EXTRAPOLATING THE TRENDS OF THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT PATTERNS OF WORLD HISTORY
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Abstract:
The possibility of the very protracted existence of
civilizations is examined and in the case of the largest ones
(European, Middle Eastern, East Asian, South Asian, Sub-
Saharan African, Central Asian) it is found to be probable.
The long-term evolutionary stages of these civilizations are
listed, in the case of the European civilization the usual
historical periodization (Neolithic, Antiquity, Medium Age,
Modern Age) is acceptable, but in the case of the others a
different periodization (Neolithic, Antiquity, Age of
Expansion) seems to be more satisfactory. A "halving rule of
the ages" is found (the duration of an age is half of the
duration of the previous one). The theory of the "periodical
(European) world wars" is examined, recent results are
surveyed. The lifetimes of the great empires (without and
with successor states) are determined, extrapolations are
made for the "modern empires". The large conflict zones
(shatterbelts: East-central Europe, Middle East, East Asia,
South-east Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle
America) are surveyed, the hypothesis of the "periodical
crisis sequences" is examined.
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1. Introduction
Traditional historiography usually amasses long descriptions
of numerous events. Historians typically add some
explanations to their descriptions (stating that some events
were more important than others, establishing causal
relationships etc.) but these explanations tend to be too
particular. Since a long time exists a demand for a more
"systematic" historiography. Among the numerous experiments
probably the most significant is the description using
"civilizations". This method appeared in the 19th century
(e.g. in the works of N. Danilevsky), but the most
significant books based on this idea were published in the
first half of the 20th century. Probably the best known
example is the work of A. Toynbee [1]. A typical problem
with this "civilizationist" descriptions is the assumption
that civilizations are "born", "living" and "dying" like
humans and this is happening in a historically not too long
time. This assumption contradicts with a very common feature
of the traditional descriptions of national histories: they
frequently claim that the "core" of the nation exists
continuously since prehistoric times (one could mention here
many examples from Ireland to Japan). In spite of the many
successes of the 19th and 20th century archaeology it is
very difficult to determine the truth about prehistory, but
it seems probable that such statements are not quite
unfounded (at least if we interpret the notion of "core" not
as a "sovereign state" but as a "culturally identifiable
ethnic group"). Recently D. Wilkinson created a
civilizational theory which describes civilizations as
continuous entities from prehistoric to modern times (see
[2]). Unfortunately, his theory has an other difficulty: he
assumes that political and military contacts between
civilizations inevitably cause the "merging" of the
contacting civilizations i.e. now exists only one "Central
Civilization". This again contradicts with the common
experience: if (for example) Germans and Italians can live
next to each other for thousands of years without merging
into a single nation then why should civilizations merge?
In order to avoid these problems one should identify (at
least) the "major civilizations" which can be traced back
to prehistoric times. "Civilizations" are usually defined as
"cultures with complex social structures (states with
significantly specialised labour-division schemes)". "Major
civilizations" can be those civilizations which produced
"great powers" (in the usual politico-military sense) during
their histories. But in prehistoric times "civilizations"
did not exist, therefore we should examine the "cultures".
Interpreting the notion of "culture" as the archaeologists
do would lead to a hopeless confusion (there are thousands of
archaeologically identified cultures). But the common meaning
of "culture" (which doesn't contradict with the
"archaeological meaning") can be covered with a rather simple
definition: "culture is what people have in common (but not
with everybody)". In this case we can say that the major
cultures are the major human races because biological
features are the most basic "commons" what people may have.
In order to avoid misunderstandings the followings should be
noted:
- The author doesn't think that certain races are more
valuable than others.
- The author doesn't think that "culture" is biologically
determined. But culture is the result of common efforts: we
learn it from each other, we practice it (usually) by
acting together etc. Any common efforts are strongly
facilitated by the feeling that we belong to the same group
and common biological features are obvious sources of such
a feeling.
The major human races (i.e. those which occupy large
territories and have large populations) are the followings:
African, East Asian, European, Middle Eastern, South Asian.
Anthropologists usually consider the "European" and the
"Middle Eastern" as a single race but because of the very
significant cultural differences here we must separate them.
This classification is a good start: all of the mentioned
groups have produced "great powers" during their histories.
But if it is compared to the lists of civilizations produced
by the "classical" civilizationists then it seems to be
rather crude. In order to refine it (to identify more closely
the social groups which produce "great powers") one must
examine each racial group separately.
2. Listing the (sub)civilizations
It is better to begin with the European civilization because
European history is probably the best documented (and
certainly the most detailedly analysed) case of
historiography. European civilization is a highly mobile
phenomenon: the distance between the oldest (Antique Greece)
and newest (20th century USA) great powers is more than 8000
kms. Therefore the European subcivilizations are usually
differentiated on the basis of religion: Catholic, Orthodox,
Protestant. This grouping covers only the Modern Age (in the
strict sense there were no Protestants before Luther
published his theses) but if one draws the division lines
between these groups on the map of Europe then it is visible
that this religious division has a geographic meaning, too:
South-western and Central Europe is Catholic, South-eastern
and Eastern Europe is Orthodox, Northern and North-western
Europe is Protestant. This geographic divisioning can be
extended to the areas conquered (and populated) by Europeans
in the Modern Age: Latin America can be considered as the
extension of South-western Europe, North America as the
extension of North-western Europe, Siberia as the extension
of Eastern Europe. What is more important, this divisioning
can be extended in time, too. The border between the Eastern
and Western Roman Empire was officially drawn only in 395,
but significant cultural differences existed between the
Eastern and Western Mediterranean regions many hundred years
before it, too. The peoples of Northern Europe were also
prominent in the Antiquity, Celts and Germans many times
played an important role in the history of that age. In their
best days they certainly can be considered (at least) as
"strong regional powers" (e.g. when the Germans destroyed the
legions of Varus in the Teutoburger forest), but what is
even more important, they were able to maintain their
independence in spite of the Roman colonisation efforts. In
the Early Medium Age this threefold divisioning is not very
obvious but if one looks at the map of Europe in 800 CE (in
[3]) then it is visible that the "large" cities (over 15000
inhabitants) in the territories ruled by Christians form
three major groups: one in North-western Europe (in the
Paris-Cologne region), one in Italy (Milan, Rome etc.) and
one in the Byzantine Empire (from Cherson to Syracuse, with
Constantinople as the largest city of Europe). This indicates
that the major urban cultures followed this threefold
geographic divisioning even in that rather troublesome age of
European history.
The other major civilizations are much less mobile therefore
a similar geographic divisioning is less problematic. In the
Middle East great powers usually emerge in the following
regions: Egypt, Mesopotamia, Iran, Anatolia (these names here
must be interpreted as strictly geographical terms, such
terms as "northern Nile valley" or "Iranian plateau" would be
more precise but rather awkward). These areas also show
remarkable ethnic continuity (except Anatolia), roughly the
same ethnic groups inhabit them since the early Antiquity,
therefore we can hope that their histories will show some
repetitive patterns. In East Asia the significant geographic
regions are the followings: China, Japan, Central Asia (the
Mongolia-Kazakhstan region), South-east Asia (the Burma-Java-
Philippines triangle). The latter is an ethnically (and
historically) quite diverse region, probably should be
divided into smaller parts, but real great powers never
emerged in that region, only (stronger or weaker) regional
powers, therefore from our viewpoint such a finer division is
not necessary.
The nomad culture of the Central Asian peoples differs very
significantly from the urban cultures prevailing in the other
parts of Asia, therefore it is better to discuss the "Central
Asian" as an entirely separate civilization. It must be noted
here that not all the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppe
region can be considered as part of the Central Asian
civilization. The "original" (Neolithic) racial composition
of these peoples was quite varied: there were European nomads
in Southern Russia (the name "Russia" is meant here as a
geographic term which includes Eastern Europe and Western
Siberia), there were Middle Eastern (pre-Turkic) nomads in
the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan region and Asian nomads existed
probably to the east of the Altai mountains only. But there
was a general tendency among these peoples to wander
(typically westward) into the territories of sedentary
cultures where (if they were able to conquer the attacked
state) they settled as a new "ruling class". Such settlings
occurred only when the nomad tribes reached a certain level
of social development (early nomads never settled down),
different groups of nomads reached this level of development
at different times, Indo-Europeans earlier, Asians later (see
[10], [18]). Therefore by that time when the really great
nomadic empires were formed the Asian nomads became
predominant.
