This essay seeks to examine the way in which western interpreters have understood the role of logical and rational analysis in regards to the Middle Way or Madhyamika tradition of Buddhism. I plan to take two different approaches to this issue. Firstly, I will examine the issue of the way in which analysis is used for the giving of intellectual proofs concerning the validity of Buddhist theories of emptiness (nirvana), looking briefly at some of the concepts that are used. Secondly, I will examine the way in which western interpreters have sought to understand the interconnection (or otherwise) between logical and rational analysis, and the achievement of insight into emptiness.

To appreciate the role of rational analysis in Buddhism, we first need to briefly examine the nature of Buddhism. Happold describes Buddhism as being the ‘most mystical and the least mystical of all the higher religions, the most spiritual religion and not a religion at all.’¹ While Buddhism is often characterised as a set of philosophical doctrines, much of it is grounded in religious experiences arising from the act of meditation. When Buddhism is understood as a religious system, its philosophical doctrines can be characterised as being no more than an attempt to ‘articulate concepts and principles explaining and justifying meditation and the kind of experience which (meditation) aims at producing.’² That is, the philosophical systems articulated under the name of Buddhism are not necessarily universal in applicability, but relate more to a specific religious system and religious way of thinking. While this may seem reductionist, many Buddhists would agree with the sentiments that ‘someone who adopted typical Buddhist philosophical theories but who had no interest in meditational practice or in certain sorts of experience would hardly qualify as a Buddhist.’³

Many of the contrasting views associated with analysis and insight can be traced back to the number of Buddhist traditions and the plethora of different subschools contained within those traditions. This renders any universal conclusions regarding the role of logical and rational analysis as essentially meaningless.⁴ Therefore, I will restrict much of this survey to the Consequentialist or Prasangika sub-school of the Madhyamika tradition with special attention to the thoughts of Candrakirti and Nagarjuna.
 

Rational analysis as giving intellectual proof to the
theory of emptiness.

Sweet states that the concept of the two truths (satyadvaya) is central to understanding the Madhyamika tradition.⁵

“The conventional (samvrtih) and the ultimate - these are accepted as the two truths. Reality (tattvam) is beyond the sphere of the intellect; intellect is called ‘concealing’ (samvrtih).”⁶

These two truths do not suggest the existence of a multiplicity of truths. Rather, the Prasangika Madhyamika, in its definition of ‘conventional truth’ distinguishes between a ‘true conventional’ (tathyasamvrtih) which can be perceived by unimpaired sense organs, and a ‘false conventional’ (mithyasamvrtih) which consists of illusions. However, both aspects of conventional truth are understood as being invalid from the standpoint of the ultimate.⁷ Candrakirti considers conventional truth as no more than an artificially constructed (krtrimam) truth which is the object of those with false vision (mrsadarsana).⁸ However, despite this negativistic view of conventional truth, when the epistemological and ontological character of this truth is taken into account, conventional truth becomes that which is ‘found by conventional means of valid knowledge.’⁹ Those scholars in the Geluk tradition conclude that, given this, the task of the Middle Way is not a solely negative one. Sweet finds that, while the disputation of those false notions that prevent the realisation of the ultimate reality is an important task for the Madhyamika, its role also extends to that of validating all phenomena that constitute both rebirth (samsara) and emptiness (nirvana).¹⁰
 
 

The question over the place of intellectual proofs vouching for the validity of emptiness appears to hinge on the interpretation of such statements as ‘Reality is not within the sphere of the intellect.’¹¹ The Geluk school seeks to interpret this particular view in light of a selective portion of Sikasamuccaya which suggests that the ultimate is actually capable of being an object of cognition, even if only for a Buddha.¹² This concept is further supported by Svatantrika’s position that intellectual inaccessibility refers only to intellects endowed with dualistic perception.¹³

A further issue related to the two truths is that of svabhava and its ramifications for Madhyamika proofs of emptiness. Candrakirti defines this concepts as ‘that property which is invariable in a thing . . . because that property is not dependent on another,’¹⁴ and makes a connection between genuine svabhava and the ultimate reality (paramartha).¹⁵ This equating of terms implies that genuine intrinsic nature is neither an entity or a non-entity, and therefore precludes any pure definition that utilises words and concepts.
 
