This paper briefly looks at the responses of Islamic Neo-modernists Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid to the concept of democracy and the role of Islam in the democratic debate during the later part of the reign of President Soeharto (1966-1998) These two figures are of interest for several reasons. Firstly, they both command a large degree of support within the Islamic ummah flowing from the holding of top leadership positions within Islamic mass organisations at some stage of their career. Nurcholish first achieved this through heading the modernist orientated Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Association of Muslim Students) from 1966 to 1971 and continues to have a high profile, while Wahid enjoys mass support through his continued chairmanship of the 35 million strong traditionalist Islamic movement, Nahdatul Ulama (NU, Awakening of Islamic Scholars) which he has held since 1984. Secondly, they are both pioneers in this unique brand of Neo-modernist thought, with its blend of traditionalism and modernism in a pluralistic paradigm. Academically, they were part of the first generation of Islamic scholars who, while undertaking western style studies as an addition to their traditional santri education, did not operate in the atmosphere of intellectual inferiority that prevailed throughout much of the post-colonial Islamic world. As such, their work takes on a fundamentally different perspective in Indonesian Islamic thinking. The primary mark of this is that their thinking is not grounded in an apologetic basis, either consciously or unconsciously.¹ Finally, both these men played different, but equally powerful roles in the shaping of a new era in modern day Indonesia. Nurcholish played a strong part in the genesis of neo-Modernism. His 1970 paper ‘The Necessity of Reform of Thought and the Integration of the Islamic Community’ created an uproar as he sought to break the link between political Islam and Islam as a religion with the now infamous catch cry “Islam yes, Islamic party no!”.² Likewise, Wahid, as Indonesia’s primary ‘non-political’ political actor,³ holds that Islamic political parties are neither necessary or beneficial to modern Indonesian society. Being “for an Indonesian society, not just an Islamic one”,⁴ he believes that all Indonesians should place an emphasis on the struggle for democracy and justice as an outflowing of Indonesia’s history of tolerance. This should take a precedence over less inclusive concerns, such as those of the Islamic community.⁵ What marks him out is that his views on the separation of religion and state has not perturbed him from taking an active role in this years elections as a political player whose basis of support is derived almost purely from an Islamic organisation.⁶
 
 

Javanese Islamic History
To achieve an understanding of the relationship between religion and politics in Indonesia, one must first appreciate the role and influence of Javanese Islam. The Javanese are the single biggest ethnic grouping in what is still a very young nation, and their concepts of religion and power have come to have a marked influence on the whole of Indonesian society.

Like much of the Muslim world, Islamic practices and beliefs within Java have been influenced by various pre-Islamic or non-Islamic perspectives. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz, writing in 1960 drew a distinction between three groupings within Javanese culture; priyayi, abangan and santri.⁷ Not withstanding his highly criticised methodology grounded in a modernist view of Islam,⁸ the distinctions outlined by Geertz can be useful in a historical sense for understanding the forces that are currently at work in modern Indonesian Islam.

Geertz’s Priyayi sub-group is characterised as being greatly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystical world views, while the Abangan sub-group is understood as being influenced by pre-Islamic Javanese animism, though modern scholars have suggested that it is in practice more a derivation of Islamic Sufism and Indo-Persian Islamic precedents.⁹ The inference from Geertz is that neither of these mystical groups represent the real Islam. Priyayi is too Indic, while Abangan is too indigenous and animistic.¹⁰ It is only the more classically monotheistic santri tradition, with its connections to Middle Eastern cultural patterns, that is considered to be ‘true Islam’. Properly understood, these distinctions represent more life-styles and perceptions of religious identity, rather than an understanding of what constitutes an orthodox belief.¹¹