In India the truly Indian great powers usually united
(almost) the whole subcontinent therefore a geographic
subdivision is not necessary. In Sub-Saharan Africa the
vastness of the continent and the ethnic diversity of the
population certainly justifies some subdivision, but no
great powers emerged there and the historical data about the
significant states (regional powers) of Black Africa is
rather unsure, therefore we may omit the subdivision of
Africa, too. It must be noted here that some
civilizationists simply ignore the African civilization
(probably because of the scarcity and uncertainty of the
historical and archaeological data).
After all these considerations, the list of the major
civilizations and their sub-civilizations is the following:
- European (Catholic / Orthodox / Protestant or Southern /
Eastern / Western in geographic terms)
- Middle Eastern (Egyptian / Mesopotamian / Iranian /
Anatolian)
- Central Asian
- East Asian (Chinese / Japanese / South-eastern)
- Indian (South Asian)
- Black African (Sub-Saharan)
The (native) American civilizations are not listed here
because they never created "great powers" on the global
level (with a 3000 years "technology lag" it is not
possible) and they might be extinct now.
All the other civilizations still exist, but
the Central Asian one probably will be extinct in a
"historically not too long" time. But in Outer Mongolia
exists an independent Mongolian state even today (although
it's independence is due to the Russian - Chinese rivalry,
not to it's own strength) and many subjects of it still live
as nomads.
Now it is possible to analyse the individual histories of
each civilization. But instead of going into the innumerable
details (which would certainly lead to nowhere), we should
concentrate on the "most important" events. Such "most
important" events could be the followings:
- events / processes closely related to the existence of
the civilization
- events / processes closely related to the existence of
the great powers of the civilization
- events / processes closely related to the (relative)
status of the great powers of the civilization
This list may seem subjective, but the followings should be
noted:
- This method is consistent with the traditional method of
historiography. Conventional "world histories" are
practically histories of the great powers, and historians
usually comment on the importance of the various events
(and the most decisive "commenting" happens before the
writing: firstly they decide what is important enough to
write it down).
- If we find some repeating patterns / events (without
ignoring many details it would be impossible - history
never repeats itself exactly) then we may extrapolate these
patterns into the future. If the predicted events really
occur (we or our descendants certainly will see it) then it
will be a strong indication of the theory's correctness.
Historians and social scientists usually refrain from
predictions, knowing the extreme complexity of their
subject. But this refraining doesn't mean that repeating
patterns don't exist. Great individuals certainly have
their roles in history but without supporting masses they
would get nowhere and if there are masses then there are
statistical laws.
3. Long-term processes
Firstly we should examine the major "turning points" in the
histories of the civilizations. Here again the best start is
the European civilization. In the traditional historiography
European history is divided into three major ages: Antiquity,
Medium Age, Modern Age. The Neolithic can be added as the
first age. Neolithic societies also were based on surplus-
producing economies, many important innovations appeared in
that age (bronze and iron working, utilisation of animals for
traction and riding, simple methods of long-distance
navigation etc.) and also many important features of the
Antique societies appeared in primitive forms (social
stratification, cities, long-distance trade etc.). It is
generally agreed that the Medium Age ends with Columbus
(reaching America in 1492) or with Luther (publishing his
theses in 1517), i.e. the approximate starting date of the
Modern Age is 1500 CE. The starting date of the Medium Age is
usually assumed to be 476 CE (deposition of Romulus
Augustulus by Odoacer) but other dates also can be suggested
(Christianity becoming the state religion of the Roman Empire
in 391, partitioning of the Roman Empire to Eastern and
Western Empires in 395, or the final fall of the Ostrogothic
kingdom in 553). Therefore the approximate starting date of
the Medium Age can be 500 CE.
There is no generally agreed date for the beginning of the
Antiquity but it is reasonable to assume that it started
with the appearance of the first major urban cultures in the
Balkan peninsula, i.e. with the Minoans or with the
Mycenaeans. The origin of the Minoans is unknown, it is
frequently assumed that they came from the Middle East (from
Anatolia? from Syria?) but it is also possible that the
Minoan culture was the result of the original Neolithic
population's internal development (see [4]). The origin of
the Mycenaeans is much more certain: since the deciphering of
their writing (the Linear B) by M. Ventris (see [5]) we know
that they were early Greeks (i.e. Indo-Europeans). But the
Linear B tablets contain only routine administrative notes,
the dated information about their large-scale activities is
purely archaeological. They were quite rich already in the
16th century BCE (shaft graves used between 1600-1500 BCE)
but their palaces were built somewhat later (1450-1350 BCE).
1500 BCE seems to be acceptable as an "average starting date"
of the Mycenaean civilization. It is an interesting
parallelism with the Modern Age that even such early European
states had an intention to colonise. They occupied Crete
about 1450 BCE (the Minoan civilization was severely weakened
by the eruption of the Theran volcano about 1500 BCE), and
their first colonies on the western coast of Anatolia
(Miletus, Colophon etc.) appeared approximately in the same
time (it is possible that Minoan trading posts - or even
small colonies - existed on the Anatolian coast before the
arrival of the Mycenaeans).
The earliest Neolithic settlements in South-eastern Europe
appeared about 6500 BCE, but those early farmers probably
were not Europeans but Middle Eastern migrants from Anatolia.
There is a theory which claims that the whole Neolithic
population of Europe descended from such Middle Eastern
migrants (see [6]), but this is a strong claim which got many
criticism. It is more probable that those migrants appeared
only in certain areas of Europe (Balkan peninsula, large
river valleys) but most of the Neolithic farmers of Europe
were descendants of the previous Mesolithic population (see
[7]). An other difficult problem is the origin of the Indo-
Europeans which has great importance because all the "great
nations" of Europe are of Indo-European origin. It is again
a much debated issue (see [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). If we
accept that the original homeland of the Indo-Europeans was
in Southern Russia then the starting date of the "Indo-
European Neolithic" is approximately 5500 BCE. In this case
we can make an interesting observation: if the starting
dates of the "large historical ages" are listed (5500 BCE,
1500 BCE, 500 CE, 1500 CE) then it is visible that the
durations of the ages are halving and the beginning of a "new
age" can be expected in 2000 CE (certainly not exactly in
this year but very probably before 2050 CE). It must be noted
that the validity of this "halving rule" doesn't depend
really on the assumption of the "Indo-European primacy"
(after all, Indo-Europeans became Europeans only in Europe,
when they migrated to the regions of other civilizations
there they integrated into those other civilizations). If we
assume that the Medium Age began in 400 CE (this is also a
reasonable date, the Western Roman Empire was quite in the
decline at that time, Britannia and most of Gaul were lost
before 410, Rome was sacked by the Visigoths in 410 etc.) and
extrapolate backward then we get the following dates:
beginning of the Antiquity about 1800 BCE (also a reasonable
date: the first Minoan palaces were built about 1900 BCE),
beginning of the European Neolithic about 6200 BCE (not
too far from the generally accepted 6500 BCE). In this case
the starting point of the "new age" is 2050 CE (a more
realistic date than the year 2000 CE).
The Antiquity and the Modern Age can be paralleled in many
ways, probably the most important parallelisms are the
following:
- European states were very active participants of the
"world economy", mass production and long-distance trading
were typical
- the European great powers made big colonisation efforts,
in the second half of each age large colonial empires were
created (Roman Empire, British Empire etc.)
- near to the end of each age the European great powers
became militarily (and economically) weaker while the
"third world" powers became relatively stronger (the
defeats of the "superpowers" in Vietnam and Afghanistan are
very ominous signs)
In order to avoid misunderstandings the following must be
noted: the "clash of the civilizations" is a popular theory
now (see [12]), and it is possible to describe the end of the
Antiquity as such a clash. But such a description is
misleading: the decline of the (Antique or Modern) great
powers is caused mostly by internal problems and the
"barbarian invasions" (which are the effects of the well
advanced decline) only deliver the final blow to the
hopelessly weakened state or empire.
At least from the viewpoint of economy the Neolithic and the
Medium Age also can be paralleled: in both ages the economic
self-sufficiency of small regions was typical and long-
distance trade was a rarity. One may say that the volume of
the long-distance trade between Europe and the other parts of
the world was increasing during the Medium Age. This is
probably true but it doesn't contradict with the decline
between the Late Antiquity and the Early Medium Age. If we
compare the tables of large cities in [3] then we can see
that in 361 CE there were four cities in Europe with more
than 50000 inhabitants (their total population was 570000)
but in 622 CE there was only one city in Europe with more
than 50000 inhabitants (Constantinople with 350000
inhabitants). This indicates a serious decline because the
persons involved in mass production and long-distance trade
are usually city-dwellers. Therefore we may infer that the
coming "new age" of the European civilization will be
somewhat similar to the Medium Age (i.e. it can be named as
"New Medium Age"). It is a surprising prediction: the
"globalization of the world" is a seemingly unstoppable
process now but the discussion above indicates that the next
250 years will be the age of "localization" (at least in the
areas belonging to the European civilization). But the
serious problems caused by the current globalization process
are well visible even today (see e.g. [13]) and it is quite
possible that those problems will become fatal within some
decades.
