The concept of ‘religious experience’ is one that has historically suffered
from a high degree of ambiguity. We can attempt to understand the notion
of ‘Experience’ as referring to either a persons particular psychological
state or condition during an experience, or the object to which the experience
is concerned. This essay will critically evaluate the insights of three
scholars who have attempted to categorise that which constitutes a ‘religious
experience’ and the extent to which such an experience is contextually
determined, asking ‘which one could be the most right?’
Rudolf Otto.
Rudolf Otto’s thoughts on religious experience are best exemplified in his 1917 work, The Idea of the Holy. This work seeks to argue for a common element to all ‘religious experience’ regardless of which particular religion is followed.
Otto begins his thesis by suggesting that religion consists of both rational and non-rational elements. That is, a rational element is one that can be conceptualised under deducible categories of understanding, while the non-rational element cannot. The referent of any religion, that is, the Holy, can be understood as both a rational and non-rational object.
In an attempt to go above and beyond an ethical understanding of ‘holy’, Otto uses the Latin numen (meaning divine) to coin the term ‘numinous’. ‘Numinous’ is a term that can not be defined in other terms, as it is used as a base term in which all religious experiences are defined. It is a term that “cannot, strictly speaking be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes ‘of the spirit’ must be awakened.”
Otto, (assuming that his readers have had a numinous experience that can be evoked to enable them to continue in the discussion), goes on to define the basic ‘religious experience’ as the feeling that one is a dependent creature, arising from an object that is given and experienced outside of the self. Drawing from concepts of the wrath of God exhibited in the Old Testament, the numinous is described as an awe-inspiring, overpowering and mysterious, with a character that is energetic and dynamic.
Various problems exist within Otto’s work. He tends not to distinguish between our two basic senses of religious experience. His major claim revolves around the ‘numinous’ bringing an awareness of a religious object; that is, the Holy is the focus of the experience. However, at the same time, Otto describes the numinous in terms of psychological states, such as awe and a sense of mystery. The apparent result of this, is that both the psychological and object-directed senses must co-exist for an authentic religious experience to occur. If this is true, and we understand that object-related experiences can not be externally induced, then only non-induced (i.e. by drugs) theistic mysticism can constitute an authentic ‘religious experience’.
This search for a common theistic foundation appears to have necessitated a rethink in Otto’s apparent theistic definitions. Staal finds that while Otto may attempt to interpret ‘theism’ as being ‘non - personal’, and ‘theistic foundation’ as simply ‘towering over a theistic basis’, he has an underlying specific interpretation in mind. Coupled with his tendency to force one particular interpretation on wide ranging religious concepts (i.e. Sankara), it can be suggested that his emphasis on theism is a basic reflection on his own Christian Lutheran theism.
Here, Otto can come under criticism for weaving too much of his own religious background into the formation of the numinous. The numinous theory is strongly grounded in his Lutheran understanding of the wrath of Yahweh. The prophet Isaiah is often quoted as the classic numinous experience along with several other examples from the Judaic-Christian traditions. However, to argue concurrently that a genuinely religious experience requires an experience of the numinous, and that Christianity and Judaism (or at least Otto’s particular Christian tradition) are the best exponents of the numinous, is to propose that Christianity and Judaism are superior religions in both doctrinal and experiential terms. Such an argument can reduce Otto’s credibility in his search for a common essence to all religions.
Further, Otto’s phenomenological account of the numinous depends on certain philosophical presuppositions. Religion is understood as being above all natural processes, with the essence of religion being irreducible and unevolvable. It can not be clearly understood through reason and rational thought. For Otto, that which is at the centre of religion is, as a matter of fact, inexpressible.
Otto’s analysis, from which he argues that religious feelings are qualitatively unique, depends on a presupposition that those contents are in fact, unique. This presupposition comes from a philosophical theory that identifies two joint causes of ‘religious experience’; the ability to logically deduce religious understanding without a prior experience, and the ability to grasp from this understanding a unique non-rational object that can bring forth these religious feelings.
In the end, Otto’s search for a common ground in ‘religious experience’
does not come from a phenomenological search of various experiences, but
from a philosophically argued unity. To argue that such a wide variety
of experiences contain a unity within them, comes from philosophical presuppositions
that are strongly grounded in Friesian metaphysics.
