CR Notes
Notes on Popper's views about science and falsification
[These notes were written March 2003. I'm always revising my ideas, but still generally agree with alot that I have written here.]
For years and years people were obsessed with how can we prove statements such as "all swans are white." In modern times the first thinker to ponder this was David Hume. I think reviewing Bertrand Russell words on the matter show how dire he felt the situation to be even into early 20th century:
"It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity, and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather - since we must no assume democracy - on the ground that the government does not agree with him. This is a desperate point of view, and it must be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it." ( History of Western Philosophy , page 673)
To state the problem again, no matter how many times you've seen the apple fall, do you know the next time you drop it that it will fall. If you say yes, then what is your proof?
Karl Popper pointed out that from a methodological point of view, it would probably be better not to search for quasi-mythological principles of induction or justification, but rather just accept the plain truth that we have no certainty. However, he hardly saw this as a problem. Popper's methodology is, simply put, accept ideas that survive criticism.
In the area of empirical science, where ideas are expressed as theories, the most important form of criticism is falsification. To wit, to assert "this swan is black" is to accept "all swans are white" as false.
What strikes me as uncalled for is that induction has yet to have died out. A quick search at Yahoo will show you what I mean. There are still people trying to determine how many white swans or fallen apples we must see, before we have proof or justification. Perhaps as many repetitions as there are angels dancing on a pin's head? One is forced to wonder.
One is also forced to wonder at the essentialism of those who try to determine if whiteness is inherent in the term swan, or something external to it. Questions like this open the academic field for endless word play, but one wonders if anything productive is being done at all.
For Popper, all *swans* are swans, and if that's not clear, then perhaps we'd better not use the term. Popper assiduously avoided all talks about meanings, for he could not see that there was anything to be gained from such mind numbing engine idling. What we need to talk about are assertions, ideas, and theories. If you say "all swan are white" then it's an empirical theory, not an assumption by definition. At least it's a theory if it's intended to be empirical science and not metaphysics.
For centuries people argued about how can we *decide* that "all swans are white". Karl Popper said we don't need *that* argument. That is the wrong argument. It's calls for either word games or nebulous principles of induction. Let's change the focus. Let's take a fresh look at the problem. Let's not ask why -- instead, let's ask why not? Then, the focus goes to our statements such as "this swan is white." Trying to decide if this here swan is white or not is a heck of a lot easier than trying to prove "all swans are white".
Now the important point is this. Stating whether a particular swan is white or not is subjective. So, if you say "this swan is white" and I say about the same object, "this swan is black" then perhaps we need to have a discussion and get our terms down better. It might be a simple terminology problem or it might be a metaphysical problem. Nevertheless, as far as I know no one is asserting language has broken down and created a tower of Babel aftereffect among all individuals. Communication is possible. So, once we have got our basic terms down, enough to agree, we'll accept the sentence, "this swan is white." So, likewise if a non-white swan comes along, we'll be able to recognize it, and then we'll know "all swans are white" is false.
Now, it seems an old game of Popper critics to come along and say the following: "Hey but wait a minute, you don't *know* that the swan is *really* white or black or purple! You can't prove it any more than you can prove "all swans are white"! So you haven't made any progress at all.
Well, this is wrong on several fronts. First, let me ask you this, methodologically speaking, which do you find it easier to agree with, "all swans are white" or "this swan is white". I mean really? Are you telling me that they are both just as undecidable for you? Really? I understand that deciding something about *this* swan is just as arbitrary as deciding something about *all* swans, from a *justificationist* perspective. However, from a *methodological* perspective, deciding something about *this* swan is far less arbitrary than deciding something about *all* swans.
Another important point lost on many, is that "this is a swan" is a sentence that can be derived from a theory yet unknown. In fact, all basic statements (test statements, observations statements) can be derived from new theories that we haven't dreamt up yet.
For example, we might theorize that:
All animals with DNA xyz are swans.
So even our basic sentences, are not infallible, but perhaps can be improved upon by latter theories or better terminology.
Another point that people like to carp on in regards to Popper, is that in science when making a falsification, we usually use many, many theories. One simple reason is because scientist don't directly observe things, but often use very sophisticated equipment for making measurements. Any theory they falsify using this equipment is dependent on theories that the equipment can effectively be used. Now, say a measurement falsifies a theory, we could always turn around and say, actually it wasn't the theory that was falsified, it was a measurement problem (a theory about measurement.) I mean why not?
A similar problem would be in a theory that is based upon other theories. Do we really need a white swan to falsify "all swans are white"? How about a DNA data base full of millions of specimens? We might have theories about "all animals with DNA xyz are swans." And "all animals with DNA abc are white." We could then use this information to test if all swans are white. If we came across a swan that wasn't white, we could then say we had falsified our theory. However which one:
1. All animals with DNA xyz are swans.
2. All animals with DNA abc are white.
3. All swans are white.
We could blame our falsification on any one of these.
Gasp, does this mean we are in trouble? Do measurement problems spell the end of science? Do basic statements derived from theories mean we are in a realm of such interconnected wholeness that we can't do anything but engage in mind-numbing word games?
No, no and no.
What Popper has done here is given us full accountability. He has not given us justification or certainty. Popper says if we want progress, wanting certainty is the last way to get it. Look, if you want to take a blind leap of faith, just accept "all swans are white" from the very beginning and be done with it. But that's not science. Science is about exploring, it is about being continuous questioning. What Popper was more concerned with was how to separate out pseudo-science and metaphysics from hard and solid empirical science.
So say we are using our DNA data bank and we find a swan that isn't white. We now can tentatively accept that not all swans are white. But say you don't believe it? You feel very uncomfortable accepting this falsification on the basis of DNA. Fine. Absolutely no problem. Science is about continuous questioning. What you need to realize is that all our theories are open to testing, and you can sort through them to any one you choose and test it if you wish. This is because science can be held accountable in a way other areas of knowledge are not. (Stop thinking justification and start thinking accountability.)
The following two theories are testable.
1. All animals with DNA xyz are swans.
2. All animals with DNA abc are white.
You don't like them? Fine, go out there and test them! Science is not justified, its accountable.
Popper never thought we could just instantly falsify something and be done with it. He was well aware that basic statements were often based on theories. And that when you falsified a theory, you are actually falsifying a whole series of theories and initial conditions (basic statements) that were used in the test. However, within the domain of what Popper wanted to consider empirical science, everything is open to criticism. Everything can be held accountable. At every stage we only use theories that are testable. If you have the following three theories that are part of one coherent system:
1. All animals with DNA xyz are swans.
2. All animals with DNA abc are white.
3. All swans are white.
And you do a test using all three that yields the result, "there is a non-white swan" you accept number 3 as falsified, but only provisionally. You are completely welcome to go back and test 1 or 2 if you feel they might be wrong. The focus is *never* ever on justification or certainty, but always on accountability. All theories can be held accountable because they are always testable.
What Popper was interested in and concerned with was how do we present a system of science that is most open to criticism. To this end, Popper presents in his Logic of Scientific Discovery a methodology that is very open to criticism. Note here, that no matter how complicated our system of theories gets, we never achieve certainty or justification, but we always can maintain integrity and accountability. When people cease to focus issues of theories of justification such as induction, and instead focus on issues of accountability through testability, we find Popper offers us a well thought out and helpful way to distinguish one type of knowledge metaphysics from another type of knowledge science. Unfortunately, the hunt for justification (dogmatism) goes on.
Notes by Matt Dioguardi
Critical Rationalism Forum: Join the Discussion