Natural Theology and theistic constructions.

The role of Natural Theology

How are we to understand ‘natural theology’? Clark describes natural theology as the act of ‘articulating, defending and criticising arguments for the existence and nature of God without the aid of special revelation.’¹ Such philosophical processes have enjoyed a long and sometimes chequered history stretching back to the dawn of the Christian era with Philo of Alexandria,² and can be found in many strands of theistic religions. The more classical natural theology traditions found in writers such as St Thomas Aquinas, seeks to ‘prove God’s existence and nature with arguments that employ premises that all rational creatures are obliged to accept.’³ As this tradition developed, the task of natural theology moved to the point of asking what specific conditions are needed so that religion becomes a logical possibility. It appears that much of the debate concerning natural theology revolves around the question of the validity or universal applicability of the presuppositions employed within the process, and how far it is possible for natural theology to go in articulating an understanding of specific characteristics or attributes of God.
 
 

The work of St Thomas Aquinas represents a systematisation of the various strands of thought that had developed throughout the process of natural theology. He also comes at a time when the Western philosophical landscape was beginning to open up to outside influences. At the turn of the thirteenth century, issues such as the existence and nature of God and the immortality of the soul were regarded as the sole province of theologians who essentially worked within the confines of Scriptural revelation. Philosophy was expressly forbidden to speculate on such areas, and the works of Aristotle were, in essence, unknown and inaccessible. It took a considerable period of time during the thirteenth century before those controversial aspects of Aristotle's natural philosophy became fully available, and were permitted to be lectured on in the arts schools.⁴

Aquinas was keen to affirm that his demonstrations of God’s existence was part of metaphysics.⁵ For him, the study of the proper causes of a particular being is in the same investigative field as the study that being itself. Therefore, as the study metaphysics examines being, or what is, metaphysics must also extend to consider the cause of such being. Natural theology becomes linked with the metaphysical search to discover why there is something instead of nothing. It would appear that on this point, Aquinas presupposes that philosophy has a metaphysical role. However, if philosophy involves the examination of things in their ‘highest degree of generality’,⁶ then the incorporation of metaphysics will pose a threat to the universality of any philosophical conclusions due to the way in which metaphysics examines the ‘nature of things generally with concepts drawn from a restricted domain.’⁷ While it may be argued that metaphysics is essentially a self limiting concept, others criticise the metaphysical arguments on account of the lack of a proper philosophical attitude within the process,⁸ though it is conceded that the approaches of the practical intellect serves as a helpful general preparation for the philosophical process.⁹

Traditional theistic arguments take the form of a posteriori arguments. That is, they are derived from experience. Such theistic proofs can be either clear apodictic demonstrations or arguments based in probability.¹⁰ This is compared to a priori arguments, which are prior to, and independent of experience.¹¹ Natural theology demands that it is really only a priori propositions that can deliver mathematical certainty when dealing with the existence of God, because they demand purely logical processes, and are separate from experiences that are often interpreted through a mindset that is already pro-theistic. That is, experience is always open to interpretations that are not necessarily purely rational in nature. However, I still believe that the mathematical certainty desired in matters religious by those such as Spinoza,¹² cannot be reached even when logically examining nature because we can not be certain that a degree of cultural relativity does not exist within the process of logic. Further, for natural theology to give answers that contain certainty, the assumptions employed by the process must also be certain. That is, the degree to which there exists uncertainty within those prior propositions will, all else being proper, be the determinant of the level of uncertainty contained within the final conclusions, in that ‘the conclusion of a deductive argument is already contained in the premises.’¹³

Proponents of natural theology claim that the process is capable of proving the existence of God to an atheist, though it would appear that as the tradition has continued to develop, the lack of complete certainty within the arguments has resulted in the process playing into the hands of atheists.
 

Forms of the Natural Theology Argument

We can identify four main types of proofs available in natural theology; cosmological, those from contingency, teleological and ontological proofs.¹⁴ Of these, Aquinas utilises all but the ontological proof in his ‘five ways of proving there is a God.’¹⁵

The first category is known as the ‘Cosmological argument’. These types of proof seek to explain some fundamental feature of the world or cosmos by suggesting that there is ultimately a transcendent cause of that feature. For example, if things in the world are subject to change, then this argument proposes that there is ultimately a transcendent cause of such change. Aquinas’s first two proofs are variations on this argument.

