1. Defining religious nominalism

Crocodile Dundee
1986 Rimfire Files Ltd.

The goal of this article is to identify some of the main issues and to examine current research associated with the issue of Nominalism within Australian Protestantism. I will focus specifically on the concept of nominalism in its religious context rather than the issue of religious participation for two major reasons. Firstly, in my experience, Protestant clergy often speak of nominalism rather than participation when reflecting on congregational life. While a majority of my experiences with clergy has been within the Anglican Church, Anglicanism accounts for an extremely high proportion of nominal adherents.¹ It is not that people are regarded as having participated at an insufficient level by the clergy, but rather that they are viewed as nominal adherents. They may exist on the parish role, or regard themselves as belonging to the denomination. They may attend services at either Christmas or Easter. However, they are not considered to be proper congregational members by the clergy. Secondly, the similar though slightly different issue of non-participation appears to be predominantly a Catholic issue. This may be due to the theological nature of the participation issue in Catholicism. Failure to attend Mass has historically been considered to have both ecclesiastical and soteriological implications. God's grace is obtainable only through the Church and its sacraments. A continued failure to observe Mass places the Catholic adherent outside of the Church and cut off from salvation.² As such, nominalism within Protestantism and participation within Catholicism are essentially two different issues that require two different methodological approaches. The issue of non-participation is primarily theological in nature. Catholic theology can not be removed from a discussion about participation. However, nominalism is a cross-disciplinary issue. While theological implications may be present, I seek to use a broader methodology utilising a historical and sociological approach to the issue.

In some respects, this work is a critique of the issues and ideas presented by the head of the Christian Research Association in Australia, the Rev Dr. Philip Hughes at the 'International Lausanne Consultation on Nominalism' held in London December 1998. His paper on Nominality, entitled 'Nominalism in Australia'³ represents the most current research on the topic. In this paper Hughes seeks to examine Australian nominalism within the context of a changing religious and spiritual landscape. In doing this, Hughes made use of three surveys; the 1996 Australian census conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the 1996 National Church Life survey conducted jointly by the Uniting and Anglican churches, and the National Social Science Survey of 1993 conducted by the Australian National University.

The first issue that needs to be addressed is what is understood by the term nominal and from this what constitutes a nominal person within a religious context. The Oxford dictionary defines the word nominal in terms of a role or status as 'existing in name only.'⁴ When we apply this term to our denominational based research by describing a person for example as a 'nominal Anglican', we are stating that their status or role as an Anglican exists in name only. When we seek a definition of the term Nominalism, we find that it is defined as a philosophical doctrine, which states that;

That is, external objects are held to exist as being individual and particular, while abstract ideas and concepts are said to neither exist, nor are they able to be engendered by the intellect.⁶ Only the individual has an ontological reality. The universals are reduced to verbal signs that point to the similarities and differences between individual things.

Tillich uses the concept of participation to explain the doctrine of nominalism.⁷ A being can only be said to be in existence when there is a separation of that being from all else. This process of individualisation then is a necessary ontological element of all beings. The self then participates in their environment, either physically in the world around them, or universally through the universal laws and structures. All that can be grasped, both physically and conceptually, is open to be participated in. Ontologically, when the process of individualisation reaches the perfect form of 'personhood', participation reaches the perfect form known as 'communion'. A real person must be in communion with others, as a fully developed individual, the self can not exist without other fully developed selves, otherwise the self would become an absolute being. Therefore, individualisation of the self and participation are ontologically interdependent. Participation then denotes a symbolism of the underlying reality. If there was no participation, categories would have no basis in reality. This includes concepts such as hostility and indifference within the category.⁸ As such, we can state that participation allows a measure of involvement with categories.

If we sought to describe a person, we would define them as an individual in terms of their properties, in order to distinguish the individual from other things with which the person participates. It is because we can differentiate that we can describe an individual existence. However, if our definition was in some way nominal, we would be describing a person in a way that does not describe their underlying structure or 'essence' in any meaningful way.⁹ We would be defining a person using a category in which the individual's participation is sufficiently negligible that any universal used to describe them in relation to that category is meaningless. That is, a nominal description occurs when we describe an area in which the individual fails to participate in a way that the category described plays no role in describing the underlying reality.

