On Duties Derived from Individual Natural Duties

  

            The scope of this paper is a very narrow one, namely inquiring about the soundness of Janos Kis’s natural duties theory regarding political obligations.[1] In the first part, I present his main argument and claim in the best possible light, overlooking the (possible weak) unclear parts and trying to provide the required silent premises. In the second part, I analyze if Kis’s theory, in its best reconstruction, can accomplish its purpose. My thesis is that even in the best reading the claim cannot be sustained by the provided arguments, which leads me to draw the conclusion that his theory lacks the demanded explanatory success.

 

1.     Mandatory cooperation and individual natural duties

 

For the beginning, I shall try to locate Kis’s theory in the field of political obligation. However, I will not insist upon the reasons why the author rejects the alternative theories of political obligation, since the original part and the point of his article is not the rejection but his solution.

The basic distinction against which all Kis’s theory evolves is that between an acquired and a natural obligation; these two options are mutually exclusive and exhaust the realm of categorical moral requirements. On the one hand, a moral requirement is an acquired obligation if and only if the conditions under which it constrains an individual include some individual deliberate acts of undertaking it. On the other hand, a moral requirement is a natural obligation if and only if the conditions under which it constrains an individual do not necessarily include any individual deliberate acts of undertaking it.[2] Both these obligations hold only as long as the social setting in which one is supposed to perform them is just; no examples where the social setting is intuitively unjust are in the range of this argument. Since an acquired obligation should meet certain necessary conditions[3] that are met only in special cases, then a theory starting from acquired obligations lacks explanatory success. Therefore, Kis proposes us to seriously consider the natural obligations account as the only feasible theory that can deal with political obligations and state claims.

The proposed account makes a very powerful claim, and this is best seen when it is compared with another rejected account. For Klosko, the non-avoidable character of public goods that one receives more or less continuously as long as one is residing within a given social setting is sufficient to establish one’s duty to pay back one’s debts toward that social setting. Therefore, political obligations are rooted in the fairness requirement of paying back.[4] Despite the fact that Klosko’s approach is non-voluntaristic, it is disqualified by the fact that obligations are based against benefits enjoyment.[5] As an alternative, Kis claims that a problem free non-voluntaristic way of grounding obligations should start not from one’s own benefits enjoyment but from a concern about a third party needs. The idea is that a proper account shall have nothing to do with self-interest or repayment of one’s debts but with one’s duties as a human towards other humans.

Nevertheless, this proposal seems to be impaired, from the very beginning, with two serious difficulties. On the one hand, it should meet the particularity requirement;[6] otherwise, the theory explains too much and is therefore useless. For instance, if we would have (political) obligations simply because of a (morally required) concern towards the needs and rights of a third party, then we should virtually have obligations towards all the people and all the (just) institutions in the world. This apparent problem was solved, in the case of acquired obligations accounts, by the acceptance of those obligations by each individual in each case, and in the case of non-voluntaristic benefits enjoyment accounts, by the receive of benefits by each individual in each case. However, in Kis’s case, the difficulty is surpassed with the help of an application clause, which says that one has an obligation towards an institution if and only if the institution exists and applies to one.

On the other hand, the proposed account should be grounded on morally relevant features; otherwise, the theory would have aberrant implications.[7] This means that both the needs of the third party[8] and the features that satisfy the particularity requirement shall be morally relevant. For instance, regarding the third party needs, it seems eccentric to consider one’s (even justified) need to change one’s otherwise suitable car with a convertible car as an activator for my duty to help one. As regarding the application clause, it looks abnormal to regard any set of rules which happens to exist and to whom I happen to descriptively fit with as imposing any obligations on me. In the rejected accounts, the problem was solved either due to the importance of promising instance (in the case of acquired obligations) or of paying back one’s debts (in the case of non-voluntary benefits enjoyment). In Kis’s case, the difficulty is solved by infusing the third party needs and the application clause with ‘morally robust content’;[9] that is, one’s natural duties toward other humans are the only ground for deciding if a given third party need can generate an obligation to help in one, or if a given moral description (in terms of natural duties) of one can ground an institution’s claim that it applies to one.

Far the above reasons, the natural duties and the application clause are the core of the proposed theory about political obligations. The only obligations a human individual has are those listed as natural duties; and the application clause makes the connection between individual natural duties and the just institutions, offering a solid non-voluntary morally relevant grounding for political obligations. Additionally, these two central elements are saving the thesis from the aforementioned difficulties.