What can be said is that the portrayal of santri and abangan religious orientations reflected the polarised nature of Indonesian society during the Old Order,¹² and that such divergence in orientation was largely made possible due to the way in which Islam, unlike many other Muslim countries, did not gain ground in Indonesia purely by military conquest. Politically, those who belonged to the abangan were more likely to be supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, while the santri were more likely to support one of the two leading Islamic parties.¹³

It was clear very early on in the ‘New Order’ reign of President Soeharto, that he was as abangan as former President Sukarno.¹⁴ Despite Islam’s central role in the defeat of communist forces during 1965 - 1966, it appeared that on a political level, Islam did not have a part to play in the New Order despite being the only real political alternative to the military backed Pancasila state.¹⁵ It was argued that a society based on religious, ethnic, regional and class affiliations would not be capable of moving forward as an economically strong nation. To achieve this national objective, Soeharto utilised the state ideology of Pancasila to de-politicise and de-ideolgise society.¹⁶ The effect of this was to legitimise his regime and to de-legitimise any serious political challengers. Pancasila portrayed a pluralistic and tolerant society grounded socially and ethically on religion without the state endorsement of a particular faith. Political Islam was accused of being sectarian in nature and therefore anti-Pancasila.

There are arguments made that this constant desire to remove or neutralise political challengers can be traced to Soeharto’s implicit use of Javanese concepts of power. This concept roughly states that as there is a fixed amount of power in any one situation, and any opposition to a decision takes away from the authority with which such a decision is made. When added to his comments throughout his New Order reign stating that Indonesians neither need or desire western style democracy, it can be seen that Soeharto’s primary philosophical basis is firmly grounded in a culture of syncretic Javanese philosophy which is suspicious of both western concepts of democracy and Islamic political parties.¹⁷

In 1984, President Soeharto required that all political and social organisations adopt the state ideology of Pancasila as their sole ideological basis.¹⁸ This action was clearly designed to de-legitimise Islam as a political force, and in the short term this appeared to have been achieved, as support for the United Development Party almost halved by the 1987 election. However, on a wider scale, rather than de-legitimising or weakening the position of Islam as a political force, this ploy effectively moved Islam into a sphere where it would be considered to be philosophically acceptable to the New Order political scheme.¹⁹ Islam could no longer be accused of standing in opposition to the national ideology. It became possible to support the national ideology without endorsing the nations political leadership.

Theologically, some found this endorsement a very difficult step to take, as it involved subordinating the Qur’an to a man made ideological construction in Pancasila. Given that for the Muslim, submission to God involves every aspect of life both now and in the hereafter, an endorsement of Pancasila was viewed by many as the equivalent step to accepting another religion.
This is expressly forbidden by Allah who decreed in Sura 3.85 that;

‘whoso desireth any other religion than Islam, that religion shall never be accepted from him, and in the next world he shall be among the lost.’²⁰

Despite this, many Muslims were able to theologically justify such endorsement. The principle used to achieve such justification is fundamental to neo-modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia, that of contextualised ijtihad. This approach to hermeneutics combines classical Islamic scholarship with modern analytical methods, and as such is not limited by restrictive taboos or dogmatic customs. This builds on the approach of previous modernists, in that it allows for the expression of progressive liberal thoughts within the context of strong religious faith.²¹
 
 

It is apparent that this attempted depoliticisation of Islam, instead of leading to an overall decrease in role Islam in society, has occurred at a time, and may even be directly responsible for, an overall increase in Islamic consciousness particularly in the expanding middle class. It may be that by adopting Pancasila, Islam as a religious system took on a more palatable character for many Indonesians who had come to be more comfortable with the pluralistic and tolerant world view perpetrated by Pancasila. There has been much debate over the precise nature of this shift; whether it represented a santri-fication of the Javanese priyayi, or a priyayi-fication of the Javanese santri.²² Whatever the case, this religious revolution changed the face of Indonesian Islam to the extent where Geertz’s definitional framework looks all the more less and representative of reality. Hefner concludes that this religious renewal was different in nature to previous religious advances in that it was not achieved by the santri reverting to political parties as a tool of reform.²³ Rather, the changes that took place were more due to the politically neutral, “neo-santri” Islam supported by the government. The overall result has been a popular movement away from mystical pantheism towards a more tauhidic or monotheistic form of religion consistent with Islamic ideals, while maintaining a pluralistic element not normally found in Islamic cultures.²⁴
 
