*

3. The Role Of Anthropology.

 Thanks in part to the humanistic thrust of Schleiermacher's Christology, contemporary Christology is now highly involved with various areas of anthropological studies; particularly the philosophical types of anthropology (eg. existentialism in the case of Bultmann). This 'study of humankind' is, like philosophy, a natural ally of modern Christology: Jesus Christ reveals what human beings can become, and anthropology provides the main categories for approaching Jesus Christ in his concrete humanity. Anthropology is thus an important element in the thinking of both Rahner and Balthasar, though they have very different conceptions of its essential contribution. For Rahner, philosophical anthropology provides the basic foundations for his transcendental Christology; hence he can say that "Christology is the beginning and the end of anthropology" (McB 477).

 Balthasar, on the other hand, has a notion of philosophical anthropology based on the enigmatic nature of language. Because philosophy is supposedly unable to account for the phenomenon of language, Balthasar concludes, rather too abruptly, that language is a gift of the gods. In any case, Balthasar's philosophical anthropology is clearly subservient to his more general theology of the Word. The most basic fact here is that the thing which most distinguishes human from animal is language; but language is a human reality only through participation in the divine Logos. For Balthasar the "fundamental anthropological reality is the fact of being called into existence of by a Thou" (O'Do 49). Hence the first step in understanding human being is to recognize the fact that 'I am addressed, therefore I am'. Being thus addressed, the human is also called upon to respond, such that the I and Thou encounter each other through communication. In Christ we find both Word and Response in unity; and on the Cross the Word becomes the Deed (ie. an act of utter self-giving, an act of ultimate love).

 The anthropologies of Bultmann, Rahner, and Balthasar approach Human Being from different directions, but are not mutually exclusive. In fact, if taken together, with the rough edges smoothed out, they present a well-rounded understanding of the human being as a creature of many levels and depths. Pannenberg is so struck by the ubiquitous influence of anthropology upon Christian thought, that he issued this warning to one and all: theologians "... must begin their reflection with a recognition of the fundamental importance of anthropology for all modern thought and for any present-day claim of universal validity for religious statements" (Anthro 16). We echo this sentiment and applaud the recognition that the universal nature and character of Christianity depends as much upon its view of humanity, as on its vision of deity

 Christology is the "theological interpretation of Jesus Christ, clarifying systematically who and what he is in himself" (O'C Int. Jesus xv). In other words, Christology is driven by ontological concerns. On the other hand, soteriology deals with the question: Who is Jesus Christ for me? It is "the doctrine of salvation; the systematic interpretation of Christ's saving work for human beings and the world" (O'C Int.Jesus xvi). So it is that one of the key problems in modern Christology is the proper place of the soteriological approach. Now a complete separation between Christology and soteriology is quite impossible, since the interest in salvation is what, in general, motivates the questions we ask about Jesus.

  The history of Christology itself shows this; where the major changes therein have "been determined by particular soteriological interests" (Pan 47). Indeed, the central notion of the tradition seems to be that "Christology is a function of a soteriology" (Tillich); but this notion is, at the very least, debatable. After all, every soteriological statement has implications for Christology and vice-versa; just as every functional Christology has an implicit ontological Christology, even when it deliberately avoids  "metaphysical" questions.

 Ever since Kant's deconstruction of metaphysics, theologians - careful to avoid too deep an involvement with the imaginary transcendent world - have tried to base their thinking upon more tangible realities (this is the essence of the quest for intelligibility). Schleiermacher built his Christology around the experience of salvation (Bultmann and Moltmann both follow a similar route). These Christologies focus less on Jesus himself than on his significance 'for us'. The result is that the latter determines the former. This method is both illogical and dangerous, for questions about Jesus himself (ie. his person and history) "must remain prior to all questions about his significance" (Pan 48).

  Now soteriology is a logical consequence of Christology because a reasonable faith in salvation first requires a solid foundation on which to build. This suggests the method proper to any adequate Christology; namely, it must begin with (and constantly return to) the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. But this is only "possible on the presupposition that a soteriological meaning is inherent in Jesus' history" (Pan 49). Thus meaning and fact are not separate and distinct moments, but are bound up together, such that the soteriological, ethical, and theological interpretations flow naturally from the Christ-event.