There is an other argument which is rather hypothetical but
also indicates the necessity of this "New Medium Age". One of
the greatest achievements of the medieval Europeans is the
Medieval Technical Revolution which provided (among other
things) the tools necessary for world-wide colonisation
(ocean-worthy ships, advanced navigational techniques etc.).
If there will be another colonising age (from 2300 CE?) then
the most important targets of colonisation will be celestial
bodies (the Moon, asteroids etc.). This assumption is
hypothetical but not unrealistic (Man landed on the Moon
thirty years ago!). It is a common belief that we cannot go
to the celestial bodies now because our space transportation
technologies are too expensive. There is some truth in it,
but the real problem is not this. The real problem occurs
when the astronauts arrive to somewhere: they cannot do
anything there except quickly returning home before their
reserves are running out. This is a straight consequence of
our modern industrial technologies: everything is produced in
large quantities, in large factories containing many highly
specialised machines, utilising the best raw materials (no
matter if those must be delivered from thousands of
kilometres). On a celestial body one cannot have such an
enormous equipment and the only available raw materials are
just "ordinary stones". A radical change in our terrestrial
technologies is necessary in order to produce industrial
quality products in small quantities with (relatively) small
equipment from low quality raw materials. In the modern
globalized world economy such a change is impossible, but in
a "localized" world where industrially advanced groups may
find themselves isolated in an adverse environment (desert,
tundra etc.) in a not too large territory then there will be
a very strong incentive to develop such technologies (not
only for industrial but for agricultural production, too).
Historians sometimes use the terms "Antiquity" and "Medium
Age" in case of the non-European civilizations, too, but
there are no such generally agreed delimiting dates like in
the European case. The beginning of the Neolithic is well
defined: appearance of the first farmers / herders, although
in practice it is difficult to find the remnants of the
"firsts" and the cultural (ethnic?) classification of the
finds also can be difficult (there were migrations in the
Neolithic, too). It is generally agreed that the Antiquity
begins with the appearance of relatively large states. In
case of the Middle Eastern civilization the Neolithic began
about 9500 BCE (first herders in northern Iraq, see [14]),
but according to [15], if the function of some Epi-
Paleolithic tools is interpreted properly then there was
agriculture in the Middle East before 10000 BCE. In Egypt the
first large state was the Old Kingdom which was formed about
2800 BCE. The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt happened a
bit earlier but because of the general uncertainties in the
Middle Eastern chronologies (see [16]) it is better to accept
this date. In Mesopotamia the first certainly existing large
state was the Akkadian Empire which was created about 2300
BCE. In earlier times Sumerian city-states sometimes
conquered other cities and created small empires, but the
extent of these empires is very unsure, therefore it is
better to consider the Akkadian empire as the first. As an
"average" date for the beginning of the Antiquity in the
Middle East, 2600 BCE seems to be acceptable.
In the history of the Middle East there is only one more
event which is generally accepted as a major turning point:
the appearance of the Islam. The "Hegira" happened in 622 CE,
but the real force of the new faith manifested itself during
the rule of the "elected Caliphs" (632-661) and the Omayyads
(661-750) when the Arabic armies conquered almost the whole
Middle East and some European territories, too. Therefore the
"third Middle Eastern age" began approximately in 700 CE. To
call it "Medium Age" would be quite misleading. City life
and long-distance trade flourished under the Arabic (and
other Islamic) Empires, and what is even more important, it
can be said that the Arabs were the first real Middle Eastern
colonisers. All the previous Middle Eastern empires were
rather unifiers than colonisers because they didn't conquer
territories outside the Middle East. There are seeming
counter-examples, the most important ones are the following:
- Phoenicians. They founded colonies in the south-western
Mediterranean (including Sicily and Spain) during the 10th
- 6th centuries BCE, in parallel with the Greek
colonisation of some northern and central Mediterranean
regions. The original inhabitants of Phoenicia were a
Semitic people (Canaanites) but during the invasions of the
"Sea Peoples" (Europeans, probably Greeks) in the 12th
century BCE the region changed significantly. On the coast
of Palestine (next to Phoenicia) a large group of the Sea
Peoples settled down (the Philistines). It is very probable
that other "Sea People" groups were received into the
Phoenician cities where they mixed with the original
population. It is certain that advanced maritime
technologies appeared in Phoenicia after these invasions.
Therefore the Phoenician sub-civilization cannot be
considered as a purely Middle Eastern one, it had a
significant "European inheritance", too.
- Persians (the Achaemenid empire, 553-330 BCE). They
conquered almost the whole Middle East, but they didn't
conquer territories outside it and probably didn't want to.
The famous Greco-Persian wars can be interpreted as
punitive actions triggered by a revolt of the Greek cities
on the Anatolian coast. The Indus valley also belonged to
the Persian empire but it is questionable whether that
region is really an "ancient homeland" of the Indian
civilization (see below).
If we accept the above described periodization of the Middle
Eastern history (the third age could be named as the "Age of
Expansion") then the starting dates of the ages are the
following: 9500 BCE, 2600 BCE, 700 CE. We can see that the
duration of the Antiquity is roughly half of the Neolithic
therefore it is probable that we have a "halving rule" here,
too. In this case the end of the "Age of Expansion" can be
expected about 2350 CE. The prediction which follows from
this is that the history of the Middle East in the next three
centuries will be rather similar to the previous 1300 years:
sometimes a large empire is created, this empire makes some
colonisation efforts and after several centuries it
disintegrates.
The Indian subcontinent can be divided into three large
regions: the Indus valley, the Ganges valley and the southern
region. The development of these regions was rather
asynchronous, especially in the prehistory. Neolithic
villages appeared in the Indus valley very early (between
7000-6000 BCE) while in the other regions the Neolithic began
only after 5000 BCE. The domesticated plants and animals
(wheat, sheep etc.) used by the early farmers in the Indus
valley were of Middle Eastern origin. In the same region
appeared the first urban culture of the subcontinent, the
Harappan sub-civilization, which existed approximately from
2500 BCE to 1800 BCE. Before discovering the early Neolithic
villages of the Indus valley, archaeologists thought that the
Harappan sub-civilization was created by migrants from the
Middle East. Nowadays this sub-civilization is usually
considered as the result of the internal development of the
indigenous Neolithic population, but it is still possible
that the previous theory was correct. In some Neolithic
villages of the Indus valley a "destruction layer" was found
which can be dated about 2500 BCE, this could be the result
of an invasion (of the founders of the Harappan sub-
civilization).
In the ancient history of India there is only one more major
turning point: the creation of the Maurya empire (about 300
BCE) because this was the first really large state which
united almost the whole subcontinent. If we consider the
ancient Indus valley as an integral part of the Indian
civilization then we get the following starting dates of the
great historical ages: 7000 BCE, 2500 BCE, 300 BCE. Here we
can see again a "halving rule": the duration of the second
age is roughly the half of the first age. Using this rule we
can extrapolate the sequence of the starting points, the
following elements are: 800 CE, 1350 CE, ..., 1900 CE (end
point). This is very unconvincing: these dates are not
especially significant in the history of India and this
history certainly didn't end in 1900. But there is an other
possibility: the Indus valley may not belong to the Indian
civilization. If we want to draw now the dividing line
between the Middle Eastern and the Indian civilizations then
we should choose the India-Pakistan borderline. This border
is not a knew phenomenon: a similar border existed between
the Indus valley and the rest of the subcontinent many times
(during the existence of the Harappan sub-civilization, the
Achaemenid Empire, the Kushan Empire, the Abbasids, the
Ghaznevids etc.). If we ignore the Indus valley then we have
only two significant dates in the Indian history: 5000 BCE
(beginning of the Neolithic), 300 BCE (creation of the Maurya
empire). If we suppose that the general development of the
Indian civilization will be similar to the development of the
Middle Eastern civilization then we may expect the beginning
of the "Indian Age of Expansion" about 2050 CE. But this date
might be too early: if we assume that the Indo-Europeans
("Aryans") had the most significant role in the development
of the Indian civilization then we must put back the
beginning of the Neolithic to 5500 BCE, in this case the
"Indian Age of Expansion" will begin about 2300 CE.