 
 

Religious renewal as Secularisation
Nurcholish Madjid, who now refers to himself as a “pluralist” or “inclusivist”,²⁵ was one of the first Indonesians to seriously question the relationship between Islam and the state. In his 1970 paper, The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat, he questions why Islamic parties attract ever dwindling amounts of support from Muslims at a time when Islam as a religion is advancing on a national scale. He finds that Islamic parties, as the receptacle or wadah of ideas in the Islamic struggle have become to be viewed as perpetuating fossilised and obsolete ways of Islamic thinking.²⁶

Two years later, Nurcholish reflected on the manner in which Muslims understand Islam as a religious system in his paper ‘More on Secularization’.²⁷ He found that many Muslims believe that, unlike other religions such as Christianity and Buddhism which are concerned only with the spiritual aspect, their religion is al-din (a non translatable term), containing all aspects of life such as politics, economics, society and culture. If this is accurate, then the fundamental nature of Islam can be seen to be similar to that of western ideologies such as democracy or communism.²⁸ Further, there are those who understand Islam as a structure and a legal code which requires formal legislative sanctioning. Nurcholish, taking a ‘substantialist position,’²⁹ found that the Qur’an does not describe the negara Islam, or Islamic state on the basis that the Islamic law, syari’ah, which is considered by many as the legal foundation of the Islamic state, cannot be turned into a positive law.³⁰ Therefore, the desire for an Islamic state is representative of the corruption between the proportional relationship between state and religion, where state is the communal dimension of ‘profane’ while religion is the spiritual and individual dimension.³¹ The political dimension of Islam was more of a culturally driven historical coincident rather than an essential element of Islamic religious faith.³²

While Nurcholish brings a traditionalist perspective into his reading of the Qur’an, he finds that the ‘Qur’an was never intended to be an absolute guide regulating every last detail of the believers life but rather was intended to be a revelation of God’s intended ideals and guiding principles for man’.³³ The only thing that does not, and cannot, change is God himself. Given that the Qur’an was given a God’s guide in the context of seventh century Arabian society, Nurcholish finds that ‘Islam does not provide definite formulations so far as temporal actions are concerned.’³⁴ The only real constants that Islam can provide concern the fundamentals of who God is and the essentials of worship towards him. Others values, with the exception of some fundamental social values, are cultural in nature and require the application of a continual process of evaluation. Ijtihad provides the manner in which social and historical phenomena can be evaluated to determine their continued correctness and appropriateness to current cultural situations.³⁵
 
 
 

The inability of Islam to understand itself this way can be traced to the ‘nonsense of misplaced sacred sentimentality’³⁶ which needs to be brought down to earth. This view has it’s basis in the concept of Tawhid. This concept of the complete unity and oneness of God demands a rejection of all forms of idolatry or assigning a partner to Allah. When it is understood that God in his unity and oneness alone is sacred, then it can be seen, Argues Nurcholish, that humans have sacrelised profane institutions which are man made, in the name of religion. Primary examples of this can be seen in the notions of Islamic political parties and the Islamic state. In these instances, a worldly preoccupation has been confused with a sacred one.

Once this has been understood, then it can be seen that Islam is all about the process of secularisation. Nurcholish was often misinterpreted on this point as encouraging Muslims to become secularists. Rather, he was seeking to desacralise all that was not sacred, for to regard anything other than God as sacred is ultimately a form of the blasphemy of shirk. From this, ‘secularisation gains concrete meaning in the desacralisation towards everything, except the ones that constitute transcendental values’,³⁷ in particular that which is human in Islamic tradition.