 

One of the most striking elements in Candrakirti’s use of svabhava, is the prima facie inconsistencies in his usage of the concept. Ames seems to imply that this can be possibly traced back to the specific intention of his work.¹⁶ In the Madhyamakavatara, Candrakirti claims that the the svabhava of things does exist, while in the Prasannapada he claims that intrinsically, it is neither existent or non-existent. The argument here being that claims of existence are made on the level of conventional truth only to avoid frightening the unenlightened hearer into nihilistic conclusions in regards to the ultimate, while the non committal claim is made on the level of imputation and conventional reality. This is in accord with with the way in which Buddha modified his teaching in light of the needs and capabilities of various disciples.¹⁷ It appears that in order to maintain a logical validity within the proofs of emptiness, Candrakirti uses various levels of definition; positively in terms of entities possessing svabhava as invariable properties of that thing and negatively as a negation of the previous definition.

However, I think it needs to be questioned whether Candrakirti actually needs to maintain this purported logical validity. It often appears that the dialectic is not undertaken to prove any particular philosophical point. Rather, it is directed at the realisation that any epistemological or ontological conclusions concerning the nature of the self and emptiness are meaningless due to the presence of incorrect prior presuppositions. This can be seen in the assertion that it is not possible to state whether a person is identical with or different from the aggregation, nor whether a person is permanent or impermanent.¹⁸ Generally we could say in life that there are two distinct ways of understanding, a correct way and an incorrect way. If we were to state that Candrakirti uses an incorrect or logically invalid method, then this could interpreted to imply support to the Prasangika assertion that it is the substantialist and essentialist philosophies that are invalid, in that their use of culturally conditioned logical procedures condemns them to being unable to rise above those errors inherently contained within their presuppositions. In this light, reason can only have the potential to transcend the rational mind when such reason is not bound by illusionary concepts. Jang-kya states that the proper role of reasoning such as that found in Candrakirti’s Sevenfold analysis, is for the ‘clarifying the path of liberation for the fortunate . . . not for the sake of those who are intent on debate.’¹⁹ I would interpret this as an indication that reason has the potential to transcend the rational mind when one reaches the stage of a Bodhisattvaic non-dual understanding of reality. Being a partaker in that which is ultimate reality (paramartha), reason becomes transcended so to clarify that which is, under normal circumstances, beyond that of the rational mind.

The ability of reason to transcend or go beyond the rational mind raises the issue of whether language is able to transcend its structural limitations in order to sufficiently prove theories of emptiness. However, in conducting a thematic investigation into language as used by the Madhyamika, we find that such a discussion is completely foreign to Madhyamika thinking on account of the lack of any Sanskrit word with a meaning that extends as far as the western conception of ‘language’.²⁰
 
 

Sprung finds that the use of language in this cultural context does not extend to the giving of names. Rather, language is used to bind together that which is disjointed and meaningless so as to allow the Buddhist to negotiate their way around that which is essentially meaningless in an effective and productive manner. According to Nagarjuna, all putative attributions (dharmas ) are false in that they are concepts of ‘attribution’ and ‘subject of attribution.’ These illusionary and unintelligible concepts demand that language be devoid of any cognitive function.²¹

Cabezon²² asks that whether, given the Buddhist belief that language is unable to depict reality, the verbalisation of any doctrine will accomplish anything beyond contradicting reality? Thurman finds that Nagarjuna, recognising such limitations, refuses to validate the usage of any verbal formula. Essentially, he understands that which is dharma as motionless, inert, silent and that dormant bliss that goes beyond all human perceptions and elaborations. Its quiescent nature is emphasised in that ‘not a bit of it was ever taught by any Buddha for anyone anywhere.’²³ This represents a complete refusal by Nagarjuna to allow any verbal formula to be misconstrued as authoritarian dogma.²⁴ The conclusion here appears to be that verbal formulations are structurally incapable of providing a full and sufficient means of communicating authoritarian truth.