The first proof starts from the premise that the world is changeable, and concludes that there must be something that is an unchanging cause of such change. This is based on the presumption that movement and change depend on a current ‘mover’. This is a broader understanding of change than that involved in localised motion. Aquinas is picking up on Aristotle’s understanding of motion in the broad sense of change, that is, a ‘reduction from a state of potentiality to one of act.’¹⁶ However, potentialities are not self-actualising. To change, involves being changed. Aquinas argues that for change to occur, an operating force that has the potential to bring about such change must be at work. In the absence of this process being infinite, there must exist a prime mover.

The second of Aquinas’s arguments begins from the premise that all things in the world are related in a cause and effect way. This presumes that there are efficient causes in the world, and that in their current causal activities are dependent on the causal activity of other causes.¹⁷ This is not so much the rejection of the possibility of an infinite series of cause and effect, rather the existence of a ‘vertical hierarchy’¹⁸ where lower members rely on the causal activities of the higher members in the present. That is, a chain of causes exist where present as well as past causes are necessary. Essentially, unless reality is in the end inexplicable, there must be in existence something that is self-explanatory for reality to be understandable.¹⁹

There have been various objections to these cosmological arguments throughout their history. Kant rejects all forms of these proofs on two major grounds. Firstly, they err in that they take ‘the world as a totality or whole which requires explanation for its existence.’²⁰ To use this form of proof requires the implicit exclusion of the possibility that ‘the physical universe has had no initial state and consist(ed) eternally of matter in motion’,²¹ though these problems are reduced for the second proof if we understand infinite regress not in terms of necessary causal conditions, but rather as a regress of causal explanatory circumstances from which there is required a independent source.²² Secondly, Kant finds that this cosmology involves an ‘illicit extension of the principle of causality beyond the world of experience.’²³ That is, extending our primary assumptions beyond that which we can experience through our senses involves an ‘illicit transition from the conceptual to the real order’²⁴ which may not universally hold true. A possible example of this is Kenny’s proposition that the assumption that ‘only that which is actual can move something being potential to that actuality’ struggles to hold true in all circumstances.²⁵ Further, Geach appears to criticise the whole tradition of Aquinas on account of the world being treated as a ‘great big object’²⁶ throughout all his proofs. The dilemma being, that if we are to identify something, then we can only do so on the basis that that particular object can be distinguished from any other object. So when Aquinas classifies the world as ‘everything’, he face the dilemma of being unable to effectively contrast the world as being distinct to something else. The result being that he makes universal statements that are based upon restrictive presuppositions.

The second form of proof employed by Aquinas is the arguments from contingency. The rationale behind these arguments is that it is a fundamental feature of any being that while it exists, it can possibly not-exist. This is where Aquinas’s third argument commences. Things come into being, and at some stage given an infinite period of time, they may cease to be. That is, over time, there is a period in which they are not. Therefore, they do not exist as a ‘necessity’. Contingency proofs propose that this then requires the existence of an ultimate cause for that which is contingent, which is in itself not contingent. That is, something that exists in a way that it is impossible for it to not to not-exist. However, this concept of ‘necessary existent’ does not appear to exclude the possible existence of several ‘necessary beings’, being something ‘which cannot undergo any essential change’,²⁷ which can in fact not-exist vis-a-vis Kant’s perspective of ‘necessary being’ and ‘necessary existent’ being one in the same thing.²⁸

The third category of arguments are known as Ontological proofs. These arguments suggest that if we can form the concept of a wholly perfect and complete being, the very act of formulating such a concept entails that such a perfect being must exist, otherwise it would not be wholly perfect due to the absence of an ‘actual’ existence. The starting point of the ontological argument is similar to that of Aquinas’s fourth proof, in that both assume a concept of ‘perfection’. However, the ontological argument assumes that existence is a quality or attribute that is necessary for perfection. This makes the existence of such a being a logical necessity. However, the nature of logical necessity appears to state that essentially, no object can guarantee its own instantiation, by making its being a logical necessity on account of such necessity being a property of propositions, not a property of things.²⁹ In contrast, Aquinas argues that if things have varying degrees of perfection, then all we can logically conclude from this is that there must be a supreme good from which all other beings attempt to replicate, for God’s essence is not something other than or separate to his being. That is, unlike contingent beings whose existence is not explained by their essence, God’s existence is inseparable from God’s nature.³⁰

