Hegemony Cycles in the Antiquity?
Abstract:
According to the theory of "hegemony cycles" (which is
popular in modern political science) the European
history from 1500 CE can be described as a succession of
hegemonic powers. An important attribute of the
"hegemon" that it has an outstanding naval
capability compared to the other great powers.
Antique historians described some
great powers of their times as "thalassocracies"
therefore it can be asked whether there were
similar hegemony cycles in the European Antiquity.
It is impossible to make long-term naval capability
statistics about the ancient powers,
but with an other method (comparing the
colonization efforts of the great powers)
it is also possible to compare the various
Antique and Modern powers with their contemporaries.
With this method it can be shown that probably
there were hegemony cycles in the Antique
history of the Mediterranean region.
1. Introduction.
An early description of the theory of the
"hegemony cycles in the Modern European history"
can be found in the works of A. Toynbee (see [1]).
A more recent description is [2] by G. Modelski.
The supporters of this theory usually refer to
two data sets which can be interpreted as cyclical:
- the war casualties data set (see [3])
- the naval capability data set (see [4])
But these data sets are quite "noisy",
therefore this cyclical interpretion got ample
criticism, too. A recent example is [5]
which shows (with a certain method of statistical
analysis - other methods may give different results)
that the above data sets are
essentially random although with a special
distribution which is highly clustered.
Another problem of the above method is
the availability and reliability of the data,
before 1500 CE (and many times even in the
Modern Age) the sources are scarce and unreliable.
The great powers of the Modern Age usually built
great colonial empires, and the territorial
extents of the empires can be determined
rather reliably even in the Antiquity.
But the sheer extent of an empire is not a
good measure of it's value: colonizing a
rich commercial city on a caravan route is a
much more successful effort than colonizing
10.000 square miles of empty desert. In spite of
this difficulty it is worth to try this method
and compare the results with the achievements of
the "hegemony cycles" theory.
2. Colonization in the Modern Age by European powers.
Table 1 shows the colonization activity of the
European great powers in the Modern Age.
The following notes and explanations must
be taken into account:
- The "most active colonizing power" is not
the great power which has the greatest colonial
empire but the great power which is extending
it's colonial empire most significantly
in the given interval (without losing the newly
acquired territories quickly).
- The hegemon is that great power which haas an
overwhelming naval capability (more than 50%
share of the total), in a "not too short" part
of the given interval (see [4]).
- Categorizing the 20th century USA as
a "colonial power" seems to be injust, but if
only for the 20th century one defines "colonial power"
as a "great power which is able to garrison
significant parts of it's military forces in
foreign countries for a long time" then this
description is probably acceptable.
- The extensibility of this table into thee future
is questionable. The naval hegemony of the USA is
unchallenged even in the 21st century, but
modern military technology is probably obsoleted
the concept of "naval hegemony". Today the
most feared weapons (which are much sought
by "rising powers") are the long-range rockets with
nuclear warheads, the supremacy of the USA
in this field is gradually diminishing.
|----------------------------------------------|
| Table 1: |
| Colonization activity of the European great |
| powers in the Modern Age (1500 CE - 2000 CE).|
|----------------------------------------------|
| interval | most | hegemonic |
| | active | power |
| | colonizing | |
| | powers | |
|----------------------------------------------|
| 1500 - | Portugal, | Portugal |
| 1600 CE | Spain | |
|----------------------------------------------|
| 1600 - | Netherlands, | Netherlands |
| 1700 CE | England, | |
| | France, | |
| | Russia | |
|----------------------------------------------|
| 1700 - | Britain | Britain |
| 1800 CE | | |
|----------------------------------------------|
| 1800 - | Britain, | Britain |
| 1900 CE | France | |
|----------------------------------------------|
| 1900 - | USA, | USA |
| 2000 CE | Russia | |
|----------------------------------------------|
At first sight the comparison between
the 2nd and 3rd column is ambiguous.
But if one examines each century individually,
this ambiguity can be removed.
16th century: the Spaniards created a big empire
in Latin America, but that was practically an
"empty land" after the destruction of the
native American empires, the economic activity
started there only slowly.
The Portuguese empire which provided direct access
to the trade routes of the Indian Ocean was
certainly more valuable. Therefore the hegemon
is Portugal.
