This now leads to a depiction of the electoral system in terms of how it functions, what the aim of the reform was and the prospects and entailments of any further reform. However, before this, it is necessary to give a background to the adoption of the new electoral system.
Politically, New Zealand is a very interesting proposition, having a strong tradition of democracy. Universal suffrage was achieved in New Zealand in 1893 giving them a twenty-five year head start over Britain in terms of representation and, in terms of participation, the lowest general election turnout recorded since 1940 is around 74%, which although low to New Zealand is relatively high when compared internationally. It also has contemporary relevance, as recent developments regarding electoral reform make it a perfect case from which lessons that would be relevant to reform in Britain can be learnt.
At the beginning of the 1990s, New Zealand operated under an almost perfect replica of the ‘Westminster Model’ of election and representation, which is based on the simple plurality method of ‘First Past the Post’. The last election under this system was held November 6th 1993, the same day as the binding referendum that was to decide on the new system. Just three years after this, New Zealand was to hold its first general election under a proportional system.
The historical background to the reform of the electoral system in New Zealand is long and complex, therefore only a very brief account can be entered into here (Miller, 1999 offers a more comprehensive account). Up to the 1960s, the Westminster system flourished in New Zealand. Voters were satisfied with the representation they had. However, more global forces were to come to have an effect on the country.
“As the two-party system de-aligned and producers became more exposed to an international economy increasingly regulated against the interests of small agricultural exporting countries like New Zealand, governments were obliged to face more and more difficult political decisions on narrowing and increasingly more volatile bases of electoral support.” (Vowles, 2000:3)
This trend continued into the 1980s, with people becoming more and more dissatisfied as successive governments, both Labour and National Party, tried to offer retrospective justification for unpopular policies instituted, apparently without regard for public opinion. In addition to this, the failures of the First Past the Post (FPP) system had been highlighted in recent elections where the National Party had gained Parliamentary majorities without winning a plurality of the vote, a fact that seriously undermined the legitimacy of their position.
The first step toward change came in 1984 when Labour came to power and established a Royal Commission on the Electoral System. The Commission published its results in 1986 stating that Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) was the best option for New Zealand and that a referendum should be held to decide whether to opt for this system or to retain FPP. Both major parties rejected this at the time but pressure was brought to bear by an organisation called the Electoral Reform Coalition, which developed support at the grass roots level with support from other political parties. The result of this was that, in the run up to the 1990 General Election, both major parties pledged to hold a referendum on the issue if they won. National emerged victorious and kept their promise.
The final decision to adopt a new electoral system was taken through two referenda, the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. The first referendum was held on September 19th 1992 and was intended as an indicative referendum by which to judge the national mood with regard to change of the system. The low turnout for this vote, just 55.2%, was belied by the overwhelming response to the first question in which 85% of those who did vote voted for change, prompting Mike Moore, a former Labour Prime Minister, to state “the people didn’t speak on Saturday, thy screamed.” The second question was on the preferred system if any change was to occur. Even at this early stage, the preference for the Mixed Member Proportional system was staggering. 70.5% voted for this system with the second favourite option of the Single Transferable Vote gaining only 17.4% of the vote.
The 1993 referendum was held on November 6th, appropriately the same day as the last general election under the first-past-the-post system. The virtue of holding this binding referendum on the same day as the general election was a much higher turnout, this time of 85.2%. The question this time was of a simple choice between First-past-the-post and MMP, with the result being 53.9% in favour of adopting MMP and 46.1% for retaining the status quo. (see Appendix 1)
The reformed system is known as MMP. It is similar to the Additional Member System used in Germany and also the system that was used in the Scottish Parliament elections of 1999. There are however two main differences in the case of MMP, the allowance in the New Zealand system for the Maori Electoral Option and that the party list system is operated on a national rather than regional basis, the significance of which will be discussed below.