The application clause is of Rawlsian extraction; it states that a pertinent political obligation can appear only in relation with an institution that exists and applies to one. As it has already been pointed out, the application clause is used in order to avoid morally irrelevant circumstances. Irrelevancy is avoided due to its two constitutive aspects. On one side, the existence requirement points to the existence of an ongoing cooperation because the theory is designed to apply to just and cooperative institutions only.[10] This last feature is crucial, since there could be imagined various social settings that do not presuppose cooperation. For example, a group of solitary people reading in a library, each of them having different intentions and interests (eventually, each reading in one’s own language and none speaking a different language than one’s own), is not cooperating despite the fact that they are confined to a limited space. They might have been as well scattered around the world: there would have been no difference in what regards the status of their activities. On short, cooperation is a morally relevant circumstance that can be invoked as a triggering condition for the application clause.[11] On the other side, the application requirement indicates that a person shall meet a morally relevant description, which means that this description should be given mainly in natural duties terms. If this condition is not met, then an institution cannot claim that a person has any political obligations to it, even if the institution meets the existence condition and it is a just cooperative.[12] For instance, a just (in what regards the scope and internal rules) and cooperative assembly of football funs can not ask about one’s allegiance in virtue of the morally irrelevant description that one happens to pass by their meeting place. All in all, both aspects of application clause show that the application clause essentially depends on the natural duties assigned to human individuals.[13]

The natural duties can be divided into basic and derivative ones. The basic ones listed by Kis (via Rawls) are:[14]

-         the duty to help if there is no serious risk or loss for helper;

-         the duty not to harm;

-         the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering;

-         the duty to be fair.

It should be noted that in Kis’s reading, the natural duty of fairness is of a special kind. Usually, fairness is correlated with self-benefit enjoyment and it means that one should pay back one’s debts. To compare, here fairness is correlated not with self-benefit but with a concern about a third party (even in the absence of any foreseeable self-benefit). Fairness means that one should carry on one’s natural duties at least to the same extent as the others do. For instance, even if the probability that one would be one day beggar is close to zero (that is, one would enjoy no foreseeable benefits from others), and even if the amount of one’s contribution makes no difference to the provided help to the poor, one still has to help the needy if the others are (justly) doing so. The reason is that it would be unfair towards the rest of the helpers if one would not fulfil one’s natural duties while the others do. [15]

The list of derivative duties consists in those duties that are not fundamental but reinterpretations or combinations of natural duties (or of natural duties with other derivative duties).  For example, (in contrast with Rawls that sees duty of justice as a natural one) for Kis the duty of justice is a derivative one[16]. What should be stressed is that Kis’s central claim is that political obligations are, in this sense, derivative duties as well.

The claim that political obligations are derivative duties is sustained by an argumentative chain starting with the initial thesis (hereafter called ‘derivation thesis’) that a natural duty ‘can be extended directly from the case of one subject to that of many subjects who bear the duty in common, without implying any change in the conditions that trigger the duty in the one-person cases.’[17] This is so because, derivation thesis holds, a common duty towards something is nothing more but a sum of individuals’ natural duties towards the same thing. To illustrate this, Kis uses the case of the ruined farmer.

 

1.       There are two neighbor farmers. Each has a natural duty to help those in need if helping brings no excessive costs or risks for the helper.

2.       The second one can help the ruined one without excessive risk or loss.

ð 4. The second one has the natural duty to help the ruined one.

 

 

5.      There are more neighbor farmers. Each has a natural duty to help those in need if helping brings no excessive costs or risks for the helper.

6.      Every neighbor can help without excessive risk or loss.

8.      ð Every neighbor has the same natural duty to help the ruined one.

9.      ð The group of neighbors has a natural duty to help the ruined one.

 

The derivation thesis holds that the argument from 1 to 4 is formally identical with the argument from 5 to 8, and that the conclusion 9 is nothing more but a restatement of conclusion 8. The ruined farmer example shows how the group becomes subject to the same duties that its members were subjects to, with the only difference that the helping cost for each member is less now.[18]

The derivation thesis opens the door for establishing various derivative obligations through different combinations of natural duties. In the case that argument from 1 to 9 is correct, the next step is to see if, from the conclusion that ‘individuals holding a natural duty implies that their group holds the same duty’, one can infer that ‘membership to a group that holds a duty implies that all its members should hold the same duty’. Even if at first sight it seems that the last formulation is nothing more but a restatement of the previous one, in fact the two formulations are very different. The first formulation is the derivation thesis, while the later one says much more: that the existence of a group duty alone can establish a corresponding duty in its members.[19] The contrast made by the later formulation is best revealed by the example of a large group, where neighboring has a vague understanding. In this case, a member’s duty to help might be less - if at all – evident if one lives hundreds of kilometers away from the ruined. The situation would be clarified if from one’s membership to a group that has the duty to help the ruined it would follow one’s correlative duty to help the remote needy as well.

