Just as the Constitutional Movement was sparked by the Iranian peoples’ aversion toward the Qajar dynasty’s injustice, the May 23, 1997 million-strong voter turnout was, ironically, fueled by the religious hard-liners’ policies and stances which prompted the people to look for solace in a moderate reformist.

In fact, Iran’s contemporary political developments all share one feature: they follow a stimulus-response pattern, in which Iran’s social uprisings are not conscious, forward-looking, and goal-oriented actions, but rather are responses to ongoing events and reactions to an unfavorable past. As such, Iran’s social movements tend to focus on "what the people do not want" rather than "what they actually want".

Indeed, throughout their modern history, the Iranian people have known "what they do not want" better than "what they actually want". The Constitutional Movement was one example of this. Supporters of the movement had little concept of parliamentary rule, constitutionalism, or division of power. They only knew one thing: they were frustrated with the Qajar tyranny and despotism. The Constitutional Movement served as a haven for the Iranians who wanted to escape despotism and allowed them to express their criticism of the political system.

The same dynamic was at work on April 1, 1979 during the referendum on the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As they were frustrated with the tyrannical Pahlavi regime, 98 percent of the Iranian people voted in favor of the Islamic Republic without having a clear conception of what it would be or how it would operate.

On May 23, 1997, this dynamic was again visible when urban and rural masses went to the polls and cast 20 million votes for Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. This was a way for them to implicitly declare their frustration with the policies and strategies that had dominated Iran for the two decades after the Islamic Revolution’s victory. The Iranian people cast protest votes but did not have a full understanding of how – or if – Khatami’s promised "civil society" would materialize. Since, in the twenty years following the Islamic Revolution’s victory, the state did not meet the demands of the Iranian people, disillusionment paved the way for the phenomenon known as "the quest for a hero".

"The quest for a hero" is a psychological reaction that arises in a dissatisfied community which cannot rely on civil institutions to protect its rights. Feeling helpless, it attempts to find a hero who it hopes will retrieve its denied rights. This phenomenon has a major disadvantage: It encourages a society to put all its eggs in one basket by pinning its hope on one person. This can actually hinder the development of the social structures and mechanisms which could solve a society’s problems. Once the hero leaves the political sphere, the social structures causing the problems generally remain.

Because the Iranian government is based on a system in which the people-state relationship is governed by the latter’s authoritative power, the Iranian state has always been highly influenced by individual political personalities. Traditionally, the people-state relationship swings on a pendulum from malignant to benignant based on traits of the official at the helm, and how those in control use their power and prerogatives. With this in mind, Mohammad Khatami’s landslide election victory on May 23, 1997 can clearly be seen as an offshoot of the peoples’ long-cherished and pursued "quest for a hero". A major segment of Khatami’s supporters comes from a disillusioned generation who dream of Khatami as their legendary hero. These supporters have presented Khatami with the enormous challenge of pleasing all the 20 million who voted for him.

Actually, Khatami faces a dual challenge: On the one hand, he must respond to the demands of his allies and those who voted for him, and on the other, he must avoid giving the conservatives any excuse to castigate him. Ever since its defeat in the presidential election, the conservative wing has carefully watched every move by Khatami and his cabinet to find and aggrandize the slightest shortcoming or slip. The conservatives have not missed a single opportunity to implement this strategy and have even generated situations in order to censure the President and his cabinet.

Contrary to Iran’s former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who considered ambition a virtue, Khatami entered the presidential campaign reluctantly. Khatami’s main rival in the election, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, declared his intention to run for president a year ahead of the election. Khatami only became a candidate after his political allies repeatedly urged him to run. When he won, he entered the presidential office without any zest for power or position. This approach to power has circumscribed his resolve to counter and challenge his rivals. On the whole, Khatami’s message does not resonate with some veterans of the Islamic Revolution who fail to identify with him or his aspirations and may feel threatened by him. However, while preserving the principles of the Islamic Revolution, Khatami has also been able to involve new sections of the Iranian population who had felt ostracized by the ruling system. Khatami has recognized these people, reached out to them, and brought them in the sphere of the revolution. Khatami’s art lies in turning the recital dominating Iran’s political system into a symphony which can strengthen Iran politically within the international arena.

The real question is whether Khatami will be able to successfully lead this symphony to the last movement. The parliamentary election in Iran this February will be one indication of the answer to this question.

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