Does such an understanding ultimately render the Madhyamika tradition as baseless? In terms of dogma that is derived from interpretations of scripture which are in themselves interpretations, yes. Cabezon argues that for a scripture to contain definite meaning (nitartha), it must linguistically depict emptiness. That is, it must be in the form of a pure negation. The paradox in this being that, in verbalising definite meaning, the linguistic outcome is reduced to an indirect meaning (neyartha).²⁵ This is not to say that the ineffable nature of the understanding of self (such as the tathagatagarbha) which is taught out of necessity (gdos pa), is incapable of being depicted linguistically so to enable beings to reach their full potential.²⁶ For it is not the words in themselves that are true in this sense, rather it is the ‘enunciation of ultimate truth that becomes the sole criterion of the Buddha’s intention.’²⁷ Such real teaching is ‘rationalistic, non-authoritarian, and empirically pragmatic.’²⁸

Huntington recognises these limitations, finding that Candrakirti holds that the end result of the yogic experience is one that represents the ‘end of the process of assigning labels and the end of the labels themselves.’²⁹ Interpreting this statement as a piece of linguistic exaggeration, we see Candrakirti emphasising the point that all claims of ‘emptiness’ must be made as a ‘non-referring’ terms. As such, he does not seek to explain the nature of reality. No change in ontological status is said to occur when a yogi reaches nirvana, only the disolution of all reifying thought. Neither does he appear to want ‘emptiness’ conceptualised, for this would result in the construction of it as ultimate truth. Concepts that refer to ultimate truth such as nirvana are ‘absolutely unsusceptible to conceptualisation’³⁰ Rather, Candrakirti’s assertion points more to a change in attitude towards mundane experience in which all appears empty to the practitioner who has fully internalised the dialectic of the Madhyamika. This attitude brings about the ‘direct realisation of the absence of intrinsic being within all phenomena.’³¹ This does not refer to non-being, rather to the dependent origination which is the constituting factor in mundane experience.
 
 

Huntington concludes that, given the application of the non-referential theory of language and conceptual thought, the use of logical and rational analysis takes on a purely pragmatic dimension.³² That is, a set of abstract logical propositions can only be regarded as having true value if they transcend their conceptual role of forming a series of successful theoretical proofs for Buddhist theories of emptiness. Scholastic and academic viability becomes secondary. Rather than seeking to explain the nature of reality, the use of analysis is in its ability to initiate a fundamental shift in the way in which reality is approached. Huntington describes this as ‘making propaganda’³³ It is convincing people to turn their back on the way they currently perceive reality, and to bring about an alteration in attitude towards mundane experiences.

Taking these views to an extreme, Bucknell³⁴ finds that while the path of practice in the Madhyamika is essentially grounded in empirical observation and reason, no measure of faith is actually required, only an awareness of the possible results that may arise from such meditation. It is from this awareness that an assessment of the validity or otherwise of such meditative practices can occur. That is, rational analysis and observation are used to prove that which may or may not happen under a controlled set of circumstances. This comes across as imperialistic and highly insincere, reducing both Buddhist meditation specifically, and religious experience generally, to an experiment that is interpreted outside of its proper social and cultural context.
 

The relationship between rational analysis and insights into emptiness.
 

Given that logical and rational analysis has some sort of valid role in providing the Madhyamika tradition a intellectually verifiable proofs for its theories of emptiness, what can be said of the role of analysis in regards to producing the Buddhist insight into emptiness?

