All human beings should have the right to decide what should happen to their own bodies and in particular they should be able to decide when their lives should come to an end.

 

Do you agree with this?

 

If the Government were to decide in favour of some form of voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide, what practical issues would have to be addressed?

 

 

 


It is accepted that each person has an autonomous right to decide what happens to their body. However when someone decides they want euthanasia, opinions vary. This brings the quarrel between a belief for self determination and societies’ belief of the sanctity of life.

 

Euthanasia can be defined as a good, dignified, premature death with the need for another person involved. This essay will discuss the right to voluntary euthanasia-that is where someone wishes euthanasia to bring an end to their life. It will also address any relevant practical measures that would need to be taken if the Government were to legalise voluntary euthanasia.

 

Currently the criminal law makes no concessions for the motives in aiding or abetting the termination of another persons’ life. Euthanasia falls within the criminal law of homicide and assisted suicide. The law refuses to “leave the issue in the hands of doctors; it treats euthanasia as murder.” 1 This belief is based on the sanctity of life principle that “all lives are intrinsically valuable, (that) it is always wrong intentionally to kill an innocent human being.” 2 This view is often forwarded by the religious community (most notably the Catholic Church) and also by many doctors and factions of the BMA.

 

However, high profile cases in the media such as that of Diane Pretty have left the majority of the public in favour of voluntary euthanasia. One commentator summed the views of many up by saying “If I had my way I could say goodbye…I could choose my time and be calm and collected about it. I have had a good life and I would dearly like a good death…my last wish is to die with dignity.”3

 

Some however “who oppose euthanasia suggest that death with dignity is best achieved with the therapeutic control of symptoms to ease a patient gradually from life into death.”4 This view is flawed as it leaves death as “the ultimate form of consumer resistance” 5 to a palliative care system which is more concerned with keeping patients alive than providing dignity.

 

Voluntary euthanasia can be passive and active. The difference can be determined by whether an omission or a positive act brings about the death. Passive euthanasia has

been given a legal framework within the common law. Patients have the right to refuse treatment even if it leads to their own death.

 

In overruling Leigh V Gladstone 6 where force feeding suffrojets on a hunger strike was allowed Home Secretary V Robb 7 set a basis for passive euthanasia. The right to passive euthanasia was furthered in Nancy V Hotel Dieu de Quebec 8 where a woman, paralysed from the neck down successfully managed to have her life sustaining ventilator switched off.

 

In a desire against euthanasia the medical profession will often question capacity to consent. It is widely accepted that those who cannot understand the implications of their wish to die can be treated against their will. This was shown in B V Croydon HA 9 where a patient lacking capacity couldn’t refuse nutrition. Doctors have also made unsuccessful attempts to claim lack of capacity in cases such as B V An NHS Trust 10 and R(on the application of Pretty) V DPP 11 (both discussed below). Providing the patient fully understands the decision of euthanasia, their general mental health is irrelevant (Re JT 12).

 

A similar problem is found in the case of euthanasia and children. Parents should not be able to refuse treatment or successfully request euthanasia. In those cases, the child is correctly made a ward of court (Re B 13).

 

Passive euthanasia can however break one of the founding principles of euthanasia which is that the death must be dignified. Examples such as starvation or suffocation through withdrawal of food or artificial ventilation lack the desired dignity. In fact it can be very painful or at the least grossly uncomfortable.

 

Active euthanasia, whilst painless and swift remains in the law of homicide. The courts have however developed certain loopholes in the law. In Re A (Conjoined twins 14) the doctrine of necessity was invoked where a positive act of surgically separating two conjoined twins which shared vital organs was allowed. There was argument about whether the act of separation was an omission as Lord Mustill argued when he stated that it was “Indistinguishable 15 from taking active steps to end a life or a positive act.

