In just nine days, all the President’s men will be known to the public after their introduction to the Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly) to gain a vote of confidence.

There is the possibility that one or several females will be among the 22 individuals whom Seyyed Mohammad Khatami will introduce to the Parliament as his ministers.

If this rumor is true, this would be the first time since the culmination of Iran’s Islamic Revolution that women are given the chance to direct the affairs of ministries in the country, and this move would further boost the popularity of Khatami among the Iranian women.

During the relatively long period between his victory as President and presentation of the list of his ministers, Khatami has deliberately avoided making public the names of his Cabinet members, intending to disclose the names only at the due time in the Majlis.

Such a deliberate attempt at keeping the names of Cabinet members a secret, perceived from the perspective of the psychology of social behavior, is reflective of an unhealthy political climate in the power circles in Iran.

In actuality, knowing that his victory in the elections was at the cost of the unexpected defeat of the right wing and considering the anger of this wing over its defeat, Khatami has striven to take away any opportunity from the rival wing by adopting a policy of reticence, not naming his Cabinet members.

Khatami’s silence has given the rumor mills more than enough material to churn out list after list containing the names of future ministers.

However, under these circumstances it is easier to predict who would NOT be in the Cabinet.

In Iran’s existing political atmosphere, it is very difficult to specifically name the would-be ministers, yet it is relatively easy to present the names of the people who are competent to become a minister in Khatami’s government but, perhaps for political reasons, would not gain a vote of confidence.

Since Khatami’s main rival in the presidential elections Hojjatoleslam Akbar Nateq-Nouri has been reinstated as Majlis Speaker and keeping in mind that the traditional conservative wing still enjoys a relative majority in the Majlis, Khatami will surely avoid nominating people who would not be fully approved by the right wing Majlis MPs.

But at the same time, Khatami wants to appoint powerful people as ministers of interior, foreign affairs, culture and Islamic guidance, and information.

As he championed a rule-governed civil community during his presidential campaign, Khatami now has to necessarily appoint his most powerful man as the minister of interior to fulfill his aims and objectives.

Khatami will be faced with a traditional evasion of the law, a characteristic of Iranian society due to 3,000 years of tyrannical rule of kings prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Because of this very reason, the minister of interior and his ministry assume special importance for Khatami.

As a result, the person who takes the helm of the Ministry of Interior should be bold and brave, decisive, and highly self-confident.

A cursory survey of the pro-Khatami groups and individuals who, during the election campaigns, played standard-bearer roles indicates that Tehran’s Mayor Gholam Hussein Karbaschi, stands out prominently for this post.

During the election campaigns, Karbaschi, who is an influential member of the G-6, boldly entered the scene and succeeded in masterfully directing the campaign in favor of Khatami.

In addition, during the last eight years, Karbaschi, with his strong management, succeeded in turning Tehran from a virtual ruin into a modern, orderly, and clean city, notwithstanding all heavy pressures exerted on him.

On the surface, Karbaschi is the most competent person for the post of the minister of interior. But despite Karbaschi’s qualifications and merits, Khatami will not present him as a nominee for the Interior Ministry because of the hostility caused by Karbaschi’s open competition with the traditional conservative wing over the past years, in particular during the period of campaigns for the Fifth Majlis and the presidency,

In addition, Karbaschi’s pre-revolution differences with the traditional conservative wing cannot be overlooked either. On the other hand, Karbaschi appears to have no intention of abandoning his post as Tehran’s mayor because he feels there are still many things to be done in the city, and logically, these affairs should not be vested with another person who might not be of Karbaschi’s caliber.

Karbaschi has, furthermore, proven that as Tehran’s mayor he commands more political power than other high-ranking political officials.

With such features, Karbaschi would be averse to dispensing with his post at the Tehran Municipality. Given the enforcement of the Law of the Councils, Karbaschi is expected to retain his post and proceed toward gaining popular legitimacy in Tehran. This will be politically of great significance for him.

Under such conditions, Karbaschi can strengthen his position like the mayors of Paris and stand against his rivals.

Among other political figures competent enough to hold a ministerial post in Khatami’s Cabinet, mention can be made of Vice-President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Ataollah Mohajerani.

With a Ph.D. in history, the influential member of the G-6, well known for his political capacity and self-restraint, Mohajerani has all the qualifications for occupying the seat of the minister of culture and Islamic guidance in Khatami’s Cabinet.

But Khatami cannot nominate Mohajerani because of the Vice-President’s position on Iran-US relations. In 1368 (1989), he wrote an article entitled "Direct Negotiations" which was published in Ettela’at daily.

In the article he explicitly underscored the need for direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington to retrieve Iran’s rights. For this, he was seriously blasted by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution.