A majority of western scholars appear to agree that a relationship between rational analysis and the gaining of insight into emptiness does exist. The issue is probably more one of the strength of the relationship between analysis and insight. Dean³⁵ suggests four various positions that are available on this issue, ranging from the denial of the existence of any relationship, to rational analysis being a necessary and sufficient condition for producing both an intuitive and conceptual insight. Essentially, it comes down to the centrality of any analysis, particularly the ability of consequential (prasanga) analysis to determine thought structures favourable to insight, that scholars are divided on.³⁶

The first possibility is that no relationship between analysis and insight exists on the basis that logical and rational analysis is unable to cause insight. This position holds that there is no causal relationship between the two, and denies any possible soteriological or ontological dimension to analysis. Inada³⁷ is not prepared to concede any role for logic that goes beyond that of depicting the play or function of reason. Further, Murti³⁸ finds that intuition exists independently of ‘contingent factors (such) as a special faculty, favourable circumstances or previous information.’³⁹ These scholars appear to state that consequential analysis is not to be regarded as a priori to insight.

The second viewpoint is that analysis serves to prepare the ground in which insight is able to arise. This line of thought suggests that preparation for real understanding includes a course in negative dialectic from which the intuition of a transcendent truth subsequently unfolds in the form of an inward conviction. That is, the dialectic serves only to create the conditions necessary for the arising of insight.

In this light, Streng finds that the negative dialectic can be used to ‘break a person’s mental and emotional attachment to phenomenal and ideal entities without positing an unconditional eternal source of all phenomena behind the phenomena.’⁴⁰ Analysis serves to dismantle those illusionary mindsets that hinder the meditative experience of emptiness. Drawing on the writings of Nagarjuna, Streng holds that logical analysis can provide conceptual formulations that contain a useful criterion of right views.⁴¹ From this, the ultimate can subsequently be understood from both the intellectual or conceptual experience that comes via logical analysis, as well as non-conceptual experience.⁴² Therefore, the rational analysis of what constitutes emptiness using concepts and symbols, serves as a preliminary tool for the gaining of a real mode of knowing the unconditioned through intuition.⁴³

While Streng’s view relies on the existence of a causal relationship between analysis and insight, Gangadean holds that logic can be used in a preparatory role without such a causal relationship. The underlying concepts that constitute the formal consciousness are understood to be neither independent, absolute or self existent.⁴⁴ Using a transformational dialectic in which the consciousness is moved beyond all possible conceptual structures, forms of discourse, natural and philosophical languages and ontologies,⁴⁵ the categorical structures and forms that constitute the primary consciousness (sunya) are understood to be in error and subsequently dismantled until all becomes unintelligible and meaningless. When reassembled, mundane experience is understood neither as being self existent or absolute. Logical allows the adherent to be released to in a way that leads to greater understanding, free from the limitations of predictive structure and descriptive modes of discourse.⁴⁶ This view would appear to be more in accordance with the Prasangika sub-school as espoused by Candrakirti, in that it finds no causal relationship existing between the analysis and the insight. Gangadean manages this by the use of an external instructor to implant the necessary conditions required to gain insight.

The third view is that analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of a intuition of insight (jnana). This category argues for a stronger relationship between rational analysis and insight than that of a preparatory role. Rather than logical analysis leading to a purely conceptual insight, Fenner suggests that such analysis serves to bring about those conditions necessary for deconceptualising. Essentially, the dialectic induces those conditions necessary for the destructuring of concepts, from which the insight that the concepts themselves are empty can occur. When the meditator understands that no concepts ultimately exist, that which is ultimate can be understood through intuition.⁴⁷ Conceptual activity leads to a situation where the non-conceptual is experienced. Fenner, assuming that the law of non-contradiction holds when applied to the human mind,⁴⁸ finds that it is ‘psychologically impossible to maintain logically contradictory concepts simultaneously in a unity of consciousness.’⁴⁹ Therefore, this conceptual analysis becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for the intuitive insight in that the logical contradictions arising through analysis necessitate a destructuring of that which is being analysed.