In the case of the East Asian civilization the most important
country belonging to it is China. In China the Neolithic
began about 9500 BCE (see [17]). The first large Chinese
state was the Shang Empire which was founded about 1500 BCE
(the extent - in time and territory - of the previous Hsia
empire is very unsure). In the history of ancient China there
are no more similarly significant dates. Since the end of the
Shang empire just disintegration and integration phases
follow each other although rather unevenly. If we assume that
the East Asian civilization follows the long-term development
pattern of the Middle Eastern civilization then we may expect
the beginning of the "East Asian Age of Expansion" in 2500
CE. This is a rather far date but the starting dates used in
this calculation are not very certain and the previous
assumption also may prove false. But it is certain that China
was not a colonising force throughout it's history. Just two
examples:
- China never colonised Siberia (in spite of it's
closeness)
- when the expeditions organised by Cheng Ho (in the first
half of the 15th century CE) created the possibility of
China becoming the greatest naval and trading power of the
Indian Ocean then the Ming emperors refused this and
introduced a strict isolationist policy
Japan is seemingly a counter-example, at least it's very
active role in the 20th century may suggest this. But Japan
didn't intend to colonise territories belonging to the
European civilization, it's clashes with the European great
powers followed from the fact that those great powers had
colonised Asian territories (Manchuria, Philippines,
Singapore etc.).
In the case of the Black African civilization the earliest
Neolithic villages and the earliest states appeared in the
Nile valley, not too far from Egypt. But this is obviously a
product of the strong influence of the nearby Middle Eastern
civilization centre, not of an indigenous development. It is
better to examine West and South Africa. The earliest
neolithic (agricultural) sites in the southern part of West
Africa are dated about 4500 BCE, but pastoralism in the
western Sahara (much more humid in the Neolithic than now)
began earlier (about 6000 BCE, cattle domestication). The
earliest states in West and South Africa (Ghana, Zimbabwe?)
appeared about 600 CE. If we assume that the long-term
development of the African civilization follows the pattern
of the Middle Eastern civilization then the starting dates of
the "African Ages" are the followings: 6000 BCE, 600 CE, 3900
CE, i.e. an "African Age of Expansion" can be expected only
in the very far future.
In the case of the Central Asian nomad civilization the
Neolithic began with the domestication of the horse. This
happened about 5500 BCE in the southern steppe of Eastern
Europe, but it reached Mongolia at a much later time,
probably about 3000 BCE. As we have already seen, the Asian
nomads were the most important constituents of this
civilization (at least in historical times). The existence of
the first large Hsiung-nu state (tribal alliance?) was noted
by Chinese chroniclers about 200 BCE. The aggressivity of
these early nomad states didn't mean that they were
colonisers: they just wanted to collect tributes or sometimes
just wanted to enforce the continuation of an advantageous
trade. If a sedentary state met them with force then they
tried to crush it but when they succeeded they didn't take
over the administration of the area (see [18]). This method
was changed only when Genghis Khan created his great empire
(about 1200 CE) with a sedentary capital (Karakorum) and with
an administrative organisation. From this point the Mongols
were able to take over the government of sedentary states (or
creating their own sedentary states) but in this way they
lost their nomadic advantages and sooner or later their
dynasties (or even their states) disappeared. In this case
the starting dates of the great ages of this civilization are
the followings: 3000 BCE, 200 BCE, 1200 CE. In spite of the
significant differences between the Middle Eastern and the
Central Asian civilizations the names used in the case of the
Middle Eastern civilization (Neolithic, Antiquity, "Age of
Expansion") fit well in this case, too. The extrapolation of
this sequence yields 1900 CE as the next significant date.
The Central Asian nomads did nothing important at that time
(they were too few and too weak already) but exactly this
shows what is this last age: the "Age of Final Decline" which
will lead to their disappearance. The observed parallelism of
the Middle Eastern and the Central Asian civilizations might
suggest that the next great "Middle Eastern Age" will be an
"Age of Final Decline", too. But it is not certain: the
differences are also plentiful, the next great "Middle
Eastern Age" can be quite different (e.g. one may imagine a
true "Middle Eastern Medium Age").
The large historical ages of the great civilizations are
summarised in Table 1.
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Table 1 | 1st age | 2nd age | 3rd age | 4th age |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| European | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | Medium Age,| Modern Age,|
| civilizat- | from 5500 | from 1500 | from 500 CE| from 1500 |
| ion | BCE | BCE | (from 400 | CE |
| | (from 6200 | (from 1800 | CE?) | |
| | BCE?) | BCE?) | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Middle | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | Age of | |
| Eastern | from 9500 | from 2600 | Expansion | |
| civilizat- | BCE | BCE | from 700 CE| |
| ion | | | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Indian | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | | |
| civilizat- | from 5000 | from 300 | | |
| ion | BCE | BCE | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| East Asian | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | | |
| civilizat- | from 9500 | from 1500 | | |
| ion | BCE | BCE | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Black | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | | |
| African | from 6000 | from 600 | | |
| civilizat- | BCE | CE | | |
| ion | | | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Central | Neolithic, | Antiquity, | Age of | Age of |
| Asian | from 3000 | from 200 | Expansion, | Final |
| (nomad) | BCE | BCE | from 1200 | Decline, |
| civilizat- | | | CE | from 1900 |
| ion | | | | CE |
------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Medium-term processes
Here again better to begin with the European civilization. It
is a well known feature of Europe's Modern Age history that
there is a roughly hundred years cycle of "world wars"
(great power wars involving the majority of the European
great powers). This was already known in the 19th century
(see [1]) but there was no general agreement about which are
those "world wars" exactly and this cycle was (seemingly) not
connected with other historical phenomenons therefore it was
considered as a hypothesis only. The theory was obviously
successful (the W.W.I came exactly as one could expect and
even the W.W.II was not contradicting with it - from a
greater perspective now we know that "W.W.II was only the
last battle of W.W.I"). In spite of it, only in the last two
decades was this theory inspected detailedly. The most
important results are the following:
- The data necessary to describe every war in comparable
terms was identified (severity, extent etc.) and collected
about each war of the European Modern Age (see [19]).
- The data about the strengths of the great navies was
collected (see [20], [21]) and it was recognised that the
relative capability of these navies shows a concentration /
deconcentration pattern (sometimes one great power owns
more than 50% of the total naval capability of the great
powers).
- It was shown that throughout the whole Modern Age there
are long economic cycles (the Kondratieff cycles, named
after N. Kondratieff, who firstly identified such cycles
but only in a shorter historical interval) with a roughly
50 years period, each period consisting of an "upswing" and
a "downswing" phase. It was shown that the severity of the
"great power wars" (number of battle fatalities in a given
interval) strongly correlates with these economic cycles
(see [22]).