The last type of proof is known as the teleological proof. This argument finds that if the cosmos displays some fundamental order, design and purpose and adaption of means to ends, then there must be a supreme cause of such order.³¹ Aquinas uses this as his fifth argument. Unintelligent material things unconsciously co-operate in a way that a stable cosmic system is maintained. This logically points to the existence of an extrinsic intelligent author who operates such a system with an end in view.³² While this argument is capable of incorporating evolutionary theories, it does require the absolute ruling out the proposition that the world is ultimately inexplicable.
 

What do such arguments prove?

Philosophically, arguments such as Aquinas’s appear to solely prove the existence of something that is a ‘first unmoved mover’, a ‘first efficient cause’, a ‘necessary existent’, a ‘wholly perfect being’ or a ‘supreme cause of design and purposiveness’. It is only after each being is proved that Aquinas makes a statement along the lines of ‘and we all understand this being to be what we refer to as God’, in which he actually means the Judaeo-Christian God. These statements come across as not so much as a logical conclusion to the argument, rather a statement of the author’s presuppositions.

However, it must be remembered that the philosophical proofs within Summa theologiae are made within the context of a medieval theological education system that had been historically immersed in the ‘mystical’ theology of Augustine and found itself poorly equipped for an informed debate on the propositions of the newly emerging philosophical systems.³³ Charlesworth finds that Aquinas has attempted to construct a theological framework that utilises Greek philosophical theology while at the same time working within the worldview of Judaeo-Christian religion.³⁴ This Greek philosophy insists that for religious faith to have any meaning, it must take place within the constrains of human reason. That which is regarded as mysterious within religion, can only be mysterious on account of its excess of intelligibility, not its irrational unintelligibility.³⁵ For Aquinas, religious belief is not a divinely revealed ‘gnostic’ style faith, or an intuitive experience involving the suspension of normal logical and rational parameters. Faith both presupposes and requires nature. Therefore, reason must be regarded as being equal to specific religious revelations in the overall picture of theistic outworkings.³⁶ While this allows Aquinas to construct much of his natural theology using premises drawn from Aristotle's philosophy, his use of philosophical reason can only go as far as the parameters of the Judaeo-Christian theological worldview will permit.
Despite working within these constrains, the process of natural theology does not necessarily guarantee Aquinas’ proofs a conclusion that equates with Judaeo-Christian notions of God. It could quite validly be said that these proofs do not necessarily point towards the existence of God at all. Kant believes that such proofs are unable to either prove or disprove the existence of God on account of the usage of speculative reason which he finds as agnostic in nature.³⁷ Leaving aside issues of agnosticism, the ability of natural theology to present the existence of God as a rational possibility often appears to rest with the particular philosophical framework employed to approach the issue. Within a theistic philosophical framework, God’s non existence is clearly not possible. Even in the case of a badly constructed proof from contingency developed within a theistic framework, the attempted proof of God as a ‘necessary being’ may logically end up to be no more than a proof of God as a ‘necessary belief’.

Does Aquinas ultimately prove the existence of the Judaeo-Christian God? The concept of God found the Old Testament can be described as philosophically ‘very loose and imprecise’³⁸ when contrasted with the image that Aquinas develops. The Old Testament as history concentrates on particulars and that which is contingent. This appears to be at odds with Aquinas’s search for that which is universal, necessary and eternal.³⁹ Meanwhile, the New Testament doctrines of God are not approached from a metaphysical contemplation of necessary theistic elements, rather God is understood in terms of a personal and pro-active being.⁴⁰ It appears that, given the variety in the construction of theistic concepts throughout the history of Judaeo-Christian revelation, Aquinas finds himself on all accounts working at cross purposes to the writers of scripture. This may be in part due to each perspective being in a sense a product of the prevailing social and cultural conditions of the time. However, the fact that this philosophical conception of God is in a sense reconcilable with (or at best, not opposed too) a biblical view, suggests that the overall biblical view may actually presupposes Aquinas’ philosophical conception.