His rivals constantly use this issue as Mohajerani’s Achilles heel. Ironically, in Iran’s anti-US political community, Mohajerani is known to favor resumption of Iran-US relations.

Cognizant of this situation, Khatami will probably abstain from introducing Mohajerani as a minister in his Cabinet, because he knows very well that his rivals in the Parliament will bring a no-confidence motion for Mohajerani based on the firm justifications that they have.

Engineer Mir Hussein Musavi is the third prominent personality among Khatami’s men. He is highly qualified to become a minister in the future Cabinet. But again there is little possibility of his being nominated.

The fact that he would not be nominated is due more to Musavi’s personal reasons rather than to the possible Majlis objection.

After his tenure of office as prime minister in 1368 (1989), Musavi, who is still highly popular among the people, has deliberately disengaged himself from politics and leads a life in the shadows.

Over the past 8 years, Musavi has openly avoided adopting a position on political issues. During the election campaigns, he strictly avoided open support for Khatami, notwithstanding all the pressure exerted on him to enter the scene in Khatami’s favor, and despite his own closeness to Khatami.

Now that it has become evident that Dr. Velayati would not remain as the foreign minister in the next Cabinet, and in view of the concurrence of Musavi and Khatami’s views on foreign policy, Musavi seems to be the most qualified person to become minister of foreign affairs in the future Cabinet.

Considering Musavi’s insistence on keeping up his policy of being in the shadows, however, it would be difficult to convince him to become foreign minister or first vice-president. By all indications, he will not accept a post in Khatami’s Cabinet.

Behzad Nabavi is another prominent figure qualified for a ministerial seat in Khatami’s Cabinet. Nabavi, who is the chairman of the Islamic Revolution Mujahideen Organization and a former minister in Musavi’s Cabinet, openly supported Khatami during the election campaigning.

He is a renowned left-wing theoretician. He has published a series of articles in the Asr-e Ma (Our Era) Weekly which is the mouthpiece of his organization. In these articles, he has defined and differentiated Iran’s political wings as traditional right, modern right, classic left, and new left.

Apparently, Nabavi has a very clean political record. But the problem that he faces is that in a diagram showing the political stances of the leftists, he stands at the peak. He is known as the most hard-line figure in the left wing who is very open and explicit in his statements.

In terms of political groupings, Nabavi is very close to Khatami, but the self-restrained, realistic, and tolerant nature of Khatami is not compatible with Nabavi’s character. Khatami will, therefore, not appoint Nabavi as a minister.

Among other well-known personalities in the pro-Khatami wing, reference can be made to Ms. Faezeh Hashemi, daughter of the outgoing President, Abdullah Nouri, Seyyed Hussein Marashi, and Hassan Rowhani, all of whom are MPs representing the pro-Khatami wing in the Majlis.

Apart from Majlis Vice-Speaker Hassan Rowhani, the other people named above are openly in Khatami’s camp. However, this does not mean that Rowhani opposes the President-elect. In his political life, Rowhani has all along tried to adopt a conservative stance to be favored by both major wings in the Majlis.

Khatami needs someone who has a stronger personality than Rowhani, notwithstanding the latter’s qualifications to be a minister in the future Cabinet.

All other MPs mentioned here are qualified to become ministers. But logically Khatami should not take his supporters out of the Majlis, given the fragile majority of votes by his supporting wing in the Majlis.

These individuals could be a powerful force for Khatami in the Cabinet. But a logical estimation indicates that their presence in the Majlis could help Khatami even more in promoting his objectives and policies with the approval of the plans and measures that he will forward to the Majlis. These individuals can support Khatami’s plans and measures when confronted by the opposing wing.

On the whole, one can predict that given Khatami’s landslide victory in the presidential elections and his reliance on 20 million people who voted for him and who expect to see new faces in the Cabinet, we will witness an 80 percent change in the existing Cabinet on the 13^th of Mordad (August 4).

Apart from the choice of the 22 ministers of the future Cabinet who will set up a command center for Khatami during his tenure as President, the President-elect’s strategy to successfully reach his objectives in the face of his experienced and strong rivals is of prime importance.

Even though Khatami won 20 million votes in the seventh round of presidential elections and even though this can be a solid springboard for him to launch his activities, lack of solidarity among his 20 million supporters, ranging from the extreme left to the liberals, affords a proper opportunity to Khatami’s rivals to easily gain supremacy in the political scene while relying on a grouping that, though small, would be consolidated.

In this fashion, the most logical path before Khatami is the set-up of an all-embracing party to enrich the minds, offer political guidance, and create solidarity among the 20 million who voted for him.