These results are summarised in Table 2.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
| Table 2 | Sources: [19] - war severity data, war classification,|
| | [22] - Kondratieff cycle timing, [21] - significant |
| | naval power concentration timing |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|total war severity| total war |total war |time intervals of|
|(thousands of | severity of |severity of |the significant |
|battle deaths) of | great power |great power |naval power |
|great power wars | wars in the |wars in the |concentrations |
|in 50 years | "upswing"(U) |complete |(more than 50% |
|intervals and the | and "down- |Kondratieff |share of one |
|number of such | swing"(D) |cycles |total great |
|wars (in which at | phases of | |power naval |
|least one great | Kondratieff | |capabilities) |
|power fought on | cycles | | |
|each side) in | | | |
|these intervals | | | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1501-1550: 397 | 1509-1528(U): | | 1502-1544 |
|no. of great power| 161 | | (Portugal) |
|wars: 13 | 1529-1538(D): | | |
| | 60 | 221 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1551 -1600: 481 | 1539-1558(U): | | 1594-1597 |
|no. of great power| 277 | | (Spain) |
|wars: 13 | 1559-1574(D): | | |
| | 160 | 437 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1601-1650: 2092 | 1575-1594(U): | | 1608-1642 (the |
|no. of great power| 112 | | Netherlands, |
|wars: 6 | 1595-1620(D): | | intermittent) |
| | 111 | 223 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1651-1700: 1732 | 1621-1649(U): | | |
|no. of great power| 2071 | | |
|wars: 11 | 1650-1688(D): | | |
| | 668 | 2739 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1701-1750: 1802 | 1689-1719(U): | | 1719-1723 |
|no. of great power| 2404 | | (Great Britain) |
|wars: 6 | 1720-1746(D): | | |
| | 462 | 2866 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1751-1800: 1689 | 1747-1761(U): | | |
|no. of great power| 992 | | |
|wars: 3 | 1762-1789(D): | | |
| | 34 | 1026 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1801-1850: 1869 | 1790-1813(U): | | 1809-1843 |
|no. of great power| 2532 | | (Great Britain, |
|wars: 1 | 1814-1847(D): | | intermittent) |
| | 0 | 2532 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1851-1900: 451 | 1848-1871(U): | | 1854-1890 |
|no. of great power| 451 | | (Great Britain, |
|wars: 4 | 1872-1892(D): | | intermittent) |
| | 0 | 451 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1901-1950: 20703 | 1893-1916(U): | | |
|no. of great power| 7739 | | |
|wars: 4 | 1917-1939(D): | | |
| | 16 | 7755 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|1950 - 2000: 955 | 1940-1967(U): | | 1944-.... |
|no. of great power| 12948 | | (USA) |
|wars: 1 | 1968-1999(D): | | |
| | 955 | 13903 | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In spite of all these results, the most basic question (is
there a cycle of great European wars with the period of 100
years?) is still unanswered. Some authors think that the
cycle of the "world wars" has the period of 150 years. They
argue (see [22]) that the three highest peaks in the war
severity data (in [19]) occur at the Thirty Years War (1618-
48), at the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) and at the W.W.II
(1939-45). This agrees well with the traditional historical
narratives: these wars (and the concluding peace agreements)
are usually considered as major turning points of European
history. Others argue that the history of the Modern Age
should be considered as a succession of "hegemonic powers",
see [23]. These hegemonic powers are those states which
obtain a more than 50% share of the total naval capability
(see [20] and Table 2). It is usually assumed that these
naval capability concentrations are the results of great
power wars, i.e. the most important great power wars are
those which precede the occurrence of these concentrations
(see [21]). This is a rather problematic logic, e.g.
according to this concept the Thirty Years War was not an
important war. In recent studies (see [24]) it was shown that
these hegemons are primarily "trading hegemons", not
"military hegemons". According to this new concept, in the
downswing phase of every Kondratieff cycle certain
innovations (organisational, commercial, technical etc.)
appear. The future hegemon pioneers the utilisation of these
innovations and obtains a large share in the world trade
during the next upswing phase. This large trade makes
possible (and worthwhile) to create a large merchant fleet
and (in order to protect it) a large navy (in the 16th-17th
centuries these were the same, almost every large ship was a
battleship and a merchantman simultaneously). This causal
chain agrees well with the historical narratives. It is also
characteristic that the "hegemons" are not the main
participants of the great wars but as "lucky outsiders" they
can increase their wealth enormously during the wars by
selling war materials (i.e. their economic advantages are
increased but not created by the great wars).
This "hegemonic" description resembles somewhat to that
description of Antique history in which the history of the
Mediterranean is discussed as a succession of thalassocracies
(Minoans, Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians,
Romans, Byzantines). This is a much criticised concept (see
[25]) but in spite of these criticisms it is popular since
the Antiquity. It is an interesting analogy that the first
thalassocracies / hegemons (Minoans, Portugal etc.) are
rather small and weak (a typical counter-argument in the
mentioned criticisms) but their successors are gradually
stronger and at the end real "superpowers" (Roman Empire,
British Empire) appear. The author thinks that the best way
to explain the war severity data distribution listed in Table
2 is to assume the existence of two factors. The first factor
is economic (as it is discussed detailedly in [22]) and
increases the severity of the great power wars in the upswing
phases of the Kondratieff cycles. The second factor is not
yet identified but it is well synchronised with the calendar
centuries. It increases the severities of the great power
wars in the first half of every century and decreases the
severities in the second halves of the centuries. The
intensity of this "second factor" is gradually increasing, it
was quite ineffective in the 16th century but very effective
in the 20th century (this is well visible in Table 2). This
"second factor" might be connected to the "hegemonic cycle"
but the causal link is not obvious.
Using this model one may expect the outbreak of the next
"world war" of European history near to end of the next
Kondratieff upswing phase, approximately between 2015 and
2025. Right now this looks like a rather improbable
prediction because now there is only one superpower, any
attack against it seems to be hopeless. But we must take into
consideration the followings, too:
- a sudden collapse of the USA (similar to the collapse of
the Soviet Union) is very improbable, but it's relative
strength is gradually declining
- two previous world wars were preceded by a "sudden rise"
of the attacking great power (France from 1792 to 1802 and
Germany from 1920 to 1940)
As it was mentioned, there is no generally agreed answer to
the question "which were the most important great power wars
of the Modern Age?". But most authors agree that the last
three "world wars" were the followings:
- War of the Spanish Succession and the (second) Great
Northern War (1701-14, 1700-21)
- Napoleonic Wars (1803-15)
- W.W.I and W.W.II (1914-18, 1939-45)
The Great Northern War is usually left out but in fact it was
an "auxiliary war" of the Spanish Succession (somewhat
similarly to the W.W.II when the "German" and "Japanese" wars
went on rather independently). After the peace of Utrecht,
some belligerents (Prussia, Denmark etc.) of the latter war
joined the former one to increase their territorial gains.
There is a common feature of these "world wars": a large
invading army entered Russia and after a long forward push it
was crushed by the Russians. These catastrophes were decisive
events, therefore we may expect that Russia will be an
important participant of the next world war, too. This
indicates that in the beginning of the 21st century the
"suddenly rising great power" will be Russia. This is again a
surprising prediction but the followings also show that it is
a probable development:
- such a sudden rise is not unprecedented in Russian
history (compare the status of the Soviet Union in 1922 and
in 1945)
- Russia still has many key features necessary for a
superpower (large territory, large population, large
industrial base with high-tech capabilities etc.)
- Russia still owns and maintains the nuclear arsenal
inherited from the Soviet times, the build-up of a
comparable arsenal by any other great power in the next 20
years is very improbable
The great military successes in the previous world wars
probably created the impression in many Russian strategists
that they are invincible in a defensive war. This is not
necessarily true, in earlier times there was at least one
important counter-example: the successes of the Mongol
armies. If a modern military genius could combine the
firepower and short-distance speed of the modern armies with
the mobility and self-sufficiency (!) of the nomad armies
then he could win even against Russia. But such a development
is very improbable in the near future therefore Russian
leaders might be tempted quite easily into a war: they might
not win it but certainly will not suffer an annihilating
defeat. The real danger comes not from this but from the
opposite possibility: if an advancing Russian army reaches
the borders of a "nuclear power" (this can be even Pakistan!)
then that power might decide to use it's nuclear weapons and
from this point the war might escalate very quickly into a
total nuclear exchange involving all the "nuclear powers" and
their allies, too.
Therefore the occurrence of the next world war in the
predicted interval would be a great success of social theory
but also the greatest catastrophe of mankind, we must try to
prevent it. Typical suggestions (see [24], [26]) about this
prevention advise to increase the importance and power
(including military power) of the various international
organisations, especially the UN. This should lead to the
formation of a "world state" which controls most of the
nuclear weapons (i.e. has it's own army) and which is
governed democratically by some top-level council of the UN
(probably not the present Security Council which is
frequently paralysed by the vetoes). Unfortunately the
formation of such a world state in the near future is
certainly impossible, a modern nation-state (with the
"sovereignty" among it's most cherished values) will not
subjugate it's military forces (especially if they have
nuclear weapons) to any international organisation. But there
is an other possibility: from the analysis of the long-term
processes of European history we know that the "New Medium
Age" will start soon and the various European states /
regions will be rather isolated and self-sufficient in that
age. If the great powers could create such a "localized"
world by their own will then there won't be next world war.
Such actions would be quite consistent with the usual great
power politics: isolationism has a long tradition in many
countries and it is the hidden (or not-so-hidden) dream of
many great statesmen to create a strong, well-protected
empire with their country in the centre of it. There's only
one thing which may go wrong: if the great powers cannot
agree about their "spheres of influence" (or don't respect
the agreed borders) then great wars may occur. It means that
the borders of each sphere of influence must be drawn
reasonably (coinciding with geographic, ethnic etc. barriers,
possibly leaving out the "problematic zones", creating "easy
to defend - difficult to attack" borderlines) and the
contacts across these borders must be minimized.