Despite the current perception articulated from a CNBC correspondent recently that ‘everyone in Indonesia seems to be a democrat these days’,³⁸ the view that Islamic and democratic values are mutually exclusive value systems has often been presented as a given theological fact. Nurcholish argues that humanity, being fundamentally of good nature despite potential shortcomings, is required to conduct ijtihad to determine the specific outworkings of daily life. Due to humanities limitations, ijtihad needs to be conducted collectively, democratically, and in an non elitist manner.³⁹ This democratic framework can be seen in the period of the Righteous Caliphs before the Umayyad dynasty.⁴⁰ Under this view, Islam understands its role as seeking God so that he would “Guide Thou us on the straight path.”⁴¹ In doing this, Nurcholish develops models in a way that ‘keeps what is good from the old and taking what is better from the new’.⁴² Using classical political theories, he notes that historically authority was vested in a group of competent Ulama with the implicit approval of the community, and finds that this can be achieved in the modern context through a parliamentary structure where members are elected by the people through general elections. Nurcholish takes the view that in such a democratic society, Islamic organisations should be non political, on the basis that Islamic based political parties do not by their very nature, serve the greater religious good. Further, the politicisation of Islam can only lead to divisions within the Islamic community, as it tends to render any allegiance to one of these organisations mutually exclusive.

The movement towards democracy, in the mind of Nurcholish, is a gradual process, whose progress can be evaluated through the examination of various criteria, such as human rights and various expressions of freedom. He also found that education and income levels are also a determining factors in the movement to a democratic system.⁴³ Given the relative low levels of income and education throughout much of Indonesia, the major pressure was always going to have to be through the elite and the intelligentsia, and this was evident in the success of student protests in the resignation of Soeharto. This was also seen in how, in the run up to the 1999 poll, mass education campaigns were required to instruct individuals about the principles and practicalities of democracy. There were many, according to press reports, who still professed a degree of ignorance even after such programs.⁴⁴

This reasoning could explain why Nurcholish has constantly insisted that the restrictions placed on “political Islam” under Soeharto should not be equated with government opposition to Islam as such.⁴⁵ Soeharto, even before his much publicised pilgrimage to Mecca in 1990 and his subsequent urges to embrace all things Islamic, accepted and occasionally encouraged Islam as means of fulfilling a social role as an ethical and cultural guide. This belief from the government that Islam has a strong, vital and non political part to play in society is viewed in a positive light by Nurcholish, particularly given the historically high levels of suspicion towards political Islam by both the military and the government. Soeharto’s creation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, was applauded by Nurcholish for this reason. He holds that, regardless of any long term political impact that such an organisation may have, the ICMI has been valuable in the way in which it has deepened Islamic devotion among the expanding middle class.⁴⁶ This view is in line with the optimistic view that Nurcholish has constantly taken throughout the New Order era regarding the government’s relationship with the Islamic community on the social level. Despite this, it appears almost impossible to discern what Soeharto’s real motivations were. It may be that the government intended to woe the santri middle class on a political level, and that the increase in Islamic consciousness was an unavoidable by-product of the exercise.
 
 

Non political politics
Abdurrahman Wahid has been the chairman of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, Nahdatul Ulama since 1984. During this time, he has used the NU platform to become one of the most influential voices in the call for a Pancasilan based democratic state which is non-Islamic and not dominated by military elements. His stance regarding the Soeharto regime has shifted notably from an accommodative attitude to an increasingly critical attitude throughout this decade. While some Muslims find his criticisms to be over exaggerated, many of his highly publicised views have gained widespread support throughout Indonesia. Wahid’s influence was such that the government allegedly supported moves to oust him from the chairmanship in the 1994 NU elections through both interference in the election process and the promotion of questionable media coverage.⁴⁷

On his election to NU’s chairmanship in 1984, he declared that NU would cease to be a participant in party politics. Rather, it would refocus itself as a social and religious organisation grounded primarily in the state ideology of Pancasila. Wahid stated that this withdrawal from political activity was done in order to participate more effectively in politics,⁴⁸ though it may be that Wahid considered the Unity Development Party, the PPP, to be such a political non-starter that their association with it would be a major hindrance to the political desires of NU.