 

A doctrine of double effect allows what most would describe as active euthanasia providing the physicians’ primary purpose was not to end his patients’ life. In R V Adams 16, a doctor prescribed high dosages of the pain killer morphine at the request of his patient to end her life. J Devlin in his judgement held that “the doctor is entitled to relieve pain and suffering even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life 17.” Dr Adams well may have been a lucky beneficiary of a loophole the courts have developed to allow those performing euthanasia to escape the criminal law.

 

Similar circumstances were found in R V Moor 18 where again a high dosage of morphine had been given to a patient, which was a significant cause of his death. The judge directed the jury that they should acquit the doctor unless they were satisfied that his intention was to kill rather than “to give treatment which he believed in the circumstances (as he understood them) to be proper treatment to relieve George Liddell (the patient)’s pain and suffering.” 19

 

The subjective test in Moor of what the doctor understands to be proper treatment seems to allow Jury’s greater freedom to acquit than the objective test of a responsible body of medical opinion which runs through the majority of the law of medical practise.

 

In R V Cox 20, had Dr Cox taken advantage of the doctrine of double effect as opposed to administering the poison Potassium Chloride to his elderly patient who had requested euthanasia, that he would have escaped liability under the criminal law. In R V Adams 16, R V Moor 18 and R V Cox 20, the patients all requested euthanasia and died very quickly. They all had a dignified death but Dr Cox was criminally liable whilst Dr Adams and Dr Moor were not with the only practical difference being what was injected.

 

Two key recent cases with different results could give an opening for the legalisation of euthanasia. The cases of B V An NHS Trust 10 and R (on the application of Pretty) V DPP 11 both concerned patients who were paralysed from the neck down. The difference however lay in the form of euthanasia requested. Ms B wanted the life sustaining ventilator switched off. Diane Pretty wanted criminal immunity for her husband so he could bring her life to an end when her health further deteriorated. Ms B’s application for passive euthanasia was allowed whilst Diane Pretty’s application for active euthanasia was not.

 

The case of Diane Pretty may however provide a basis for the legalisation of active euthanasia. Whilst she was unable to rely on the European convention of human rights Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment and Article 9 (freedom of conscience), a window of opportunity has opened from Article 8. Article 8 confers that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life.”

 

A recent European case of X V Iceland 21 gave Article 8 a wider scope to incorporate “fulfilment of ones own personality.” 22 This was further established in Botta V Italy 23 where it was stated that “the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the convention is primarily intended to ensure the development…of the personality of the individual.” 24 Diane Pretty argued that “when it comes to developing individual personality, the interest in determining the timing and manner of death one of the most fundamental.”

 

If this is to be accepted, the only hurdle to pass for those seeking active euthanasia is to prove that the act of terminating life amounts to part of their life, not death itself. If established, active euthanasia can be bought within the ambit of Article 8.

 

I suggest that acts such as giving someone a lethal injection, bring about the process of dying which according to Grayling “Dying is an act of living; it is indeed one of the most important events in life.”26 This accepted, whilst death is the antithesis of life, euthanasia in bringing about the process of dying, is actually part of living and therefore comes within Article 8. This assertion was helped further in the case of Diane Pretty when the ECHR recognised that “the way she (Mrs Pretty) chooses to pass the closing moments of her life is part of the act of living, and she has a right to ask that this too must be respected.”27

 

If a similar case to Diane Pretty’s, but with physician aided death, is bought to the courts, Article 8 in the light of X V Iceland 21 could bring about legality for active euthanasia.

 

In principle I agree that passive euthanasia should be within the ambit of the law. Whilst the wishes of those seeking to preserve the sanctity of life must be appreciated, the view of Lord Donaldson in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 28 where a patient wished euthanasia, should be followed. He stated “This situation gives rise to a conflict of two interests, that of the patient and that of the society in which he lives… It is well established that the ultimate right of the individual is paramount.” 29

 

Following from Lord Donaldson’s assertion, it seems logical that active euthanasia also be bought within the law. Passive euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect have both used wordplay to create loopholes in the law allowing euthanasia. The populist opinion is that all voluntary euthanasia is moral. The law needs to change to reflect the changing morals of society.