In the case of the non-European civilizations there is no
such commonly known "historical pattern" like the periodical
world wars of the European history but there is one common
feature in every great civilization: the rise and fall of the
empires. According to A. Toynbee before the final decline of
any civilization a "universal empire" is created which lasts
for approximately 400 years. According to the concept
presented here, the "final decline" of most civilizations
will happen only in the far future (if it will happen at all)
but it is quite possible that the "typical" lifetimes of the
great empires fall into the 300...500 years interval. An
extensive analysis about the spatial and temporal extent of
the great empires is presented in [27], [28], [29], [30]. In
these studies no such "typical lifetime" was found, but the
"duration time" as it is defined in [30] (duration at more
than one half of the polity's stable maximum size) is a
rather mechanistic concept. Probably it is better to analyse
the "most important" cases individually. In [27] a list of
the 20 largest empires / states is presented, the followings:
1. British Empire.
The first British colonial cities were founded in North
America about 1600 CE, the British East India Company was
founded in the same time (the first British trading posts
appeared soon after it in India). India and Pakistan became
independent in 1947, Canada and Australia are practically
independent since the first decades of the 20th century. In a
strict sense the lifetime of the British Empire was
approximately 340 years. But one may say that "an empire is
not really fallen until at least one significant successor
state of it exists". The large overseas English-speaking
countries (USA, Canada, Australia) certainly can be regarded
as successors, i.e. in this sense the British Empire still
exists and it's lifetime will be certainly more than 400
years.
2. Mongol Empire.
It was created by Genghis Khan between 1206 and 1223 CE
(unification of Mongolia, conquest of northern China and the
western parts of Central Asia). His successors continued the
conquests (China, southern Russia, Iran, Mesopotamia) but the
unity of the empire was rather illusory because it was
partitioned between the sons of Genghis after his death
(1227). In a strict sense the empire's lifetime was only 20
years. But the successor states continued to exist with
Mongol rulers. The most significant successor states were the
followings:
- The Yuan dynasty in China, ended in 1368.
- The state of the Il-Khans in Persia, fragmented and
reunited several times, final break-up about 1460.
- The Golden Horde, it was conquered by Timur about 1390,
after his death three successor states were formed on it's
territory: the Khanates of Crimea, Kazan and Astrakhan. The
latter two were destroyed by Russian attacks about 1550.
Therefore one may say that the lifetime of the Mongol Empire
(in a broad sense) was 340 years.
3. Russian Empire.
The first major Russian state, the Kievan Rus was a
significant power in the 9th - 11th centuries CE, but it
disintegrated in the 12th century, the remnants of it (small,
weak states) were an easy prey to the conquering Mongols. The
rulers of the conquered states were mostly Russians, but they
were vassals of the Golden Horde. The rise of Moscow started
with Ivan I (1325-41, victories over the neighbouring small
Russian states). Under the rule of Ivan III (1462-1505)
Moscow conquered almost all of the smaller Russian states and
formally disengaged itself from the successors of the Golden
Horde. His successor (Ivan IV, 1533-84) conquered the
Khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan. The approximate starting
date of the empire can be 1500 CE. The events of the Great
Russian Revolution can be interpreted in two ways: the old
empire was terminated and a new empire was founded (in this
case the old empire's lifetime was 410 years) or the
existence of the same empire continued with new rulers. In
the latter case the empire's lifetime will be more than 500
years because the events of the last decade, although
weakened the empire, certainly cannot be interpreted as
"total disintegration".
4. French Empire.
The colonisation of Canada started in the middle of the 16th
century CE, the last significant French colony (Algeria)
became independent in 1962. From these dates one may infer
that the lifetime of the empire was at least 360 years but it
would be misleading. During this time France lost all of it's
colonies three times (at the end of the Seven Years War in
1763, after the selling of Louisiana in 1803, and at the end
of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815). It is also characteristic
that the end of the French colonial rule was not followed by
the formation of large French-speaking successor states (with
the possible exception of Quebec, but that is not an
independent state). Therefore it is better to leave this
empire out of consideration.
5. Manchu Empire.
Manchuria was united about 1600 CE, Korea was conquered in
1637. Under the rule of the last Ming emperor, China
disintegrated (peasant revolts). Taking advantage of the
opportunity, the Manchus conquered China (between 1644 and
1660) and founded their dynasty. The starting date of the
empire is approximately 1650 CE. In the second half of the
19th century the ossified empire gradually disintegrated
(military victories of the Europeans, territorial losses,
internal revolts like the Taiping rebellion and the Boxer
rising). In 1911 the Revolution of the Young Chinese began,
the last emperor abdicated in 1912, the territory of China
became politically fragmented. The revolutionary era ended
with the victory of the Communist Party in 1950, the Chinese
territories (with minor exceptions) were re-united, but the
neighbouring countries which were conquered in the Manchu era
remained independent (except Tibet). In the strict sense the
empire's lifetime was 250 years but if we consider the PRC as
a successor of the Manchu empire then the lifetime will be
longer than 350 years.
6. Spanish Empire.
The conquest of America began in 1492, the great native
empires (Mexican, Peruvian, Colombian) were destroyed before
1540. The starting date of the empire can be 1530 CE. The
Latin American successor states gained their independence in
the 1820s. The Philippines and the Spanish Sahara were lost
much later but these were rather insignificant colonies.
Therefore in a strict sense the empire's lifetime was 300
years. But large Spanish-speaking successor states (Mexico,
Argentina etc.) still exist, in a broader sense the lifetime
will be more than 500 years.
7. Baghdad Caliphate.
The greatest conquests happened under the rule of the elected
Caliphs (632-661) and under the Omayyads (661-750). The
starting date of the empire can be 650 CE. Under the rule of
the Abbasids (750-1258) the empire gradually disintegrated
(the Omayyads in Spain declared their independence in 756,
northern Iran and the north-western parts of Africa became
independent about 800 etc.). The year 940 CE is usually
considered as the ending date of the Baghdad Caliphate
because political changes in the 930s rendered the Caliph
powerless. In the strict sense the empire's lifetime was 290
years. But significant successor states (above all, the
Fatimids in Egypt) continued to exist under Arabic rule until
the middle of the 12th century, therefore in a broader sense
the empire's lifetime was 500 years.
8. Yuan Empire.
It was a successor state of the Mongol empire, see at 2.
9. Canada.
It is a successor state of the British empire, see at 1.
10. PRC (People's Republic of China).
It might be regarded as a successor state of the Manchu
empire, see at 5.
11. USA.
It is a successor state of the British empire, see at 1.
12. Hsiung-nu Empire.
The extent of this empire (in time and territory) is not
known very well. It existed probably from 230 BCE and started
to disintegrate about 50 BCE, but two successor states were
formed on it's territory, the Eastern and Western Hun states,
which existed approximately between 10 CE and 90 CE. In a
strict sense the empire's lifetime was 180 years, but if we
take into consideration the successor states, too, then it
was 310 years.
13. Brazil.
It is a successor state of the Portuguese colonial empire.
The first Portuguese posts on the coasts of South America and
South-west and South-east Africa were created in the 16th
century, but major colonisation efforts in South America
(e.g. expelling the Dutch and French rivals from the
territory) began only after Portugal regained it's
independence in 1640 CE. Brazil became independent in 1822.
In a strict sense we can say only that it's lifetime will be
more than 180 years, but if we consider the whole Portuguese
empire than it's lifetime is already more than 360 years. The
last Portuguese colonies in Africa became independent in the
1970s, the lifetime of the Portuguese empire (in the strict
sense) was 330 years.
14. Australia.
It is a successor state of the British empire, see at 1.
15. Han Empire.
This was the succession of three empires: the Ch'in (221-206
BCE), the Western Han (206 BCE - 9 CE) and the Eastern Han
(25-250 CE). Their total lifetime was approximately 470
years. Before the Ch'in empire, China was quite disintegrated
("epoch of the warring states", 403-221 BCE). After the end
of the Eastern Han empire the "period of the three kingdoms"
followed (220-265 CE) but after this period China was again
united (Chin empire, 266-317 CE). Near to the end of this
empire serious and long-lasting fragmentation occurred.
Therefore the lifetime of the Han empire in a broad sense was
520 years.
16. Ming Empire.
The empire of the Ming dynasty lasted from 1368 to 1644 CE.
It was preceded and followed by dynasties of non-Chinese
(Mongol, Manchu) rulers, but the territorial integrity of
China was not affected seriously at the beginning and at the
end of it. It's lifetime was approximately 280 years, but if
we consider the empires of the Yuan, Ming and Manchu
dynasties as "different governments of the same state" then
we get a very long lifetime, 630 years.