Wahid justified the decision to embrace Pancasila on the basis of a series of legal decisions that recognised Indonesia as a Muslim kingdom and its constitution as a means through which the will of Allah could be realised, and accepted the role of the President as a temporary powerholder with authority over Muslims until the emergence of a clearly designated imam.⁴⁹ He further notes that the Muslim community has come to accept Pancasila while at the same time maintaining an ‘Islamic’ way of life. This is evidenced in the manner by which both the traditionalist NU and the modernist Muhammadiyah continue to be two of the most important Muslim organisations in Indonesia, having accepted this principle of complimentarity between Islam and the state.⁵⁰ Wahid would appear to argue that this broad acceptance of Pancasila does not commit Muslims to an automatic endorsement of an individual President. This position was demonstrated at the March 1, 1992 NU commemorative rally. At this event, Wahid publicly reiterated NU’s loyalty to Pancasila as the state ideology in way that did not endorse President Suharto in his bid for a fifth term, despite strong pressure to do so. In doing so NU, and in particular Wahid, stood out from most other large organisations who had succumbed to this request under pressure.⁵¹

It is evident that while Wahid emphasised that a non-political party should not make political statements, he did not shy away from using Pancasila to his own political ends. He holds that free speech is not only permitted in the Qur’an, but is ordered on the basis that individuals will come to different conclusions and that no one person can know the will of God perfectly.⁵² Wahid had refused to join the ICMI, claiming that it was an exclusivist organisation grounded in ‘primordialism and sectarianism’.⁵³ It also appeared that, while the organisation sought to portray itself as evidence that Indonesia was moving towards a culture of free speech, that the government still sought to exert some degree of control over it. Partially as a response to the formation of the ICMI, Wahid founded Forum Demokrasi in 1991 as a group of intellectuals committed to the process of democratising Indonesia in the face of growing sectarianism throughout Indonesia

As well as advocating democracy, Wahid accepts the concept of popular sovereignty in national life. Popular will must be controlled by state constitution, while the function of the Shari’a is reduced to a complimentary role within the matrix of factors that constitute national life.⁵⁴ The embracing of an Islamic state tends to involve to idealisation of Muslim society to the extent where it fails to reflect the reality of such a position.⁵⁵ Islam is understood as one of a number of systems capable of contributing to Indonesian society;

Islam should not idealize itself as the only feasible system able to maintain true democracy, strict adherence to the law and economic justice . . . but rather (play a role) as the inspirational base for a national framework of a democratic society. As such, Islam is not an alternative to other social systems, but a complementary factor among a wide spectrum of other factors in the nation’s life.’⁵⁶

In regarding Islam as an ‘inspirational base’ Wahid moves towards what Hefner describes as a ‘soft’ version of secularisation. In this, the maintenance of the Islamic faith becomes important less for current material benefits that will profit the individual through religious obedience, but a secularised religious experience that can be understood in a more empirical fashion concerned with universalistic ideals such as human rights and democracy.⁵⁷ Islam is understood through the process of contextualised ijtihad, where the ‘social teachings of Islam are (to be) reinterpreted in accordance with the demands of a rapid changing society and in response to modernity.’⁵⁸ That is, the social teaching of Islam is understood through Pancasilan pluralism and tolerance.