However, the transition from a group duty (established through derivation thesis) to group-related duty is not a straightforward one; even for the simple case of the ruined farmer, an infusion of additional natural duties is needed in order to warrant the further claim. The rationale is the following. If the remote helper would not discharge one’s duty to help the ruined farmer, while the rest of the group does, then there are two possible cases. In one case, the others’ contribution is sufficient to provide help to the ruined one. Notwithstanding, the remote member still has to fulfill one’s duty because otherwise one infringes the duty of fairness in regard with others’ fulfillment of their duty. In the other case, the others’ contribution is insufficient to provide help to the ruined one. Then either the ruined will receive less, or the others’ contribution will have to increase. In either situation, in addition to the unfairness towards the rest of the helpers, one’s failure to discharge one’s duty inflicts harm and unnecessary suffering in either the ruined or the helpers or both. It follows that due to either one’s duty of fairness, or one’s duty not to inflict harm and unnecessary suffering combined with duty of fairness, one should share the group effort. This group-related duty means nothing more than that the duty to cooperate with one’s group is derivative from one’s natural duties. [20]

The above case shows what the derivation thesis can imply when it starts from one’s natural duty to help those in need if helping brings no excessive costs or risks for the helper. The thesis can establish other derived duties if it starts from other natural duties, too. For instance, if it starts from one’s natural duty not to harm, in the first step it results the non-obstruction principle that states that everyone has the derivative duty not to impair just cooperative schemes.[21] Further, if the natural duty not to harm is combined with the natural duty of fairness, then the thesis implies members’ derivative duty of contributing to the just cooperative schemes they are members of (contribution principle).[22] When this derivative duty of contributing is applied to the special case of institutions, then it is obtained the derivative duty to comply with just institution regulating a cooperative practice (compliance principle).[23]

And the story may go on virtually indefinitely; different other duties might be derived, like the duty of justice. The suggestion is that, if we combine a number of natural duties and their different derivations, we can see that political obligations are derivative duties as well. Nevertheless, in order to make this step, some further assumptions steaming from the derivation thesis shall be made explicit: it should be true that what holds for a one shot case holds for an ongoing practice as well, and that what holds for a simple institution holds for a complex institution, too.

The transition from one shot case to an ongoing practice is done according to the same principle, namely that since an ongoing practice is nothing more but a simple sum of one-shot cases, then a duty present in an ongoing practice is nothing more but the sum of duties already present in one-shot cases. If the transition from a one shot case to an ongoing practice has the same properties as the transition from an individual duty to a group duty, and if a group-related duty (which is more far-reaching than a simple sum of individual duties) can be constructed out of the transition, then a ongoing-related duty (which is more far-reaching than a simple sum of one shot duties) can be constructed out of the transition, too. For instance, a natural example of a stronger duty that might stem only from the participation to an ongoing practice seems to be the duty of mutual advantage.[24]

Similarly, the transition from a very simple institution (like marriage) to a complex institution that may consist of a mixture of both simple and complex other institutions (like the state) is done by the same additive principle. This transition is facilitated by broadly considering any system of rules that guide a social practice as an institution.[25]

All these three premises are claimed to imply the thesis that the duty of compliance with a just cooperative institution that applies to one is a derivation from one’s natural duties towards third parties. On short, the argument is that from an existing individual natural duty in a one-shot case with two persons it can be derived the existence of a group duty in an ongoing case. Correspondingly, from the existence of a group duty in the case of a simple institution it can be derived the existence of a group duty in the case of a complex institution. It follows that a political obligation towards a complex institution is derived from individuals’ natural duties towards each other.