How is this definitional framework then applied to popular usage of the term 'nominal' within the realm of religion? We could state that a person is Anglican, by which we mean that this person identifies himself or herself with the denomination known as Anglican. This classification represents a claiming of a twofold identity. Firstly, it states that the person in some way identifies with the Christian religion, as opposed to another religion. Secondly, it states that within the Christian religion, the person identifies himself or herself with a specific denomination in a way that excludes the possibility of belonging to another denomination. If this identification with the denomination reflects that person's basic nature in some way, we can say that it is a representative statement of who they are and therefore an authentic label. However, if this denominational labelling does not represent who that person is in a meaningful way, we can say that the person's claimed affiliation with the denomination is nominal. They are not in communion with their nominated denomination.

This raises the issue of what constitutes the 'meaningful way' in which we categorise the person's connection to a denomination. Hughes acknowledges in his opening remarks that the definition of nominalism is 'very much in the eyes of the beholder'.¹⁰ That which may be regarded as acceptable grounds for authentic membership by one religious group or denomination may not be deemed as sufficient within another group. The effect of this would be that an individual displaying certain characteristics may be accepted as a group member within one denomination, but be considered nominal within another without any difference in either their character or behaviour. Even within one denominational group, individuals may have different ideas on what constitutes a meaningful way that authentic membership can be gauged.

Looking for a way to approach the issue, Hughes defines religious nominalism as 'those who attend church services less than once a month, but who describe themselves with a denominational label rather than "no religion" in surveys or censuses.'¹¹ I would suggest that there are several problems contained within such a definition. Firstly, this definition makes a blanket assumption about a denomination's expectations of its members. It suggests a single determining factor can gauge the authenticity of an individual's membership. However, each denomination will have a different set of expectations of those who claim membership derived from their theological or philosophical base. These expectations may take the form of a private spirituality, a visible presence at group gatherings, or an active participation in social action. These differences may be reflected within various schools of thought within a denomination.

Secondly, this definition takes church attendance as sole indicator. Attendance at church services may be considered adequate in some denominations, but not in others. Various denominations apply different criteria with different levels of expectation. Some groups such as sections of the Australian Orthodox community do not necessarily expect weekly attendance at services. Attendance at major festivals is considered as being adequate for authentic membership to the community. The group's distinctive ethnic identity serves to hold the community together more than a weekly role call. Thirdly, for the purposes of statistical analysis, Hughes' definition fails to take into account historical changes within denominations. Throughout Australia's early history, there was a gradual erosion of the boundaries between members and non-members in the local Protestant congregation.¹² Denominational expectations change over time in response to both social circumstances and theological developments. During the early days of European settlement, attendance at religious services could be either extremely irregular due to lack of available clergy or forced by repeated government orders as an outward sign of good government.¹³ Non Church of England settlers were not serviced by ministers of their respective denominations until well into the nineteenth century. Despite the large number of Catholics settling in Australia, the first fully sanctioned chaplains were not appointed until 1821 after years of anti Catholic persecution.¹⁴ We could say that nominalism was not simply the norm for Catholics under this definition, it was the only legal possibility. Fourthly, this definition places an over reliance on empirical data. By reducing nominalism to a crude statistical state, we lose track of the multi dimensional nature of religious membership. As such, Hughes' definition fails to comprehend the relationship between faith and the individual. Regular non-attendance does not automatically necessarily render a person as nominal. Rather it is one of a variety of symptoms that may point to overall inadequacies in the way the individual approaches their religious affiliation according to the denominational authorities.

One of the difficulties in reaching a definitive definition of religious nominalism is the multi dimensional state that underlies that which is being described. Nominalism involves a failure to be in communion with that that deems a person to be religious. However, it is more than a failure to participate in a physical manner such as attendance. When Tillich talks of Christian participation, he is referring to a participation in 'the New Being as manifest in Jesus the Christ',¹⁵ not regular church attendance. Religious sociologists Glock and Stark developed a multi dimensional framework within which religious participation can be measured.¹⁶ These five dimensions sought to cover the major areas that a denomination would require as a display of religious commitment, though the emphasis on each area will differ between denominations. The belief dimension involves the acceptance of certain religious propositions as being true, while the practice dimension includes both public and private acts of devotion directed towards the supernatural. An experience dimension will be involved that involves either some subjective experience of the supernatural or a heightened awareness of the same. Religious people are also expected to have some kind of knowledge of the basic elements of their religious culture. The final dimension of religiosity is an awareness of the consequences of one's actions in everyday life. The implication of this multi dimension approach is that an analysis of religious commitment must take on a broad range of factors, some of which are subjective and difficult to measure in an objective manner. Within their framework, no one dimension was necessarily superior to another in the measurement of religiosity. That is, the practice dimension, particularly on the public level, should not be used as a sole determining factor in any measurement of general religiosity.