The fourth category is the understanding that analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for producing a conceptual (prajna) and intuitive (jnana) insight. This category suggests a stronger relationship between analysis and insight, partly due to its conclusions being drawn from wider range of sub-schools within the Madhyamika tradition.

Hopkins suggests that the initiative is obtained using a conceptual realisation which was in turn obtained using a preparatory analytical path. He finds that the end result of analytical meditation is a ‘calm abiding’ that occurs in a context where there is an absence of intellectual activity. That is, direct cognition or intuition of emptiness takes place within a context of meditative stabilisation where all intellectual activity has ceased to be. Such stabilisation is induced by analytical meditation.⁵⁰ In this case, Hopkins argues that it is analysis that has been a direct cause of the insight. However, his claim that the stabilisation that constitutes an absence of intellectual activity is able to lead to higher degrees of analysis, which in turn lead to greater states of stabilisation, appears completely paradoxical on account of the illogical progression of an absence of something leading to a greater amount of that thing, which subsequently leads to its absence again in a fuller degree.⁵¹

Thurman holds an equally strong position on the relationship between analysis and both conceptual and non-conceptual insight. Thurman believes that while the ultimate can be understood as an intuitive non-conceptual experience, the ultimate is also a conceptual or intellectual experience.⁵² That is, given that emptiness can be proved and is capable of undergoing conceptual cognition, ‘conceptual, analytic wisdom (becomes) absolutely indispensable to attain a correct cognition of ultimate reality.’⁵³ The boundaries of human reason are ‘pushed to its utmost and held there by the cultivated power of concentration’⁵⁴ in order to achieve insight into emptiness. In this case, the transcendent nature of verbalisation is viewed as an affirmation of empiricism so that ‘rational knowledge of the fact that reality . . . is never reducible to what we may say about it.’⁵⁵ Therefore, a full and complete apprehension of the ultimate is both conceptual and intuitive in nature.⁵⁶ That is, the conceptual is able to bring about the intuitive, as verbalisation as expressed in its highest degree, is capable of transcending its normal mundane usage to the nature of ultimate reality and the self.⁵⁷
 

In Conclusion.

Is the Madhyamika tradition is used solely for giving intellectual proofs, or does its value lie more in the production of Buddhist insight? It seems that the way in which this question is answered is highly contingent on the way in which Buddhism is understood. I believe that, in the same way in which Buddhist philosophical systems do not appear to accept systems of logical necessity (in that various concepts are understood as being neither A or not-A), universally applicable definitions of Buddhism that are concise and meaningful do not come easily using words and concepts. Therefore, what constitutes Buddhism is always up for interpretation. Is it religious or non religious? Mystical or non-mystical? Supra-rational or sub-rational? Is it grounded in logic or experience? Or is it a hybrid of all of these at the one time?

It appears that, to take an extreme position on the ‘religiosity spectrum’ will naturally invoke some form of bias within our conclusions. For example, to work on the presumption that Buddhism is no more than an intricate philosophical system devoid of any significant underlying religious character, is to restrict the resultant conclusions of any investigation to secular non-religious ends. Insight, becomes interpreted purely as a psychological occurrence, not a mystical or religious one. Philosophically, emptiness can become a non-mystical philosophical state. Religion becomes a series of doctrines and propositions that are open to systematisation. Conversely, to view Buddhism as a highly mystical religious system is to risk restricting the influence of logical or rational understanding within any conclusions. Such a supra-rational view suggests that Buddhist religious experience transcends the realms of logical and linguistical expression. The inability of reason to transcend the rational mind renders any attempts at an intellectual proof as worthless. It could even be said that Buddhism maintains its mysterious nature due to the excess of intelligibility within it, rather than its irrational unintelligibility. The role of philosophy becomes reduced to that of being a ‘handmaid of religion.’