Nevertheless, the step between the existence of a group duty in an ongoing case and the existence of that duty in the case of a simple institution has yet to be secured; the already provided arguments are not sufficient for this. For example, there is no link between a group of people having a duty to help the ruined farmers, and a group having the same duty and being guided by a system of rules in fulfilling its duty. The missing premise is that an institution is needed in order to provide the necessary information for a feasible cooperation.[26] Therefore, if the only way to efficiently coordinate a group in order to fulfil its duties is by a system of rules, then from one’s duty to cooperate to the group duty towards something, it follows that one has a duty to comply with whatever system of rules happens to effectively guide the group.[27]

Before turning to a critical examination, it is important to note that Kis does not allege that his theory explains political obligations in all the possible cases. On the contrary, his theory is confined, firstly, to just institutions, secondly, to cooperative ones, and thirdly, to mandatory ones. I shall add a few words about mandatoriness in order to have a complete presentation of Kis’s theory.

An optional cooperative scheme is a scheme were everybody who has not voluntary adhered to be free to opt out. In comparison, a mandatory cooperative scheme is a scheme where no one is morally permitted to reject it. This means that if one meets a certain morally relevant description, then one necessarily falls under the scope of the scheme that produced the description.[28] As we have already seen, the aspect of morally relevant description is enacted by the application clause, while the application clause depends upon natural duties. It results that the existence of a mandatory cooperation scheme for one is predicated on natural duties, which is par with saying that mandatoriness is derived from natural duties. Therefore, an institution shall be mandatory (that is, non-avoidable due to reasons starting from natural duties) in order to be within the scope of the proposed theory.

 

 

The below graphic indicates the scope and application of Kis’s theory in comparison with other kind of approaches.

 

	VOLUNTARY ACQUIRED OBLIGATIONS	nON-VOLUNTARY acquired obligations	NON-VOLUNTARY NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
		Self benefit	Third party benefit (NATURAL DUTIES)
JUST & COOPERATIVE OPTIONAL SCHEME	ð through acceptance (for both insiders and outsiders)	ð through fairness (for both insiders and outsiders)	ð through non-obstruction principle (for outsiders)
JUST & COOPERATIVE MANDATORY SCHEME	ð through acceptance (for outsiders)	ð through fairness (for outsiders)	ð through application clause (for insiders)

 

 

 

 

2.      The range of individual natural duties

 

 

In what follows, I analyze derivation thesis, which is the starting point for all the rest of Kis’s argument regarding political obligations; implicitly I scrutinize the related topics like the status of group-related duties and the list of natural duties. My position is that (2.1.) the derivation thesis lacks explanatory success since it can not sustain the claim that group duties are derivable from individual natural duties in many (important) cases. Nevertheless, even if this explanatory success is not crucial for the rest of the argument, I maintain that (2.2.) the group-related duties (i.e., duty of cooperation) cannot be derived from group duties.

 

 

2.1.

 

The derivation thesis holds that a group duty towards a third party is nothing more but a sum of each member natural duty towards the same party. In the case of the ruined farmer example, this amounts to show that the triggering conditions of the natural duty to help are not formally different from the basic case of one subject/one needy to the case of a group/one needy. The soundness of the ensuing argument is crucial, since its faultiness would amount to the nonexistence of a proper grounding for political obligations.

 

For the sake of simplicity, I will use the following shorthand:

Non-actualized duty = a duty with yet unsatisfied triggering conditions

Actualized duty = duty with satisfied triggering conditions

 

The starting rationale is:

 

1.      There are two neighbor farmers, X and Y. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

2.      X can help Y without excessive risk or loss. (1^st triggering condition for natural duty to help)

ð 4.  X has an actual natural duty to help toward Y.

           

            If the first triggering condition is not fulfilled, then the duty to help is not actualized:

 

ð 4’. X has no actual natural duty to help toward Y. (It is a matter of supererogation.)

 

Since the helper has no duty in the supererogatory case, nothing can be further derived. Kis’s theory is limited in scope to non-supererogatory cases.

The further steps in the argument are:

 

5.      There are more neighbor farmers. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

6.      Every remaining neighbor X_n can help without excessive risk or loss. (1^st triggering condition for natural duty to help)

7.      Y gets ruined and may starve. (2^nd triggering condition for natural duty to help)

ð 9. The group of X_n neighbors has an actual natural duty to help toward Y.

 

Now, if one of the neighbors is in the supererogatory position, it means that from premise 4’ and 6 can follow only:

 

8’. Only every remaining X_n-1 has the same actual natural duty to help toward Y.