In light of this, Wahid holds that proper intellectual discourse regarding the state can only occur when such discussions are directed to those elements within the future state of Indonesian society which are universal in nature, such as democracy and human rights. The voicing of these universal matters represents the degree of the autonomy that exists between the people and the state. Therefore, it would be improper for this function to go under the name of Islam, as that precludes all members of society, with their differing ideological positions, from contributing to the nation’s future.⁵⁹ What function does this then leave organisations such as NU with? Wahid identifies the role of NU in terms of a pressure group and moral force that seeks to influence the direction of public policies without the direct involvement in the practical politics.⁶⁰

This sense of wanting to be involved in a constructive manner while standing outside of the political system seems to stem from Wahid’s frustrations with the slow rate of political change throughout the history of the New Order, finding that ‘political restructurization had succeeded in the sense of deideologization, not in the sense of people’s aspirations.’⁶¹ Political parties have been created from top and handed down, rather than emerging from grass roots movement. As such, these parties have traditionally failed to articulate the desires of those who they claim to represent. At the same time, he expressed strong concerns over the proliferation of new Islamic parties leading up to this years elections.
 
 

Is Wahid full of contradictions as some charge?⁶² It may be that the fine line that Wahid attempts to take, comes from the presupposition that religion and culture are independent of each other, while at the same time overlapping in certain spheres. Further, as the understanding of the Qur’an is determined by contextual factors, apparent inconsistencies in a particular position over time, may be traced back factors in society that have undergone change.
 

The way forward
It is widely agreed that there are two kinds of approaches available in the realisation of Muslim aspirations in Indonesian society and state; the structural and cultural approach. The structural approach, which requires the changing of social and political institutions is hard to put into practice, so many Muslim intellectuals take on the cultural approach, seeking to bring about a transformation of social behaviour. What enables intellectuals to successfully conduct this approach is the holding of top leadership positions of Islamic mass organisations. This is, in part what has given the thoughts of both Nurcholish and Wahid such influence in Indonesian society.⁶³ By doing this, they are more able to work outside of the political sphere and in an arena where they can have the maximum effort in educating and strengthening the expanding Muslim middle class, which has in itself, undergone a santri revival.

There is also a belief that success in the New Order is best achieved by working within and alongside the government.⁶⁴ The formation of ICMI in 1990 was interpreted by some as representative of a new relaxation towards political Islam, though this apparent softening by Soeharto can, even when taking into account his personal religious renewal, be linked to tensions between Suharto and sections of the military connected to a Christian general in 1989. While it is accepted that formation has allowed Muslim intellectuals and activists unprecedented freedoms in the public airing of their views and concerns,⁶⁵ there have been instances where the military has stopped such forums occurring despite the ICMI nature of the meetings. Soeharto's appointment to the ICMI’s chairmanship, B.J. Habibie has enjoyed a degree of goodwill from the Islamic community. This has been aided by the way in which he has taken on issues such as the marginalisation of Muslims in Indonesian economic life,⁶⁶ and permitted frank discussion on areas that could be considered uncomplimentary to the government, such as the vexed issue of human rights.⁶⁷ Did Habibie use ICMI as a stepping stone to power? Certainly pre-ICMI he did not have the mass support that has often been a pre requisite in the perusal of high political ambition. While the ICMI made this possible, it was often viewed by people such as Wahid as a tool of Soeharto for broadening the legitimacy of his rule.⁶⁸ It is noteworthy that Habibie received support from people such as Nurcholish and current presidential candidate Amien Rais, and is viewed by many as Indonesia’s Islamic president.⁶⁹

One concern has often been that Islamic neo-modernist thinkers tended to be way ahead of the communities they were supposedly representing. Modernist thinker, Moeslim Abdurrahman writing in 1993 stated that;

‘Nurcholish’s movement is one of ideas, even though it is true that ideas have their own legs, a mechanism is also needed that can more effectively put the legs in motion.’⁷⁰

We could add to this criticism the charge that Nurcholish tends to focus on the elite hoping for a trickle down effect of ideas and attitudes which are capable of bringing about social change.⁷¹ On Wahid, Abdurrahman finds that he;