17. Gok (Kok) Turk Empire.
It was a nomad empire, it's extent in space and time is not
known very well. It existed probably from 550 CE to 650 CE
but it is also probable that a successor state of it
("Western Turk Empire") existed until 750 CE. Therefore the
lifetime of this empire was between 100 and 200 years.
18. Golden Horde.
It was a successor state of the Mongol empire, see at 2.
19. Achaemenid Empire.
It had a predecessor state, Media, which became a great power
under the rule of Cyaxares (625-585 BCE). The Persians were
vassals of the Medes, but under the rule of Cyrus II (559-529
BCE) they conquered Media, Lydia, Babylonia and eastern Iran.
The starting date of the empire can be 610 BCE (if Media is
included) or 540 BCE. The Achaemenid Empire was conquered by
Alexander between 334 and 330 BCE, but it continued to exist
(under Greek rulers) with the same organisation. After the
death of Alexander his successors fought the "Wars of the
Diadochi" (323-281 BCE). At the end of these wars Seleucus
gained the control of Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia. His
successors ruled here until 139 BCE when the Parthians
conquered most of this territory (a Seleucid state existed in
Syria until 64 BCE, but that was not a significant power). In
the strict sense the Achaemenid Empire's lifetime was 210
years, but in a broader sense it was 470 years.
20. Tang Empire.
It had a predecessor empire: China was united by the emperor
Yang Chien (founder of the Sui dynasty) about 590 CE. His
successor was dethroned by domestic rebels whose leader (Li
Yuan, 618-626 CE) founded the Tang dynasty. Between 755 and
765 the empire was weakened by a serious internal revolt, the
unity was restored but since that time the government
gradually weakened and rebellions became more and more
frequent. The last Tang emperor abdicated in 907, after it
the empire quickly disintegrated. The empire's lifetime was
290 years in the strict sense, 320 years in a broader sense.
Now it is possible to make a small statistics of empire
lifetimes in a "strict sense" (predecessor and successor
states are ignored, i.e. from the above list the no. 8, 9,
11, 14, 18 are left out) and in a "broad sense" (predecessor
and successor states are considered as "integral parts" of
the empires). In both cases it is better to leave out the
French empire (no. 4) and the early nomad empires (no. 12,
17). In the "broad sense" case it is logical to consider the
Yuan, Ming and Manchu empires as a single empire and to leave
out the PRC (a "too young" successor or new empire). In the
"strict sense" case it is better to consider the whole
Portuguese empire (as no. 13) instead of Brazil (it is only a
successor state and it became independent not too long ago).
In the "strict sense" case there are 1 lifetime less than 100
years, 6 lifetimes between 200 and 300 years, 4 lifetimes
between 300 and 500 years. In the "broad sense" case there
are 6 lifetimes between 300 and 500 years and 4 lifetimes
longer than 500 years. Therefore one may say that even in a
strict sense the "expectable lifetime" of a great empire is
approximately 250 years, while in a broad sense the
"expectable lifetime" is 400...500 years. Using these
lifetimes it is possible to examine the great powers (or
major regional powers) which exist now and to determine
(approximately) their future lifetimes.
In the case of the European civilization the Russian empire
is the only large empire of the Modern Age which still
exists. The events of the previous decade (fall of the
communist system, return to a political system which
resembles to the system of the Provisional Government in
1917) has shown that modern Russia is rather a continuation
of the tsarist Russia, not a "new start". In this case the
empire is quite old (almost 500 years), one may expect it's
fall in the "not too far" future (before 2050?). Even the
successor states of it probably will not have long lifetimes,
500 years is a long lifetime even in the "broad sense". This
doesn't exclude the "quick rise" mentioned at the beginning
of this section, seeing the symptoms of the decline Russian
rulers probably will resort to traditional methods (creating
a police state with a strong army, trying to increase
nationalist sentiments, in a desperate situation they may
even start a war). The British empire had fallen already, but
it has left several great successor states, the greatest is
the USA. The USA is really a superpower now, but if we
consider it as an "independent empire" then it is almost 250
years old, one may expect the "final decline" of it in the
not too far future. If we consider it as a successor state of
the British empire then we cannot expect a much longer
lifetime because this empire (in the "broad sense") is
already 400 years old. The Spanish empire (also in the "broad
sense") is even older, therefore the Spanish successor states
probably will not reach the level of the great powers in the
"not too far" future. But Brazil is different: as an
"independent empire" it is only 180 years old, and even the
Portuguese empire (in the "broad sense") is not too old (360
years). It is quite possible that in the second half of the
21st century Brazil will be a real great power. It's
political and geographic position also indicates this: it has
no close military ties with the present great powers, it is
far from the probable conflict zones, i.e. in the next world
war (if there will be such a war) it has a good chance to be
a "lucky outsider". Such lucky outsiders (if they had the
necessary resources) frequently became major powers after the
previous (European) world wars.
On the territories of the Middle Eastern civilization there
are no great powers now. The latest Middle Eastern great
power, the Ottoman empire fell at the end of W.W.I. Modern
Turkey was created on it's ruins almost immediately and the
successes of this new state (repelling the invaders from the
Turkish territories, staying out of W.W.II etc.) may suggest
that the foundations of a new empire has been laid and the
expansion of this new empire may start soon (e.g. when the
European great powers will be weakened). But the modern
Turkish state is based on European principles (European-style
political system, separation of the state and the church
etc.) while the Turkish society is still an Islamic society.
This contradiction is a grave internal problem of Turkey and
it will not disappear quickly. Therefore it is probable that
Turkey will not be strong enough in the near (and medium-
term) future to start a major expansion.
Modern Iran is seemingly a counter-example, the political and
religious systems of the country co-operate well (some
Europeans view the resulting "Islamic state" with disgust,
but it could be a successful state in spite of this view).
But if we examine the antecedent states then we can see that
the Iranian states in the 20th century are the successors of
the Kajar dynasty (1794-1925). Iran (in the "broad sense") is
still in the declining phase of this dynastic empire, the
formation of a new empire there in the near future is rather
improbable. In Mesopotamia there were no strong states after
the fall of the Baghdad Caliphate, therefore the formation
of a great empire in this territory is not probable in the
near (or medium-term) future. In Egypt, the modern republic
was created by a nationalist revolution in 1952-53. It had a
significant antecedent state, the empire of Mohammed Ali
(1805-49), but that was only a short-lived empire (it had
lost most of it's conquests after the Turkish-Egyptian war in
1839-40). The Republic of Egypt fared well in the 20th
century (victories against the Israelis and Europeans), it is
not impossible that it will begin to expand in the 21st
century.
The PRC is probably not the continuation of the Manchu empire
but a "new start" (there was a significant gap between the
end of the old and the beginning of the new empire, and the
communist system did not fall in China - the Chinese leaders
probably adopted it well to the structures of the Chinese
society). If it avoids the possible clashes with the European
great powers (especially during the next world war, if there
will be such a war) then it may exist for 200...300 years and
even it may expand a bit, mainly in South-east Asia (the
formation of a great power in that area is very improbable).
The perspectives of Japan are not so bright: modern Japan was
created in the Meiji era (1868-1912), as an empire it is
almost 150 years old, it will preserve (probably) it's
integrity in the 21st century but any expansion is very
improbable. It's strong military ties with the USA are also
unfortunate, serious involvement in a great war can be fatal.
Modern India was formed in the 1940s, it had no significant
antecedents (there were no strong independent states on the
subcontinent in the 18th and 19th centuries). The Republic
of India seems to be a rather cohesive state, it has a good
chance to exist in another 150...200 years, although a major
expansion is not very probable (see the analysis in the 3.
section). The same analysis indicates that the appearance of
Black African great powers in the near (or medium-term)
future is very improbable (a strong but slowly evolving
civilization).
5. Short-term processes
Here again the best choice is to begin with the European
civilization. The most salient repetitive events of European
history in the second half of the 20th century CE are the
crises of the East-central European countries (1956: violent
revolt and Soviet intervention in Hungary, 1968: non-violent
revolt and Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1981:
non-violent revolt and coup d'etat in Poland, 1991-95:
civil/secession war in Yugoslavia). One may think that these
crises were only the manifestations of the "general crisis of
communism", but this interpretation is wrong. The most
serious event (the Yugoslavian war) occurred after the fall
of (European) communism, and Yugoslavia was the "least
communist" and most independent among the East-central
European countries. If we try to extrapolate backward the
above sequence then we get the following dates: 1944, 1932,
1920, 1908. In fact, there were serious crises in the region
at these dates (or near to these): 1944 - Warsaw uprising,
1934 - coup d'etats in Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia, 1919 -
Roumanian-Hungarian war. The Balkan wars (1912-13) were
somewhat "out of phase" but this fact points to the real
cause of the crises: the East-central European region (in
it's modern form) was created after the W.W.I rather
unnaturally (ethnic boundaries were not respected), the
region is plagued with ethnic problems since then. Naturally
these problems manifest themselves regularly in the form of
violent crises. We may expect the following crisis in the
2004-8 interval (taking 1956 as the "base year" and assuming
a 12...13 years cycle length).