17th century: France and Russia are rather land
powers, not good candidates for the position of
the "greatest seapower". The British colonies in
North America were certainly less profitable
than the Dutch colonies on the "Spice Islands".
18th century: the most active colonizers were
France and Great Britain, but both suffered big losses
in this century. The British compensated their
losses in North America by successful empire
building in India and Australia, but France
lost almost every overseas territories in the
Seven Years War.
19th century: almost every European power built
(or expanded) a colonial empire in this time,
but the largest territories
(in Africa and in South-East Asia)
were acquired by the French and the British.
France is rather a land power therefore
the hegemon is Great Britain.
20th century: Russia is a land power.
It can be seen that the method is viable, it
is worth to try it in the European Antiquity.
According to the historians of that era,
"thalassocracy" was an important attribute of
the great powers of the Mediterranean region.
3. Colonization of the Mediterranean region in the Antiquity.
Table 2 shows the colonization activity of the
European and Middle Eastern great powers in the Antiquity.
In this case the limits of the intervals associated
with the rows of the table cannot be simply
aligned with the calendar centuries because the
phase and the length of the cycles (if they exist)
might be different from the cycles of the Modern Age.
The limits of the intervals in Table 2 were determined
by the "big changes" in the Mediterranean region when
old great powers disappeared. As an explanation
a column titled "transitional war" was added to this
table which describes the event marking the end
of the interval.
According to the theory of hegemony cycles
the events marking the transition from one hegemonic
rule to the other are "general wars" in the Modern Age.
The exact definition of "general war" is a debated
issue, see [8]. A typical definition is something
like this: a general war is a "long" war with "many"
participating great powers, where the exact meanings of
"long" and "many" are disputable. In case of the
Antiquity a better definition is the following: in a
"transitional war" at least one of it's participants loses
the great power status (it is better to use the
attribute "transitional" instead of the frequently used
but ambiguous "general").
Another problem with the concept of "general war" is
that the usual notion of "war" is based on the examples
of Modern Age European wars where the armies
were supported by great powers and the rulers
commanded them according to some long-term strategic
concepts. But there is another type of warfare
(probably much more ancient than the "normal war")
when there are large territories without
any central authority and there are no armies
just armed groups roaming around, trying to find
a place to live (or just some means of survival for
the next day). Historians usually describe this type
of events as "times of troubles" but naming it as a
type of war probably would be more appropriate
(a "times of troubles" is usually far more destructive
than any "general war").
The following notes also must be taken into account:
- It is possible that the first "Euroopean thalassocracy"
was the Minoan one, but it is uncertain whether they
created any colonies outside Crete. The existence of
the Mycenaean colonies in Crete and on the
Western Anatolian coast is much more certain,
therefore the table begins with the Mycenaeans.
The Mycenaeans appeared on Crete about 1450 BCE,
it is very probable that the Mycenaean city-states
(or at least the alliences of them) were great
powers from 1500 BCE.
- The chronologies before 900 BCE (or 800 BCE) are rather
uncertain, the interval limits given in the first
three rows of the table might be 100 (or more)
years wide of the mark (see [6] and [7]).
- In the Antiquity the name "leading thalassocracy"
seems to be more appropriate than the "hegemon".
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| Table 2: |
| Colonization of the Mediterranean region in the |
| Antiquity (1500 BCE - 400 CE). |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| interval | most | leading | transitional |
| | active | thalassocracy | war |
| | colonizing | | |
| | powers | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1500 - | Mycenaean | alliances of | "times of |
| 1200 BCE | city-states, | Mycenaean | troubles" |
| | Hittites, | city-states | (wars of the |
| | Egypt | | Sea Peoples) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1200 - | probably no | none ? | wars of |
| 900 BCE |"colonization",| ("dark ages") | Assyrian |
| | only | | expansion ? |
| |"resettlement" | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 900 - | Phoenician | Phoenician | wars of |
| 550 BCE | city-states, | city-states | Persian |
| | Greek | | expansion |
| | city-states, | | |
| | Assyria | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 550 - | Persia, | Carthage | Punic and |
| 200 BCE | Macedonia, | | Macedonian |
| | Carthage | | wars of Rome |
| | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 200 BCE - | Roman Empire | Roman Empire | "times of |
| 400 CE | (expansion | | troubles" |
| | halted about | | (wars of the |
| | 100 CE) | | Germanic |
| | | | Peoples) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
A short analysis of every interval is necessary here, too,
because the colonization efforts of the concurrent
great powers must be compared and the "transitional wars"
also require some explanation.