I would suggest that perhaps a more appropriate definition of a nominal religious adherent is 'an individual who claims a denominational labelling in either surveys, census or general description of themselves, but is not considered by members of the denomination to have fulfilled the conditions for membership in a satisfactory manner.' The advantage to this definition is that it allows for wider scope in the interpretation of survey data. Issues of religiosity can be raised in a way that allows nominalism to become a state understood in terms of the individual's spiritual journey and grasp of religious issues. It allows for different denominational expectations, so that those denominations with stricter expectations are not measuring their nominals by criteria suitable more to denominations with less stringent expectations for membership. The disadvantage of this definition is that within the different requirements of membership, there exist several different understandings of what the concept of membership entails. Membership and nominalism are related concepts. How membership is understood affects how nominalism is understood. I would suggest that there are three major philosophical models that can be applied to the nexus between membership and nominalism. I will refer to these as exclusiveness, transitional, and centred models.

Throughout our attempt to define nominalism, we have constantly made the assumption up to this stage that religious group membership is to a degree exclusive. That is, there exists within the group, different levels of commitment to one or more elements within the respective religious system, such as adherence to creeds and doctrines, or an ethical code of behaviour. This occurs to the extent that there is in existence some point where the physical and/or spiritual commitment to these elements renders an individual as being an outsider within the group. It is what Paul Hiebert refers to as 'bounded set' thinking.¹⁷ If you do not measure up, then you are outside the boundary. If you still insist on claiming adherence to the group, you are considered to be nominal. The membership criterion is one of well-established boundaries. You are considered to be either in the group or out of it.

My experience of Anglican clergy has been that they almost always speak of nominalism in negative terms. They examine their parish role, lament the large number of nominals and feel powerless to address the issue. This is largely due to the adoption of an exclusive membership theory. If a registered person is not considered a bona fide member, the clergy will tend to ask theological questions as to whether the nominal adherent has accepted a belief system that the denomination regards as being either inadequate or misrepresented. However, this is a view that regards nominalism simply as a problem that needs solving, rather than a state of religiosity within which to work. Brierley suggests that nominalism should be viewed not so much a state which a person permanently holds, but rather as a time of transition which may be spread over some time.¹⁸ Religiosity is not understood as a stagnant state, but as a disposition where movement may be made in one of two directions. The individual may be moving actively towards the physical or spiritual conditions that would validate their membership under typical 'bounded set' thinking, so that their nominalism leads to membership. Conversely, nominalism may be representative of an individual's move away from active involvement within the religious community. It may be a time where the person is actively developing a new understanding of the way in which that is their 'ultimate concern' operates outside of their denominational worldview. While this transitional model still works within 'bounded set' definitions, it takes away the class distinctions present between members and nominals. Nominal members take on greater importance in that those who are moving towards the membership criteria are viewed as potential members rather than simply 'another nominal' on the books.

An extension of this view is found in Hiebert's 'centred set' perspective.¹⁹ This view looks at how the individual relates to the centre and asks questions such as 'which way are you facing?' and 'which direction are you moving'. Where as nominalism was understood in terms of movement along a continuum, this view is interested in the person's current place along that continuum. The difference between this view and the transitional view is that a religious conversion is redefined as a turning around and heading towards the centre, rather than crossing from one state to another. The test of membership is whether an individual is facing the right way, regardless of their adherence or otherwise to other membership criteria. As such, a religious searcher would be classed as a member under the centred model, while they would still be classified as nominal under the transitional model.

While the Lausanne consultation considered Nominalism a worldwide problem within the Western Christian church, it is important to note that the issue is restricted neither to the Western world, or the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Clifford Geertz's categorisation of groups within Indonesian Islam was used by Islamic reformists who understood his category of 'abangan Islam' as being representative of the nation's nominal Islamic community on the basis of their failure to comply with Islam's monotheistic norms.²⁰ Likewise, Martin Southwold considered the issue of nominalism in Sri Lankan Buddhism. His study examined the way in which certain Buddhists consider many village Buddhists as being Buddhist in name only. The rationale given for this was that they 'neither seek, nor indeed really want, nirvana: for this, the authentic goal of Buddhism, they have substituted other, less worthy goals.'²¹ The implication in both these cases is that failure to meet various criteria regarded as fundamental by the religious ruling class renders their religious adherence as nominal.