Is there a position that can be characterised as being true for the Madhyamika tradition? One of the major problems here appears to lie in the desire of the western mind to systematise Buddhism into experiential and doctrinal categories. It must be remembered that Buddhism is not in itself, a religious system based on doctrine or dogma. No one canonical doctrine exist as such, and no authoritarian leader exists that can give ‘infallible’ decisions on such matters. Buddhist scriptures are inherently interpretive. What is presented as doctrine is often a product of scholarly work that is undertaken outside of Buddhist cultures by western academics. Therefore, I would argue that the raising of this question demonstrates the western protestant emphasis on seeking some form of orthodox doctrinal position vis-a-vis the liturgical and cultural emphasis intrinsic in common Buddhism.⁵⁸ Writers such as Cabezon freely admit to forcing culturally inappropriate concepts and problems into their investigations on the assumption that this is a legitimate course of action.⁵⁹ Why should it be? In seeking to understand any religion, an outside observer will view that religion through their own cultural perspectives. In this case, our cultural bias could be said to be our high reliance on our western brands of analytical thinking, logic and philosophical analysis. If such tools possess a degree of cultural relativity, then any conclusions may seem at best irrelevant to those who operate completely within a Buddhist culture.

The Madhyamika dialectic is, in a sense, designed to demonstrate the meaningless nature of epistomological and ontological explanations of reality. I would characterise this as ‘when you begin to play the game - you have already lost!’ To begin an analytical dissection of how the system fits together, is to take an investigative path that is ultimately unable to provide a sensible solution by nature of the subject. It can be suggested that one reason for this can be seen in the claim that, in the end Madhyamika analysis has an ‘inherent self-destruct mechanism.’⁶⁰ This is possibly due to the way in which analysis is defined as a phenomena which is without substance.

Therefore, I find it impossible to make any definite statements on the role of rational analysis within in the Middle Way. Analysis can provide intellectual proofs to validate nirvana while concurrently producing some degree of insight into the matter. I believe that a true understanding can only come from experience within Buddhist culture, in that many concepts and ideas within the Madhyamika appear to transcend western interpretations. Forgive me for being cynical, but I can’t help but think that much of what I have read about this issue refers to a Buddhism that has been exported and now exists in universities, and not a Buddhism that exists as practiced and understood by the common village people with a long and proud history of Buddhist beliefs within their culture.
 
 

Bibliography
 
 

Ames, William J., ‘The notion of Svbhava in the thought of Candrakirti’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 10, 1982, pp. 161-77.
 

Benz, Ernst, ‘On understanding non-Christian religions’ in M. Eliade and J.M. Kitagawa The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, University of Chicago 1959.
 

Bucknell, R.S. and Stuart-Fox, M., ‘The ‘Three Knowledges’ of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa’s Interpretation of rebirth’, Religion, vol. 13, 1983, pp. 99-112.
 

Cabezon, Jose I., ‘The concepts of truth and meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures’, The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1981, pp. 7-24 as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987.
 

Dean, Colin, L., The Relationship Between Analysis and Insight in Madhyamika Buddhism: A Logico-Psychological Model, Masters Thesis, Deakin University, 1993
 

Fenner, Peter, ‘Reason in Buddhism’ in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987(a), pp. 103-30.
 

Fenner, Peter, ‘A reconstruction of the Madhyamakavatara’s analysis of the person’, The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, 1983, pp. 7-34 as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987(b).
 

Gangadean, Ashok, ‘Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of consciousness’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 29, no. 1, 1979, pp. 21-48.
 

Happold, F.C. Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology Penguin;England, 1990.

Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956.
 

Huntington, C. W. Jr., ‘The system of two truths in the Prasannapada and Madhyamakavatara: a study in Madhyamika soteriology’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, no. 11, 1983, pp. 77-106.
 

Siderits, Mark, ‘The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology I’ Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 8, 1980, pp. 307-35.
 

Siderits, Mark, ‘The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology II’ Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 9, 1981, pp. 121-60.
 