 

Whilst sections of the population are against active euthanasia for moral or religious reasons and the BMA have consistently rejected claims for its legalisation, it is unlikely that Parliament will legislate in favour of active euthanasia. However as discussed above, they may be forced to accept it from a binding ruling from the ECHR. The effect of X V Iceland 21 of expanding the right to respect for private life set out in Article 8 of the convention to include respect for the individuals’ personality could have a vital role in the legalisation of active euthanasia. As explained above, if Graylings view that dying is part of living, active euthanasia falls within the protection afforded by Article 8, providing that the patient has capacity to consent and has done so.

 

Whilst the majority of legally practised euthanasia has been passive, the majority of patients wishing euthanasia would undoubtedly wish it to be active. If administered efficiently by a physician it is more apt to being painless, quick and undoubtedly more dignified than passive euthanasia which can be slow, painful and uncomfortable. Active euthanasia emphasises individual personal autonomy which currently only confers a right to refuse treatment. It does not confer a right to demand treatment such as a lethal injection to end life.

 

Whilst I would suggest that voluntary euthanasia should be legalised, Parliament is unlikely to do so in the near future. If it was to not go that far, a defence to homicide of mercy killing should be created.

 

If voluntary euthanasia were to be legalised in some form, there would undoubtedly be some practical problems to overcome. Objections on moral and religious basis’ have to be at the very least appeased. It would be very wrong to legalise euthanasia without strict controls and allow dignity to be breached as firmly as in the instance of American doctor Jack Kevorkian, alias Dr Death, who promotes the use of his ‘suicide machines’ to people seeking euthanasia. This is not dignity! This is disgusting commercialisation on TV of death and must not be allowed.

 

There is undoubtedly a risk that if the rules governing euthanasia are relaxed, that many will abuse them. A largely successful legalisation of euthanasia has taken place in the Netherlands, and the beginning of one is unfolding in Belgium.

 

Some similarities would have to run through a model for England and Wales. A doctor would have to be the one to perform euthanasia to ensure enough expertise for a painless, dignified death. Physicians should however be allowed to gain ethical exception if they choose not to perform euthanasia. This would still mean that applicants such as Diane Pretty would not be able to allow family members to aid their death. Similar to abortion laws, another doctor should also approve the decision.

 

There must also be a durable request for euthanasia by the patient who must be capable of giving consent. The durability of the request must be over a reasonable period of time leaving doctors entirely sure that the patients views are not likely to change. Expert clinical advice must first be sought to ensure the patient has all the facts at their disposal. Advance directives should be followed only where it is clear expert advice has been given before the document is lodged and must be precise enough to cover the situation in question. However Advance directives which give power of attorney to a proxy should not be followed as strictly as power of attorney should not be continued once the person granting it is no longer able to understand its implications (Drew V Nunn 30). Accordingly all palliative care that can be taken without overly intrusive measures should be exhausted, before euthanasia is allowed. The patient must also be suffering such intolerable pain without any reasonable chance of recovery that their quality of life is seriously impaired.

 

Whilst the Dutch system works well for them, it must not be assumed that the same control would work in England and Wales. Palliative care is not as strong in the Netherlands and the Dutch people are not as corrupt as the English and Welsh. Here we would also need a tighter system of reporting euthanasia and tighter controls over its administration. I would also suggest compulsory disclosure of membership of pro-euthanasia societies from doctors and close monitoring of potential corruptness in circumstances such as doctors receiving payments within or outside a patients’ will in potential exchange for their assistance in euthanasia.

 

At the heart of the question of how to control legalised practise of euthanasia, lay certain principles. Euthanasia should be a quick, efficient, painless and dignified death. It must be closely monitored to ensure that this is given only where the above criteria have been met and that only the patient benefits.

 

As I have discussed above, voluntary euthanasia should be legalised and strictly controlled. If is not, not only will the law be out of sync with public morals but it will also continue to fail in controlling euthanasia which with or without legalisation continues to happen on a day to day basis. At least with the legalisation of euthanasia, death for those seeking it will be more painless, quick and dignified.