While it may be argued that the biblical concept of God is not the end product of any process of philosophical reasoning, scripture concedes the possibility of a natural theology where ‘what can be known about God is plain to them because God has shown it to them’, for Gods ‘eternal power and divine nature . . . (can be) understood and seen through the things he has made.’⁴¹ Aquinas uses this biblical concept to argue that natural theology can only operate properly when preceded by faith.⁴² Those concepts that are claimed to be known through specific revelation concerning the nature and attributes of God become in a sense recognisable in the conclusions of these proofs.⁴³ Therefore, the process does seek to discover that which is unknown, rather it seeks to make intelligible that which is already discovered.⁴⁴

Despite historical resistance to this style of philosophical theology by ecclesiastical authorities, elements of reformation theology embraced both natural theology and its proofs so they came not before the doctrine of faith, but became part of the doctrine itself, ⁴⁵ despite protests by some protestant reformers such as Calvin. In the process, natural theology became the cornerstone of much rational theology until the enlightenment and the influence of Kant. This ecclesiastical acceptance promoted these philosophical theologies so that they were no longer solely concerned with basic theistic proofs. The rational defence of those attributes that were considered as being appropriate for a theistic being, as well as an understanding of the meaning of such attributes became over time more accepted as legitimate areas of enquiry for natural and philosophical theology.⁴⁶
Given the potential problems involved in using natural reason to prove the probable existence of God, how can the process extend to the allocation of attributes to such a being? Two possible strands of thought can be isolated in Aquinas’s endeavour to espouse a full doctrine of God using natural theology. These are, his ‘way of negation’ and the use of analogy, particularly his doctrine of ‘analogical predication’.
 
 

The principles of analogy are crucial to Aquinas’s attempts at allocating attributes to God. Using the principle that no cause is capable of conferring any perfection that it does not possess itself and that such perfections are intrinsic to God’s nature, then it appears that any description of that perfection can only occur analogously. That is, the descriptions denote a ‘particular kind of similarity between two different orders or kinds of things.’⁴⁷ Proponents of this method argue that this is possible despite Kant’s objection that is it rational to propose that which can be known beyond that which is obtainable from direct sensory experience in the world. For when a perfection that we can experience is attributed to God, it is done so on the understanding that such a description is free from those limitations normally associated with that attribute existing in a caused being.⁴⁸ It is only ‘pure perfections’ such as life or existence that can ever be univocally applied, and only if their signification is exactly the same regardless of the subject in which the perfection is affirmed. Essentially, this rules out the possibility of any univocal linguistic descriptions of God.⁴⁹ Meanwhile ‘mixed perfections’ which, unlike ‘pure’ perfections imply imperfection when only partially realised, can only be employed in a metaphorical sense when describing God.⁵⁰

While Aquinas does not view philosophy as having any kind of ‘transcendent’ role, he takes up the philosophical task on the basis that a degree of rationality and philosophy need to be present for the position of pure faith to be an arguable option. This places philosophy in stark contrast to the transcendent nature found in God’s being. It is argued that if God is both transcendent and infinite, then the content of any specific revelation is likely to transcend the capacity of the finite human mind to comprehend it. Therefore, assuming God is the transcendent first cause of the world, then his characteristics will be, by definition, above and beyond the things of this world. It becomes impossible to describe God by what he is, particularly with Aquinas’s usage of metaphysics given the restrictive constrains implicitly contained within the process. For example, God can not correctly be described as possessing wisdom or justice, as he possesses these characteristics in a way that exceeds our power of comprehension.⁵¹ Rather, God’s attributes can be understood in natural theology by describing what they are not. For example, the cosmological argument can be used to describe God as not changing or subject to change, and the arguments from contingency can be used to describe God as a non contingent entity.⁵²

However, in his attempt to combine Greek philosophical theology with the Judaeo-Christian religion to prove both the presuppositions of faith and the non-impossibility of the articles of faith, Aquinas risked creating a hierarchy where revelation and faith are distinct and over philosophy and reason. That which is understood from revelation is different from that which is understood as philosophical truths. While both streams have the same object, that is God, they understand this object from differing perspectives. Religion takes God as the one who reveals his being and character through specific revelation, while the philosophical perspective approaches God as either the author of nature or a cosmological first cause devoid of specific attributes.⁵³ In an endeavour to overcome this dilemma, Aquinas employs a doctrine of ‘analogical predication,’ where he attempts to affirm as true that which be proved by the parallel examination of religion and philosophy. Rather than expressing characteristics in a univocal sense, they are expressed as being a similar attribute despite its application to a transcendent being.⁵⁴

