"James Madison and the Role of Republicanism, Federalism, and Checks and Balances in the United States"

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Christopher R. Geidner
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, Ohio

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From his compelling argument for America's republican form of government to his vigorous defense of its divided and federal systems of governing, James Madison brought to the United States of America some of its most important attributes. At the same time, however, many of the significant details of his conceptions have suffered in the 212 years since the Constitution's ratification. Looking at Madison's ideas on each of the three branches of the national government and the role of the people and states in its organization, the substantial value and timeliness of his arguments are quickly apparent.

Madison�s understanding of America�s government rested upon a strong belief in the people, in general, and an even stronger belief in the people�s chosen representatives. A major part of his analysis and persuasion in The Federalist Papers was that one of the Constitution�s greatest gifts to democracy was that it controlled the "public passions" of the people through its use of republican and federalist principles and co-equal branches. Changes or proposed changes in each of those three branches, however, act to increase the influence of public passions upon America.

From the direct election of Senators through the 17^th Amendment to proposals calling for the elimination of the Electoral College to acts of judicial review declaring national laws unconstitutional, Madison's delicate balance has been greatly disturbed.

In 1913, the United States adopted the 17^th Amendment, which called for the election of Senators directly by the people, rather than through the filter of the state legislatures. The change encourages the passions of the people and increases the control those passions hold over the Congress and its legislation, ends in direct contrast with Madison's goals. In Federalist No. 51, Madison discussed the importance of the differences in methods of election between the two houses of Congress. He wrote that the distinction is of the utmost importance in maintaining the balance of power within the national government because the legislature "necessarily predominates," so therefore its powers are split into two dissimilar branches with "different modes of election."

This aim to remove from the Senate the public passions that could overtake the House is further illustrated by the division of the Senate into thirds for electoral purposes. A passionate faction would need to maintain electoral control for a period of six years in order to affect all of the Senators' elections. While this provision is still in effect, the 17^th Amendment clearly weakens Madison's intent for the Senate to be protected from the people's passions.

Also, the amendment discouraged federalism because it removed the state power and interest in the Congress. As Madison discussed in Federalist No. 39, "The House of Representatives will derive its power from the people of America ... The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the states ..."

Before the passage of the 17^th Amendment, each state government in America's federalist system had an important role to play at the national level: the selection of its state�s two Senators. This point was argued by Madison in Federalist No. 62 when he gave his examination of the Senate. Since the passage of the Amendment, however, state governments have had no role in the national legislature.

The delicate balance of the nation�s republic was thus doubly struck by the passage of the 17^th Amendment. Nearly 100 years later an election struck this nation that could just as greatly tug on its federalist and republican nature.

The 2000 presidential election has tested many areas of national and state governments, including the role of the Electoral College in those elections. Madison likely would fear the implications of changes to this system because just as with Senate elections prior to the 17^th Amendment, the Electoral College is tightly woven into America�s web of republicanism and federalism.

The elimination of the Electoral College and the direct election of the president were called for by Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton and others in the days after the conclusion of the contested election. Removing the power from state legislatures to devise the method for choosing its state�s electors would greatly weigh down in favor of the national government in federalist terms. This explicit constitutional grant of authority to the state legislatures would be removed, and the power for choosing the president would become a national, rather than a federal, decision.

In addition, federalism would take a second hit from any proposal that called for the direct election of the president. The compromise so hard earned between the large states and the small states� delegates in Philadelphia would be eliminated in terms of the presidency. The federalist principle that created the differing makeup of the chambers of Congress was applied to the election of the presidency in order that the small states would have some say, as an equal state in the union, in the selection of the president.

In Federalist No. 49, Madison argues against a proposal that called for Constitutional conventions whenever there was a disagreement among the branches. In examining this issue, he expounds upon the importance of removing decisions from the people directly, and instead placing such decisions with their chosen representatives. The same analysis applies to the "appeals to the people" discussed by Madison in Federalist No. 49 as to Sen. Clinton's proposal for the removal of the Electoral College.

The abolition of the Electoral College would place both houses of Congress and the Presidency at the whims of the same passions. This is not far removed from Madison's fears in Federalist No. 49. "The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government."

The balance has not, however, only been weighted in favor of people's passions against republicanism and in favor of a national government against federalism, but also in favor of one branch over the others. This third un-balancing act has taken place in the Judiciary. In the past 15 years, the United States Supreme Court often has reviewed the legitimacy of acts of the legislative branch, on 30 occasions striking down sections of Congressional legislation or entire acts of Congress as unconstitutional. The use of judicial review over Congressional acts not vetoed by the president places the nation's Judiciary above its once co-equal branches, a result Madison disdained.

While Madison did not discuss the matter of judicial review at depth in The Federalist Papers, it is clear that he believed the three branches of the government were to be co-equals. He stated in Federalist No. 51, "Each department should have a will of its own ..." and be able to "resist encroachments of the others."

Some scholars have pointed to statements in various Constitutional debates and in The Federalist Papers to suggest that Madison may have felt otherwise. This "co-equal" opinion, however, is by far the most consistent opinion expressed by Madison on the matter throughout The Federalist Papers and in later published works. Madison clarified his opinion on judicial review in June 1789 in the first session of the First Congress:

Madison left no uncertainty, however, as to his dismay at the Court's potential use of national judicial review in a 1788 letter to John Brown, a friend. Madison wrote that the Judiciary having the final authority on a law's constitutionality "makes the Judiciary paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and could never be proper."

James Madison's careful weighing of the many competing interests in the structure of the nation's government is the most important contribution any individual made to the richness of the Constitution. Madison had neither Alexander Hamilton's zeal for the nation's least democratic institutions nor Thomas Jefferson's faith in democracy as the healer of America's problems. He was a federalist in the truest sense of the word, praising the careful balance sought and achieved in the Constitution between states and the national government. He believed that a republican government of checks and balances carefully weighing many competing interests would best achieve a long-lasting democracy for America.

These beliefs were successfully explained and justified through his essays in The Federalist Papers. These warnings from the waning days of 1787 through the spring of 1788, along with Madison's many later achievements, today challenge students of government and political leaders to utilize the wisdom from so many years ago.

Madison's hopes and fears for the nation were summed up in a few simple words as important today as they were when they were written in Federalist No. 10:

"Pure democrac[ies] ... have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. ..."

"A republic ... promises the cure for which we are seeking."

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Madison, J. Federalist Nos. 10, 39, 44, 49, 51, 62. Clinton Rossiter, ed. The Federalist Papers. Middlesex, England: Mentor. 1961.

Madison, J. to John Brown. Oct. 12, 1788. Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia." Gaillard Hunt, ed. The Writings of James Madison. New York: Putnam's Sons. 1904. Reprinted in Walter Murphy, ed. American Constitutional Interpretation. (2^nd Ed.) New York: The Foundation Press. 1995.

Madison, J. to the first session of the First Congress. June 1789. Walter Murphy, ed., American Constitutional Interpretation. (2^nd Ed.) New York: The Foundation Press. 1995.

Please feel free to e-mail me at crgeidner -at- usa -dot- net with any questions or comments about my essay.