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Iranian Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s letter to the Majlis (Parliament) to remove the press law amendment from its agenda pitted him against the public opinion, as the amendment had huge popular support.

With this move, Ayatollah Khamenei, the most high-ranking political player in Iran’s power pyramid, officially and openly confronted the reformists for the first time after President Khatami’s election in 1997 and unnecessarily elicited the Iranian and world public opinion’s wrath.

Given that all Parliament bills in Iran have to go through the Guardians Council and the Expediency Council for final approval, Ayatollah Khamenei’s direct intervention was not necessary, as these two Councils could have well taken care of the bill.

The fact that Ayatollah Khamenei did intervene could be interpreted as a measure tactfully orchestrated by Chairman of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is a master of covert diplomacy in Iranian politics.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, who faced a severe and unexpected defeat in the sixth Majlis elections after the reformist press lashed out at him, spent some time in the shadows harboring a deep grudge against the reformist press.

After his defeat in the parliamentary elections, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as chairman of the Expediency Council (which oversees and settles disputes between the Majlis and Guardians Council), had two choices: First, to settle inevitable differences between the Parliament and the Guardians Council in favor of the reformists. Hashemi Rafsanjani’s high ability at persuasive discourse would have thus allowed him to improve his tarnished political image by getting close to the reformists. Second, to adopt a hostile stance toward the reformists by dismantling their approved bills in a bid to take revenge on the reformist press that had been so unfriendly toward him.

Some political analysts contend that the mass crackdown on the reformist press is the inevitable outcome of the reformist papers’ battle with Hashemi Rafsanjani. In confronting Hashemi Rafsanjani, the reformist press paid no heed to his political weight and capabilities. If the reformists had avoided fighting Hashemi and had rather befriended him, they could have reaped benefit of his political capabilities and averted their current bitter fate.

Hashemi Rafsanjani’s recent Friday prayer sermon in which he decisively defended the Leader’s inalienable right to steer the course of reforms is an important signal, given his joint meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei and heads of the three branches the night before it.

The importance of the signal lies in the fact that 48 hours after the sermon, the Leader sent his letter to the Parliament intercepting the press law amendment. Hashemi Rafsanjani seems to have cleverly convinced the Leader to send the letter, proving his influence over the Leader.

This is Hashemi Rafsanjani’s unique political tactic. In 1988, too, the same tactic was at work when in an exclusive interview with the Tehran-based moderate newspaper Ettelaat he recounted memories of early days of Iran’s revolution and noted that he recommended Ayatollah Khamenei for membership in the Revolutionary Council set up by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, in this interview, implied that he was the one who introduced Ayatollah Khamenei to Iran’s political power pyramid and that as such Iran’s future Leader is indebted to him.

In the course of the press law amendment, Hashemi Rafsanjani was well aware that the amendment would be easily passed by the Parliament. He also knew well that the Guardians Council would easily veto the amendment, landing it ultimately into his own hands as chairman of the Expediency Council.

Then all eyes would have been fixed on Hashemi Rafsanjani to see how he would approach this amendment, a situation that would have constituted a very big dilemma for him.

Given his bitter memories of the reformist papers, Hashemi Rafsanjani, on the one hand, had no incentive to approve this amendment which by nature strengthened the reformist press. On the other hand, the public opinion’s support for this amendment was very high, and Hashemi Rafsanjani’s opposition with the amendment would have turned the public against him.

Apparently Hashemi Rafsanjani, in a realistic evaluation, avoided this dilemma by throwing the ball into the Leader’s court and by convincing him to directly intervene, an intervention that was totally needless but that served only to save Hashemi Rafsanjani from a tough future decision.

Now Hashemi is sitting in the shadows with peace of mind, having settled his scores with the reformist papers as well.

The Leader’s intervention also practically placed the issue of republication of the reformist press in limbo. This suspense is now giving Hashemi Rafsanjani leeway to think of running for president next year in the absence of the intruding press.

Now that four years have lapsed after Hashemi Rafsanjani’s tenure as president, he can legally run again. If Hashemi Rafsanjani, by reliance on his political allies, succeeds in aggrandizing the country’s economic problems during the last 10 months of Khatami’s presidency and magnifying Khatami’s inability to solve Iran’s economic problems, he can take a powerful leap to win next year’s presidential elections.

To this end, Hashemi Rafsanjani strives to convince the public opinion that he has the required management skills to improve the country’s economy. Then in an unequal battle with Khatami, who will lack the press to support him, Hashemi Rafsanjani will have high chances of becoming the next Iranian president.

Khatami, however, experienced this unequal war in the May 23, 1997 elections and came out of it victorious. But next year’s presidential election will be very different: In 2001, Khatami will have a four-year track record as president, a track record which will allow the people to compare his performance with that of his rivals.

In case Khatami’s opponents stress the country’s unfavorable economic conditions during the President’s last 10 months in office and launch a publicity campaign against him, Hashemi Rafsanjani will find the propitious ground to launch his campaign for presidency.

It is worthy of note that Hashemi Rafsanjani does not care about the number of votes he gets. He attaches prime importance to victory in the elections, irrespective of the number of votes cast in his favor.

In case he runs for president, Hashemi Rafsanjani would, in his heart of hearts, like to win 20 million votes, as Khatami did in the May 23, 1997 elections. But even if this does not happen, Hashemi Rafsanjani would not care, as he only wants to win, be it with 20 million votes or just 5 million.

Hashemi Rafsanjani does not believe in the political importance of the lower strata of the society. He prefers to heed the oligarchic and traditional layers of Iran’s political power pyramid and, as such, win the support of power-wielders at the upper strata. Hashemi Rafsanjani in general grants that the masses of people can at best offer only populist support for him and his policies.