This leads us to the question of ‘Is the God that is supposedly proved the Judaeo-Christian God, or are their other possible alternatives?’ Given Phillip’s logic,⁵⁵ if God is by definition all perfect, then a plurality of Gods is impossible on the basis that they would be indistinguishable from one another, as no God would lack an attribute that would differentiate itself from any other. Therefore, natural theology would seem to affirm some form of monotheistic belief as being the sole true position. However, many of the presuppositions are in themselves, a product of the westernised monotheistic worldview prevalent during the history of natural theology. A Hindu would have no problem in regarding some Gods as subordinate manifestations with specialised functions.⁵⁶ If Dharma or Brahman were inserted as presuppositions into the natural theology process, one could find very different results.
 
 

If God’s existence was in the end recognised as a probability, then the empirical hypothesis ‘God exists’ would essentially be no more than the recognition of a particular sequence of rules regulating the process of nature. To refer to God as a transcendent being with a particular manifestation returns the theistic search to a metaphysical problem.⁵⁷ Whenever we return to metaphysics, the theist will inevitable struggle against evidentialism, on the basis that the prime evidence submitted by the theist can never really be sufficient for a full and certain proof.⁵⁸
 

In Conclusion

That which is proved by natural theology, can never really be sufficient for any religious purposes. Kant would want to strike out all proofs or disproofs that emanate from natural theology as invalid on the basis that God is beyond the reach of speculative reason. This effectively removes religious belief out of the realm of philosophical analysis. However, while Aquinas remains within the process of philosophy, he reduces any sense of religious belief as an intellectual assent to the truthfulness or validity of particular religious propositions. This particular view removes the necessity of ethical considerations that come about as a result of belief. Belief may change a believers ethical outlook in a practical manner, but this does not occur as a necessity. This is very much in line with what is proved through his five proofs. There are no moral or ethical consequences that would naturally flow from a belief in ‘the great uncaused cause’.

The philosophical God serves as a logical non-impossibility for the articles of faith while being unable to point to a specific theistic construct as being the sole true God. It would be interesting to take into account twentieth century trends in philosophy, particularly the work of process philosophers in relation to the chaos theory and its possible influence on the presuppositions and methodology of natural theology.
 

Bibliography
 

Aquinas, Thomas, (McDermott, T. (ed.)) Summa Theologiœ: a Concise Translation , Methuen, London, 1989.
 

Ayer, Alfred J., ‘On the Literal Significance of Religious Sentences’, in Santoni, Ronald E., Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968, pp. 129-35 in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong
 

Bavinck, Herman., The Doctrine of God, W.B. Eerdmans, Edinburgh, 1951.
 

Bilimoria, Purusottoma et. al., Religious Investigations: The Philosophy of Religion Study Guide Deakin University, Geelong, 1987.
 

Charlesworth, Max, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches Herder and Herder, New York, 1972.
 

Clark, Kelly J. (ed.), Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1992.
 

Copleston, F.C., Aquinas, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1955.
 

Dryer, D.P., ‘The Limits of Metaphysical Knowledge’ in Dryer, D.P., Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, pp. 477-526 in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong.
 

Edwards, David L., Tradition and Truth: The Challenge of England’s Radical Theologians 1962-1989, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1989.
 

Elders, Leo J., The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1990.
 

Hick, John H., The Existence of God, Macmillan, New York, 1964.
 

Hick, John H., Arguments for the Existence of God, Herder and Herder, New York, 1971.
 

Hinnells, John R. (ed) A Handbook of Living Religions Penguin, England, 1984.
 

Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956.
 

Joyce, G.H., ‘Religious Language is Analogously Descriptive’, in Charlesworth, Max (ed.) The Problems of Religious Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974, pp. 103-17 in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong.
 

Kenny, Anthony (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, New York, 1969.
 

Phillips, D.Z., ‘Hume’s Legacy’ in Phillips, D.Z., Religion without Explanation, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp. 7-27 in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong.
 

Spinoza, Benedict A Theologico-Political Treatise (Trans. R.H.M. Elwes), Dover, New York, 1951, pp. 98-119.
 