 

30. DREW V NUNN (1879) 4 QBD 661

 

ESSAY DETAILS

 

1. G.WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW(2ND ED, 1983) AT PG 580

2. J.KEOWN, “COURTING EUTHANASIA? TONY BLAND AND THE LAW LORDS”, ETHICS AND

MEDICINE, VOLUME 9, No 3 1993

3. C TAYLOR-WATSON IN MARGARETT DRISCOLL “AFTER A GOOD LIFE, WHY CAN’T WE CHOOSE A GOOD DEATH?” THE SUNDAY TIMES, JAN 15TH 1995

4. C SAUNDERS, “VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA”, PALLIATIVE MEDICINE, 1992 VOL 6 AT pp 1-5

5. I ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPLORATION OF HEALTH, 1975 AT p.149

6. LEIGH V GLADSTONE (1909) 26 TLR 139

7. HOME SECRETARY V ROBB (1995) 1 ALL ER 677

8. NANCY V HOTEL DIEU DE QUEBEC (1992) 86 DLR 385

9. B V CROYDON HA (1995) 1 ALL ER 683

10. B V AN NHS TRUST (2002) 2 ALL ER 449

11. R (ON THE APPLICATION OF PRETTY) V DPP (2002) 1 ALL ER 1

12. RE JT (1998) 1 FLR 48

13. RE B (1981) 1 WLR 1421

14. RE A (CONJOINED TWINS) (2000) 3 FCR 577

15. ibid

16. R V ADAMS (1957) CRIM LR 365

17. ibid

18. A ARLIDGE QC, ‘THE TRIAL OF DAVID MOOR’ (2000) CRIM LR 31

19. ibid

20. R V COX

21. X V ICELAND APP No 6825/74

22. ibid

23. BOTTA V ITALY (1998) 26 E.H.R.R 241

24. ibid

25. DAN MORRIS, “ASSISTED SUICIDE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE”

26. A.C GRAYLING “A GOOD DEATH” – GUARDIAN (SATURDAY REVIEW) OCTOBER 27TH 2001

27. ibid

28. RE T (ADULT : REFUSAL OF TREATMENT) (1992) 4 ALL ER 649

29. ibid

30. DREW V NUNN (1879) 4 QBD 661

 

WORD COUNT: 2499

 

UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS UP TO COMPLETION ON 28 MARCH 2003

 

BOOKS/REPORTS/ARTICLES QUOTED OR USED IN THE RESEARCH FOR THIS ESSAY

 

1. G.WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW(2ND ED, 1983)

2. J.KEOWN, “COURTING EUTHANASIA? TONY BLAND AND THE LAW LORDS”, ETHICS AND MEDICINE, VOLUME 9, No 3 1993

3. C TAYLOR-WATSON IN MARGARETT DRISCOLL “AFTER A GOOD LIFE, WHY CAN’T WE CHOOSE A GOOD DEATH?” THE SUNDAY TIMES, JAN 15TH 1995

4. C SAUNDERS, “VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA”, PALLIATIVE MEDICINE, 1992 VOL 6

5. I ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPLORATION OF HEALTH, 1975

6. A ARLIDGE QC, ‘THE TRIAL OF DAVID MOOR’ (2000) CRIM LR 31

7. DAN MORRIS, “ASSISTED SUICIDE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE”

8. HAZEL BIGGS, “EUTHANASIA AND DEATH WITH DIGNITY: STILL POISED ON THE FULCRUM OF HOMICIDE”

9. JONATHAN MONTGOMERY, HEALTH CARE LAW(2ND ED, 2003)

10. BRENDAN GREENE, ESSENTIAL MEDICAL LAW

 

ARTICLES TAKEN FROM www.westlaw.co.uk

 

OTHER WEBSITES USED

www.euthanasia.com/www.euthanasia.org/dutch.html

 

 

 

 

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