate.

The precondition for the success of theological seminary reforms is that reformists fully converge with Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s influential leader among the traditionalists, and also bring Hashemi Rafsanjani, the complex and weighty political figure, into the scene.

Hashemi Rafsanjani was extremely humiliated by the reformist papers in the course of the February 2000 parliament elections. But he exercised self-restraint and showed the reformist press that he has so much power and wit that he can settle his scores with the said press by staying in the shadows for a few months during the conservatives’ clampdown on the press in May 2000.

This move was reminiscent of what Hashemi Rafsanjani did during his tenure as president in reply to Ezzatollah Sahabi’s verbose protest letter when he cast the latter in prison and said, "That puts him in his place!"

Hashemi Rafsanjani’s personality traits aside, the former president’s political track record affords him the chance to resort to his enchanting words that appeal to the theological seminary to convince the Ulema to revise the pillars of traditional fiqh without them having to fret over Islam being undermined.

Hashemi Rafsanjani is deemed an elder in Iran’s political power structure. He has served as a confidante and companion to the late Founder of Islamic Republic Imam Khomeini and has a long track record of revolutionary combat and service. These give him the power to convince Iran’s traditional power circles from behind the scene without needing to resort to democratic means to do so.

Even though being a veteran revolutionary increases Hashemi Rafsanjani’s maneuverability to advance his cherished secret diplomacy, this very feature postpones the chance to institutionalize the democratic trend in Iran’s reformist movement, and as such Hashemi Rafsanjani simultaneously becomes the bane of the civil community.

Hashemi Rafsanjani’s closeness to the late Imam has always entitled him to demand special rights and create master-subject relations between him and those around him. But politics is the scene of possibilities. The reformists can buy Hashemi Rafsanjani to use him for their own benefits.

Even if Hashemi Rafsanjani demands more than he deserves in this deal, the benefits accruing from this investment will provide ample economic justification for the reformists.

Fear, anger, and imbecility are three chronic and historic plagues gripping Iran’s political and social developments. If Iran’s reform movement can, like Dorothy in the classic American literary work (2), rely on Khamenei’s needed "courage", Khatami’s loving "heart", and Hashemi Rafsanjani’s pragmatic "brain", it can reach its destination.

The Islamic Republic is the only alternative for the Islamic Republic! The religious fabric of the society and the influence of religion on political, social, and cultural affairs make the reformists realize this undeniable reality that they should avoid violent and hostile approaches and rather preserve the Islamic Republic as a system while revamping it from the inside in a bid to minimize the costs of reform.