‘represents a movement for the transformation of the umat, the problem is that there is not yet a social machine that understands and can be used effectively in support of his concepts.’⁷²
 
 

I find it difficult to fully understand Wahid. Indonesia Political Watch describes him as ‘the most influential, enigmatic, fascinating and yet also vulnerable political player’ who seems to be ‘full of contradictions and too willing to compromise.’⁷³ Even through the charge is not meant in any negative manner, it does not quite seem to fit. If Wahid was an easily compromising contradictory figure, then it is doubtful that he would have had not only the power or the strength to maintain his NU chairmanship given the anti-Wahid forces come election times, but the ability to lead NU to the stage where it is now able to actively engage in the process of reform in both areas religious, and political and civil society. It could just be that we tend to view Wahid from the wrong way. Benedict Anderson raises the possibility that religious people may use politics for religious ends, rather than religion for political ends as we tend to assume.⁷⁴ This could explain some of the apparent inconsistencies in his behaviour. Instead of assuming that political power is the final goal, we should think that perhaps that the goals of religious autonomy and religious reformation are Wahid’s ultimate concern. Even if this is not strictly true, then it may serve to demonstrate that the truth is somewhere in between.

Despite the criticisms of Moeslim Abdurrahman, it would appear that the economic crisis, along with international concern over areas such as human rights managed to force the issue of democratic reform. In the end, it may appear that given the complex nature of Indonesian Islam and Indonesian cultural pressures, the best explanation for the events over the last twelve months could be that of ‘historical coincidences,’ rather than the desire for reform among Islamic neo-Modernists. Muslims throughout Indonesia have embraced democracy, thought the increasing number of Islamic groups suggest that Islam is being politicised. The challenge for Islamic leaders such as presidential candidates Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid is to harness their popular support in a way that retains fundamental Pancasilan principles such as tolerance and pluralism, while at the same time controlling those elements within the Muslim community who desire a more dominant political and economic position.
 

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The Koran (Rodwell, J.M., trans.), J.M. Dent, London, 1994.

¹ Greg Barton, ‘Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: the meeting of Islamic traditionalism and Modernism in new-Modernist thought’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, p. 329.

² N. Madjid, ‘The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat’, in M. Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to ‘New Order’ Modernisation in Indonesia, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p. 188.

³ Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 43.

⁴ Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class’, Indonesia, No. 56, October 1993, p. 21.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Michael Maher, ‘New moon over Jakarta’, The Bulletin, Vol. 117, No. 6172, May 4, 1999, p. 31.

⁷ see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Free Press, New York, 1960.

⁸ such as Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Vol. 2, p. 551.

⁹ R. W. Hefner, ‘Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia’, unpublished paper, Boston University, June 1996, p. 12.

¹⁰ Nurcholish Madjid, ‘Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experiences’, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, April-June 1994, p. 60.

¹¹ M.C. Ricklefs, ‘Islamization in Java: An Overview and Some Philosophical Considerations’ in Rapael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), Islam in Asia: Southeast and East Asia, Vol. 2, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 19.

¹² G. Barton, Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama’, op. cit., p. 324.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ William Liddle, ‘Politics and culture in Indonesia: highlights’, Politics and culture in Indonesia, University of Michigan, 1988, p. 12.

¹⁵ D. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia , op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁸ Adam Schwarz, A nation in waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1994, p. 172.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 174.

²⁰ The Koran (J.M. Rodwell, trans.), J.M. Dent, London, 1994, p. 39.

²¹ Greg Barton, ‘Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia’, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, pp. 7-8, 12.

²² A. Schwartz, A nation in waiting, op. cit., p. 174.

²³ R.W. Hefner ‘Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia’ in R. W. Hefner and P. Horvatich (eds.) Islam in an era of nation-states: politics and religious renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 1997, p. 90.

