On Bernard Williams’ The Truth in Relativism

  

In order to analyze Williams' case for relativism in ethics, first I shortly present the main features of his argument. My thesis is that Williams' theoretical framework is not a good defense of relativism.

Williams' leading concern is to set up the theoretical framework that makes possible a discussion about relativism in ethics. The theoretical constrains are not limits imposed upon relativism, but conditions one needs to meaningfully formulate the problem of relativism. They are the logical pre-conditions for assessing a meaning to relativism.

 

The conditions for systems of belief

 

(1) The basic condition for relativism is that there are at least two different systems of belief, S1 and S2. This condition is necessary because it is definitionally void to ask about relativism if one can conceive only one option. Additionally, these systems have to be substantially different in order to talk meaningfully about relativism. _{(p. 132)}

            (1.1.) Consequently, every system of belief S should be internally self-sufficient (in Williams' terms: 'self-contained'); nevertheless, a self-contained system of belief could mean many things. For Williams, the condition of S' internal coherence is sufficient; this condition guarantees that a given S could be recognized as a unitary system by those who share it (i.e., they could identify their S). _{(p. 133)(In Williams' text, 1. and 1.1. are condition (a).)}

            (1.2.) The second requirement, which follows from (1), is that two different systems of belief, S1 and S2, must be exclusive of each other. Plainly, as one has to be able to identify one's system of belief S1, one should be able to identify the competing S2. Therefore, this condition states that S1 and S2 have to have their own (separate) identities _{(p. 134).}

(1.2.a.) Surprisingly, this condition is not fully analyzed, the author limiting himself to one example, namely the example of exclusiveness due to conflicting consequences.

(1.2.b.) In order to have conflicting consequences for S1 and S2 (that is, for fulfilling 1.2.a.), the comparability condition is needed. This condition states that there should be at least one possible description of Ss' consequences in acceptable terms for both S1 and S2.

(1.2.c.) Moreover, if one gives a yes/no answer to the question of choosing one of these comparable descriptions of Ss, both Ss will still hold. _{(pp. 134-135)}

Overlooking one of these requirements makes relativism a senseless term. For example, if one neglects 1.2.c., then S1 can be reduced to S2, or vice versa. There would be only one S and no relativism _{(p. 134).} Further, if one disregards 1.2.b., then S1 and S2 are incommensurable exclusive _{(p. 137)}; that is, S1 and S2 are referring to different things, and they are not describable in a common language _{(in Williams' terms,} “it is impossible to live within both Ss” - p. 135). Moreover, even if S1 and S2 are different (i.e., 1.2. still holds), if 1.2.a. is disregarded then for one different Ss are indifferent because the outcome for one is the same; it would result that there is no relativism.

Letting aside all these refinements of 1, I would emphasize upon the fact that condition 1 and its sub-requirements are not restricted to 'propositional differences' between Ss. More exactly, it is meaningful to ask the problem of relativism if S1 and S2 are differentiated in non-conceptual manners only. (p. 132)

 

The relations between systems of belief

 

Given the above requirements, S1 and S2 could be in either synchronic or diachronic exclusivity. For the shake of simplicity, Williams restricts himself to synchronic exclusivity _{(p. 138).} Given a synchronic exclusivity between two Ss, they may be:

a. In mutual ignorance to each other. _{(p. 138)}

b. At least one of the systems of belief is not ignorant towards the other. If all the above requirements are fulfilled, then we have the following sub-cases:

b.1. If S1 and S2 are real options for an x (where x stands for an individual or a community), then there is a real confrontation between Ss. (p. 138)

            An S is a real option for x if either (i) x already holds S, or (ii) x' transition to S is possible. Condition (ii) means both that x "retains its hold on reality", and that x' transition to S is conscientious and rational. More exactly, the question if an S is a real option is an objective question (or/and a social question), because the possibility of transition to an S2 depends upon the objective feature of the original S1, and the changes needed for accepting S2. This simply means that x' subjective option about S2 does not count in establishing if S2 is a real option or not. X' opinion is not sufficient for deciding about S2 because x could be "ill-informed, unimaginative, un-self-aware, or optimistic'. On the other hand, x' opinion is not necessary for deciding about S2 because S2 may have unknown features for x, which makes S2 a real option regardless x’ contrary opinion. _{(p. 140)}

                        b.2. If at least one of Ss is not a real option for x, then there is a notional confrontation between Ss.

 

            Relativism regarding systems of belief

 

            Once Williams stated the logical conditions for talking about relativism and the possible relations between two systems of belief, his claim is that only in the case b.2. one could meaningfully talk about relativism. His arguments are the following.

