From Germany's Aims in the First World War by Fritz Fischer, 1967
The news of the outbreak of the Russian revolution reached Berlin in the middle of March [1917]. The belief at once obtained that the Russian state had been shaken to its foundations, and the most far-reaching hopes were entertained. A few weeks later (April 19) Ludendorff thought that Russia had been so weakened that he need no longer fear an offensive on that front and could readjust the balance of forces on the western front in Germany's favour by sending troops to it from the east.1 . . . Bethmann Hollweg, for his part, saw in the confusion prevailing in Russia primarily the political possibility of achieving the same end by promoting social and national revolution.At first these hopes were disappointed. On May 18 the new Lvov-Milyukov government . . . announced that it was carrying on the war at the side of the allies in conformity with the treaty obligations of the Tsarist government, and rejected the idea of a separate peace. . . .
1 See Werner Hahlweg, Lenin's Rückkehr nach Russland, 1917 (Leiden, 1957), p. 11.( page 364 )
. . . Brockdorff-Rantzau strongly advised the Wilhelmstrasse 'to create the greatest possible chaos in Russia', and especially to support the extremist elements, in Germany's own interest, 'because this would do the work more thoroughly and bring the conclusion sooner.'.
To this end, any outwardly discernible intervention in the course of the Russian revolution should be avoided. On the other hand, we should in my view do everything we can secretly to intensify the differences between the moderate and extremist parties, for it is very greatly in our interest that the latter should gain the upper hand, because the upheaval (Umwältzung) will then be inevitable and will assume shapes which must shatter the existence of the Russian Empire. . . . We should in all probability be able to count on disintegration proceeding far enough in about three months' time to guarantee that military intervention by us will bring about the collapse of Russian power.
Brockdorff-Rantzau accordingly advised letting Russia's power of resistance disintegrate through the advance of the revolution, without outside intervention . . .
Such being his ideas, it was only logical that Brockdorff-Rantzau should send his confidant and revolutionary expert, Parvus Helphand, to Berlin to propose personally to the Chancellor that Lenin should be helped to return to Russia from Switzerland. In Berlin, Helphand was supported by Erzberger and Baron Ago von Maltzau, of the Foreign Ministry.1 Although Helphand himself belonged to the right wing of the Social Democrats and disagreed with Lenin on questions of revolutionary principle, he believed that the Bolshevik leader, being a much 'wilder fellow' than the two Socialists in the Lvov government, Cheidse and Kerensky, would 'push the latter aside and be ready for peace without delay.'2
On April 5 Brockdorff-Rantzau gave Helphand an introduction to Zimmermann . . .
1 Epstein, Mathias Erzberger, pp. 168 f.
2 Hahlweg, op. cit., p. 14. [Etc.]The idea of sending the Russian revolutionaries home from Switzerland was not, however, Brockdorff-Rantzau's alone, nor did it derive exclusively from Helphand's interview with the Chancellor. As early as March 23 Romberg, in Berne, had reported that 'outstanding' Russian revolutionaries had been pressing to return to Russia since the outbreak of the February revolution and wanted to travel across Germany, and Zimmermann had consented in principle, subject to the agreement of the OHL* which arrived two days later. . . . The despatch of Lenin is to be regarded only as one move, if the most successful one, in Germany's policy of revolution, an integral part of her efforts to achieve her war aims through a separate peace [with Russia].
* Oberste Heeresleitung, I gather, or, the General Staff. (WPT).How strongly Germany was interested in Lenin's journey is shown by the fact that the German government at once accepted his conditions, with one unimportant exception ; it also agreed that he should be accompanied by a party of pro-Entente Mensheviks, even large than the Bolshevik group, so that the Bolsheviks should not be compromised as German agents.
Lenin was anxious to demonstrate his independence . . .
The co-operation between the German government and Lenin has been regarded as a German-Bolshevik plot.1 This is a political rather than a historical judgment, and one which reflects the standpoint of that 'democracy' which has been made an ideological objective of the enemies of the Central Powers by Wilson's welcome to the Russian revolution and his declaration of war on Germany. It was a policy of interests on both sides that brought monarchist Germany and the leaders of the Russian revolution into their short-lived co-operation. The German government was aiming, not simply at achieving any kind of peace, but at realising its definite and far-reaching objectives in the east. For this purpose the Germans needed Lenin, who had declared the question of peace to be central to his political plans and actions. But Lenin, on his side, used the interest of imperial Germany in him and his party to turn the Russian revolution . . . into a victory for the Bolshevik revolution as the first stage of a world revolution. . . . In spite of their reverses the Bolsheviks, like the separatist nationalities, enjoyed continuous support from Germany. Thus Zimmermann�s successor, Kühlmann, was able to write on December 3, looking back on the successful October Revolution :
It was only the resources which the Bolsheviks received regularly from our side, through various channels and on various pretexts, that enabled them to develop their chief organ Pravda, to carry on a lively agitation, and greatly to expand the originally narrow basis of their party.
This deliberate support of the radical revolutionaries shows how determined Germany was to persist in her war aims, however they had to be modified. . . .
1 S. T. Possony, Jahrhundert des Aufruhrs (Munich, 1956,), pp. 449 f.( pages 365 - 368 )
( setting slightly re-arranged )Fritz Fischer, Germany's aims in the First World War.
With introd. by Hajo Holborn and James Joll.
New York : Norton, 1967.