 Faith is based on the history of Jesus inasmuch as he shows himself to be the revelation of God, and as such has universal significance. [So for Pannenberg the meaning of universal history is contained, as in a nutshell, in the proleptic resurrection; that is, for him the truth about Jesus of Nazareth must be seen in the context of universal history wherein the Resurrection anticipates the end and goal of world history.] Christology is thus concerned to establish the truth of Christian confession by unpacking the intrinsic meaning of Jesus' life, work, and proclamation.  The radically different Christologies of Rahner and Balthasar converge upon this point, but draw forth different consequences.  For Rahner, it means that the whole of the Incarnation is itself salvific; and for Balthasar, it means that the universal significance of this particular life-history allows us to recognize Jesus Christ as "the Catholic" 'par excellence'.

 In the first century, the theme of salvation was heavily weighted with apocalyptic and eschatological elements. Even today, eschatology is a major ingredient in the thinking of Bultmann, Pannenberg, and Moltmann. For Moltmann, Christology is "no more than the beginning of eschatology"; and eschatology is "always the consummation of Christology" (Way xiv). Now it is certainly true, as Pannenberg suggests, that the early Jewish-Christians saw the resurrection as proof of the imminent end of the world, but they were perhaps led astray by the general apocalyptic zeal of those times. Pannenberg's (and Moltmann's) attempt to rehabilitate the central role of eschatology in Christology seems equally misled, and contrary to reason; but it is certainly in keeping with the widespread tendency to interpret Jesus within the boundaries of the Jewish thinking and spirit of first century Palestine. However, such a methodology is bound to misunderstand Jesus; chiefly by overemphasizing the gap between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith.

 Pannenberg especially has a curious view of salvation. For him, it is "obtained when the destiny of man becomes identical with his present existence, when man is united in his present with his past and his future" (193). This implies a 'wholeness of life', being the fulfillment of humanity's ultimate destiny, but which cannot be fully realized until the resurrection from the dead. Pannenberg's eschatological salvation thus depends entirely upon the revelational event of Christ's Resurrection. The trouble with Pannenberg is not so much that he lays too much stress on the Resurrection, but rather that his understanding of it depends entirely upon the idea that it embodies the 'end of history'.

 Now this view of the Resurrection is consistent with both the biblical view of Time, and his own revelational theology, and so we will carefully include this element in our synthesis; but not without adding that the Resurrection, precisely as historical event, has other meanings and implications. For example, it seems that the most powerful and immediate aspect of the Resurrection is not its proleptic character, nor its inauguration of the end of the world, nor even its vindication of Jesus' person and mission, but rather its most outstanding quality is that the Resurrection graphically demonstrates that love overcomes even death. Of course, our knowledge of, and faith in, the Resurrection event does not "prove" the reality of 'life-after-death' (except for the original eyewitnesses who met the Risen One face to face), but it does provide grounds for hope; not so much in immortality or eternal life as such, but rather in life itself as a whole.

 Pannenberg's christological method is to begin with the humanity of Jesus, and to go on from there. To begin Christology within the incarnational framework (as Barth and Balthasar do), one assumes at once two serious handicaps: by beginning at the end, one has already adopted an anti-historical position; and one cannot escape from encouraging a mythological tone. It is Pannenberg's view (and ours) that the ultimate criterion of any Christology must be the historical Jesus himself. After all, God is revealed in and through history; hence the Resurrection is both a real event, and a revelation which establishes the authenticity and authority of Jesus' words and deeds. Pannenberg's 'from ahead' method, and his concern to keep soteriology in its place, meant that he had relatively little to say about the Cross.

 Now this oversight was over-corrected by Moltmann, whose Christology focuses on the crucified Christ within the context of the whole history of human suffering. For Moltmann, the shift from hope in the future to a present concern with praxis and justice leads to a political theology of the Cross. Here the meaning of the crucified Christ is that God is now in solidarity with the godforsaken and oppressed womb. [But actually, God was in solidarity with such people long before the crucifixion; see Old Testament for details.] Moltmann's "Christology for pilgrims" is thus highly functional, such that Christology and christopraxis are inseparable.

  This 'Way of Christ' Christology is a deliberate step away from the paradigm of the modern world (ie. subjectivity, materialism, etc), and the "modern metaphysics of transcendental subjectivity" which results from it. His "metaphysics of community, process, and relation" directs our attention to Christ's bodily nature as the "existential point of intersection between history and nature in human beings" (Mol 'Way' xvi). In any case, my synthesis would place the Cross somewhere between these extremes.