 

            If there are many neighbors (say m in number) in the supererogatory position, it means that:

 

9’. Only a restrained group of X_n-m neighbors has an actual natural duty to help toward Y.

 

            If the discussion about political obligations would be restricted to partial groups only, then many cases where our intuition sees that there are (or should be) political obligations would be left unexplained and the success of the theory would be minor. A possible reply is that, since this theory is not intended to explain all the cases of political obligations, then its explanatory success is preserved.[29] However, I do not think that this is a good escape for two reasons. First, the explanatory failure is happening exactly within the restricted area where the theory was supposed to apply, namely within the field of natural duties based political obligations toward just, cooperative, and mandatory schemes. Second, if this theory would happily concede that both itself and (or in combination with) the alternative accounts (i.e., acquired obligations accounts) are covering only partially the field of political obligations, and then the point of developing it would fade away.

Nevertheless, this difficulty might be overcome by observing that, if there is a large enough group of people, then the helping cost for each is so small that none would be in the supererogatory position. I agree with this point, but this does not solve the problem. For instance, take the Somalian extreme case that all the neighbors are so poor that regardless their number they are all in supererogatory position. In this instance, the conclusion of the argument is that:

 

9’’. The group of X_n neighbors has no actual natural duty to help toward Y.

           

In order to pass this dead end, it should be admitted that the supererogatory cases are not within the scope of the theory, even if this limitation runs counter our intuition that in Somalia there are and should be political obligations.

            Let us now turn to the second triggering condition. This case is similar with the above discussion: if the second triggering condition is not fulfilled, then the duty to help is not actualized:

 

1.      There are two neighbor farmers, X and Y. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

2. X can help Y without excessive risk or loss.

ð 4’.  X has no actual natural duty to help toward Y

 

            In this case, premise 7 is replaced as well, and the argument is that

 

5.      There are more neighbor farmers. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

6. Every remaining neighbor X_n can help without excessive risk or loss.

7’. Y needs no help.

ð 9’. The group of X_n neighbors has no actual natural duty to help toward Y.

           

            To this, one can react by observing that the case of a society where no one needs help is rare and extreme. As I remarked above, this is not a satisfactory solution since the explanatory failure happens exactly within the theory’s supposed application area and since restricting the scope of the theory leaves too many cases of political obligations uncovered. For instance, take the case of Monaco where all the neighbors are so rich that it can never be the case that one neighbor will satisfy the second triggering condition of needing assistance. As nothing can follow from 9’, the proposed theory cannot derive political obligations for Monacans. This means that it should be admitted that the rich people are not within the scope of the theory (that is, it can not be explained why they have or should have political obligations),[30] even if this limitation runs counter our intuition that in Monaco there are and should be political obligations.

            All in all, the triggering conditions are facing the possibility that a too poor neighborhood can never help, while a too rich neighborhood needs never help. In both cases, the proposed theory seems to be powerless.

            An exit from this lack of explanatory success is to readjust the claim that political obligations can be derived from the bare listing of natural duties, by adding that this is so only when the triggering conditions for natural duties are present as well. This seems to be a good clarification but it should be noted that if the claim is readjusted in this way, then the rest of the criteria should be readjusted as well in order to sustain the new version of the claim.

The main procedure that should be readjusted following the same line is the application clause. The reason for its modification is that the application clause was intended to satisfy the particularity requirement about one’s political obligations. Since one’s political obligations depend upon the triggering conditions as well, it follows that this conditions are part of the particularity requirement, which implies that the application clause has to consider them, too. Explicitly, the adjusted application clause should be that ‘one has political obligations towards a certain institution if one meets a certain description that is given in both natural duties and triggering conditions terms’. Nevertheless, the existence of triggering conditions are sheer happenings, without any moral relevance. On this ground, the application clause appears to operate with morally irrelevant features, which is in flagrant contradiction with the cornerstone initial requirement that the political obligations account (and, implicitly, the application clause) shall be morally relevant.       As this scrutiny indicates, the postulation of triggering conditions as necessary for the scope and feasibility of the theory is not only solving problems but implying new dilemma, too. It might be the case that the solution required by new dilemma would have dramatic consequences. 

 

 

2.2.

 

If the triggering conditions are not subject of dispute anymore (by assuming that the neighborhood is neither too poor nor too rich), then from derivation thesis it follows that the argument from 1 to 4 is formally identical with the argument from 5 to 8. As a result, conclusion 9 states that a group duty toward Y is nothing more but a sum of members’ natural duty toward Y. The next step in Kis’s argument is to claim that from group duties it is possible to derive group-related duties, where by group-related duty is understood that one’s mere membership to a group triggers that duty for one.