Before discussing the specifics of the electoral system, the importance of the Maori Electoral Roll must be taken into account. The Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand and make up around 13 % of the population. The Maori were never formally excluded from the democratic process in New Zealand as Article Three of the Treaty of Waitangi “accorded Maori the rights and privileges of British citizens.” (Miller, 1999:367) The Treaty of Waitangi was the constitutional charter, which marked the founding of New Zealand as a colony of the British Empire and is regarded as the document which enshrines the legitimacy of New Zealand governments, both to govern and command the allegiance of the Maori and Pakeha (officially New Zealand European). However, although they had the technical right to vote, the Maori generally did not qualify to vote as the extension of the franchise was, as was the case in Britain, dependent on being a landholder. This issue was overcome in 1862 with the introduction of the Native Land Act, which enabled Maori to hold individual title to land as opposed to communal title. The Maori gained separate representation with the Maori Representation Act (1867) which gave them four parliamentary seats out of a total of seventy-six. This may seem to be a reasonably high proportion of the total seats until comparative population size is taken into account, at the time these Acts were passed the size of the Maori population was just about equal to that of the non-Maori population. Although this was intended as a temporary measure it continues to this day.
Over the years a number of changes have been made to the regulations governing Maori electorates. In 1896, the land qualification was abolished, but between then and 1975, Maori were entitled to vote only in Maori electorates, the opportunity to register on either the general or Maori roll being afforded only to those of mixed parentage. The democracy of Maori voting was also different to that offered to those who voted on the general roll. The secret ballot was not used in Maori votes until 1937, sixty seven years after it had been introduced on the general roll and Maori electoral registers were not compiled until 1949, thirty five years after the legislation to allow this had been passed, and it was a further seven years until registration became compulsory for Maori. The equivalent requirement on the non-Maori roll had been in place since 1927.
Although never technically denied the vote, Maori participation was not exactly encouraged and the place of the Maori vote was very much secondary to the general vote. Up until the middle of the twentieth century, voting in Maori electorates took place the day before the general election, which meant that those Maori who wished to vote would have to take time off work, not only to vote but also to get to polling stations, which were not as numerous in Maori electorates as in general electorates.
Under the current system the Maori Electoral Option is held every five years, following the national census. This affords those on the Maori roll and those on the General roll who stated they were Maori when they last registered, the opportunity to register on whichever roll they prefer. Following this the Maori electoral boundaries are set for the next five years with each Maori electorate having an electoral population roughly the same as a general electorate. This means that the number of Maori electorates can change dependent upon the number registered on the Maori roll, with the Maori electoral population calculated according to the following formula:
Number enrolled on the Maori roll
____________________________ x Census Maori = Maori Electoral
Number enrolled on the Maori roll Descent Popn. Popn.
+
Number enrolled on the General roll
A Maori Electoral Option is currently being held, details of which can be found in Appendix 2.
It would seem that the introduction of proportional representation would result in equality for the Maori in terms of the ratio between parliamentary representation and population size. However, there are some who argue that the “existence of Members of Parliament who represent a single ethnic group, in a multicultural electorate, is antidemocratic.” (Newman, 1999) The argument that follows on from this, is that further reform towards a more proportional system, might remove the need for any distinction to be made between gender and ethnicity, allowing for total democratic representation of the entire population. This will be discussed at further length below but first the current system must be addressed.
The features of MMP are as follows; a proportion of the Parliamentary seats are filled using the first past the post system (FPP). The remaining seats are filled using a party list system. This means electors cast two votes one for a particular candidate in their electorate, electorate being the term used in New Zealand instead of constituency, and the other for their party of preference.
In practical terms this means that of the 120 MPs in the New Zealand Parliament 61 hold electorate seats, 53 are taken from party lists and 6 are Maori seats. To qualify for any representation parties must either win an electorate seat or receive at least 5% of the party votes, which in New Zealand is roughly equivalent to 100, 000 votes. This 5% threshold has two main purposes. Firstly it allows for relatively stable government, as there is not a proliferation of minor parties, which would tend to make cooperation both complicated and confusing with many disparate aims and ideologies to be taken into account. The second purpose is a logical continuation of the first in that it prevents the more extreme parties from gaining a parliamentary voice, a fact that may be un-democratic but undoubtedly has its benefits.
The following model demonstrates a simple example of what this system means in terms of the allocation of seats.
Party A – 35%
· Party A wins 35% of the party vote and is therefore entitled to 35% of the 120 seats = 42 MPs
· Party A has already won 30 electorates by FPP, so it needs another 12 MPs
· Party A will get 12 list MPs to take it up to the 35%or 42 MPs as approved by the voters
Party B – 4%
· Party B wins 4% of the party votes but no electorate seats
· Party B will not qualify for any list seats in this election
· In the next election Party B will have to receive either 5% of the party vote or win an electorate
Party C – 2.5%
· Party C wins 2.5% of the party votes and one electorate seat
· Party C qualifies for 3 MPs, representing 2.5% of 120
· Party C gains 2 list MPs to top up to its level of the party vote
This system of allocation is called the Sainte-Lague formula.