1500 - 1200 BCE:
The great powers of the Eastern Mediterranean region
were the Mycenaeans, the Hittites and the Egyptians
in this time. The Hittites and Egyptians conquered
large areas in Anatolia and in the Levant.
These conquests were made by overland expeditions,
it seems that they didn't try overseas colonization.
The Mycenaean colonization affected only smaller areas
in Crete and on the Western Anatolian coast,
but this was an overseas expansion which certainly
involved a great fleet. The Egyptians also had a
good navy as the successful battles against the
Sea Peoples showed, but the Mycenaeans were
much more dependent on their fleet in order to maintain
their trade and colonial connections, therefore
it is probable that they were the leading
thalassocracy of that era.
1200 - 900 BCE:
At the beginning of this era the great powers of the
Eastern Mediterranean region collapsed (the Mycenaean
and Hittite kingdoms about 1200 BCE, the Egyptian
New Kingdom approximately 100 years later).
These changes are associated with the appearance
of the "Sea Peoples". The ethnicity of these peoples
is a debated issue but it is probable that
many of them were displaced Mycenaeans (see [9]).
They were not just armies but whole "nations"
trying to find a new place to live. They settled
on many places on the Anatolian and Levantine
coastline and in Cyprus. Obviously this was not
"colonization" but the resettlement of these
people. It is probable that long distance trading
was significantly reduced in the region during
this time and there is no evidence of any
great naval power.
900 - 550 BCE:
The leading land power of this era was Assyria.
But the Assyrian expansion was quite slow,
the conquests started under the rule of Ashurnasirpal II
(883 - 859 BCE) and it took them 200 years to reach
Egypt. This is why the question mark was added in
the table to the "wars of Assyrian expansion".
In this time the Phoenician cities flourished,
but the Greek city-states progressed a lot, too.
They were all very active colonizers, founding
many colonies in the Mediterranean region.
The Phoenicians even created some colonies on
the Atlantic coast of modern Morocco and Spain.
According to some Antique sources, certain Phoenician
colonies were created in the 11th century BCE,
but the archeological finds doesn't support this
(see [10]). Archeology shows that the Greek and
Phoenician colonization went in parallel in the
8th - 6th centuries BCE. But the purposes and
the methods were different:
- the Phoenicians wanted to create reliablee trading
posts for their long distance trade, they
controlled and taxed their colonies
- the Greeks wanted new territories for thee
increasing population and extend their influence,
the colonies were expected to have a friendly
relationship with their founding cities, but
were not taxed or other way controlled by the
"mother cities"
The Phoenician method was more successful from a
strictly economic viewpoint, therefore they were
the leading thalassocracy of that time.
550 BCE - 200 BCE:
This interval starts with the quick expansion
of the Achaemenid empire. The Persians conquered
almost the whole Eastern Mediterranean region from
Lydia to Egypt in less than 25 years (546 BCE - 525 BCE),
including Phoenicia. The exception were the Greeks
who successfully defended themselves in the
Greco-Persian wars. These wars can be considered as a
"general war" because in 480 BCE the Persians agreed
with the Carthaginians to attack simultaneously
(in Greece and in Sicily).
Later both great powers were weakened by
civil wars (the Greeks in the Peloponnesian and the
Corinthian wars, the most famous Persian civil war
was the one in which Cyrus the Younger fought against
Artaxerxes II with the help of a Greek army).
Alexander the Great united the Greeks (by
cruelly crushing his opponents) and overrun the
territories of the Achaemenid empire even more
quickly than the Persians 200 years before.
His empire disintegrated after his death but
most of it's parts were ruled by Greek dynasties
until the Romans came.
All these spectacular conquests were achieved
by overland offensives. Big navies were used in
the Greco-Persian wars, but neither the Greeks
nor the Persians used their naval power for
significant overseas colonization in this era.