Initially, it might seem that it should be clarified why – if at all – one’s membership to a group is a morally relevant factor that can trigger a duty for one. This is problematic because the reason why one is member to a group might be not a good reason for further duties. For instance, on the one hand, one became a member of a certain group because of one’s duty to help one’s ruined neighbor, and on the other hand, one finds out that as a member of the group one has to contribute for the education system as well. To this, the reply is that this example points out exactly what is it as stake and therefore it is not a counter example.

The paradigm used for illustrating the derivation of group-related duties from group duties is the duty to cooperate. The claim is that cooperation naturally arises from the (derived) group duty to help and further natural duties.[31] I presented before how the duty to cooperate is derived from a combination of natural duties;[32] here I will examine if it is indeed possible to derive the duty of cooperation in the suggested way. My position is that the argument establishing the necessity for cooperation is too quick; and even if it were not, it is circular and proves nothing.

The rationale starts from the established fact that

 

8.      Every X_n has the same actual natural duty to help toward Y

 

is equivalent with

 

9. The group of X_n neighbors has an actual natural duty to help toward Y

 

            As this equivalence is due to a mere summing process (i.e., group duty = X₁ duty + X₂ duty + … + X_n-1 duty + X_n duty), it means that a neighbor has the same duty to help the ruined regardless if he is the only helper or if there are another helpers too.[33]

 

2.2.1.

 

One interpretation of this result can be the following. Since X was contributing with an M amount to Y when X was the only helper, and since X still has the same duty towards Y in the case of a group duty, it follows that X still has to contribute with M to Y regardless that there are many other helpers besides him that are contributing to Y. The result would be paradoxical: Y would receive as many times M compensations as many helping neighbors he has; it means that Y would end up rich if the neighborhood were a large one. E.g., in the case of a single neighbor Y will receive M, while in the case of n neighbors, Y will receive n*M. At this point, one can maintain that in order to prevent this ironical result we have to make appeal to cooperation. If the only method to provide the correct amount of compensation is by having a central distributive system (that requires individual’s cooperation), it means that cooperation is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of group duty to help one. Hence, cooperation is derived from individuals natural duties, i.e. group-related duties are derived – through group duties – from individuals’ natural duties. Q.E.D.

However, this conclusion is too quick. One does not need to add further principles to the already given framework in order to prevent the paradox, since in the original framework there were sufficient but ignored principles that could have been invoked in order to avoid the predicament. The ignored principles are that all the individuals are supposed to hold a natural duty of fairness and that the ruined neighbor is a moral person, too. Therefore, tailoring their contribution can be done without cooperation, since if the ruined is subject to the same natural duties as the helpers and he is a moral person too, then he will retain from each helper only an M/n contribution and will return the surplus to each. Therefore, not each helper has to pay M. In other words, cooperation is not essentially needed for group duties’ fulfillment.

Still, one can resist to this dismissal of cooperation by calling our attention to the practical incertitude that the ruined will indeed return what is more than the fair help back. Even if cooperation is not needed in order to provide help, we still need cooperation in order to secure that the helpers are not cheated. I think that this defense makes a too strong claim by upholding cooperation as necessary for protecting the helpers, since the helpers may protect themselves by simply informing each other what amount was already paid to the ruined (see 2.2.2.2.). The information will be sufficient to decide if Y needs more help from each or if Y shall make some payments back, so the proof for the necessity of cooperation is a step still to be done. In the remaining, I present and analyze this indispensable move.

 

2.2.2.

 

The lack of explanatory success in the above reading of premise 9 is due to one ignored aspect; specifically, cooperation is needed for group fulfillment of duty to help when this duty cannot be discharged because of insufficient information. At this point, a new reading of 9 can distinguish two cases.

 

2.2.2.1.

 

In the first case of insufficient information, some neighbors (or all of them) are not capable of providing Y with the entire needed help by their own; in other words, every neighbor considers himself in the supererogatory position. This is happening precisely because everyone lacks the information that the neighborhood consists of a sufficient number of individuals that can make the cost for each so small that none would consider himself in the supererogatory position any longer. As the only way to overcome this lack of necessary information is by cooperation, it follows that cooperation is essentially needed for both individual and group duties fulfillment. Q.E.D.