R.C. Zaehner
While Otto argues from a philosophical viewpoint, Zaehner seeks to categorise religious experiences via the process of comparative religion. In his 1957 book Mysticism, Sacred and Profane, he argues against the possibility of a unitary form of religious experience, suggesting that there are three basic types of preternatural (or supernatural) religious experience; Nature mysticism, where the self is merged into a union with the wider natural dimensions of existence; Monistic mysticism, where the self experiences as unity with the absolute reality, and Theistic mysticism, were the self is united with God.
After identifying these three forms of experience, Zaehner seeks to find a value hierarchy in which to place these experiences. He argues that nature mysticism does not fall under the category of religious due to its ability to be explained as purely a naturalistic psychological phenomena, and citing the lack of moral and spiritual reverberations from such an experience. Theistic mysticism is presented as the highest from of mystical experience, while monistic mysticism is valued as a step below theistic mysticism.
One issue that has been highly debated is Zaehner’s claim that any drug induced mysticism is a significantly inferior form of experience that cannot be classed as a ‘religious’ experience. This claim is in severe contrast to the views proposed by writers such as Aldrous Huxley. Masters and Houston find that when this argument is carried to its logical extension, drugs can never induce those authentic theistic states of religious experience that Zaehner ranks as being optimum.
Masters and Houston further claim that Zaehner has ignored many long standing religious traditions (such as peyote rituals in the Native American Church) and suppressed evidence that supports the instigation of theistic mysticism through the use of drugs. Smith proposes three variable factors that will determine the ‘experience’ arising from an individuals drug usage; the drug, the psychological make-up of the participant, and the users social and physical environment. He finds that when these three factors are ‘right’, drug use can ‘induce religious experiences indistinguishable from experiences that occur spontaneously.’
A concern with much of Zaehner’s work relates to how he identifies whether or not a person has undergone a ‘religious experience’. His evidence is drawn solely from post-experiential testimonies that fail to account for any experience-interpretation distinctions. Smart finds that a general lack of concern with the philosophical problems involved with this relationship between ‘religious experience’ and interpretation has generally impaired the quality of Zaehner’s work. This stems in part from the western need to examine the ‘science of God’ as a ‘science of God-as-experienced’. The resultant phenomenology becomes highly dependent on statistical data which invariably suffers through incorrect implicit evaluations. Staal, while unable to satisfactorily resolve the philosophical problems related to the classification of ‘religious experience’ himself, further charges Zaehner with allowing his own Catholic biases to unduly influence his overly emotional interpretation of religious doctrine, continually drawing inaccurate generalisations.
Zaehner also receives criticism for not carrying his methodology to
its logical conclusion, thereby neglecting any diversity contained within
his categories (particularly that of monastic experience). Almond argues
for a recognition of the variety of experiences within all of Zaehner’s
three categories. A thorough examination of post-experimental interpretation
demonstrates the possibility of multiple varieties of ‘experience’ in both
monastic and theistic categories. Therefore, Zaehner's methodology unwillingly
pushes him towards a position that suggests that there are ‘as many different
types of mystical experience as there are paradigmatic expressions of them.’
Steven Katz.
Steven Katz approaches the issue of ‘religious experience’ as a philosopher concerned with the issues in the field of epistemology. That is, he seeks to understand ‘experience’ via understanding the methods and grounds of knowledge.
Katz begins with a single basic assumption that ‘There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences’, and argues that all experience is completely determined by pre-existing interpretive frameworks. From this, he moves on to demonstrate that ‘religious experiences’ are conditioned by factors such as the individuals pre-formed framework of ideas, beliefs, expectations and practices. If this is true, then one can only have an experience that is within their personal framework or context. No ‘new’ revelation can occur that is not firmly grounded in what already is. Any natural evolution of religion only becomes possible when new concepts manage to penetrate the individuals pre-formed framework.
Rejecting the phenomenological typologies used by Zaehner as being too reductive and inflexible ‘forcing multifarious and extremely variegated forms of mystical experience into improper categories which lose sight of the fundamentally important differences between the data studied’, Katz claims that the number of categories of experience is limited only by the number of interpretive frameworks or contexts in which such experiences take place.
Katz uses two epistemological theories in reaching this conclusion. The first states that that experience is ‘mediated or determined or constituted by the particular contexts, or frameworks, of the experiencing agent’. This position denies the possibility of comparing different ‘religious experiences’ from different contexts. The only method available of comparing contexts would to be to stand outside all contexts. The second theory, that states that ‘perceptions and experiences are shaped and influenced and conditioned by the interpretive framework we bring to them,’ acknowledges the validity of the process of comparative religion provided due attention is paid to the differences in interpretive frameworks and contexts.