However, there are a number of special circumstances in which this formula varies; the case of independent MPs, the possibility of a party winning more electorate seats than its party vote entitles it to proportionally, a party failing to have enough list candidates to fill its allocation and the situation if a sitting MP resigns, dies or is disqualified from Parliament.
If an independent MP wins an electorate seat, the size of the Parliament does not alter but the parties are topped up to 119 seats not 120. If two independent MPs won electorate seats, this number would be 118 and so on.
If the situation arose where a party had gained more electorate seats than its proportional party vote entitled it to, the Parliament would alter in size, increasing in size by one seat for every extra MP. These ‘extra’ seats are called overhang seats and it is in regard to them that the party list being national is significant because although they remain a theoretical possibility they are highly unlikely compared to countries that use a regional list system.
In the case of a party failing to nominate enough list candidates to which it is entitled according to the share of the party vote it receives, then the size of the parliament reduces by whatever number of seats was appropriate until the next general election.
If a list MP dies, resigns or is disqualified from Parliament, the vacancy that arises is filled by the next candidate who would have been elected, according to the list used at the previous general election, subject to that candidate still being a member of the political party on whose list they stood. However, a seat may remain unfilled under these conditions if 75% of the MPs agree to the seat remaining empty if there is less than six months of the Parliamentary term left or if the Prime Minister announces a general election will be held within six months of the vacancy arising.
This then leads on to the question of what the aims of MMP were and how successfully these aims were met. There are a number of aims that it is possible to identify
1. Parliamentary seats awarded that relate to the share of the vote each party receives
2. increased representation of minorities in Parliament
3. decreased possibility of ‘electoral dictatorship’ by the larger parties
4. increased levels of both inter and intra-party consensus and cooperation within Parliament
5. increased levels of public awareness of how legislative decisions are taken
6. greater opportunity for smaller parties to have an active voice in the decision making process
7. a more competitive party system
In terms of representation, the fundamental goal of proportionality was achieved with parties gaining seats in proportion to the share of the party vote they receive. It also broadened the representation of social and political minorities, with Maori representation improved across the parties, a greater proportion of women becoming MPs and the presence of other ethnic minorities such as Asians and South Sea Islanders. This can be attributed to the need for the parties to show strongly in terms of the party list, which meant that the lists had to be designed to appeal to as wide a demographic as possible thus leading to greater Parliamentary representation of groups that had previously been under-represented. Mulgan (1995) makes the following argument;
“…the extent to which Parliament is ‘typically’ representative of the nation is not without significance. Parliament has an important symbolic function as the nation’s elected legislative assembly. In view of New Zealand’s claim to be a bicultural society, a significant Maori presence in Parliament is therefore essential.” (Mulgan, 1995:127)
This is also true for women and the other ethnic groups mentioned above such as Asians and South Sea Islanders.
The introduction of a degree of proportionality also means that the likelihood of a single party government is greatly reduced, with cooperation becoming a necessity rather than an anomaly. This entails a move away from the situation of government control simply alternating between the two largest parties.
Across the board consensus is also increased. This is because it becomes necessary to cooperate with political opponents not only to form a government but also to defeat a government.
The consensus aspect of proportional representation also has an impact on the public awareness of political issues. As more than one party takes decisions, debate within the Parliament should increase, thus contributing greatly to the ability of the electorate to understand and make use of the greater level of information that becomes available to them.
Following on from this, more debate engenders a more consultative approach and the minor parties begin to have a more noticeable influence. This is a very important feature in terms of the measurements of democracy that were addressed earlier, as it demonstrates to the electorate that their vote has not been wasted and those they have chosen to represent them are afforded the opportunity to do so, even if sometimes this just appears to be a token gesture.
In terms of a more competitive party system, the advent of MMP has resulted in a shift away from the dominant feature of plurality elections, where the two main parties are separated by, and do battle for, only a small number of marginal seats. The aspect of MMP, which has had most significance in creating this situation, is the list vote. As the list vote is calculated nationally and not by region, it has engendered a more comprehensive approach to campaigning. The parties now have to place importance on campaigning in all electorates, as their voter support is no longer based simply on the popularity of a local candidate in a particular area but also on the perception of the party as a whole.
Evidence of Increased Levels of Democracy