My response to this case is that the conclusion is, again, too quick. This is happening because the solution is based against a too rigid interpretation of when one is to be considered in a supererogatory position. To illustrate, it is considered that if one cannot provide alone all the required help for Y, then one is in the supererogatory position:

 

1.      There are two neighbor farmers, X and Y. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

2’’. X can only partially help Y without excessive risk or loss.

ð 4’.  X has no actual natural duty to help toward Y. (It is a matter of supererogation.)

 

            If this is so, the argument goes, then X is legitimate in providing no help to Y. The only way to let X know that X is not in the supererogatory position is by giving to X the information that X is not alone and that his although insignificant help can make a difference through cooperation.

            In contrast with this interpretation, I think that 4’ does not follow from the given premises, but a different result:

 

1.      There are two neighbor farmers, X and Y. Each has a non-actualized natural duty to help.

2’’. X can only partially help Y without excessive risk or loss.

ð 4’’. X has a partial actual natural duty to help toward Y.

           

            Conclusion 4’’ signifies that X is not in a supererogatory position. For example, consider that X is the only neighbor and Y is starving. If Y needs an entire bread daily and X cannot provide entire bread but with a slice only, it is unreasonable to say that X can do nothing to help Y. On the contrary, X can help Y with what he can, that is, with that slice of bread. To compare, conclusion 4’ signifies that X has no reason to give the slice to Y - which seems to be absurd. If this is the case, then cooperation is not a must, since X would help Y regardless the information X has about the rest of neighborhood. In spite of this, one can claim that even if I might be right in maintaining that X would help regardless the available information, cooperation is still needed because it can be the case that Y would receive more than Y needs. But here my riposte is that this amounts to return to an already rejected path of reasoning (see 2.2.1.). 

 

2.2.2.2.

 

In the other case of insufficient information, all the neighbors are capable (and willing) to provide the required help; the problem is that they do not know that Y needs their help, and consequently they do not provide the help. Since the only way to overcome this lack of necessary information is by cooperation, it follows that cooperation is essentially needed for both individual and group duties’ fulfillment. Q.E.D.

My rejoinder is, once more, that the solution is too quick, because cooperation is not necessary in order to find out that Y needs help. This lack of information can be pass by simply appealing to a natural duty. The suggestion is that there can be invoked a natural duty to inform as many people as possible about a third party needs. It follows that people will know that someone needs help without having to appeal to a group-related duty to cooperate.

One way to take my suggested duty to inform is by simply considering it as a particular case of a natural duty. For example, it can be seen as a particular case of the duty not to cause unnecessary suffer, since blocking the information without reason would cause exactly unnecessary suffering. Another possibility to is see it as a distinct case of the duty to help, since help can be expressed in various ways, including by providing information. In the same way, it can be visualized as a special instance of no harm duty, since sometimes retaining information can be harmful for a third party. More, fairness seems to require one to provide information as well, since in the absence of information about one’s actions the others would not have the opportunity to fulfill their duty of fairness.

Another way to see my suggested duty to inform is to consider it as a derivative duty obtained from a mixture of all four natural duties.[34] But regardless of which interpretation of the duty to inform is preferred, we should see that it has two main advantages over cooperation. The first advantage over the duty to cooperate is that its origination is straightforward and simple (compare with the proposed derivation of cooperation).[35] The second advantage is that since it is not a group-related duty but either a special case of a natural duty or a simple-derivative duty, it is not exposed to the extended problems encountered this far by the duty to cooperate.[36]

Nevertheless, this suggested duty to inform will not be easy to digest since information providing was a cornerstone idea in which group-related duties were grounded. With the same difficulty is faced now the compliance principle too, since the argument (which has its roots in the above-discussed rationale) that institutions are to be complied with because they provide the necessary information is melting down.[37]

Yet, one can resist admitting that a duty to inform makes cooperation unnecessary. The underlying idea is that since a piece of information is shared by a number of people then they are cooperating, regardless the way they arrived to share it; i.e., my case is not an objection. This is to say that a number of people that are scattered around the world, with no other connection between them but reading a certain web site where everyone posts information which is read by everyone, are cooperating. This is very weird and very counterintuitive, and I propose to overlook it.

