In 1987 Iran deftly averted a crisis that could have taken a heavy toll on its political image. Then parliament speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani broke up the news of an unpublicized, or better say secret, visit to Iran by Robert MacFarlane, national security advisor to American president Ronald Reagan.

This trip could have sparked a crisis in Iran since the country’s officials had not disclosed it to the people for two months. But when news of this trip was suspiciously published in Lebanon’s Al-Sharaa, Iranian officials felt they had to divulge it to avoid accusations of holding secret talks with the U.S.

Hashemi Rafsanjani cleverly broke the news to the Iranian people, presenting it in such a way that it seemed a humiliation for the Americans. He, however, never clarified why the U.S. Administration boldly – and secretly – dispatched its national security advisor to Tehran during the peak of the Iran-Iraq war and in the face of still vivid memories of 444 days during which American diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran.

Nor did he ever mention what agreement Tehran and Washington had reached that kept the two from disclosing the trip before its divulgence by the Lebanese paper. This question remained unanswered and unresolved even in the Tower Commission report.

As a politician notorious for wisely settling issues, diffusing tension, and curbing crises, Hashemi Rafsanjani diverted the brunt of the crisis from Iran to the U.S.

Hashemi Rafsanjani used the same tact another time after Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 in 1988. In a televised address after the resolution’s acceptance, Hashemi Rafsanjani put an end to the peoples’ bewilderment and confusion. Through his particular interpretation of the resolution’s acceptance, he made the Iranians believe that they were the victors of the eight-year war, an interpretation that was very appealing to the Iranians.

Twelve years after the disclosure of MacFarlane’s visit, Iran’s supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a speech a while before the 20^th anniversary of the U.S. Embassy’s take-over, commented vehemently on the White House demand to dispatch American diplomats to Tehran, calling it an imperceptible pressure exerted on Iran.

The U.S. State Department immediately confirmed this news, noting that Washington merely wanted to send consular officials to Iran to assist the Iranians who wish to travel to the U.S. by issuing visas in Tehran.

By disclosing the piece of news, the Iranian Leader apparently wanted to create a crisis for the Americans, similar to the one caused by the Iran-Contra affair! This time, however, what the White House demanded was not as grave as the Iran-Contra affair. Nor was the political atmosphere dominating the two countries’ relations the same as that of 1987.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s remarks were actually a reaction to the positive signals the White House has been sending to Tehran ever since the reformist President Mohammad Khatami took office and created a new atmosphere between Tehran and Washington, based on more understanding. This time, however, the signals that the U.S. gave were more calculated than the past and practically threw the ball into the Iranian peoples’ court. The demand for U.S. consular officials visiting Iran should have logically come from the Iranian administration to facilitate travels to the U.S. by the Iranians, but the White House took the lead and set this demand forth.

The Iranian state’s anti-American policy has, as a result, been questioned by Iranians who care least for politics and who wish only to find a more accessible way – created through bilateral consular relations -- to apply for the American visa by getting over the nightmare of having to travel to another country twice to submit their visa documents and be interviewed as part of the visa issuance process.

This is what a large number of Iranians who wanted to go to the U.S. to visit their children or to study or work there have had to face over the past two decades. The nightmarish part has been that the visa issuance process has been very costly, time-consuming, and problematic for these Iranians.

Notwithstanding this, the Iranian Leader, as in the past, categorically rejected the American demand, calling it a sly means for the U.S. to set up an espionage base in Iran.

Since the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy, Iran’s anti-American policy has been subjective, contrary to the objectivity of the U.S. diplomacy. This duality has kept the two sides from understanding each other over the past 20 years.

Iran’s young revolutionaries in 1979 climbed the walls of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, believing that through rejecting the U.S they could assert themselves. They were inspired in part by Spinoza’s philosophy of rejecting others to assert oneself.

Another reason that motivated these revolutionaries was that after 25 years of humiliation following the 1953 coup against Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq’s popular government, their rejection of the U.S. credibility and status enabled them to objectify their own independence and declare it to the world.

The deceased Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini approved the anti-American nature of the Islamic Revolution by officially recognizing the measure taken by these young revolutionaries.

The anti-American nature of the Islamic Revolution was of prime importance for Ayatollah Khomeini, since up to that time the Communists were the standard-bearers of combat with the U.S. and the West in general in the polarized system of the time. Being in the forefront of combat with imperialism, these Communists held that religion barred the people from countering the united Western front.

As such, the take-over of the American Embassy in Tehran enabled the religious people to outpace the leftists in the struggle against the U.S. and actually sidelined attempts by Iran’s leftists who targeted this goal.

While he was alive, Ayatollah Khomeini staunchly kept up this position. But would his successor be able to preserve this stance forever? Ayatollah Khamenei is a pious cleric who, like most modern-day Iranian politicians, has learned politics in practice.

When Ayatollah Khamenei was unexpectedly declared Iran’s leader following Ayatollah Khomeini’s demise in 1989, he had to immediately take charge and assume all responsibilities that the new position placed on his shoulders.

