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NATO troops' advance into Kosovo had the potential to be hampered by serious difficulties in communications and the chain of command, according to a confidential Army report obtained by The Telegraph.
The document, by Brig Adrian Freer, the commander of Britain's 5 Brigade, the lead Nato formation in the advance to Pristina, says that there was "too great" a gap between tactical commanders on the ground such as himself and Kfor headquarters, with too much "improvisation" needed as a result. Some commanders found themselves doing different things from each other, the report says.
Referring to Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the commander of Kfor, the report says: "ComKfor's intent was not always transmitted with sufficient detail and co-ordinating instructions. Even when detail was requested from Kfor it was not always forthcoming. This led to improvisation at brigade level and a consequently asymmetric effect within Kfor as different brigades made their own interpretations."
Confusions also occurred through unclear divisions of responsibility between each Nato country's own national headquarters and alliance headquarters in Brussels. "The division of responsibilities between national and Nato operational chains of command took some time to become clear," says the report.
"Unfortunately, the delay in resolving Kfor direction within national guidelines meant that soldiers were frequently operating in something of a vacuum." In a "potentially dangerous" example of this, rules of engagement were not produced for days, the report says.
Brig Freer was in charge of the Parachute Regiment and Gurkha soldiers who were the first, apart from special forces, to enter Kosovo, on June 12. The report, prepared for the Ministry of Defence's comprehensive "lessons learnt" exercise on the Kosovo war, and copied to Gen Jackson, is unusually strong criticism of the command structures in the operation. Because there was little or no Serb opposition to the arrival of the Nato peacekeepers, the failings identified were not fatal.
Equipment available to the 5 Brigade soldiers was also inadequate, the report says: "Once again the brigade's paucity of suitable communications assets was exposed. Key capabilities had to be reinforced." Existing communications were unreliable and insecure. "It is the view of this headquarters that had the situation which prevailed on June 12 been anything less than benign, there would have been command, control and co-ordination difficulties which could not have been resolved by HQ Kfor," says Brig Freer.
The report supports recent testimony to the United States Congress by Gen Wesley Clark, Nato's overall commander during the Kosovo campaign. In July, Gen Clark told congressmen that the Alliance was "hamstrung by competing political and military interests that may have prolonged the conflict".
It adds to already compelling evidence that Nato's air campaign was hampered by similar failings. In July, The Telegraph reported that a confidential RAF inquiry had identified a serious lack of secure communications, accurate weapons and timely intelligence as reasons why so little apparent damage was done to Serb fielded forces in Kosovo.
Even last week, RAF chiefs admitted that they still had no idea exactly how much damage had been done. "We don't know how many tanks were destroyed and we will have no way of knowing," said Air Vice Marshal Jock Stirrup, the assistant chief of the air staff.