Finally, one can accuses that I was biased in choosing the cases; they were only easy cases, while a good case is one where the virtual helper has no information about the existence of the other helpers ( see 2.2.1.) or of the third party need (see 2.2.2.2.). To illustrate, if every one is isolated on its own island then no one can fulfill one’s duty to inform. Thus, cooperation is required exactly by the duty to inform about third party needs. Q.E.D.

In my opinion, to buttress that the islanders must cooperate in order to fulfill their natural duties means to buttress that their cooperation is a condition for the existence of their natural duties. First, this means to be circular, because at stake it was exactly to show that cooperation stems from the existence of natural duties (see 2.2.3.). Second, this seems to be absurd, since it establishes their duty to discover who needs help. It is like if you were the only inhabitant of your island, then you had to spend all your time on the beach waiting for a drowning man who needs your help. Or it is like claiming that it is a moral requirement that the islanders shall pursue their technologic advance in order to communicate any possible ruined or drowning man; it should be a moral duty to discover satellite-based mobile telephony. People would be then the slaves of their duties.

 

2.2.3.

 

Nevertheless, suppose that my suggestion is beside the point and that all the above difficulties are overcome (or proved to be false difficulties). This would amount to say that the duty to cooperate is derived from individual natural duties. In this case, my reply is that this derivation can be made by appeal to circularity only. The reply is based upon all the premises presented until now:

 

The hidden assumption revealed in the new proposed reading of the premise 9 was that a duty could not be discharged without information (see 2.2.2.), which means that:

 

a. Every X_n’s duty fulfillment toward Y requires information about Y’s need.

 

            The claim for the necessity of group-related duties, and in particular for the necessity of cooperation, insisted that the required information for discharging natural duties can not be provided with other means but cooperation,[38] which means that:

 

b. Information about Y’s need requires cooperation.

 

            As one cannot talk about cooperation in solitude, this implies that cooperation is logically depended upon a group:

 

c. Cooperation requires group’s existence.

 

            In the same time, derivation thesis claims that:

 

d. Group’s existence requires a sum of X_n’s duty fulfillment toward Y.

 

            In the argument supporting derivation thesis, conclusion 9 is based on 8, which means that:

 

e. A sum of X_n’s duty fulfillment toward Y requires every X_n’s duty fulfillment toward Y.

           

As we already saw, X_n’s duty fulfillment toward Y requires the first premise a:

 

a. Every X_n duty fulfilling toward Y requires information about Y’s need.

 

            Therefore, the argument is of the form a ð b ð c ð d ð e ð a, which means that it is circular. Q.E.D.

 

One way to avoid circularity, both in the case of duty to cooperation in particular and of group-related duties in general, is to acknowledge that more premises are needed. But this acknowledgement means that the conditions that trigger the group-related duties are different (i.e., more) than in the case of natural duties. As a group-related duty is nothing more than a derivative duty, it means that for some derivative duties the triggering conditions are different (i.e., more) than in the case of natural duties. Therefore, the derivation thesis is invalidated. For example, a very remote neighbor has no natural duty to help the ruined, as a very remote swimmer has no natural duty to help a drowning man. In this case, the remote’s duty is given only by his belonging to group, which would contradict the claim that there is no difference between a single individual case and a group case. The price to be paid in order to escape circularity is the repudiation of theory’s core claim.

Nevertheless, the reply can be that this is not necessarily so, because proximity and costs are interdependent, and therefore a group expands or shrinks due to the ruined needs and the amount of supportable costs for helpers. I agree that this solution is in perfect concordance with derivation thesis, since the triggering conditions (third party needs) are kept constant. But this does not solve the problem, since this way out of the circularity charge revolves to the puzzle faced by the information providing argument (see 2.2.2.). That is, seeing the proximity and costs as interdependent cannot ground the claim that group-related duties (e.g., duty of cooperation or compliance principle) are derivable from natural duties.

 

 

3. Concluding remarks

 

 

I have shown that if one wants to explain political obligations starting from the bare list of natural duties, then one places oneself in the embarrassing position of not being able to explain obvious cases of political obligations (remember Somalia and Monaco). In spite of this limitation, the argument for deriving cooperation with (and compliance to) a group from natural duties is either precipitate or circular. The argument’s lack of explanatory success suggests that it may be exaggerated to attempt to construct and explain societies that originate in our duties toward third parties only (remember the islanders searching for drowning men). I think that if Kis would consider that people are self-interested and emotional creatures too, he might get somewhere easier.

 

Cristian Vasilescu

2002