By becoming Iran’s leader he found himself in a power hub which was widely debated and contradictorily viewed by a large number of Iran’s influential traditional clerics who, despite differences of views with the architect of the revolution, did not intervene in politics so long as Ayatollah Khomeini was alive due to his popularity and charismatic power.

Even at such crucial times, too, Hashemi Rafsanjani was Ayatollah Khamenei’s closest – or top -- ally. When Mohammad Javad Mozaffar from the Tehran - based Ettelaat daily interviewed Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1988, he said the following about Ayatollah Khamenei:

After Ayatollah Khomeini formed the Revolution Council in 1979 whose members included Hashemi Rafsanjani and seventeen other clerics and nationalists, he (Hashemi Rafsanjani) introduced Ayatollah Khamenei to Imam Khomeini and while recommending him to the then Leader got the latter’s permission to make him a member of the Revolution Council.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, in this interview, implied that Iran’s future leader is indebted to him. But Mozaffar who conducted the interview had to spend nine months in jail!

Under such a condition, Iran’s new Leader had to preserve the legacy of Imam Khomeini’s leadership. He had no choice but to balance the forces and urge the traditional clerics to make logical demands. At times, however, he practically had to overlook the behavior of Iran’s conservative clerics circle.

An instance was in 1991 when Ayatollah Khamenei kept silent toward the heavy pressure exerted by the conservative clerics to sideline the reformist clerics and their allies who were the apple of the eyes of the late Leader.

Ayatollah Khomeini was the Leader of a revolution that he masterminded and directed, but his successor was only the inheritor of the revolution and lacked the power and influence of the late Imam. He, therefore, made efforts to follow the Imam’s model to make his own policies and leadership powers equal to those of the Islamic Revolution’s architect.

After his position as Leader was relatively established, Ayatollah Khamenei made it well known to all Iranian political wings that he would have the say in foreign policy.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry had in essence been impotent, lacking any initiative during the 16 years in which Ali Akbar Velayati headed it as minister. Ayatollah Khamenei’s monopolized authority over foreign policy matters gave him ample elbow - room to devise and follow up his policies.

Velayati was one of the longest serving ministers in the Iranian administration. Prior to President Khatami’s election, he served four consecutive terms as Iran’s foreign minister. This was not, of course, because of his diplomatic competence and qualification. It was rather because of his personality trait.

Being a conservative, Velayati has a unique personality trait that makes him highly appealing to the traditional circles: This feature is Velayati’s high capacity for submissive obedience.

Just as famous former Soviet foreign minister Andre Gromyko was known as "Mr. No" in the diplomatic circles, Velayati is known in Iran’s political circles as "Mr. He Said".

Being highly submissive to the Iranian Leader, Velayati, throughout his political career, had one key reply to any question posed to him: He would always answer by quoting the Leader.

This reply shielded Velayati so much so that he was able to retain his cabinet seat for sixteen years without ever facing the slightest danger of losing his position.

This management system was also solidified in the Iranian Foreign Ministry during Velayati’s long ministerial term, leading to formation of a collectivist clique that was submissive to political power-wielders and that went up the ladder of success because of this trait rather than because of its meritocracy.

This malady went so far that when Velayati handed his cabinet seat over to his successor, the Iranian Foreign Ministry lacked a minimum competent diplomatic cadre that qualified to meet global standards.

An Iranian saying has it that one can awaken a person who is asleep but one can never awaken a person who pretends to be asleep.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry, during Velayati’s term, was tied up with routine affairs and, therefore, lacked a strategy, so much so that when in a 1994 speech in the UAE, U.S. diplomat Richard Murphy declared with astonishment and a tinge of irony that the U.S. was confused over Iran’s diplomacy, the Iranian Foreign Ministry took this comment as a praise of the complex and subtle way it had functioned!

After leaving the Foreign Ministry, Velayati became the Leader’s advisor on international affairs. Even though he still has weekly meetings with his former deputies and allies, Velayati has not gained the maturity of a seasoned politician after his sixteen-year long political career. In his new post, too, he has practically not been able to offer the Leader sagacious advice on international relations.

An instance is Ayatollah Khamenei’s inaugural address presented at the 1997 OIC summit meeting in Tehran. After a last-minute revision made through consultation with Velayati, the address included a novel point that reflected a weak analytic ability in writing the text. This point was the proposal to the OIC heads of state to seek veto right in the Security Council, a proposal that was vehemently criticized and rejected by Malaysian President Mahatir Mohammad the same afternoon and that soon became lackluster and fell into oblivion.

In case Velayati, as the Leader’s senior advisor for international relations, has contributed to Iran’s rejection of the U.S. demand to set up a consular office in Tehran, Ayatollah Khamenei should seriously rethink consulting with him.

Improvement of Iran-U.S. relations is an inevitable trend that has been set in motion. If both countries’ statesmen realize the national and regional realities and interests and adapt their diplomacy with this trend, they can in time make utmost use of it for their own countries.