            ØIn the case of a., conditions 1.2.a and 1.2.b. are not satisfiable; i.e., one could not be sure that Ss are exclusive (~1.2.), therefore one could not talk about relativism. _{(Note: Williams does not give this explicit reasoning.)}

            ØIn the case of b.1., all conditions for (1) are satisfied but 1.2.c.; that is, if the yes/no answer to the question “which of S1 or S2's consequences are feasible?” is an objective one (see condition ii.), then only one of the Ss would still hold afterwards. This means that in the case of a real confrontation, one of the Ss will be reduced, in objective terms, to the other. If we have ~1.2.c., then there are not real conflicting consequences (~1.2.a.), which means that in real/objective terms there are no exclusive alternatives; it follows that there are no different systems of belief (in real terms). Therefore, one could not talk about relativism. _{(Note: Williams does not give this explicit reasoning.)}

            Nevertheless, one may claim that in a real confrontation there could be relativism, because one could relativize such phrases as ‘true for us’ and ‘true for them’ _{(p. 142).} Yet, this relativism should be rejected because it infringes the comparability condition 1.2.b. _{(see p. 133).}

            Concerning real confrontation, another rejected relativism is the one based upon confusing x’ actual S. This confusion means to infringe 1.2. condition; i.e., there are not two really different Ss. _{(p. 143)}

            Another rejected form of relativism, which is also related to b.1. case, is the ‘vulgar relativism’. This relativism treats real confrontations like notional ones, and it would be a mistake to designate a logical error as relativism. _{(p. 143)}

          ØIn the case of b.2., Williams formulation is:

"This form of relativism is coherent because unlike most other forms it manages, in the distinction between real and notional confrontation, to cohere with two propositions both of which are true. The first is that we must have a form of thought not relativized to our existing S for thinking about other Ss which may be of concern to us, and to express those concerns. The second is that we can nevertheless recognize that there can be many Ss which are related to our concerns too distantly for our judgments to have any grip on them, while admitting that other persons' judgement might get a grip on them, namely, those for whom they were a real option." _{(p. 142)}

This is to say that, in the case of notional confrontation, one could admit as true both 1.2.b. (the first proposition) and 1.2.c. (the second proposition). The two propositions, which cohere with notional confrontations, are nothing more than re-statements of the logical conditions that make relativism a meaningful term.

 

Critique

 

My first point regarding Williams’ argumentation is that his case for notional relativism (b.2.) lacks a positive demonstration; that is, he resumes himself to rejecting other forms of relativism and to stating the conditions that makes possible a discussion about relativism. Notwithstanding, the above-stated basic conditions should be supported; moreover, the requirements used for rejecting other forms of relativism (1.2.a., 1.2.b., and 1.2.c.) are the weakest ones. As he says, 1.2.a. is only an example; there is no evidence that this condition (and those related to it) is either necessary or sufficient.

The second general problem is that condition 1, and the entire subsequent discussion, does not exclude non-propositional differences between Ss _{(p. 132).} This means that the distinction between notional and real confrontations is not enough, because this distinction covers only the particular case when differences between Ss may be propositionally expressed. Plainly, if the differences between Ss are non-conceptual ones (however, what this should mean?), then the term ‘notional relativism’ is meaningless.

The third observation is that if objectivity condition (ii.) for being a real option is respected, that is, that x' opinion is not necessary for deciding about S2’ status because S2 may have unknown features to x which makes it -or not - a real option, then I do not see what is the difference between b.1. and a. Plainly, in both cases Ss are unknown to x, which means that 1.1. is infringed. Thus making a distinction between two different real options is meaningless. If there is no distinction between b.1. and a., then there is no distinction between b.2. and a., too This is so because a notional option is defined in opposition with a real option; but a real option is meaningless. Thereupon the distinction between real (b.1.) and notional confrontations (b.2.) is also blurred. All in all, the case for relativism seems self-defeating.

The final point is that not even notional relativism (b.2.) respects the basic conditions for a meaningful relativism; that is, b.2. seems to respect not the comparability condition (1.2.b.), despite Williams’ claim. As defined, a notional confrontation means that there is no ”substantial question” regarding two Ss (maybe because they are very remote, as an alien system of belief - see p. 141), which means that the appraisal vocabulary is used only in a loosely way. In this case, if one gives a yes/no answer when asked about some Ss, then the answer has not relevance; therefore, condition 1.2.c. is skipped, exactly as in the case of b.1. It means that a notional confrontation is immune to the comparability condition (~1.2.b.): even if two Ss can be described in commune acceptable terms, these terms are so remote for x, that x could not say if described consequences are really conflicting or not (~1.2.a.). Again, notional relativism is not defined and, then, meaningless. 

 

Cristian Vasilescu

2000

 

Bibliography:

 

Bernard Williams, The Truth in Relativism, chapter in "Moral Luck", Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981, pp. 132-143

Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981, pp. 132-143