A much less spectacular, but equally important
event was the Carthaginian expansion in the
Western Mediterranean region. When the original
Phoenician mother cities fell, Carthage seized
the control of the western Phoenician colonies,
in many cases by force. They employed even
stricter control on the colonies than the
Phoenicians (the leaders of the colonies were
appointed by Carthage). They expanded the colonial
territories somewhat (mostly on the Iberian
peninsula and around Carthage) but this expansion
involved much smaller territories than the
large empire-building conquests in the east.
In spite of it (or because of it - they did not
over-extended themselves) they were economically
very successful. Therefore the leading thalassocracy
of this era were probably Carthage.
One may argue that the Carthaginians and the
Greeks fought a long series of wars (the
Sicilian wars) and these wars yielded rather a
stalemate than a Carthaginian supremacy.
But the decisive battles in these wars were
land battles, ie. the inconclusive results of
these wars doesn't exclude that the Carthaginians
had a better fleet.
200 BCE - 400 CE:
After a long development and expansion in Italy
Rome appeared in the area as a new great power
about 300 BCE. Their expansion was opposed by
the established great powers (the Greeks and the
Carthaginians), this resulted in two series
of wars, the Punic and Macedonian wars.
The decisive ones (in which Carthage and
Macedonia lost the "great power" status) were
the Second Punic War (218 - 202 BCE) and the
Second Macedonian War (200 - 196 BCE).
From 200 BCE to 100 CE the Romans had conquered
the whole Mediterranean basin and became the unrivaled
rulers of the area (including thalassocracy).
But after the wars of Emperor Trajan (98 - 117 CE)
the empire "ossified" (probably because with the
technologies of that era it was not possible
to control a larger area effectively).
It was not able to expand further and defending
the borders became more and more difficult.
The "ossified empire" survived the next 300 years,
but disintegrated when a "times of troubles" came.
It is debatable whether Trajan's wars in the
East were a "transitional war" or not. His
victories fatally weakened the Parthian empire,
but about a hundred years later practically the same
empire under the rule of the Sassanids
became a great power again.
4. Transitional wars in the Modern Age.
Because the interval limits in the Table 2
were determined by the "big changes" when
old great powers disappeared it is interesting to
test the same method in the Modern Age.
Usually it is assumed that the roster of the
"great powers" in Europe did not changed much
in the last 300 ... 400 years.
But this assumption is false: now the US navy dwarfs
any other navy and in the "cold war" times the
Russian army dwarfed any other European army.
Therefore the other European powers are not
great powers now. An important ability of
a "great power" is that it can defend it's
"core territory" against any other power.
Sometimes it is not obvious what is really
the "core territory" but in most cases the
territorial changes are good indicators of
the strengths of the states.
The great powers listed in the Table 1 are
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands,
France, Great Britain, Russia, USA.
Critical defeats and territorial losses (or gains)
of these countries were the followings:
Spain: it lost the Netherlands officially
by the Peace of Westphalia (1648),
practically some decades earlier.
The Netherlands are not close to Madrid,
but it was the richest province of the empire,
the loss of it was a fatal blow.
According to traditional historiography,
the "great power" status of Spain ended with
the battle of Rocroi (1643).
Portugal: Spain and Portugal were united by
a personal union between 1580 and 1640.
The Eighty Years War (1568-1648) was fought with the
Dutch in this time and the Dutch East India Company
successfully repressed the Portuguese traders
in the Indonesian archipelago. When it
became independent again it had not enough
power to regain it's previous positions ie.
it was not a great power any more.
The Netherlands: It became a great power in the
beginning of the 17th century (getting independent,
creating a colonial empire around the Indian Ocean).
It's core territory was overrun
by enemy forces in 1795 and 1940 and it lost
Belgium in 1830. It was certainly not a great
power after the Napoleonic wars, but traditional
historiography puts the start of it's decay
to a much earlier time. When the Dutch helped
William III of Orange to the English throne
in 1688 the resulting common rule of the two
countries proved to be a failure for the
Netherlands (the Dutch navy was limited to
60% of the strength of the British, it
had to bear disproportionately high expenses
during the War of the Grand Alliance and the
War of the Spanish Succession etc.).
France: it suffered catastrophic defeats in
1815, 1871 and 1940, not a great power
after the Napoleonic Wars.
Great Britain: it lost Ireland in 1921 and
India in 1947, probably not a great
power after the World War II.
Russia: it lost Ukraine in 1991.