Sprung, Mervyn, ‘Non-Cognitive Language in Madhyamika Buddhism’ in Kawamura, Leslie S. & Scott, Keith, Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization, Dharma Publishing, Emeryville, 1977, pp. 241-53 as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987.
 

Streng, Frederick J., ‘The Buddhist doctrine of two truths as religious philosophy’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, no.3, pp. 262-71.
 

Sweet, Michael J., ‘Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 as a focus for Tibetan interpretations of the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamika’, the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 1979, pp. 79-89.
 

Thurman, Robert A.F., ‘Buddhist Hermeneutics’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. XLVI, no. 1, pp. 19-39.
 

Williams, Paul M., Silence and truth: some aspects of the Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet’, The Tibet Journal, vol. 7, no. 1/2, 1982, pp. 67-80.
 

Wilson, Joe B., Chandrakirti’s Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation of the selflessness of persons Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, New Delhi, 1980.

¹ F.C. Happold, Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology Penguin;England, 1990, p. 159.

² C.W. Huntington, ‘The system of two truths in the Prasannapada and Madhyamakavatara: a study in Madhyamika soteriology’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, no. 11, 1983, p. 80.

³ Ibid.

⁴ C.L. Dean, The Relationship Between Analysis and Insight in Madhyamika Buddhism: A Logico-Psychological Model, Masters Thesis, Deakin University, 1993, p. 15.

⁵ M.J. Sweet, ‘Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 as a focus for Tibetan interpretations of the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamika’, the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 1979, p. 79.

⁶ Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 in
Ibid., p. 79.

⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 82.

¹¹ Bodhicaryavatara 9:2c

¹² Sweet, op. cit., p. 83.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ W.L. Ames, ‘The notion of Svbhava in the thought of Candrakirti’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 10, 1982, p. 161.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁸ P. Fenner, ‘A reconstruction of the Madhyamakavatara’s analysis of the person’, The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, 1983, as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987(b), p. 164.

¹⁹ J.B. Wilson, Chandrakirti’s Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation of the selflessness of persons Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, New Delhi, 1980, p. 3.

²⁰ M. Sprung, ‘Non-Cognitive Language in Madhyamika Buddhism’ in Kawamura, Leslie S. & Scott, Keith, Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization, Dharma Publishing, Emeryville, 1977, as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987, p. 180.

²¹ Ibid.

²² J.I. Cabezon, ‘The concepts of truth and meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures’, The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1981, pp. 7-24 as appears in Religious Investigations: The philosophy of religion reader, Deakin University, Geelong, 1987, p. 178.

²³ R.A.F. Thurman , ‘Buddhist Hermeneutics’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. XLVI, no. 1, p. 36.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Cabezon, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁶ Ibid.,p. 176-8.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁸ Thurman, op. cit., p. 36.

²⁹ Huntington, op. cit., p. 99.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

³¹ Ibid., p. 99.

³² Ibid., p. 102.

³³ Ibid., p. 103.

³⁴ R.S. Bucknell & M. Stuart-Fox, ‘The ‘Three Knowledges’ of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa’s Interpretation of rebirth’, Religion, vol. 13, 1983, p. 110.

³⁵ Dean, op. cit., p. 115.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 116.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 117.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ F.J. Streng, ‘The Buddhist doctrine of two truths as religious philosophy’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, no.3, p. 267.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 266.

⁴² Dean, op. cit., p. 122.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ A. Gangadean, ‘Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of consciousness’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 29, no. 1, 1979, p. 39.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁷ Dean, op. cit., p. 125.

⁴⁸ J. Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956, p. 209.

⁴⁹ Dean, op. cit., p. 126.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 129.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., p. 131.

⁵³ Thurman, op. cit.,p. 35.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁶ Dean, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵⁷ Thurman, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁸ Ernst Benz, ‘On understanding non-Christian religions’ in M. Eliade and J.M. Kitagawa The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, University of Chicago 1959, p113.

⁵⁹ Cabezon, op. cit., p. 180.

⁶⁰ Sweet, op. cit., p. 86.