It would seem likely that there will be further changes to the New Zealand system. The third MMP election will be held in November 2001 and once the results of this election have been studied, it will be easier to draw definite conclusions about how well MMP has performed. In addition to this, there will be a further review of the system in 2002, in accordance with the recommendation of the Royal Commission.
The results of the 2001 General Election will provide more scope from which to predict the possible development of the electoral system. It may be that now the political parties have had time to adapt to the nature of their position within MMP, they will be more willing to offer the electorate greater insight to the mechanisms of inter-party negotiations. This is evidenced by the position of National in the current campaign. Having learnt from their mistakes with NZ First in the 1996-1999 term, National have already made it clear that, if they were in a position to form a coalition, their partners would be ACT. This would most likely have the effect of creating a right wing coalition that could match the current centre-let coalition in terms of voter popularity.
Under the current system a number of issues arise that can be used to argue against MMP as a democratic system. The two different types of MP result in an imbalance in equality, as there are essentially two levels of representation, “one burdened by insecurity and constituency duties, the other having higher status and the prospect of holding ministerial office” (Heywood, 1997:219) Although this may be identified as a weakness, it can also be identified as a strength because it recognises that the skills and qualities that are required to be a good constituency MP and an effective minister are vastly different, the current system therefore making it less likely that those in ministerial positions are found to be incompetent.
However, what the last argument fails to take into account is the degree to which the list system is centrally controlled. Although the party list enables voters to vote for a particular party, it does not mean they are afforded the opportunity to influence who is placed on the list and where they are ranked. Instead, this is done according the views of the central party meaning that it is possible for party leadership to surround themselves with the members of the party they favour. To change this would require pressure from the party membership to make the party take into account the wishes of its membership. It is possible that this might lead to increased levels of party membership, which has a positive effect in terms of the measurement of political culture outlined above as it represents more active participation in the democratic process and would lead to higher levels of party identification among the electorate, both features that would have a positive effect on increasing turnout at elections as well as the expectation of the electorate that their representatives display awareness of accountability.
A feature of the current system that would be likely to disappear, should further reforms be introduced to increase the proportionality of the electoral system, is the Maori electorates. This would especially be the case if a referendum were held that resulted in the adoption of the Single Transferable Vote system (STV). STV is regarded as the most purely proportional system that could be used while still retaining the possibility of stable government. As this system would essentially ensure a Parliamentary composition that was representative of the composition of the general population, the existence of a separate roll and separate electorates for a particular ethnic group become anti-democratic and would result in artificially high levels of representation for the Maori.
Possible Implications for Britain