Wollheim, R., Hume on Religion, Collins, London, 1963.
 

Biblical quote from
New Revised Standard Version, World Bible Publishers, Iowa, 1989.

¹ K.J. Clark (ed.), Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1992, p. 1.

² M. Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches Herder and Herder, New York, 1972, p. 45.

³ Clark, op. cit, 1992, p. 1.

⁴ D. Knowles ‘The Historical Context of the Philosophical Work of St Thomas Aquinas’ in A. Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, New York, 1969, pp. 15-6.

⁵ Leo J. Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1990, p. 84.

⁶ Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956, p. 55.

⁷ D.P. Dryer, ‘The Limits of Metaphysical Knowledge’ in D.P. Dryer, Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, p. 52.

⁸ Elders, op. cit, 1990, p. 139.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ John Hick, The Existence of God, Macmillan, New York, 1964, p. 3.

¹¹ John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, Herder and Herder, New York, 1971, p. viii.

¹² Benedict Spinoza A Theologico-Political Treatise (Trans. R.H.M. Elwes), Dover, New York, 1951, pp. 99-100.

¹³ Alfred J. Ayer, ‘On the Literal Significance of Religious Sentences’, in Santoni, Ronald E., Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968, p. 194.

¹⁴ as listed in M. Charlesworth ‘Philosophy of Religion: the natural theology tradition’ in Purusottoma Bilimoria et. al., Religious Investigations: The Philosophy of Religion Study Guide Deakin University, Geelong, 1987, pp. 19-23.
Some would add ‘ethical proofs’ as a separate category.

¹⁵ Aquinas, Thomas, (McDermott, T. (ed.)) Summa Theologiœ: a Concise Translation , Methuen, London, 1989, pp. 12-14.

¹⁶ F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1955, p. 115.

¹⁷ Hick, op. cit, 1964, p. 87.

¹⁸ F.C. Copleston ‘Commentary on the five ways’ in Hick, op. cit, 1964, p. 88.

¹⁹ Hick, op. cit, 1971, p. 43.

²⁰ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 109.

²¹ Hick, op. cit, 1971, p. 40.

²² Ibid., p. 42.

²³ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 109.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Hick, op. cit, 1971, quoting Anthony Kenny, pp. 40-1.

²⁶ D.Z. Phillips, ‘Hume’s Legacy’ in D.Z. Phillips, Religion without Explanation, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976 in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong, p. 190.

²⁷ Patterson Brown ‘St. Thomas’ Doctrine of Necessary Being’ in Anthony Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, New York, 1969, p. 165.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 162-3.

²⁹ Hick, op. cit, 1971, p. 85.

³⁰ N. Wolterstorff ‘Divine Simplicity’ in Clark, op. cit, 1992, p. 144.

³¹ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1987, p. 21.

³² Hick, op. cit, 1964, p. 91.

³³ Knowles, op. cit, 1969, p. 17.

³⁴ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 82.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 106.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 76-7.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

⁴¹ Romans 1:19-20, New Revised Standard Version, World Bible Publishers, Iowa, 1989, p. 144.

⁴² Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 93.

⁴³ Elders, op. cit, 1990, p. 131.

⁴⁴ N. Kretzmann, ‘Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism’ in Kelly J. Clark (ed.), op. cit, 1992, pp. 27-8.

⁴⁵ Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, W.B. Eerdmans, Edinburgh, 1951, p. 67.

⁴⁶ Clark, op. cit, 1992, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 80.

⁴⁸ G.H. Joyce, ‘Religious Language is Analogously Descriptive’, in Max Charlesworth (ed.), The Problems of Religious Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974, in Religious Investigations Reader, Deakin University, Geelong, pp. 27-8.

⁴⁹ J.F. Ross ‘Analogy as a Rule of meaning for Religious Language’ in A. Kenny, op. cit, 1969, p. 138.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 31.

⁵² Charlesworth, op. cit, 1987, p. 25.

⁵³ Charlesworth, op. cit, 1972, p. 82.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Phillips, op. cit, 1976, p. 190.

⁵⁶ John R. Hinnells(ed) A Handbook of Living Religions Penguin, England, 1984, p. 212.

⁵⁷ Ayer, op. cit,1968, pp. 194-5.

⁵⁸ Kretzmann, op. cit, p. 19.