This was certainly the loss of a part of the
"core territory" but it would be a bit
early to say that Russia is not a great
power any more. It is a quite recent
development and Ukraine is still a member of the
"Commonwealth of Independent States" which is
dominated by Russia. According to most
historians Russia was not a great power
at beginning of the Modern Age,
it became one only after the battle
of Poltava (1709). From the viewpoint of
territorial extent it is an acceptable
opinion, the Russian control of Kiev
was guaranteed by the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667),
the conquest of the northern part of
Siberia was finished about the same time and
Ingermanland was conquered in the
Great Northern War (1700-1721) which
was important for getting access to the Baltic trade.
USA: the territorial expansion indicates that
it became a great power at the end of the
19th century (purchasing Alaska in 1867,
obtaining strategically important islands
from Spain after the Spanish - American War in 1898).
But it became the "superpower" with
permanent military presence in Europe (and in many
other places of the world) only after the World War II.
It can be seen that in most cases the analysis
of the territorial changes gives acceptable results
from the viewpoint of the traditional
historiography, too (there is only one
exception, the case of the Netherlands).
Using the above results the following wars
can be identified as transitional wars in
the Modern Age:
- Thirty Years War (1618-1648, Spain and
Portugal losing the great power status, the
Netherlands becoming a great power)
- Great Northern War (1700-1721, Russia
becoming a great power)
- French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
(1792-1815, France losing the great power status)
- World War I and II (1914-1945, Great Brittain
losing the great power status, the USA is becoming
the strongest great power)
This list is similar to the lists of "general wars"
usually presented in the descriptions of the
hegemony cycle theory, with one exception:
instead of the the War of the Spanish Succession
(1701-1714) the Great Northern War is listed here but
these wars were fought parallelly and some
powers (Prussia, Hannover) participated in both,
hence this difference is not important.
The Great Northern War seems to be exceptional
in an other way, too: it is not marking the fall of a
great power. But Sweden was a "rising power" during
the 17th century, it conquered large areas around
the Baltic Sea and even acquired some overseas
colonies (including New Sweden in North America).
The war fought between the two rising powers decided
which will be a great power and which will not.
5. Conclusion.
At first sight Table 2 shows that there were
hegemony cycles in the Antique history of the
Mediterranean region, the length of the cycles
were 300 ... 350 years. The 600 years long
Roman thalassocracy can be explained as not
one but two cycles (in the Modern Age the
British had two cycles, too). But one must
take into account that before 800 BCE the
chronological data is highly uncertain and
even the factual data is quite imperfect (see eg.
the endless debate on the "historicity of the
Trojan war"). A more realistic conclusion
could be the following: "considering the
available data it cannot be excluded that
there were 300 ... 350 years long hegemony cycles
in the Antiquity of the Mediterranean region".
6. References.
[1] Toynbee,A.J.: A Study of History.
(Oxford University Press, 1934, 1961)
Abridgement of "A Study of History"
by D.C.Somervell.
(Oxford University Press, 1946, 1987)
[2] Modelski,G.: Long Cycles in World Politics.
(University of Washington Press, 1987)
[3] Levy,J.S.: War in the Modern Great power system, 1495-1975.
(The University Press of Kentucky, 1983)
[4] Modelski,G. - Thompson,W.:
Seapower and Global Politics, 1494-1993.
(University of Washington Press, 1988)
[5] Silverberg,G.: When is a Wave a Wave?
Long Waves as Empirical and Theoretical
Constructs from a Complex Systems Perspective.
(No 14, Research Memoranda from Maastricht : MERIT,
Maastricht Economic Research Institute on
Innovation and Technology, 2005)
[6] Mellart,J.: Egyptian and Near Eastern chronology, a dilemma?
(Antiquity, Vol. 53, pp. 6-20, 1979)
[7] Warren,P. - Hankey,V.: Aegean Bronze Age Chronology.
(Bristol Classical Press, 1989)
[8] Melko,M.: General War among Great Powers in World History.
(Edwin Mellen Press, 2001)
[9] Chadwick,J.: The Mycenaean World.
(Cambridge University Press, 1976)
[10] Moscati,S.(ed.): The Phoenicians.
(Abbeville Press, 1989)
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Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Mr. Csaba KECSKES, Budapest, Hungary