²⁴ R. Hefner, ‘Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia’, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁵ W. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia’ in Mark R. Woodyard (ed.), Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1996, p. 327.

²⁶ N. Madjid, ‘The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat’, op. cit., p. 188.

²⁷ N. Madjid, ‘More on Secularization’, in M. Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to ‘New Order’ Modernisation in Indonesia, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, pp. 198-210.

²⁸ Maasykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966-1993), Abera Verlag Meyer, Hamburg, 1997, p. 52.

²⁹ W. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism’, op. cit., p. 326.

³⁰ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy , op. cit., p. 52.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., p. 56.

³³ G. Barton, ‘The International Context of the Emergence of Islamic Neo Modernism in Indonesia’ in M.C. Ricklefs (eds.) Islam in the Indonesian Social Context, Annual Indonesian Lecture Series #15, CSEAS, Monash University, Melbourne, 1991, p. 73.

³⁴ N. Madjid, ‘The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat’, op. cit., p. 195.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 196.

³⁶ Istiadah, ‘Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia: Investigating paths to resist the patriarchal system’, CSEAS, Working Paper No. 91., Monash University, Clayton, 1994, p. 4.

³⁷ N. Madjid, Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesian , p. 206 as quoted in G. Barton ‘Neo- Modernism’, op. cit., p. 20.

³⁸ Various news reports, CNBC Asia, June 1999.

³⁹ see also Sura 3:159 and 41:38.

⁴⁰ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy, op. cit., p. 73.

⁴¹ Sura 1:5. The Koran (J.M. Rodwell, trans.), op. cit., p. 3.

⁴² N. Madjid, ‘An Islamic Appraisal of the Political Future of Indonesia’, Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator, Vol. 35, March 1985, p. 25.

⁴³ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 168-9.

⁴⁴ Various news reports, CNBC Asia, June 1999.

⁴⁵ R. Hefner, ‘Islam, State and Civil Society’, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁷ Greg Fealy, ‘The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle for Control of NU’ in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.) Nahdatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1996, p. 268.

⁴⁸ D. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia , op. cit., p. 158.

⁴⁹ Mark Woodward, “Conversations with Abdurrahman Wahid” in Mark Woodyard (ed.), Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1996, p. 147.

⁵⁰ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 194.

⁵¹ G. Barton, ‘Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama’ op. cit., p. 341.

⁵² M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 114.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 241.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 189.

⁵⁶ Abdurrahman Wahid, Abdurrahman, “Indonesian’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice? in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, 1990, p. 24.

⁵⁷ R. Hefner, ‘Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia’, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁸ Istiadah, ‘Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵⁹ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 241-2.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 220.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 168.

⁶² ‘Abdurrahman Wahid: Indonesia’s Enigmatic and Frail Hope’ , Indonesia Political Watch, Vol. 1, No. 4., 14 December 1998.

⁶³ M. Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy , op. cit., p. 237.

⁶⁴ R. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism’ op. cit., p. 338.

⁶⁵ R. Hefner , ‘Islam, State and Civil Society’, op. cit., p. 22.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

⁶⁸ D. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, op. cit., p. 102.

⁶⁹ Gerry van Klinken, ‘Emerging Support for the New President’, International Herald Tribune, Paris, June 9, 1998.

⁷⁰ R. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism’ op. cit., p. 339.

⁷¹ G. Barton, ‘The Impact of Islamic New-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The emergence of a new pluralism’, in Bourchier, David., and Legge, John (eds.), Indonesian Democracy - 1950’s and 1990’s, Monash Papers of Southeast Asia No. 31, CSEAS, Monash University, Clayton, 1994, pp. 148.

⁷² R. Liddle, ‘Media Dakwah Scripturalism’ op. cit., p. 340.

⁷³ ‘Abdurrahman Wahid: Indonesia’s Enigmatic and Frail Hope’, op. cit., p. 2.

⁷⁴ R. Hefner, Islam, State and Civil Society, p. 31.