Nominalism is an issue that is so cross disciplinary in nature that while many writings touch on the subject, very little is written on the subject itself. This cross-disciplinary nature brings about a degree of methodological confusion. It would appear that no generally accepted methodology exists that allows for the various disciplinary areas, such as theology, sociology, psychology, anthropology, phenomenology and history, to sit together comfortably. What I can state at this stage is that the empirical research that I am examining, specifically that from the Christian Research Association and the National Church Life Survey, has been collected as a response to the specific needs of the collecting organisation. Towler looks on this type of study as being 'religious sociology', as opposed to a straight sociology of religion, in that its primary concern is to provide practical advice for those involved in ecclesiastical administration.²² His concern is that when research is 'needs driven', that;

This is an extension to Tillich's hypothesis that all methodological reflection is abstracted from the cognitive work in which one engages. That is, methodological awareness will always follow the application of a method within the research process, rather than precede it.²⁴ From this we can suggest that much of the research into nominalism is implicitly underpinned by the desire to solve the problem of nominalism, rather than a desire to trace the issue of nominalism back to its primary source. As such, the way in which the issue is approached will be influenced by the solutions that it needs to come up with to achieve the organisational objective of the researchers.

What then is the essence of the issue of nominalism that Hughes seeks to address? After lamenting over the groups that have withdrawn from active membership, he poses the following questions;

These questions, though valid, are in part influenced by the desired outcome of the research. However, the question as to why people have kept their religious label is still I believe the central question raised by nominalism. It impinges on issues of faith and faith development, of history and how we historically perceive our heritage, and of institutions and the way in which we live our lives through them.

As such, I will take the following approach. Having sought a definition of nominalism in the religious context, the second chapter takes a statistical overview of various surveys and census data that help build a picture of nominalism in Australia. The third chapter involves a historical and sociological critique of the issue in light of the statistical overview.

The final chapter makes the following proposition in light of the questions raised by Hughes. Human faith, in any of its various representations, is a universal characteristic within human existence. By our very being we are people of faith. It is developed from our first relationship with others, and governs the way in which we relate to those around us. This view of faith is grounded in the work of James Fowler and Paul Tillich. Furthermore, humanity finds institutions to be a sociological necessity. We live out our lives through institutions. They constitute our models for growth, development and morality. As such, there will be some type of tendency to be drawn towards various religious institutions. This is likely to occur to some degree regardless of any strict adherence to the credal or ethical statements of such an institution. Nominalism may represent in a way the possibility that people claim to belong to the group but do not share in the collective history of the group. Further, I will demonstrate how nominalism is affected by the conduct of the particular institution.

nominalism index next chapter

1 Philip Hughes, Believe it or not: Australian spirituality and the churches in the 90s, Christian Research Association, Melbourne, 1995, p. 35.

2 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1965, p. 207.

3 Philip Hughes, 'Nominality in Australia' in Heather Wraight (ed.), They Call Themselves Christian: Papers on Nominality given at the International Lausanne Consultation on Nominalism December 1998, Christian Research and Lausanne Committee, London, 1999.

4 Judy Pearsall (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 1258.

5 Ibid.

6 The Catholic Encyclopaedia, ^{http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11090c.htm}

7 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation Being and God, James Nisbet and Co., London, Vol. 1., 1963, p. 176.

8 Ibid., p. 177

9 Pearsall, op. cit., p. 1258.

10 Hughes, 1999, op. cit., p. 32.

11 Ibid.

12 H.R. Jackson, Churches and People in Australia and New Zealand, 1860-1930, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987, p. 82.

13 Hilary M. Carey, Believing in Australia: a cultural history of religions, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996, p. 5.

14 The Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02113b.htm

15 Tillich, 1963a., op. cit., p. 177.

16 Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 9-10.

17 Eddie Gibbs, 'Introduction and Literature Review' in Heather Wraight (ed.) They Call Themselves Christian: Papers on Nominality given at the International Lausanne Consultation on Nominalism December 1998, Christian Research and Lausanne Committee, London, p. 11.

18 Ibid., p. 10.

19 Ibid.

20 Robert W. Hefner, 'Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia', unpublished paper, Boston University, June 1996, p. 25.

21 Martin Southwold, 'True Buddhism and village Buddhism in Sri Lanka', in J. Davis (ed.), Religious Organisation and Religious Experience, Academic Press, London and New York, 1982.

22 Robert Towler, Homo Religiosus, Constable, London, 1974, p. 6.

23 Ibid.

24 Tillich, 1963a., op. cit., p. 39.

25 Peter Bentley, Tricia Blombery and Philip Hughes, Faith without the Church? : Nominalism in Australian Christianity, Christian Research Association, Melbourne, 1992, p. 38.

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