The exact nature of this coming crisis is not yet obvious.
Right now (in the year 2000) it would be very easy to point to
Kosovo and to predict an Albanian-Yugoslavian war, but easy
solutions are not always the right solutions. E.g. in an
early description of this theory the author predicted that
the crisis in the early 1990s will occur in Roumania (see
[31]). This was not a bad guess (the fall of the Roumanian
dictatorship at the end of 1989 was a violent event), but now
we know that the real crisis of the decade was the
Yugoslavian war.
The severity of an ethnic crisis is probably proportional
with the size of the ethnic minority involved. There is a
very large (over 2 millions) Hungarian minority in Roumania,
the outbreak of a serious conflict is rather probable,
although not necessarily in the near future. If Kosovo will
secede from Yugoslavia then the Hungarians will be the last
significant minority in Serbia, this also may cause a
conflict. The largest ethnic minority in the region since
the fall of the Soviet Union is the Russian one. Their
presence in Belarus and in the Ukraine is not very disturbing
(these peoples are culturally similar to the Russians) but in
the Baltic states they are frequently treated as undesirable
aliens. A crisis involving a Russian minority group (if it
occurs in the right time, i.e. between 2015 and 2025) can
provide the perfect ignition mechanism for the next world war
(except if the other great powers will respect the limits of
the "Russian sphere of influence", but now there are no
such generally agreed limits). It must be noted here that in
the earlier centuries of the Modern Age East-central Europe
was rather an "average" region, the really dangerous conflict
zones were the divided countries of Western and Southern
Europe (the Netherlands, Germany, Italy). If the great powers
could agree on the limits of their "spheres of influence" in
the region (like in the 19th century, just better respecting
the major cultural/ethnic borderlines) then the
"dangerousness" of East-central Europe would decrease
significantly.
In the political science the conflict zones similar to East-
central Europe are described usually as "shatterbelts" (see
[32], [33]). According to [33] in the second half of the 20th
century the shatterbelts are the following: Middle East, East
Asia, South-east Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle
America (i.e. Central America and the Caribbean islands). In
[33] East-central Europe is not considered as a shatterbelt
because the Russian occupation of the region putatively
stabilised it. As we have seen, even this occupation didn't
eliminate the conflicts, only dampened them. Now when the
region is "free" again we have good reasons to consider it as
a shatterbelt (there is serious internal instability and
great power rivalry in it). The previous list contains only
the "great shatterbelts", there are some zones which could be
described as "small shatterbelts" (e.g. Northern Ireland) but
because of their relative unimportance, these are usually
ignored. The above list is over-generalising, too, because in
most cases not the mentioned (sometimes very big) geographic
regions are the shatterbelts, only some smaller subregions.
If we restrict the analysis to the second half of the 20th
century then those sub-regions are the followings:
1. Middle East.
Typical conflict zones are the major cultural division lines
(Arab-Israeli, Arab-Black African, Armenian-Azeri, Russian-
Muslim, Greek-Turkish) and the countries burdened with
internal ethnic hostilities (Israel, Lebanon, Afghanistan).
The problem of the largest ethnic minority in the region (the
Kurds) didn't lead to a major conflict to date, but it is
possible that in the future they will get the support of a
great power and in this case a severe regional war may break
out. The "unification crises" (Morocco - Spanish Sahara, Iraq
- Kuwait) are also typical in the region. The cultural
differences between the neighbouring Arab countries are
marginal, many borders were drawn rather arbitrarily in the
colonial era.
2. East Asia.
This shatterbelt was very active in the first half of the
20th century, large areas of China were occupied by colonial
forces who warred with each other and with the Chinese
liberation movements. There is a major cultural division line
(Russian - Chinese) in the region, but this didn't lead to
really serious conflicts in the second half of the 20th
century. But there are still two divided countries
(China/Taiwan, North/South Korea), the problem of Korea
caused a major war in 1950-53.
3. South-east Asia.
Since the end of the last colonial wars (French and US
Vietnam wars, 1946-55, 1965-75) the conflicts in the region
seem to be easing. China also reduced it's activity there
(abandoned the attacks against Vietnam and the support of the
anti-Vietnamese forces in Cambodia). There are some major
cultural division lines in the region between the Muslims and
the Buddhists and the Christians, but these caused only minor
conflicts in the second half of the 20th century (with the
possible exception of Eastern Timor). Now there are no grave
ethnic conflicts in the region but there are substantial
Chinese minorities in some countries of South-east Asia.
4. South Asia.
There are two major cultural division lines in the region,
the India-Pakistan and the India-China border zones. Violent
conflicts occurred at both borders in the second half of the
20th century. India and Pakistan are both multi-ethnic
countries but they seem to be quite cohesive (their prolonged
strife probably helps to dampen the internal problems, the
secession of Bangladesh was caused rather by geographic than
ethnic reasons). The Tamil-Singhalese conflict in Ceylon
caused violent uprisings several times.
5. Sub-Saharan Africa.
In spite of the vastness of this area the whole region can be
considered as a single large conflict zone. The colonial era
has left rather arbitrarily drawn borders, almost every
country has a multi-ethnic composition (endless possibilities
of "secession" and "unification" wars and intra-country
conflicts). The Black African societies are in an early phase
of the development, there are many tribes instead of a few
large nations, this also aggravates the problems. There is a
major cultural division line (Arab - Black African) in the
region, but this caused only moderately serious conflicts to
date (mostly in Sudan and Chad).
6. Middle America.
There are no significant cultural differences between the
Spanish-speaking Latin American countries and their borders
were created rather arbitrarily, it is easy to find there a
pretext for a "secession" or a "unification" war. Such wars
really occurred in the region (e.g. the Salvador-Honduras
conflict between 1969 and 1992) but the typical Latin
American crises are internal political conflicts (uprisings,
coup d'etats etc.). An important cause of these conflicts is
the poverty (democracy is not working well in poor countries
frequently, revolutionary propaganda can be very effective if
there are large, very poor social classes etc.). But there is
a cultural reason, too: Latin American leaders tend to
consider the USA as a model (and the US foreign policy just
reinforces it), but Catholic countries seem to be not very
fit for democratic government. Even in Europe, where the
countries had a much longer time to evolve politically, long-
lasting and stable democratic governments in Catholic states
are rare. This cultural problem certainly will not disappear
soon.
After surveying the shatterbelts, it is possible to examine
the question whether there are such periodical crises in the
other shatterbelts like in the East-central European one. The
answer is not easy, the crises are so numerous in these
regions that almost arbitrary "crisis series" can be created.
But the following examples (in which the elements of the
series are somewhat similar events) probably indicate that
such cycles exist:
- Arab-Israeli wars: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1991 (in
the latter war Israel participated only passively, but this
happened only because of the very active presence of the
USA)
- Chad: 1965-67 (anti-government revolts), 1971 (strikes,
government crisis), 1975 (coup d'etat), 1980-81 (civil war,
Libyan intervention), 1986 (civil war, driving out the
Libyans), 1990 (coup d'etat)
- Vietnam: 1945 (beginning of the anti-colonial
revolution), 1954-55 (battle of Dien Bien Phu, independence
of Vietnam, secession of South Vietnam), 1964-65 (US
bombing of North Vietnam began, US expedition force arrived
to South Vietnam), 1975 (victory of the communist forces,
unification of Vietnam)
- Middle America: 1948-51 (civil war in Costa Rica,
revolution in Panama), 1959-62 (revolution in Cuba, US-
supported counter-revolutionary attacks, civil war in
Dominica), 1969 ("soccer war" of Honduras and Salvador),
1978-80 (revolution in Nicaragua, civil war in Salvador),
1988-91 (coup d'etats in Haiti, US intervention in Panama)
The above lists only indicate the probability of the
hypothesis of "periodical crises", certainly don't prove it.
But if the predicted crisis in the 2004-8 interval will occur
in East-central Europe then at least in this region the
hypothesis can be considered as proven.
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Copyright (c) 1995-2000 Mr. Csaba KECSKES, Budapest, Hungary