Wainwright finds that there is no natural connection between a ‘mystical
experience’ being ‘pure’ or ‘unmediated’ and it being significantly determined
by the participants particular religious tradition. It can be suggested
that in fact a broad spectrum of experiences and underlying assumptions
collectively shape a person’s ‘religious experience’. It is further possible
that ‘non-religious experiences’ are capable of taking precedent over one’s
‘religious tradition’ in the formation of such experiences. Katz seems
to be working from an underlying assumption that it is only that which
could be called ‘religious’ has a place as the dominant contextualising
force in determining ‘religious experience’.
Which one is Right?
How can the ‘correctness’ of these models be assessed? Each writer approaches
the issue of ‘religious experience’ with a different method of analysis,
from a different cultural-religious worldview, and comes to a different
conclusion. It appears that two main factors affect the ‘validity’ or ‘correctness’
of these models; the effect of religious and social conditioning upon the
researcher, and the plausibility of those methodological assumptions employed
relating to the relationship between experience and interpretation.
When these two factors are met, then the model will survive scrutiny.
Otto’s model is often criticised for being strongly bias towards his Lutheran culture. However, one of the great strengths in Otto’s work is that, while working within the ‘nineteenth century tradition seeking the essence of religion’, he sought to enlarge the scope of the philosophy of religion beyond that phenomena which was closely aligned to the Judaeo-Christian culture of the time. He viewed the role of philosophy of religion as an investigation of the possibilities of any religious position, not just of a particular religion. It could be said that Otto’s research parallells the work of Immanuel Kant. While Kant sought a universal view of morality which he found as a sense of ‘duty’, Otto finds ‘The Holy’ as the universal element of religion.
At the same time, it must be understood that Otto’s aim was not to produce a philosophical treatise that proved the existence of the numinous, but an apology for the intuitive element involved in religious experience. The Idea of the Holy appears to be intended to assist those who have previously experienced ‘the Holy’ in understanding their experience. It conclusively describes one form of ‘religious experience’, but his analysis falls short in describing that which is common to all ‘religious experience’.
Otto’s methodology does contain some very strong points. It can be argued that primary concern for the search for ‘what is’ in part bypasses the problems inherent in the epistemological and phenomenological search for the ‘knowledge of what is. A ‘what is’ search deletes the need for implicit evaluations of a phenomena that Staal finds a major defect in phenomenology.
Zaehner’s work too, receives strong criticism for being overtly bias. The use of emotional and dogmatic terms suggest that his classifications simply reflect his own Catholic system of beliefs. While his work is strong in its interpretation of theistic mystics and the recognition of the diversity of mystical utterances, Zaehner loses credibility in his philosophical confusion between the nature of experience and interpretation, and his statistical methods. If anything, Zaehner offers a middle solution between the works of Otto and Katz. He stresses the variety of ‘religious experience’, but is only prepared to proceed so far in allowing a wide variety of ‘religious experience’, avoiding Katz’s pluralistic view of ‘religious experience’.
While it could not be said that Katz allows his work to be overtly influenced
by his own religious background, there seems an element of reaction against
the works of Otto, Zaehner and Stace. The argument that there are
virtually an unlimited number of different types of ‘religious experience’
sounds the most plausible option, though Katz seems to need radical epistemological
theories to make his point. The intellectual validity of comparative religion,
while being seriously challenged, is not completely discounted through
this thesis. Perhaps Katz’s radical nature is part of his cultural interpretative
framework through which he understands experience.
Conclusion.
The extent to which ‘religious experience’ can be categorised is highly debatable. Proposals vary between the existence of only one category of ‘religious experience’, and the existence of as many categories as there are incorporated interpretations of such ‘religious experiences’. The works of Otto, Zaehner and Katz represent various points along this spectrum of ideas. Likewise, the question of contextual determination can receive answers from ‘nil’ to ‘completely’. The fact that I approach these issues from a pluralistic society, pushes me towards the conclusions of Katz, but at the same time, my religious background suggests to me that Otto is onto something, even if his final conclusion is decidedly doubtful. Zaehner’s attempt at a middle ground inevitably fails due to his philosophical inadequacies concerning experience and interpretation and his failure to follow through with his methodology.